In re J.M. CA2/2

CourtListener 10292301Calctapp12 de dez. de 2024

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Filed 12/12/24 In re J.M. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re J.M., a Person Coming B337319
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
24CCJP00365A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.O.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Stephen C. Marpet, Judge Pro Tempore, and
Cristina Gutierrez Legaspi, Judge. Affirmed.
Tracy M. De Soto, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________________________

In this juvenile dependency appeal, A.O. (mother)
challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding and
disposition order continuing dependency jurisdiction over her
young son, J.M. (son). We conclude both substantial evidence
supports the court’s jurisdictional finding and the juvenile court
did not abuse its discretion in continuing its jurisdiction at the
disposition hearing. Thus, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
1. The Family and Events Preceding the Petition
Son’s father (father) and mother were married in 2019. In
2021, after son was born, they separated and, when the
underlying proceedings began, were in the process of divorcing.
Mother and father do not have an amicable relationship. In 2021
or 2022, mother obtained a criminal restraining order protecting
her from father due to domestic violence incidents. Mother was
son’s primary caregiver. Mother believed father abused drugs
and alcohol. Mother said she did not use drugs and did not have
mental health issues.
Because of the restraining order against him, father had
not been in contact with mother or son for years. Father did not
know if mother had mental health issues, but noted sometimes
mother “is happy and then she ‘loses her shit.’ ” Father stated

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that at times when they were together, mother was “ ‘delusional
and convinced that I was cheating on her.’ ” Father explained
mother got angry and “ ‘would not listen to reason’ ” and could
“ ‘not let it go.’ ” Father stated, although he was not innocent, the
domestic violence between him and mother included mother
scratching and hitting him. Father said mother randomly would
scratch him and he did not know why. Father’s mother (paternal
grandmother) similarly reported mother “ ‘was always accusing
[father] of having sex with all these women’ ” and “ ‘was very
suspicious of things.’ ” Paternal grandmother said mother
“ ‘could flip on a dime. Her mood just flips for no reason. She’ll
[b]e fine one minute and then boom. She’s walking out the
door.’ ” Paternal grandmother noted, “The way [mother] can flip
like that does worry me” and “I think something is off.”
In 2019, mother’s teenaged nephew, Marvin M. (Marvin),
and niece, Ana M. (Ana), moved in with mother. They lived with
mother for a few years until their father (maternal uncle) arrived
in the United States in late 2021, at which time they moved in
with their father. While Marvin and Ana lived with mother, she
cared for and treated them like her own children. Although
Marvin and Ana eventually lived with their father, who assumed
all parental roles, mother remained their legal guardian for
immigration purposes.
Son was born while Marvin and Ana were living with
mother. From time to time, Marvin babysat son. On a few
occasions after Marvin babysat son, mother noticed an abnormal
rash on son’s buttocks. Mother suspected Marvin sexually
abused son. Mother told Marvin of her suspicions, but Marvin
denied her allegations. Once, mother secretly recorded Marvin
while he babysat son, but mother saw nothing suspicious.

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Despite her suspicions of sexual abuse, mother neither called the
police nor took son to be examined by a doctor.
In October 2023, at mother’s request, Marvin agreed to
babysit son. Mother picked up Marvin and brought him to her
house. Once there, it was apparent mother did not need Marvin
to babysit as son was not present. Instead, mother told Marvin
she wanted to make a TikTok video and zip-tied him to a chair.
Mother then interrogated Marvin, accused him of sexually
abusing son, and would not free him from the chair. Eventually,
Marvin told mother he had been videotaping her with his phone,
and mother let him go or Marvin was able to break free. Marvin
went outside and called law enforcement. The zip ties had made
red marks on his wrists and ankles. Mother was arrested but no
charges were brought because mother was a “first-time offender.”
Marvin denied sexually abusing son. He was shocked at
what mother had done to him. Mother had never done anything
like that before. Both Marvin and Ana reported mother had
always been “kind and loving.” They had never seen mother act
inappropriately toward son or abuse alcohol or drugs. Others,
including maternal uncle and a maternal aunt, echoed similar
sentiments about mother. However, maternal uncle stated
mother “has a difficult personality and has always been loud and
difficult to deal with.” Father said he never saw mother mistreat
son, Marvin, or Ana. No one expressed concern about mother’s
ability to parent son. Nonetheless, Marvin and Ana no longer
wanted contact with mother.
In November 2023, son underwent a forensic medical exam.
Mother reported she had never seen blood in son’s pants or
diapers. Son denied having any pain in his buttocks. The
forensic report stated son’s exam “was a Normal exam,” which

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could “neither confirm nor negate sexual abuse.” Father did not
know whether son had been sexually abused, but he tended to
believe the social workers and doctors who said son had not been
sexually abused over what mother believed. Father stated
mother “was extremely overprotective with” son and was “very
impulsive.”
Although eventually mother recognized her treatment of
Marvin was wrong, she continued to believe son had been
sexually abused. Mother felt no one cared about her concerns.
Nonetheless, mother was remorseful and willing to accept and
comply with recommended services.
2. Petition
In February 2024, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (Department) filed a Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300 petition on behalf of son (petition).1
The petition alleged two identical counts, one brought under
subdivision (a), the other brought under subdivision (b)(1). The
two counts alleged son was at risk because mother physically
abused Marvin, for which mother was arrested. Father was not
named in the petition.2
At the initial hearing on the petition, the juvenile court
detained son from father and released son to mother under
Department supervision. The court ordered the Department to

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 The Department first filed a section 300 petition on behalf
of son in December 2023. However, that case was assigned an
incorrect case number and, therefore, the Department asked that
it be dismissed, allowing the Department to file the petition at
issue here.

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assist mother with family maintenance services and to make both
announced and unannounced visits to confirm son’s well-being
and mother’s compliance with court orders. Father was granted
unmonitored day visits with son.
Prior to adjudication, a Department social worker spoke
further with mother. She reiterated that she was remorseful for
what she had done to Marvin, stating “ ‘that was the biggest
mistake of my life.’ ” However, mother described what had
happened with Marvin a little differently. She said she never
tied Marvin to a chair, but instead she zip-tied his wrists and
ankles while he was standing. She said Marvin rubbed his wrists
against a wall and believed that was how he injured his wrists.
She reported she used scissors to cut the zip ties when Marvin
was at the wall and she realized he wanted to get out of them.
She denied holding him hostage. The social worker observed son
to be bonded with mother and well-behaved.
3. Adjudication and Disposition
The adjudication hearing was held on March 11, 2024.
Counsel for the Department and son both noted that, for the most
part, the facts were undisputed. Counsel for the Department
emphasized that, at the time mother tied up Marvin, she was his
legal guardian and, following that incident, had not shown much,
if any, concern for Marvin. Counsel for the Department and son
both argued the court should sustain the petition. On the other
hand, counsel for mother urged the court to dismiss the petition.
Although mother’s attorney agreed mother was wrong to restrain
Marvin, she did not believe mother’s actions put son at any risk
of harm. Mother’s counsel noted not only was mother remorseful
for her actions toward Marvin, but her abusive conduct toward

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Marvin was an isolated incident. All reports were that mother
was caring, nurturing, and overprotective of son.
After hearing argument, the juvenile court dismissed the
subdivision (a) count and sustained the subdivision (b)(1) count.
The court noted mother had planned her abusive actions toward
Marvin, “[T]his didn’t just happen. It happened over a period of
time.” The court declared son a dependent of the court under
subdivision (b) of section 300 and ordered him to remain released
to mother under Department supervision. The court granted
father monitored visits with son, but a few days later changed
father’s visits to unmonitored.
In an April 2024 report for the court, the Department noted
mother had completed anger management, parenting education,
and co-parenting/divorce classes.3 However, mother believed
individual counseling was unnecessary and had not participated
in any. The Department also reported mother did not agree with
son having overnight visits with father, which son had done twice
without incident. A Department social worker stated she had “no
child safety concerns at this time and that her only concern is the
parents being unable to get along and co-parent.”
The disposition hearing was held on May 1, 2024. Counsel
for the Department noted although father was nonoffending, he
had been a noncustodial parent and did not have a history with
son. Therefore, the Department requested that son be placed
with mother. Counsel for the Department also urged the court to
order further anger management classes for mother, as well as
individual counseling. Counsel for son was amenable to the court

3 Later, at the disposition hearing, counsel for the
Department stated the parenting and anger management courses
mother completed were not Department-approved courses.

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placing son with both parents so long as the Department could
assist mother and father in developing “a custody arrangement
that goes to a step up basis” given father’s lack of history with
son. Counsel for mother asked the court to terminate its
jurisdiction with a custody order granting mother “full physical
and full legal custody.” Counsel noted mother had kept son safe
and already had completed several courses. In the alternative,
counsel requested placement with mother. Mother’s attorney
argued mother had completed sufficient courses prior to
disposition and, other than further parenting classes, additional
services were unnecessary. Counsel for father asked the court to
place son with both parents.
After hearing argument, the juvenile court declared son a
dependent of the court. Over the Department’s and mother’s
objections, and noting father was nonoffending, the court ordered
son released to both mother and father under Department
supervision. Mother and father were ordered to develop a shared
custody agreement and to participate in family maintenance
services. The court ordered mother to enroll in individual
counseling as well as anger management and “high conflict”
parenting classes.
Mother appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Jurisdiction
a. Applicable Law
In this case, the juvenile court exercised its jurisdiction
under subdivision (b) of section 300. Under that subdivision, a
juvenile court may assert dependency jurisdiction over a child
when, among other things, “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm

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or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] (A) The failure or inability of the
child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the
child.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).)
“[S]ection 300 does not require that a child actually be
abused or neglected before the juvenile court can assume
jurisdiction.” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “The
legislatively declared purpose of these provisions ‘is to provide
maximum safety and protection for children who are currently
being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being
neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection,
and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk
of that harm.’ (§ 300.2, italics added.) ‘The court need not wait
until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction
and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’ ” (In re I.J.,
supra, at p. 773.) “ ‘The purpose of dependency proceedings is to
prevent risk, not ignore it.’ ” (Jonathan L. v. Superior Court
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1104.)
b. Standard of Review
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for
substantial evidence. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
“ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we
determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note
that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are

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sufficient facts to support the findings [and disposition order] of
the trial court.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In determining whether substantial
evidence exists such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
order challenged on appeal is appropriate, we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the challenged order. (Ibid.)
“Substantial evidence is evidence that is ‘reasonable,
credible, and of solid value’; such that a reasonable trier of fact
could make such findings.” (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th
187, 199.) Substantial evidence “ ‘is not synonymous with any
evidence. [Citations.] A decision supported by a mere scintilla of
evidence need not be affirmed on appeal.’ ” (In re Yolanda L.
(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992.)
c. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional finding.
Mother argues substantial evidence does not support the
juvenile court’s finding that son was at substantial risk of serious
physical harm due to mother’s actions against Marvin. We
disagree.
Although mother was described as a doting parent both to
son as well as to Marvin and Ana, she also was described as, at
times, “ ‘delusional’ ” and able to “ ‘flip on a dime.’ ” Moreover,
mother’s recent conduct toward Marvin was unquestionably
abusive, irrational, and bizarre. Although on appeal mother
argues that, in luring Marvin to her home, tying him up, and
berating him about sexually abusing son, she was “attempting to
protect” son; we do not see it that way. While mother adamantly
believed son was being sexually abused, she took no protective
measures, such as alerting law enforcement or taking son to be
examined and cared for by a doctor or other professional. Rather,
mother continued to leave son with the very person she believed

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was abusing him. Ultimately, mother was arrested for
attempting forcefully to extract a confession from the alleged
abuser. Regardless of mother’s intentions, these are not the
actions of a rational or protective parent.
We also do not agree with mother’s assessment that her
abusive conduct toward Marvin was simply a lapse of judgment
for which she was remorseful. Although mother appeared to
regret her actions and expressed remorse, her conduct was not a
“mere lapse in judgment.” Not only had mother preplanned her
physically abusive questioning of Marvin, but her actions toward
Marvin were the culmination of her obsessive belief that for some
time Marvin had been sexually abusing son. Her conduct also
lent support to the descriptions of mother as very suspicious and
at times unable to listen to reason.
In effect, mother asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we
cannot do. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) We conclude
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
finding.
Mother relies on In re G.Z. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 857. In
that case, the minor child had subdural hematomas, the
existence of which the mother could not explain. (Id. at pp. 869,
877.) Doctors were unsure of the cause of the internal bleeding,
but opined the child had congenital conditions that may have
caused the bleeding. (Id. at pp. 871–873, 877–878.) There was
no evidence the hematomas were caused by abuse or neglect by
anyone, let alone the mother. (Id. at p. 877.) On appeal, the
court reversed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding against
the mother, concluding there was no evidence, let alone
substantial evidence, that the child was at risk of harm as a
result of neglect, abuse, or nonaccidental trauma. (Id. at p. 883.)

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We find In re G.Z., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th 857, factually distinct
and, therefore, unpersuasive. In contrast to that case, here,
mother took definitive steps to harm Marvin, took no rational
steps to protect son from what she believed was real sexual
abuse, and people who knew mother said she could be delusional
at times and something about her seemed “off.”
2. Continuation of Dependency Jurisdiction
a. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Once a child is declared a dependent of the court under
section 300, the juvenile court has wide discretion to make “any
and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody,
conduct, maintenance, and support of the child.” (§ 362,
subd. (a).) Although at the conclusion of the disposition hearing,
the juvenile court can terminate jurisdiction, that is not the
norm. (In re Destiny D. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 197, 211.) Rather,
“it will be an unusual case when protections imposed at
disposition will be sufficient to permit the conclusion that
termination is appropriate. It will be rarer still for a juvenile
court to reach that conclusion when the parent with whom the
child remains has been found to be an offending parent.” (Ibid.)
“Jurisdiction should not be terminated unless the court concludes
services and ongoing supervision are not necessary to protect the
child.” (Ibid.)
We review the court’s dispositional order for abuse of
discretion. (In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 851.) “ ‘ “The
appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court
exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can
reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no
authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ”
(In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.)

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b. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.
Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion
when, at the disposition hearing, it continued its jurisdiction and
supervision. Again, we disagree.
The facts that support jurisdiction similarly support the
juvenile court’s decision to continue its jurisdiction over son.
Additionally, although as mother points out, by the time of the
disposition hearing she had completed several courses, those
courses were not Department-approved. Thus, while mother’s
efforts certainly were commendable, unfortunately neither the
Department nor the court could determine the value of the
courses she took. Moreover, mother never enrolled in individual
counseling and indeed believed that was unnecessary. On
appeal, mother makes much of the fact the juvenile court never
removed son from mother. Although true, the logical conclusion
is not that son required no court supervision. Rather, the court
kept son with mother because of court supervision. Thus,
although mother appeared to be on the right track and was
making progress, it was reasonable for the court to continue its
jurisdiction at the disposition hearing. We find no abuse of
discretion.

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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding and dispositional
order are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

RICHARDSON, J.

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