People v. Barnhill CA4/2

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Filed 12/11/24 P. v. Barnhill CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E082054

v. (Super.Ct.No. BAF2300330)

HENRY MICHAEL BARNHILL, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Rene Navarro, Judge.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

Ellen M. Matsumoto, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Junichi P.

Semitsu, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
A jury convicted Henry Michael Barnhill of one count of misdemeanor domestic

battery (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e)(1)) and one misdemeanor count of simple assault

(Pen. Code, § 240), arising out of two separate incidents involving his girlfriend.

(Unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.) The jury also convicted Barnhill

of numerous other offenses, including one count of felony evasion of law enforcement

(Veh. Code, § 2800.2), one misdemeanor count of resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 148,

subd. (a)(1)), and one felony count of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422). The

trial court sentenced Barnhill to 15 years in state prison.

On appeal, Barnhill argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by (1) failing to

instruct the jury on self-defense on the misdemeanor battery offense, (2) failing to

instruct on unanimity for the criminal threat count, (3) imposing the upper term on that

count on the basis of unproven aggravating facts, and (4) not staying a sentence under

section 654 for either felony evasion or misdemeanor resisting arrest. We agree about the

self-defense instruction and the upper term. We accordingly vacate the misdemeanor

battery conviction and vacate the sentence on the criminal threat conviction. We

otherwise affirm the judgment. We remand the matter for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

I. The charges

The People charged Barnhill by information with several offenses arising from

incidents that occurred on April 23 and 29, 2022. The information alleged that on both

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dates Barnhill committed felony violations of section 273.5 by willfully inflicting

corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on Jane Doe 1 and that Barnhill had

previously suffered a domestic violence conviction. (§ 273.5, subds. (a), (f)(1); counts 1

& 2.) With respect to count 1, the information also alleged that Barnhill inflicted great

bodily injury on Doe 1. (§ 12022.7, subd. (e).)

The information further alleged that Barnhill committed: (1) seven additional

felonies, including one count of making a criminal threat (§ 422; count 4), one count of

felony evasion of law enforcement (Veh. Code, § 2800.2; count 8), and several counts of

possession of firearms and ammunition by a prohibited person (§§ 29800, subd. (a)(1),

29825, subd. (a), 30305, subd. (a)(1); counts 6, 7, 9); and (2) one misdemeanor, namely,

resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 10). It was also alleged that Barnhill

personally used a firearm—“a/an Polymer 80 handgun”—in making the criminal threat

(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and that he had a prior serious felony conviction (§§ 667, subd. (a),

12022.7, subd. (e)) and a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd.

(c)(1)).

II. Barnhill’s offenses against a prior victim

Jane Doe 2 dated and lived with Barnhill in 2016. Doe 2 testified that she “was

attacked and terrorized most of the relationship” and that Barnhill “was physical with

[her] every chance he got.” She described numerous incidents in which Barnhill acted

violently toward her, including by wrapping a purse strap around her neck, picking her up

by her neck, throwing her against a wall, choking her, hitting her, spitting in her face,

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“bash[ing her] over the head,” and punching her. In December 2016, Doe 2 called law

enforcement about Barnhill because he had “bashed [her] over the head” and “busted

[her] eardrum.”

Barnhill admitted that he was arrested in December 2016. In January 2020, he

pled guilty to three counts of committing domestic violence against Doe 2 in violation of

section 273.5 and one count of assaulting Doe 2 with the intent to cause great bodily

injury, and he admitted an allegation that Doe 2 suffered great bodily injury.

III. Barnhill’s relationship with Doe 1

In January 2021, Barnhill started dating Doe 1. The two moved in together within

a couple of months, and Doe 1’s five-year-old daughter moved in with them shortly

thereafter. Doe 1 lived near Barnhill’s sister, Latasha L. Doe 1 testified that the

relationship was “really good” in the beginning but that “[i]t started getting physical”

during the summer of 2021.

IV. The April 2022 incidents

Doe 1 testified that she and Barnhill got into an argument on April 23, 2022.

According to Doe 1, Barnhill pushed her onto her bed, straddled her by pinning down her

arms with his knees, put his hands around her neck, and strangled her by “squeezing [her]

neck.” Doe 1 is five feet four inches tall and then weighed 170 pounds, and Barnhill is

six foot three inches tall and then weighed about 250 pounds. Doe 1 screamed, and

Barnhill placed a pillow over her face. She fought to get out of the hold and eventually

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“wiggl[ed] [her] way out.” Afterward, Doe 1’s eyes were red, and her peripheral vision

remained blurry for “a couple weeks.”

On the night of April 28, 2022, Barnhill went to his sister’s house after Doe 1 went

to bed. Barnhill returned home at around 3:30 a.m. and questioned Doe 1 about whether

she was cheating on him with her ex-husband. Barnhill was “[v]ery angry” and acted

“very aggressive.” Barnhill told Doe 1 that “if [she] ever cheated on him, he would blow

[her] brains out.” The couple continued arguing and “ended up at the edge of [the] bed,”

where Barnhill “pulled out a gun, pointed it to [her] face, and said that if [she] ever

cheated on him, he would blow [her] brains out.” Doe 1 said that Barnhill was “standing

right in front of” her with the barrel of the gun about one-half inch from her face, and she

believed that he “was going to pull the trigger.”

Barnhill had pulled the gun out of the pocket of his sweatshirt. Doe 1 described

the gun as a black and silver “Smith & Wesson 40 something” or “a bigger size handgun”

that belonged to her. Barnhill had instructed her to buy the gun, which she kept in a gun

safe in her bedroom closet.

Doe 1 testified that, sometime after Barnhill threatened her with the gun, he started

choking her while they were both standing. He was no longer holding the gun. Doe 1

fell onto the bed on her back, with Barnhill’s hands still on her neck. Barnhill pinned

Doe 1’s arms down with his legs. According to Doe 1, Barnhill strangled her for

“[p]robably a minute or less,” but “it felt like forever.” When Barnhill stopped choking

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her, he locked the bedroom doors, took Doe 1’s keys and phone, and told her to go to

sleep.

In the morning, Doe 1 told Barnhill that she was taking her daughter to school. He

responded, “‘No, we’re both going,’” and he then drove Doe 1’s daughter to school with

Doe 1 in the front passenger seat. When they arrived at school, Doe 1 fabricated an

excuse to go into the school office, and Barnhill allowed her to go. Doe 1 told a school

employee that she was in danger and “needed help.”

Doe 1 called 911. She told the dispatcher that she was at her daughter’s school

and feared for her life because on the previous night her boyfriend “threatened to kill

[her] multiple times” and “had a gun to [her] face.” Doe 1 informed the dispatcher that

Barnhill was parked outside the school, waiting for her. Doe 1 described Barnhill, said

that he was driving a Dodge Challenger, and told the dispatcher where he was parked.

V. Barnhill’s flight and arrest

Law enforcement officers were dispatched to the elementary school. Three

marked black and white police patrol cars parked behind the Dodge Challenger, which

the officers identified by license plate number. The officers turned on the patrol cars’

overhead lights. Three uniformed law enforcement officers got out of their cars and

approached the Dodge Challenger with their weapons drawn, and one officer yelled,

“‘Driver, step out of the vehicle with your hands up.’” Barnhill did not comply, started

the engine, and “immediately sped off,” loudly accelerating and traveling at “a high rate

of speed.”

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The three officers jumped into two patrol cars and followed Barnhill with both

cars’ overhead lights and sirens turned on. Barnhill drove about 50 miles per hour or

faster through a residential and school-zoned neighborhood with a speed limit of 25 miles

per hour. He also ran two stop signs. He then entered a 40-mile-per-hour zone, where he

accelerated to about 60 miles per hour. Barnhill drove through a red stoplight at a four-

way intersection, where he maneuvered around five or six cars in his path. He then drove

through a gas station, where several customers were pumping gas. Upon exiting the gas

station, he drove on the wrong side of an adjacent street.

Barnhill stopped the car approximately one and one-half miles away from the

school. He stopped near Doe 1’s house. Barnhill got out of the car and ran toward the

house. The officers exited their cars, drew their weapons, ran after Barnhill, and yelled at

him to stop and show them his hands, which “were kind of concealed in his front waist

band.” Barnhill got to the front door, where one of the officers noticed that he was

fumbling with keys and did not appear armed. One officer used a taser on Barnhill. An

officer testified that the taser was not effective “[b]ecause the defendant still continued to

resist after it was deployed.” Another officer tackled Barnhill away from the front door,

and Barnhill ended up seated in a chair on the porch. Throughout the interaction, that

officer who tackled Barnhill was yelling at him to get on the ground. The officers

attempted to grab Barnhill’s hands, which were above his head, and one of the officers

said that Barnhill attempted to pull away by rotating his arm in a way that was making

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the officer lose his grip of Barnhill’s wrist. The officers eventually gained control of

Barnhill and arrested him.

VI. The investigation

Law enforcement searched Doe 1’s residence and found a black Polymer 80

handgun without a serial number on a nightstand in her bedroom. The gun was loaded

with 10 rounds of live ammunition. Additional ammunition was stored underneath the

bed. Law enforcement also found a .40 caliber Smith & Wesson along with 100 rounds

of ammunition located in a gun safe in the bedroom closet. Law enforcement broke into

the safe with a sledgehammer.

A law enforcement officer interviewed Doe 1 at the elementary school on April

29, 2022. He noticed that she had bruising on her arm, chest, and neck. The officer

photographed Doe 1’s injuries, and those photographs were admitted into evidence. He

also saw “redness in her right eye,” which a forensic nurse examiner described from a

photograph as conjunctival hemorrhaging.

VII. Defense evidence

Two of Barnhill’s sisters (not Latasha) testified on his behalf. One sister testified

that the day after the incident she asked Doe 1 what happened, and Doe 1 told her that

Barnhill “shouldn’t have cheated on her.” The other sister also spoke with Doe 1 after

Barnhill was in jail, and Doe 1 told her “that’s what he gets for cheating on me.”

Barnhill also testified. He said that he never hit Doe 1 or “lay hands on her.”

Barnhill said that on the night of April 23, 2022, he was planning to see another woman

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with whom he was romantically involved. Barnhill lied to Doe 1 about his intended

destination. Doe 1 was angry and accused Barnhill of going to see another woman.

Barnhill said that Doe 1 pulled a gun out from underneath her pillow, stood up, and

pointed it at him. Doe 1 struggled to cock the weapon, and the gun fired, startling her

and causing her to drop the gun. One of Barnhill’s sisters testified that Doe 1 admitted

firing a gun at Barnhill and told the sister that it fired accidentally.

Barnhill testified that after the gun fired, he walked toward Doe 1 and demanded

that she give him the gun. Barnhill described what happened next as follows: “So she

immediately jumps at the gun, and she jumps on the bed with the gun, and you know, so I

jump over the bed, you know, to get the gun. And she takes the gun, and she’s like

backing away from me with it, like she’s trying to keep it from me. She’s not—she’s not

aiming it at me or nothing like that, but it's like she’s trying to keep it away from me. So

I crawl over the bed, I straddled her, I’m on top of her, and she has the gun holding it

outwards, like she’s trying to keep it away from me.” Barnhill was on top of Doe 1,

straddling her upper body while she was holding the gun in her right hand. He grabbed

her right hand to prevent her from putting her finger on the trigger. He did not want her

to fire the gun intentionally or accidentally. He was afraid and feared for his life because

she had the gun. Doe 1 was physically resisting Barnhill and would not release the gun,

so Barnhill grabbed Doe 1 by the face with one hand, squeezing both of her cheeks.

Barnhill was eventually able to get the gun out of Doe 1’s hand by using both of his

hands.

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The following week, on the night of April 28, 2022, Barnhill went to his sister

Latasha’s house after Doe 1 fell asleep. Doe 1 later awoke, realized that Barnhill was

gone, and texted him that she was upset. When Barnhill returned home, Doe 1

confronted Barnhill about cheating on her. Barnhill responded angrily by repeatedly

telling Doe 1 that he would let Latasha “kick [her] ass.” The couple fell asleep, and

Barnhill repeated the same threat the following morning before taking Doe 1’s daughter

to school.

Barnhill testified that he fled from the school because he noticed a gun in the car

window and it scared him. He did not notice the presence of law enforcement officers.

Barnhill said that he drove home safely and responsibly. He denied that he was

attempting to evade law enforcement and also denied that he resisted arrest, explaining

that he was trying to protect his face.

VIII. The verdict and sentencing

The jury found Barnhill not guilty of felony willful infliction of corporal injury on

a cohabitant resulting in traumatic injury as alleged in counts 1 and 2. (§ 273.5, subd. (a);

counts 1 & 2.) The jury found Barnhill guilty of the lesser included offense of

misdemeanor domestic battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)) with respect to count 1, and the jury

found Barnhill guilty of the lesser included offense of simple assault with respect to count

2 (§ 240). The jury also found Barnhill guilty of making a criminal threat (§ 422; count

4) but found not true the allegation that he personally used a firearm, “to wit: Polymer 80

Handgun,” in committing that offense (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). In addition, the jury found

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Barnhill guilty of the three firearm and ammunition possession offenses (§§ 29800, subd.

(a)(1), 29825, subd. (a), 30305, subd. (a)(1); counts 6, 7, & 9), the one count of felony

evasion (Veh. Code, § 2800.2; count 8), and the one count of misdemeanor resisting

arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 10). With respect to the firearm and ammunition

possession offenses, the jury found true that in January 2020 Barnhill was convicted of

violating section 273.5, subdivision (a).

In a separate bench trial, the court found true that Barnhill’s January 2020 felony

conviction for domestic violence (§ 273, subd. (a)) along with the great bodily injury

enhancement (§ 12022.7, subdivision (e)) constitutes a prior serious felony and a prior

strike conviction. (§§ 667, subd. (a), 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) To

prove the prior conviction, the prosecution introduced a certified copy of Barnhill’s rap

sheet and Barnhill’s plea form from January 2020.

The trial court sentenced Barnhill to an aggregate determinate sentence of 15 years

for the felonies and concurrent six-month jail sentences for each for the three

misdemeanors.

DISCUSSION

I. Self-defense instruction

Barnhill contends that the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the

jury on self-defense for the lesser included offense of misdemeanor battery on count 1.

We agree.

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A. Relevant proceedings

The court instructed the jury on misdemeanor simple battery against a cohabitant

(§ 243, subd. (e)(1)) as a lesser included offense for count 1 (based on the events of April

23, 2022). The court instructed the jury that in order for the jury to find Barnhill guilty of

simple battery the prosecution had to prove that: (1) “The defendant willfully and

unlawfully touched [Doe 1] in a harmful or offensive manner;” (2) Doe 1 “and the

defendant had a previous dating relationship;” and (3) “The defendant did not act in self-

defense.” (CALCRIM No. 841.) The court further instructed: “Someone commits an act

willfully when he does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he intend to break

the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage. [¶] The slightest touching can be

enough to commit a battery if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with

another person, including through her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to

cause pain or injury of a kind.”

Defense counsel’s written request for instructions included CALCRIM No. 3470,

which explains the law on the right to self-defense in a case not involving homicide.

CALCRIM No. 3470 provides that self-defense is a defense to a specified crime, and a

defendant is not guilty of the offense if he or she used force against the alleged victim in

lawful self-defense. The instruction defines lawful self-defense as follows: (1) “The

defendant reasonably believed that [he or she] was in imminent danger of suffering

bodily injury . . . ;” (2) “The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of

force was necessary to defend against that danger;” and (3) “The defendant used no more

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force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger.” (CALCRIM No.

3470.) The instruction otherwise defines imminent harm, reasonable force, and

reasonable belief in that harm. (CALCRIM No. 3470.)

The court did not give the jury CALCRIM No. 3470 and did not otherwise instruct

the jury on self-defense. The instructions conference was held off the record.

In closing argument and during rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that the jury should

find Barnhill guilty of felony domestic violence for count 1 based primarily on Doe 1’s

testimony that Barnhill strangled her. In rebuttal, the prosecutor told the jury that if it

found Barnhill not guilty of felony domestic violence on count 1, then the jury would

have to consider whether Barnhill was guilty of a lesser included offense. The prosecutor

argued: “And so if you think that he hit her but he didn’t cause an injury, that’s what

misdemeanor domestic battery is, you’ll circle guilty.”

Defense counsel argued in closing: “Count 1, domestic violence on April 23rd.

Mr. Barnhill did jump on top of her, he did hold her down because he needed to get that

gun away from her. He acted in self-defense, and he is entitled to do that. The law says

you may act in self-defense, and that’s exactly what he did here. He didn’t strangle her,

he didn’t choke her, he didn’t do any of that. He did exactly what he said he did. And

what’s interesting about self-defense is you might think I have to prove that. I don’t.

The prosecution has the burden to prove it was not self-defense.”

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B. Analysis

“A trial court must instruct the jury sua sponte on general principles of law

applicable to the case,” including any defense supported by substantial evidence that “is

not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.” (People v. Villanueva (2008)

169 Cal.App.4th 41, 49 (Villanueva); People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 195.) In

“deciding whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, the trial court

does not determine the credibility of the evidence, but only whether there is evidence

which, if believed by the jury, is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt.” (People

v. Orlosky (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 257, 269-270.) We independently review claims of

instructional error. (People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.)

Barnhill testified that on April 23, 2022, he straddled Doe 1, pinned her on the

bed, grabbed her face, and wrestled with her because he feared for his life after she

pointed a gun at him and it accidentally discharged. According to Barnhill, he used force

in order to defend himself against being shot by Doe 1 accidentally or otherwise.

Barnhill’s account of the incident constitutes substantial evidence from which the jury

could reasonably infer that Barnhill reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger

of suffering bodily injury, that the immediate use of force was necessary to defend

himself against the danger, and that he used a reasonable amount of force to defend

against that danger. Given that substantial evidence supported Barnhill’s claim of self-

defense and that he actually relied on that theory, the trial court had a sua sponte

obligation to instruct the jury on self-defense. (Villanueva, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p.

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49.) The court therefore erred by failing to instruct the jury on self-defense as it related

to simple battery.

The People’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. A challenge to the trial

court’s failure to instruct sua sponte “required no trial court action by the defendant to

preserve it,” so we reject the People’s argument that Barnhill forfeited the challenge by

failing to object in the trial court. (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 17.)

We also reject the People’s contention that CALCRIM No. 3470 would have merely

clarified the meaning of “self-defense,” so the court did not have a sua sponte duty to

provide it to the jury. (See People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151, disapproved on

another ground by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 417-421.) Instructing the jury

on the elements of self-defense would not merely have clarified the law; it would have

instructed the jury on the legal requirements of the defense, on which the People bore the

burden of proof. (Cf. People v. Estrada (1990) 11 Cal.4th 568, 574-575 [“terms are held

to require clarification by the trial court when their statutory definition differs from the

meaning that might be ascribed to the same terms in common parlance”].) Moreover,

even assuming for the sake of argument that giving CALCRIM No. 3470 would have

merely clarified the meaning of “self-defense,” the trial court nevertheless would have

been required to give it sua sponte because self-defense has “‘“‘a technical meaning

peculiar to the law.’”’” (People v. Ellis (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1338.)

The People also contend that the evidence was insufficient to support a self-

defense finding because “the People’s sole focus when discussing the conduct underlying

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Count 1 was the evidence that [Barnhill] choked [Doe 1] on April 23, 2022” and defense

counsel “never argued . . . that if [Barnhill] did strangle his girlfriend, that he did so out

of self-defense.” The argument is not supported by the record. As to the lesser included

offense of misdemeanor battery, the prosecutor did not focus on Barnhill’s act of

strangling Doe 1 but instead argued that the jury could find Barnhill guilty of that offense

if it found that Barnhill merely struck Doe 1 but did not injure her.

Having concluded that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury with

CALCRIM No. 3470, we next analyze whether the instructional error was prejudicial.

The California Supreme Court has “yet to determine whether a trial court’s failure to

instruct on a requested affirmative defense instruction supported by substantial evidence

is federal constitutional error or state law error.” (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th

186, 199; People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 984; see also Chapman v. California

(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [federal harmlessness standard]; People v. Watson (1956) 46

Cal.2d 818, 836-837 [state law harmlessness standard].) We need not resolve the

question in this case, because the error was prejudicial even under the state law standard.

Under that standard, reversal is warranted if it is “‘reasonably probable that a result more

favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’”

(Watson, at pp. 836-837.) In this context, a probability “‘“does not mean more likely

than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.”’”

(Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050.)

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The jury found Barnhill not guilty of the felony domestic violence count arising

from the same events and accordingly also found not true the associated great bodily

injury enhancement. Those findings indicate that the jury did not entirely believe Doe

1’s version of events. Given that Barnhill admitted that he used force against Doe 1 in

the April 23, 2022, encounter, the jury could have disbelieved Doe 1’s version of the

account in its entirety, believed Barnhill’s version, and still found Barnhill guilty of

simple battery. Although the jury was instructed that it had to find that Barnhill did not

act in self-defense in order to convict him of misdemeanor simple battery, the jury was

not given any guidance on the law of self-defense. The jury thus was left to its own

devices to define the term according to the court’s instruction that “[w]ords and phrases

not specifically defined in these instructions are to be applied using their ordinary,

everyday meanings.” (CALCRIM No. 200.) But self-defense is an affirmative defense

with specific legal requirements that the jury needed to find were not satisfied in order to

convict Barnhill. In light of the jury’s other findings related to the incident, it is possible

that the jury would have found that Barnhill’s use of force satisfied the legal definition of

self-defense, if the jury had been properly instructed on self-defense. Given the jury’s

rejection of Doe 1’s full version of the events, there is a reasonable probability that the

same jury would have returned a verdict more favorable to Barnhill on the lesser included

offense of misdemeanor domestic battery had it been instructed on self-defense.

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For all of these reasons, we conclude that it was prejudicial error not to instruct the

jury on self-defense. We accordingly reverse the conviction under section 243,

subdivision (e)(1), and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

II. Unanimity

Barnhill argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to give the jury a

unanimity instruction with respect to the criminal threats count (§ 422; count 4). We are

not persuaded.

In order to prove the offense of making a criminal threat in violation of section

422, the prosecution has the burden of demonstrating “(1) that the defendant ‘willfully

threaten[ed] to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another

person,’ (2) that the defendant made the threat ‘with the specific intent that the statement

. . . is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out,’ (3) that

the threat—which may be ‘made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic

communication device’—was ‘on its face and under the circumstances in which it [was]

made, . . . so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the

person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the

threat,’ (4) that the threat actually caused the person threatened ‘to be in sustained fear for

his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety,’ and (5) that the

threatened person’s fear was ‘reasonabl[e]’ under the circumstances.” (People v. Toledo

(2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227-228.)

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“In a criminal case, ‘the jury must agree unanimously the defendant is guilty of a

specific crime.’” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 877.) “Therefore, when

the evidence suggests more than one discrete crime, either (1) the prosecution must elect

among the crimes or (2) the trial court must instruct the jury that it must unanimously

agree that the defendant committed the same criminal act.” (People v. Hernandez (2013)

217 Cal.App.4th 559, 569.) “The prosecution can make an election by ‘tying each

specific count to specific criminal acts elicited from the victim[’s] testimony’—typically

in opening statement and/or closing argument.” (People v. Brown (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th

332, 341 (Brown); People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 627 (Brugman).)

“‘Under these principles, there is an implicit presumption that the jury will rely on the

prosecution's election and, indeed, is bound by it.’” (Brugman, at p. 627.) We

independently review whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct on unanimity.

(Hernandez, at p. 568.)

During closing argument, the prosecutor generally described what happened on

April 29, 2022, as follows: Barnhill “points this gun, a foot away from [Doe 1’s] face,

says, ‘If I ever find out you’re cheating on me, I’m going to blow your shit off,’ with a

gun a foot in front of her nose.” In describing why Doe 1 did not ask for help that night,

the prosecutor remarked: “The defendant had just showed her within the past week that

he could end her life with his own bare hands. And not only that he had pointed a gun in

her face and threatened her, and it wasn’t the first time that he threatened her.” In

discussing count 4 specifically, the prosecutor stated: “The defendant is charged in

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Count 4 with making criminal threats. And the first element is that the defendant

threatened to unlawfully kill ([Doe 1]), ‘If I find out you’re cheating, I’m going to blow

your shit off.’” The prosecutor reiterated that the threat Barnhill made was telling Doe 1,

“‘If I find out you’re cheating, I’m going to blow your brain off.’” The prosecutor

explained that threats are “usually conditional” in that “the person making the threat

hopes that whatever expectation that is set, whatever that expectation is, is met so that

they don’t have to carry that threat out. He had the gun in his hand. That threat had to

actually cause [Doe 1] to be in sustained fear and that fear has to be reasonable.” With

respect to whether the threat caused Doe 1 to be in sustained fear, the prosecutor

remarked: “She’s still terrified, reasonably so. Your boyfriend points a gun in your face,

strangles you where you feel like you’re about to black out . . . .” She also told the jury:

“He meant to scare her. And how did he do that? With the firearm.”

Doe 1 testified that during the April 29, 2022, incident Barnhill twice threatened to

“blow [her] brains out.” Each threat could have formed the basis of the criminal threat

charge. There accordingly “was a risk that, unless instructed otherwise, different

members of the jury could rely on different incidents in finding [Barnhill] guilty in [count

4], which would result in an impermissible nonunanimous verdict.” (Brugman, supra, 62

Cal.App.5th at p. 628.) However, the prosecutor eliminated that risk by making a clear

election during closing argument with respect to the specific conduct on which count 4

was based. The prosecutor twice specified that count 4 was based on the threat to blow

Doe 1’s brains out that Barnhill made when he “had the gun in his hand,” “point[ed] a

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gun in [her] face,” and threatened her “with the firearm.” The only evidence that “the

prosecutor discussed in arguing that the elements of that count were established was the

evidence relating to that same incident.” (Id. at p. 629.) “This type of direct and clear

statement qualifies as an effective election.” (Ibid.) By tying count 4 to a specific

criminal act described in Doe 1’s testimony—the threat to blow Doe 1’s brains out that

Barnhill made when holding a gun—the prosecutor made an election that satisfies the

unanimity requirement. (Id. at p. 628.) “Such an election removes the need for a

unanimity instruction.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 341.)

Barnhill does not deny that “the prosecutor did not mention [his] first threat to

blow [Doe 1’s] brains out and only argued that the second threat to blow her brains out

when he used her gun was a criminal threat.” Relying on People v. Melhado (1998) 60

Cal.App.4th 1529 (Melhado), he contends that the prosecutor’s argument nevertheless

suffered from a “lack of clarity,” thus requiring the trial court to give a unanimity

instruction. We disagree.

Barnhill’s reliance on Melhado is misplaced. In Melhado, the defendant was

charged with one count of making a criminal threat in violation of section 422 but made

three similar threats at different times on the same day. (Melhado, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th

at pp. 1532-1533.) During closing argument, the prosecutor quoted the 11 a.m. threat

verbatim, described the victim’s reaction to that threat, and argued that those facts

satisfied the elements of the offense. (Id. at p. 1535.) But the prosecutor otherwise

discussed the other two threats made by the defendant. (Id. at pp. 1535-1536.) The Court

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of Appeal concluded that the prosecutor had not made a clear election for purposes of

unanimity. (Id. at p. 1536.) The court reasoned that even though it was “possible to

parse the prosecution’s closing argument in a manner which suggest[ed] that more

emphasis was placed on the 11 a.m. event than on the others,” “the argument did not

satisfy the requirement that the jury either be instructed on unanimity or informed that the

prosecution had elected to seek conviction only for the 11 a.m. event.” (Ibid.)

Melhado is distinguishable because, as Barnhill correctly concedes, the prosecutor

never specifically mentioned any other threats that Barnhill allegedly made. The

prosecutor generally acknowledged that Barnhill had otherwise threatened Doe 1, but the

prosecutor did not mention any specific facts of the other threats, instead describing in

detail only the threat that Barnhill made while holding the gun. Moreover, the prosecutor

expressly tied count 4 to the threat that Barnhill made with the gun. Thus, unlike the

prosecutor in Melhado, the prosecutor here made a clear election that the threat made

while Barnhill was pointing the gun at Doe 1 was the only threat that could form the basis

of the offense. (See Brugman, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 628-629.)

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err by not

instructing the jury on unanimity for count 4.

III. Section 654

The trial court sentenced Barnhill to one year four months for the felony evasion

count and a concurrent six-month jail sentence for the resisting arrest count. The court

did not make express findings concerning the application of section 654 to those counts.

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Barnhill contends that the trial court erred by not staying his sentence for either felony

evasion (Veh. Code, § 2800.2; count 8) or misdemeanor resisting arrest (§ 148, subd.

(a)(1); count 10). We find no error.

Section 654 provides: “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by

different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no

case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” (§ 654, subd.

(a).) The provision “‘prohibits multiple punishment for the same “act or omission.”’”

(People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 337.) “This restriction applies not only to a

single act violating multiple code provisions, but also to an indivisible ‘“course of

conduct”’ violating several statutes.” (People v. Fuentas (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 670,

680.) “‘Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more

than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the

actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be

punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.’” (Correa, at p. 336.)

“Whether section 654 applies in a given case is a question of fact for the trial

court, which is vested with broad latitude in making its determination.” (People v. Jones

(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143.) “In the absence of any reference to [section 654]

during sentencing, the fact that the court did not stay the sentence on any count is

generally deemed to reflect an implicit determination that each crime had a separate

objective.” (People v. Tarris (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 612, 626.) We uphold the trial

court’s express or implied factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. (People

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v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618.) “We review the trial court’s determination in the

light most favorable to the [People] and presume the existence of every fact the trial court

could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (Jones, at p. 1143.)

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied finding that Barnhill

harbored separate intents and objectives in evading law enforcement and in resisting

arrest. It was reasonable for the trial court to infer that in evading law enforcement in the

vehicle pursuit, Barnhill’s intent was to get away from law enforcement to avoid getting

caught and going to jail. It also was reasonable for the trial court to infer that Barnhill’s

objective when he exited the car and resisted arrest was no longer to evade capture but

instead was to get inside the house in order to hide exculpatory evidence, namely, the

firearms and ammunition that he was not allowed to possess.

We therefore conclude that the trial court’s failure to stay the sentences imposed

for the felony evasion and misdemeanor resisting arrest offenses (counts 8 & 10) is

supported by substantial evidence.

IV. Upper term on count 4

Barnhill’s felony violation of section 422 is punishable by terms of 16 months,

two years, or three years (§ 18), doubled because of the prior strike conviction

(§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). Barnhill contends that the trial court prejudicially erred by

“imposing the upper term of three years on count 4 because no aggravating factors were

alleged and proved” under section 1170, subdivision (b) (§ 1170(b)). (Capitalization

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omitted.) We agree that the trial court erred by relying on unproven aggravating factors

to impose the upper term, and the error was prejudicial.

A. Relevant proceedings

The information alleged numerous aggravating factors, including that “the offense

involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts

disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness within the meaning of

California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1).” The court bifurcated the trial on the

aggravating factors but subsequently struck the allegations before sentencing, at the

prosecution’s request.

Barnhill admitted during trial that he had a criminal record. He testified that in

2010 he was convicted of human trafficking in violation of section 236.1 and of pimping

in violation of section 266h, subdivision (a). He further testified that with respect to Doe

2 in 2020 he pled guilty to three counts of domestic violence (§ 273.5) and one count of

assault intended to cause bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) and admitted that Doe 2

suffered great bodily injury.

At sentencing in September 2023, the court imposed the upper term for count 4.

The court explained its reasoning as follows: “The court finds that the protection of

society and punishment are primary importance the sentencing objectives in this matter.

In addition, pursuant to Penal Code section 1170(b)(3) together with the totality of the

circumstances attending the commissions of the crimes of which the defendant was

convicted, together with the reasonable inferences and the actions drawn therefrom and

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the defendant[’s] criminal history and record of convictions, the court finds that the

aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors such that the court will select the

upper term for the imposition of a sentence as to Count 4.” Defense counsel objected to

the court “choosing the upper law” on the basis that “the only aggravating circumstance

the court has if the court can consider is prior convictions as the other aggravating

circumstances were dismissed by the prosecution.” Defense counsel also noted that there

were mitigating circumstances in that Doe 2 admitted to abusing Barnhill. The court

agreed about the mitigating circumstance but found it too slight to warrant imposing the

middle term, reasoning that “[t]he appropriate term given the totality of the circumstances

as the court indicated [in] its analysis is the upper term based on all the factors that the

court enumerated.”

B. Analysis

Rule 4.421 of the California Rules of Court sets forth circumstances in

aggravation that a court may consider in sentencing, including “[f]actors relating to the

crime, whether or not charged or chargeable as enhancements.” (Cal. Rules of Court,

rule 4.421(a).) Effective January 1, 2022, section 1170(b) “provides that the upper term

shall be imposed ‘only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that

justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term’ (id., subd.

(b)(2)) and the circumstances are (1) stipulated to by the defendant, (2) found true by the

trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt, or (3) based on prior convictions evidenced by a

certified record of conviction (id., subd. (b)(2)-(3)).” (People v. Butler (2023) 89

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Cal.App.5th 953, 958, overruled on another ground in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th

730, 768-769 (Lynch).)

A trial court violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial when it

“relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some

other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.” (Lynch, supra, 16

Cal.5th at p. 768.) The violation is prejudicial unless we can “conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that the jury would have found the unproven aggravating facts to be true

had it been properly instructed. This prejudice inquiry does not allow us to uphold the

trial court’s imposition of an upper term sentence based on some subset of aggravating

facts.” (Id. at p. 761.)

The trial court erred by imposing the upper term on count 4 because it relied not

only on Barnhill’s “record of convictions” but also on “the totality of the circumstances

attending the commissions of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, together

with the reasonable inferences and the actions drawn therefrom.” The court did not

specify what circumstances concerning the crimes’ commission it considered. Because

the trial court did not identify the facts relied on, we cannot “conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that the jury would have found the unproven aggravating facts to be true

had it been” asked to do so. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 761.)

We remand the matter for resentencing. Given the prosecution’s voluntary

dismissal of all of the aggravating factors alleged in the information, the trial court on

remand may consider whether to impose the upper term on count 4 on the basis of the

27
prior convictions that Barnhill admitted at trial. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2); People v. Dorado

(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 717, 739-740.) Moreover, because we are vacating Barnhill’s

sentence on count 4, he is entitled to a full resentencing, and we accordingly vacate his

entire sentence. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) Under the full

resentencing rule, “when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for

resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can

exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.’” (Ibid.; People

v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425.) The sentence imposed on resentencing

may not exceed the original aggregate sentence. (People v. Jones (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th

1780, 1783-1784; People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 357-358.)

DISPOSITION

The count 1 conviction under section 243, subdivision (e)(1), is reversed. On

remand, the prosecutor may choose to retry Barnhill on that count. We vacate the

sentence and remand the matter for resentencing consistent with this opinion. In all other

respects, the judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ
J.
We concur:

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

FIELDS
J.

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