CourtListener 10291937•In re S.M. CA2/6
Texto completo
Filed 12/11/24 In re S.M. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re S.M., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B337594
Under the Juvenile Court (Super. Ct. No. 22JV00175-C)
Law. (Santa Barbara County)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
S.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
In a petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code section 602,1 S.M. was charged with murder (Pen. Code, §
187, subd. (a)), and possession of a concealed firearm by an active
gang member (Pen. Code, § 25400(a)(2)). He was 17 years old at
All statutory references are to the Welfare and
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Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
the time of the offense. After a hearing, the juvenile court
ordered appellant transferred to the superior court. (§ 707, subd.
(a).) Appellant contends the order is not supported by substantial
evidence. We affirm.
Factual Predicate
In February 2022, appellant and fellow gang member,
Jorge Tafoya, attempted to rob Maurilio De La Cruz as he rode
his bicycle down the street. An argument ensued and seconds
later, four gunshots were heard. Lompoc police officers
responded to the scene and found De La Cruz face down on the
sidewalk in a pool of blood. He had been shot three times. Two of
the shots were fatal. De La Cruz was taken to the hospital where
he died from his injuries. Surveillance video taken from the area
captured much of the incident but not the actual shooting.
Appellant later made admissions about the shooting and the
gang-related motive on social media.
Section 602 Petition
In October 2022, the People filed a petition alleging that
appellant committed murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd., (a)(1),
count 1), with the special allegations that he personally used a
firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.5, subd. (a)), a principal intentionally
discharged a firearm causing death (Pen. Code, § 12022.53,
subds. (d), (e)(1)), and the crime was committed while appellant
was engaged in street terrorism (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subds.
(b)(1)(C), (b)(5)). The petition also alleged that appellant carried
a concealed firearm while an active participant in a criminal
street gang. (Pen. Code, § 25400, subds. (a)(2), (c)(3), count 2.)
The People filed a motion to transfer appellant to adult
criminal court. Probation filed two reports, including a
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supplemental report, in support of transfer. After extensive
briefing, the juvenile court conducted the transfer hearing.
Appellant’s Family and Social History
Appellant’s mother suffered from drug addiction and
relinquished her parental rights to him when he was very young.
He was placed in the care of his great aunt where he experienced
general neglect, housing, and food insecurity. Appellant
reestablished contact with his mother at age 11 and again at age
15. After appellant’s mother abandoned him at a motel, he went
to stay with his father, whom he had only recently met at age 16.
He struggled with the “structure” imposed by his father’s rules
and rebelled. He returned to his great aunt’s house and
continued his association with the F Street gang.
Appellant was diagnosed with a learning disability and had
an individualized education plan (IEP). He was also diagnosed
with cannabis use disorder, oppositional defiant disorder,
insomnia, and was significantly underweight.
Due to the lack of positive and consistent adult figures in
his life, appellant “ingratiated” himself with gang members
where he gained recognition and acceptance.
Appellant’s Conduct in Custody
Appellant has been detained at the juvenile detention
center since October 2022. Since that time, he has received 54
disciplinary write-ups for behavior ranging from cursing in class
to gang-related violence. He has participated in social and
rehabilitation programming, earned his high school diploma,
received mental health and substance abuse treatment, and
participated weekly in individual therapy. Appellant was
enrolled in an online college class but was dropped after he
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violated the computer-use policy by accessing social media and
posting gang-related content.
In December 2023, appellant began to self-isolate and
refused to participate in programming, due in part to conflicts
with rival gang members.
Transfer Hearing
Sergeant Brian Guerra, a gang detective with the Lompoc
Police Department, investigated the murder of De La Cruz and
testified on behalf of the People. Sergeant Guerra was familiar
with the F Street criminal street gang and appellant, who went
by the moniker, “Sporty.” Sergeant Guerra interviewed two F
Street gang members who were with appellant and Tafoya the
night of the murder.
According to the witnesses, their plan was to be more active
and commit crimes for F Street. Appellant and Tafoya confronted
the victim and tried to rob him. One of the witnesses heard
arguing and saw Tafoya pull out a gun and shoot the victim.
After the shooting, appellant and Tafoya were captured on
surveillance video running down the street. Appellant, was
holding onto his waistband in a manner consistent with someone
holding a gun.
After the murder, appellant changed his moniker from
“Sporty” to “Lil Bams,” which was in reference to a high-ranking
F Street gang member known as “Bams.” According to Sergeant
Guerra, appellant’s name change reflected his elevated status
within the gang for “putting in work” and committing more
serious crimes for the gang.
The defense presented two expert witnesses.
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Martin Flores, a non-law enforcement gang expert, opined
the juvenile justice system would have more resources to
rehabilitate appellant as opposed to jail or prison.
Dr. Carolyn Murphy, a forensic psychologist, opined that
although there was some “planning” and “conversation” about
perpetrating robberies between appellant and his peers, the
commission of the offense was not criminally sophisticated
because appellant did not commit it alone, he was identified
despite attempts to conceal his identity, and his communications
on social media about the crime and his involvement were easily
discovered. Dr. Murphy found appellant “behaviorally
disordered,” “impulsive,” “emotionally dysregulated,” and
“immature.” She also diagnosed him with “conduct disorder.”
Dr. Murphy opined appellant could be rehabilitated prior to
the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.
The Juvenile Court’s Ruling
In May 2024, the juvenile court issued its ruling, finding
that the People had met their burden on three of the five transfer
criteria: (1) criminal sophistication exhibited by appellant, (2)
whether appellant can be rehabilitated before expiration of
juvenile court jurisdiction, and (3) the circumstances and gravity
of appellant’s offenses.2 In its ruling, the juvenile court found, by
clear and convincing evidence, that appellant was not amenable
to rehabilitation while under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and
ordered the matter transferred to the superior court.
2 The juvenile court found the People had not met their
burden as to the minor’s previous delinquent history and success
of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the
minor.
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Discussion
Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion
in ordering the matter transferred to a court of adult jurisdiction
because the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence with
regard to the three factors the juvenile court found in favor of
transfer.
We review the juvenile court’s determination to transfer a
minor to criminal court for abuse of discretion. (J.N. v. Superior
Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 714 (J.N.); In re Miguel R.
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 165.) “The court’s factual findings
are reviewed for substantial evidence, and its legal conclusions
are reviewed de novo. [Citation.] A decision based on insufficient
evidence or the court’s ‘“erroneous understanding of applicable
law”’ is subject to reversal. [Citation.]” (Kevin P. v. Superior
Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 187 (Kevin P.).) But “we do not
reweigh the evidence and we do not substitute our discretion for
the discretion exercised by the trial court.” (In re J.S. (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 205, 211 (J.S.).)
The ultimate question for the juvenile court in a transfer
petition is whether a minor is amenable to rehabilitation before
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction expires. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3); In re
E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416.) To order a minor’s transfer
to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the juvenile court must “find by
clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3).)
In making that determination, the juvenile court must
consider five specific factors: (1) “[t]he degree of criminal
sophistication exhibited by the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i));
(2) “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the
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expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction” (id., subd.
(a)(3)(B)(i)); (3) “[t]he minor’s previous delinquent history” (id.,
subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)); (4) “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the
juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor” (id., subd. (a)(3)(D)(i));
and (5) “[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in
the petition to have been committed by the minor” (id., subd.
(a)(3)(E)(i)). The statute also sets forth a nonexhaustive list of
relevant factors for the juvenile court to consider with respect to
each of the five criteria. (Id., subds. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii),
(D)(ii), (E)(ii).)
Criminal Sophistication
Appellant contends the juvenile court’s finding as to this
criterion is erroneous because the juvenile court focused solely on
the crime itself, failed to consider the factors related to
appellant’s criminal sophistication, and disregarded the contrary
opinions of the probation officer and defense experts. But, as
trier of fact, the juvenile court was not required to credit the
testimony or opinion of the probation officer or the defense
experts. (J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 212.)
When evaluating the degree of criminal sophistication
exhibited by the minor, section 707 requires the juvenile court to
“give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to,
the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical,
mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense;
the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and
consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or
peer pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s
family and community environment; the existence of childhood
trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster
care system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human
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trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minor’s
criminal sophistication.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).)
Here, the juvenile court expressly acknowledged appellant’s
background, history of adverse childhood events, and his
immaturity, but nevertheless found he was in a position to
appreciate the risks and consequences of his actions. As the
juvenile court explained, “When I consider [appellant’s] activities
in the gang and commission of this offense, all the factors
regarding his immaturity, being rash, impetuous, and reactive
were not present either in the commission of this offense or his
conduct after the offense. In fact, that conduct was deliberate
and planned with a clear goal of furthering the interest of the
gang and the minor’s status in that gang.”
The juvenile court was well within its discretion in finding
appellant’s criminal sophistication supported transfer to the
superior court.
Rehabilitation Prior to Expiration of
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
Appellant contends the prosecution failed to present any
expert testimony regarding the programs available to appellant
at the secured youth treatment facility or why the existing
programs were unlikely to rehabilitate him during the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction.
In determining whether the minor can be rehabilitated
prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, “the
juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including,
but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow and mature.” (§
707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii).) “The prosecution bears the burden of
producing evidence of insufficient time to rehabilitate the minor.
[Citations.] Expert witnesses may testify on the issue of the
availability of treatment programs in the juvenile court system
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and the amenability of the minor to those programs.” (J.N.,
supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 721.)
Here, the supplemental transfer report detailed “[s]everal
program options” available to S.M., but concluded there was
insufficient time available for rehabilitation “[g]iven the
calculated nature of the offense,” appellant’s “continual disregard
for the rules” while in custody, and his “gang entrenched,
negative mindset.”
The juvenile court agreed. Appellant had made little
progress during the 590 days in custody. He refused
programming on approximately 51 occasions, received multiple
disciplinary write-ups, and created safety and security issues for
himself, staff, and other detainees. As the juvenile court
explained, it “place[d] somewhat more weight on this factor based
on the evidence of nonparticipation, his failure to repudiate the
gang, and entrenchment in [the] gang culture that he
demonstrates, as well as his age.”
While the juvenile court must consider each of the criteria
listed in section 707, the weight given to each criterion is within
the court’s discretion. (C.S. v. Superior Court (2018) 29
Cal.App.5th 1009, 1035; Kevin P., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p.
186.) The juvenile court was well within its discretion in finding
this factor supported transfer to the superior court.
Circumstances and Gravity of the Offense
Appellant contends the juvenile court failed to state that he
was not the actual shooter, and the court should have given more
consideration to Dr. Murphy’s determination that appellant was
not highly criminogenic, was emotionally dysregulated and
impulsive, and his decision-making was impacted by his cannabis
use.
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In determining whether the circumstances and gravity of
the offense support transfer to the superior court, “the juvenile
court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not
limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of
the person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the
level of harm actually caused by the person, and the person’s
mental and emotional development.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(ii).)
Here, the juvenile court explained that appellant’s actions
“caused the most severe harm possible, the loss of life.” The
juvenile court expressly stated, appellant was “directly involved”
in the crime. He bragged about it afterwards, attempted to
conceal the weapon, and even asked for more ammunition. He
was “deeply involved in the gang and the gang’s intent to
increase their activity in the community,” which resulted here in
murder.
The juvenile court’s reasoning is consistent with section
707 and was not error.
Disposition
The juvenile court’s order transferring this matter to the
superior court is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
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Gustavo Lavayen, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Lauren N. Guber, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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