People v. Balion CA4/3

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Filed 12/13/24 P. v. Balion CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063195

v. (Super. Ct. No. 08CF2995)

JORGE ENRIQUE ESTRADA OPINION
BALION,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Michael A. Leversen, Judge. Affirmed.
Jorge Enrique Estrada Balion, in pro. per.; Paul R. Kraus, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Jorge Enrique Estrada Balion1 filed a petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.62 on his first degree murder
conviction. The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage.
We appointed counsel to represent Balion on appeal. Pursuant to
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, appointed counsel filed a brief
setting forth the facts of the case and, without arguing against his client,
stated he was unable to identify any arguable issues on appeal and asked us
to conduct an independent review of the entire record. Balion was given
notice and an opportunity to file a supplemental brief, and he did so.

Under People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pages 231 to 232,
the Court of Appeal may conduct an independent review of the record in the
exercise of its discretion, and we elect to do so. After fully examining counsel’s
brief and the entire record and considering the issues suggested by Balion, we
find no reasonably arguable issue on appeal and affirm.
DISCUSSION
Balion seeks to be resentenced under section 1172.6, which
allows “[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is

1
In the record, the defendant’s name sometimes appears as
Balion and, at other times, as Bailon. In our earlier nonpublished opinion
affirming Balion’s judgment in the original proceeding, we used the name
Bailon. (People v. Bailon (Aug. 2, 2011, G042849) [nonpub. opn.].) In this
opinion, we use Balion because defendant signed his resentencing petition
with that spelling.

2
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. The form
submitted by Balion on March 30, 2023, refers to section 1170.95. Effective
June 30, 2022, however, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95, without
change, to section 1172.6 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10) and we refer to the
statute as section 1172.6 throughout.

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imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime,
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
manslaughter [to] file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner
to have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
conviction vacated and to be resentenced . . . .” (Id., subd. (a).) As stated in
the statute, to be eligible for resentencing under section 1172.6, the petitioner
must have been convicted of murder under a theory of imputed malice.
Balion asserts he was tried under a theory of “murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine” and the trial court failed to
properly apply section 1172.6 in considering his petition for resentencing. As
the petitioner, Balion had the burden of making a prima facie case for relief,
i.e., showing he was tried under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972.) “At the prima facie
stage, a court must accept as true a petitioner’s allegation that he or she
could not currently be convicted of a homicide offense because of changes to
section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019, unless the allegation is
refuted by the record.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 463, italics
added.) We review de novo whether Balion met his burden. (People v. Ervin
(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.)
The record here conclusively refutes Balion’s contention that he
was tried under a natural and probable consequences theory. The jury was
not instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine as to the
murder charge, so Balion is not eligible for relief. (People v. Coley (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 539, 548; see People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 599 [“if
the jury did not receive an instruction on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, the jury could not have convicted the defendant on
that basis, and the petition should be summarily denied”].)

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Rather, the jury was instructed Balion could only be guilty of
murder if he either directly committed the crime or aided and abetted the
perpetrator who committed the crime (CALCRIM No. 400) and that to find
Balion guilty of murder on an aiding and abetting theory, the People had to
prove: (1) a perpetrator committed the murder; (2) Balion knew the
perpetrator intended to commit the murder; (3) either before or during the
murder, Balion intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the
murder; and (4) Balion’s words or conduct actually aided and abetting the
perpetrator in committing the murder (CALCRIM No. 401). Under these
instructions, the jury found Balion guilty of first degree murder, i.e., that
Balion acted with the intent to kill. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
710.)
The jury also found true the special circumstance allegation that
Balion committed the murder for a criminal street gang purpose. (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(22).) In connection with the special circumstance allegation, the jury
was instructed as follows: “If you decide that (the) defendant is guilty of first
degree murder but was not the actual killer, then, when you consider the
special circumstance of Murder Committed for Criminal Street Gang
Purpose, you must also decide whether the defendant acted with the intent to
kill. [¶] In order to prove [this] special circumstance for a defendant who is
not the actual killer but who is guilty of first degree murder as an aider and
abettor, the People must prove that the defendant acted with the intent to
kill. [¶] The People do not have to prove that the actual killer acted with the
intent to kill in order for (this) special circumstance to be true. . . . If you
decide that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder, but you cannot
agree whether the defendant was the actual killer, then, in order to find (this)
special circumstance true, you must find that the defendant acted with the

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intent to kill. [¶] If the defendant was not the actual killer, then the People
have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with the
intent to kill for the special circumstance to be true. If the People have not
met this burden, you must find this special circumstance has not been proved
true.” (CALCRIM No. 702, italics added.) In finding the special circumstance
true, the jury found Balion acted with the intent to kill.
In sum, Balion was not found guilty under a theory of felony
murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory
of imputed malice.
Balion raises three additional issues in his supplemental brief, all
of which assert errors in the underlying criminal proceeding.3 A petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6 is not an opportunity to challenge the
original conviction on grounds other than section 1172.6. (See People v.
Hernandez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1122 [“the limited jurisdiction
afforded by section 1172.6 does not provide the trial court broad jurisdiction
to correct alleged errors in the original judgment on alternative grounds”];
People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947 [a section 1172.6 petition
“does not afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial
error”].) Accordingly, Balion’s arguments do not raise a reasonably arguable
issue on appeal.
In sum, Balion’s assertion that he could not be convicted of first
degree murder because of changes to section 188 or 189 “is refuted by the

3
Balion argues: (1) his conviction should be overturned for
evidentiary errors; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel
failed to request a jury instruction directing the jury to “view an informant’s
out-of-court statement with caution” and failed to move for a mistrial; and (3)
the trial court erred in its application of the firearm enhancement.

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record” (People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463), and the trial court did
not err in denying his petition at the prima facie stage.

DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying Balion’s petition for
resentencing is affirmed.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

SANCHEZ, J.

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