CourtListener 10292381•Cooke v. Tayac CA1/4
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Filed 12/12/24 Cooke v. Tayac CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
PHILIP COOKE,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A170044
v.
ROBERT TAYAC et al., (City & County of San Francisco
Defendants and Respondents. Super. Ct. No. CGC-21-594052)
Robert Tayac and Eric Parton (collectively, respondents) moved in the
trial court for sanctions against Andrew Peterson and his counsel, Martin
Glickfeld, for failing to comply with discovery obligations. Peterson is a co-
defendant with Philip Cooke in an action filed in Contra Costa County that
was ordered consolidated with the action underlying this appeal.
Respondents’ motion was filed after the discovery cutoff date and the formal
close of discovery. The trial court granted respondents’ motion for sanctions
in part, awarding them $6,075 in fees relating to their motion to compel
Peterson to produce his text messages with Parton, and later a declaration
confirming he had produced all such text messages.
Glickfeld appeals from that order. Relying on Pelton-Shepherd
Industries, Inc. v. Delta Packaging Products, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th
1568 (Pelton-Shepherd), he argues that reversal is required because
respondents’ motion was untimely and they prejudicially failed to request
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leave to file the untimely motion consistent with Code of Civil Procedure
sections 2024.020 and 2024.050.1 Respondents counter that the trial court’s
“fact-specific analysis,” and resulting order, were not an abuse of discretion.
We note at the outset that we could deem Glickfeld’s claims of error
forfeited given the paucity of citations to the record in his opening brief. The
record in this appeal is relatively short given the narrow issue presented, but
counsel always has an obligation to support every factual assertion with
adequate citation. While we exercise our discretion under the circumstances
to entertain Glickfeld’s arguments based on the facts in the record, we
caution him that his brief falls significantly below expected standards in this
respect. At the same time, we observe that respondents’ brief also fails to
meet expected standards because it is conclusory. It does not meaningfully
address Glickfeld’s principal argument—that the sanctions motion was
impermissibly heard beyond the statutory deadline—nor does it properly
develop any legal or factual argument in support of the trial court’s decision.
We conclude that the sanctions award should be reversed because
respondents’ motion was untimely and there is a reasonable probability that
Glickfeld would have achieved a more favorable result had respondents filed
a timely motion or complied with the procedure for hearing a discovery
motion beyond the deadline.
BACKGROUND
Cooke initiated this action by filing a complaint against respondents
arising from a series of financial and real estate transactions that went awry.
Tayac represented Parton in the Contra Costa County action; Cooke and
Peterson were named as defendants there. In this action, the initial trial
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2
date was set for September 25, 2023. In May 2023, the trial court granted
Cooke’s motion to transfer and consolidate the Contra Costa County case
with this action, with the consolidation order entered on August 7, 2023.
On August 24, 2023, respondents filed a motion to compel production of
various discovery documents following Peterson’s August 14, 2023 deposition.
Respondents simultaneously filed an ex parte motion to shorten time,
apparently to ensure the motion to compel would be heard by the
September 11, 2023 discovery hearing cutoff date.2 On September 25, the
trial court continued the trial to November 13, 2023. Over Cooke’s
opposition, and following hearing and negotiations between the parties, the
trial court granted the motion to compel on September 26, 2023, and entered
a stipulated order reflecting the parties’ negotiated resolution of the dispute.
It ordered Peterson to submit to a second two-hour deposition regarding his
text messages with Parton and to provide a declaration confirming he had
produced all relevant text messages between himself and Parton. Peterson
had already submitted to the deposition on September 20, 2023, but did not
provide the declaration as ordered.
On November 13, the trial court continued the trial to March 2024.
Respondents objected to the trial court’s suggestion to link the discovery
dates to the new trial date, and the court ordered discovery closed. The next
day, respondents filed a motion for sanctions, seeking $14,035.50 in fees
associated with the sanctions motion and their earlier motion to compel.
Peterson provided his declaration on November 30.
2 With the initial trial date set for September 25, 2023, any discovery
motion had to be heard no later than September 10, 2023. (§ 2024.020,
subd. (a).) September 10 was a Sunday, so the cutoff date for any discovery
hearing rolled to the next court day, September 11, 2023. (§ 2016.060.)
3
The court granted respondents’ motion for sanctions in part. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated that it was adopting its
tentative ruling. In a short order entered after the hearing, the court cited
good cause and granted relief “as to the original motion and as to [the motion
for sanctions] to the extent it involved addressing [Peterson’s] failure to
comply with the Court’s [September 26] order on the original motion.” The
court awarded $6,075 in sanctions to respondents, for 15 hours of attorney
time.3
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Background and Standard of Review
Section 2024.020, subdivision (a) states that “any party shall be
entitled as a matter of right to complete discovery proceedings on or before
the 30th day, and to have motions concerning discovery heard on or before
the 15th day, before the date initially set for the trial of the action.”
Subdivision (b) provides that, “[e]xcept as provided in Section 2024.050, a
continuance or postponement of the trial date does not operate to reopen
discovery proceedings.”
Notwithstanding section 2024.020’s requirements, section 2024.050,
subdivision (a) permits, “[o]n motion of any party, the court [to] grant leave
. . . to have a motion concerning discovery heard . . . closer to the initial trial
date, or to reopen discovery after a new trial date has been set. This motion
shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under
Section 2016.040.” In considering a motion pursuant to subdivision (a),
subdivision (b) of section 2024.050 requires the court to “take into
3 The order states the amount awarded is for 14 hours of attorney time,
but the court’s calculations make clear that it intended to award sanctions
based on 15 hours of attorney time.
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consideration any matter relevant to the leave requested, including, but not
limited to,” certain enumerated factors. (§ 2024.050, subd. (b).)
We review the court’s ruling imposing discovery sanctions for abuse of
discretion. (In re Marriage of Moore (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1275, 1287.) We
reverse such a ruling only if the trial court’s imposition of sanctions was
“ ‘ “ ‘arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘Action that
transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the
scope of discretion and we call such action an “abuse” of discretion.’ ” (Pelton-
Shepherd, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1587.)
II. Timeliness
Glickfeld argues that, once respondents asked the court to close
discovery and not to reset trial dates, they “could no longer make any
discovery motion without complying with . . . section 2024.050.” Under that
provision, respondents had to seek leave of court to file the motion for
sanctions, and to meet and confer and file a corresponding declaration
pursuant to section 2016.040.4
Respondents do not argue that the motion for sanctions was timely
under section 2024.020. Notwithstanding the statutory requirements,
respondents urge us to review the trial court’s “fact-specific analysis,” citing
London v. Dri-Honing Corp. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 999 (London). But
4 Glickfeld’s opening brief took it for granted that the sanctions motion
was a “motion concerning discovery” within the meaning of section 2024.050,
and respondents did not argue otherwise in their brief. When we raised the
issue at oral argument, respondents emphasized that they did not concede
that the motion satisfied the statutory definition, but both sides appeared to
agree that the aim of the motion was in part to obtain production of
Peterson’s declaration, which was required by the stipulated order on the
motion to compel. On this basis, and given the absence of briefing, we adopt
the parties’ implicit assumption that the sanctions motion qualified as a
“motion concerning discovery.”
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London did not address the timeliness question at issue here. The cited
portion of London merely stands for the proposition that a party may choose
whether to include a motion for sanctions with a motion to compel discovery,
and if the party chooses to file a separate sanctions motion, the court may
then engage in a “fact-specific analysis” to evaluate whether the sanctions
motion was filed within a reasonable time after the motion to compel. (Id. at
pp. 1008–1009.) This case, unlike London, hinges on the discovery cutoff set
forth in section 2024.020 and related requirements for hearing a late
discovery motion. (See §§ 2016.040, 2024.050.) As to those issues, Pelton-
Shepherd controls. Specifically, Pelton-Shepherd reinforced a plain-meaning
reading of sections 2024.020 and 2024.050, concluding that the discovery
motion cutoff established a hard deadline; that after the cutoff a motion for
leave to file a late discovery motion was necessary; and—absent a motion for
leave, equitable estoppel, or another exception—a trial court abuses its
discretion in considering a late discovery motion. (Pelton-Shepherd, supra,
165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1585–1588.)
Respondents write that “Appellant may have waived the issue to the
extent Appellant failed to timely and specifically object to the Superior Court
hearing and deciding this issue at the hearing of this matter.” This
ambiguous sentence stops well short of a claim that Glickfeld failed to do
something at the hearing necessary to preserve the issue for appeal. We also
note that Glickfeld’s argument before the trial court began with this
sentence: “Well, in my view, there is or should be no dispute that the motion
before you is untimely.”
Respondents do not offer any further argument countering Glickfeld’s
showing that the sanctions motion was untimely and that the trial court
abused its discretion by not requiring respondents to use the statutory
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procedure for entertaining a discovery motion past the deadline. The
introductory paragraph in respondents’ brief includes the following
statements: “Matters not addressed in Respondent’s Brief are not conceded.
Rather, they are believed to be not relevant or not supported by the record.”
This blanket assertion is not sufficient to avoid forfeiture of any further
possible arguments.
Pelton-Shepherd allowed for the possibility that the non-moving party
may be equitably estopped from objecting to the court hearing a discovery
motion past the deadline when it engaged in conduct that lulled the moving
party into inaction. (Pelton-Shepherd, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1585–
1586.) The trial court’s order is silent about equitable estoppel, but in any
event, Glickfeld’s opening brief argued that there are no facts warranting
application of the doctrine here, and respondents’ brief offered no argument
to the contrary. Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its discretion
by hearing the sanctions motion beyond the deadline without requiring
respondents to satisfy the statutory requirements for a late motion.
III. Prejudice
Glickfeld also argues that the trial court’s error was prejudicial.
Respondents have not presented any argument regarding prejudice.
We conclude that a result more favorable to Glickfeld was reasonably
probable had respondents either filed a timely motion for sanctions or
followed the procedures required by section 2024.050. (Pelton-Shepherd,
supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1589.) Had respondents filed their motion for
sanctions by the discovery cutoff, they would have had to file it
simultaneously with their August 24 motion to compel. It is likely that
respondents would have found some efficiencies in filing a single, combined
motion, reducing the amount of compensable attorney work time spent on the
motion. If, instead, respondents had requested leave to reopen discovery in
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conjunction with their November 14 motion for sanctions, the trial court
would probably have viewed their request skeptically. The day before,
respondents had objected to any extension of discovery deadlines. Had they
sought leave to reopen discovery, they would also have been required to meet
and confer with Glickfeld and Peterson beforehand. Glickfeld argues that his
failure to produce the Peterson declaration was inadvertent and he would
have produced it had respondents met and conferred with him prior to filing
the motion for sanctions. At any meet and confer, Glickfeld and Peterson
would undoubtedly have pointed out that respondents had just agreed to
discovery closing and therefore may have forfeited their ability to seek
sanctions. That would have placed Peterson and Glickfeld at an advantage in
any negotiated resolution arising from the meet and confer.
At the very least, some of the factors enumerated in section 2024.050—
in addition to the court’s consideration of respondents’ overnight change in
position—would weigh against the reopening of discovery in these
circumstances. (§ 2024.050, subds. (b)(2) [“The diligence or lack of diligence
of the party seeking the discovery or the hearing of a discovery motion, and
the reasons that the discovery was not completed or that the discovery
motion was not heard earlier”], (b)(4) [“The length of time that has elapsed
between any date previously set, and the date presently set, for the trial of
the action”].) And although the trial court did not award the full amount of
requested sanctions, it does not appear from the record that the reduction
had anything to do with respondents’ failure to comply with
sections 2024.020 and 2024.050, and consequently that the reduced
$6,075 award already accounted for respondents’ faulty procedural approach.
IV. Sanctions Award
Because the trial court erred in granting respondents’ motion, we do
not address the propriety of the sanctions amount.
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DISPOSITION
The order awarding sanctions is vacated. Glickfeld is entitled to
recover his costs on appeal.
GOLDMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
STREETER, J.
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