People v. Keukelaar CA2/1

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Filed 12/9/24 P. v. Keukelaar CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B332174

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA112249)
v.

CARLOS RUBEN KEUKELAAR,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Christopher J. Frisco, Judge. Affirmed.
Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
INTRODUCTION
In December 2020, defendant Carlos Ruben Keukelaar was
charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), with
an enhancement for willful failure to consent to a chemical test,
and with resisting a peace officer in the discharge of his duties.
While awaiting trial, Keukelaar called the police department and
spoke at length with the watch commander, offering to make a
$25,000 “contribution” to the department in exchange for ending
the case against him. As a result of this call, Keukelaar was
charged with bribery. The court consolidated the two matters for
trial and a jury convicted Keukelaar.
On appeal, Keukelaar contends there was insufficient
evidence for the jury to convict him of DUI, to find true the
allegation he willfully refused to submit to a chemical test, and to
convict him of bribery. He also asserts that the trial court erred
in consolidating the charges against him for trial. We reject
Keukelaar’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his convictions for DUI and bribery, and his
contention the court erred in consolidating the charges for trial.
We agree with Keukelaar, albeit on other grounds, that the jury’s
true finding on the enhancement allegation he willfully refused to
submit to a chemical test is not supported by sufficient evidence.
However, the trial court ultimately did not impose any criminal
penalty based on the jury’s finding and it is not reflected on the
judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We summarize only those portions of the facts and
proceedings necessary to discuss the issues raised on appeal.

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A. The People Charge Keukelaar with Driving Under
the Influence and Resisting a Peace Officer (Case
No. NA112249)
On June 11, 2019, Signal Hill police officer Jorge Ramirez
arrested Keukelaar for driving under the influence of alcohol. At
the scene, Keukelaar refused to take a preliminary breath test
but consented to have his blood drawn. As explained below, he
later interfered with the attempted blood draw to the point that
Officer Ramirez abandoned it.
In an information filed on December 11, 2020, case
No. NA112249, the People charged Keukelaar with DUI with
priors (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a), 23550; count 1) and with
willfully resisting a peace officer (Pen. Code,1 § 148, subd. (a)(1)).
The People alleged as a sentencing enhancement that Keukelaar
willfully refused a peace officer’s request to submit to a chemical
test. (Veh. Code, § 23577.) Keukelaar pleaded not guilty.
B. The People Charge Keukelaar with Bribery (Case
No. NA119837)
On May 12, 2022, Keukelaar called the Signal Hill Police
Department and spoke on a recorded line with the watch
commander, Sergeant Raul Ramirez. During the call, Keukelaar
offered to make a $25,000 contribution to the police department
and to drop an excessive force complaint related to his arrest if
“this incident went away.”
On September 30, 2022, the People filed an information,
case No. NA119837, charging Keukelaar with one count of
bribery (§ 67) and one count of dissuading a witness (§ 136.1,

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code,
unless otherwise noted.

3
subd. (b)(2)) based on his May 12 phone call. The information
alleged Keukelaar had previously been convicted of four felonies
within the meaning of section 1203, subdivision (e)(4). The
charge of dissuading a witness was later dismissed and is not at
issue in this appeal.
C. The Two Cases are Joined for Trial
On December 16, 2022, the People moved pursuant to
section 954 to consolidate case No. NA112249 (DUI and resisting
arrest) and case No. NA119837 (bribery and dissuading a
witness). The People contended “the same nucleus of events”
connected both cases in that the alleged bribery was to influence
Keukelaar’s DUI case, and the People would use the same
witnesses and evidence to prove both sets of crimes. The People
further contended joinder would not prejudice Keukelaar because
the evidence in each case would be admissible in the other, and
the cases were equally strong so that neither would be unfairly
bolstered by being tried with the other.
On January 23, 2023, the trial court heard the
consolidation motion. Defense counsel argued that some aspects
of the alleged DUI offense, such as the circumstances and
evidence of intoxication, would not be admissible in a separate
trial of the bribery charge. Counsel also argued the DUI case was
weak because there was no direct evidence of Keukelaar’s driving
and no evidence of his blood alcohol level. Counsel further
argued the bribery and dissuading a witness charges were weak
because the sergeant who spoke with Keukelaar did not have the
authority to reduce or dismiss the DUI charge. Counsel conceded
that evidence of the alleged bribery could be used to show
consciousness of guilt for the DUI. At the conclusion of oral
argument, the court granted the motion.

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That day, the People filed a first amended information
consolidating cases Nos. NA112249 and NA119837, and
Keukelaar pleaded not guilty to the bribery count.
D. The Trial
The jury heard testimony over two days, April 25 and 26,
2023.
1. Prosecution Case
a. Officer Ramirez finds Keukelaar in a vehicle
stopped in a traffic lane.
Officer Ramirez testified he is employed by the Signal Hill
Police Department. On June 11, 2019, at around 1:05 a.m., he
was on patrol in the city, parked on Gundry Avenue north of
Willow Street. He heard the sounds of an engine revving from
Willow Street. When he went to investigate, he found a white
Hyundai stopped in the number 3 eastbound lane of Willow
Street; he heard the Hyundai’s engine revving and saw smoke
coming from under the vehicle. Officer Ramirez stopped behind
the Hyundai and activated his emergency lights. He then saw
Keukelaar exit the vehicle from the driver’s door and begin
walking towards the patrol car. Keukelaar was stumbling and
having a hard time with his balance. Officer Ramirez noticed
that the Hyundai was rolling backwards towards the patrol car,
so he ordered Keukelaar to get back in his vehicle and stop it.
Keukelaar did so, stopping the Hyundai before it struck the
patrol car, but the vehicle was now in both the number 2 and 3
lanes.

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b. Officer Ramirez and his fellow officer conclude
Keukelaar is under the influence of alcohol and
arrest him.
Before becoming an officer, Officer Ramirez attended a
police academy where he received training on investigating DUIs.
In addition, he later attended 32 hours of a seminar on DUI
investigations. For the first six months of his time as an officer,
he rode with senior officers and observed DUI investigation
techniques. His training period ended in about May or June of
2018. Prior to June 11, 2019, he had been responsible for
approximately 15 DUI investigations.
Officer Ramirez observed that Keukelaar’s eyes were
bloodshot and watery, and he smelled of alcohol. Officer Ramirez
asked Keukelaar where he was coming from and Keukelaar
responded “Buena Park”; when Officer Ramirez asked where he
was going, Keukelaar again stated “Buena Park.” Officer
Ramirez pointed out that this did not make sense. Keukelaar
started to explain but then changed the subject; he later said he
had come from Long Beach. Officer Ramirez observed that
Keukelaar’s speech “was a little slow” and that “he was fumbling
over his words.”
Officer Ramirez believed Keukelaar was unable to control
his vehicle. He pointed out to Keukelaar that he had allowed his
vehicle to roll backwards. Keukelaar claimed he was unable to
put his manual shift vehicle in gear because of problems with its
clutch. Officer Ramirez knew that, even with a clutch problem, a
driver should be able to prevent a manual shift vehicle from
moving by using the emergency brake.
Officer Ramirez told Keukelaar he believed Keukelaar was
under the influence of alcohol and began performing a horizontal

6
gaze nystagmus (HGN) test. A “nystagmus” is an involuntary
jerking of the eyes. During the HGN test an officer is looking to
see if the subject can smoothly follow a stimulus with their eyes.
Officer Ramirez initially observed that Keukelaar was unable to
smoothly follow the pen the officer was using as a stimulus, but
then Keukelaar stopped following the stimulus and the officer
was not able to complete the test.2
Officer Ramirez asked Keukelaar if he was willing to
submit to other field sobriety tests. Keukelaar refused.
After another officer attempted to perform an HGN test,
Officer Ramirez offered Keukelaar the opportunity to blow into a
preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) device, which is a mobile
machine that measures blood alcohol concentration from a
person’s breath. Keukelaar refused to take the PAS test and
stated he would take a blood test.
Officer Ramirez believed that Keukelaar was under the
influence of alcohol and could not safely operate a vehicle, based
on smelling alcohol on Keukelaar’s person, his slurred speech,
glassy and bloodshot eyes, “brief” lack of smooth pursuit during
the HGN test, stumbling gait, and inability to safely control his
vehicle.

2 On cross-examination, Officer Ramirez agreed that the
subject is supposed to stand during the HGN test but Keukelaar
was seated, and that it was possibly hard for Keukelaar to see
because Officer Ramirez was shining a flashlight into his eyes.
Officer Ramirez also agreed he had not given Keukelaar full
instructions for the HGN test, but explained he was doing the
test as a preliminary matter to assess the need for additional
testing.

7
Signal Hill police officer Taylor Byrd also testified. Officer
Byrd had received training on investigating DUI at the police
academy and attended a 40-hour seminar on the subject. Officer
Byrd was on duty in the early morning of June 11, 2019, and
responded to a call put out by Officer Ramirez. Officer Byrd
smelled an odor of alcohol coming from Keukelaar and observed
that he had glassy eyes and slurred speech. Officer Byrd
attempted to administer an HGN test, but Keukelaar would not
follow his instructions and stared at the officer’s chest. However,
Officer Byrd did notice a lack of smooth pursuit and some jerking
of Keukelaar’s eyeball as Keukelaar partially tracked the
stimulus before looking away.3 Keukelaar refused to perform any
other field sobriety tests. Officer Byrd formed the opinion that
Keukelaar was intoxicated to the extent he could not operate a
vehicle safely.
The jury was shown a video recording from Officer
Ramirez’s body-worn camera depicting the events soon after he
arrived at Keukelaar’s location on Willow Street. The recording
did not capture Keukelaar when he first exited his vehicle upon
Officer Ramirez’s arrival; the video began when Keukelaar exited
his vehicle after having stopped it from rolling into the patrol car.
The recording ended as Officer Ramirez was placing Keukelaar in
the patrol car to drive to the hospital for a blood test.

3 Keukelaar was seated while Officer Byrd conducted the
HGN test. On cross-examination, Officer Byrd agreed that a full
HGN test is supposed to be performed while the subject is
standing.

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c. Officer Ramirez takes Keukelaar to the hospital
for a blood draw, but once there they engage in
an altercation and no blood draw occurs.
After Keukelaar’s consent to a blood test, Officer Ramirez
drove Keukelaar to the hospital. When they arrived, Officer
Ramirez had Keukelaar sit down in a chair while the officer
turned his attention to the intake process, which included filling
out a form. Keukelaar’s hands were cuffed behind his back.
A few minutes later, Keukelaar stood up and began
repeatedly asking to use the bathroom. Officer Ramirez told
Keukelaar multiple times to sit and calm down, and told him he
could use the bathroom after the intake process was complete.
Keukelaar did not comply with Officer Ramirez’s direction to sit
down and continued to ask repeatedly to use the bathroom.
Officer Ramirez, who was holding a clipboard in his right hand,
used his left hand to push Keukelaar back into a seated position,
but Keukelaar immediately stood up again and stiffened his body
while leaning against the wall. As a result, Officer Ramirez was
unable to push Keukelaar back into the seat as Keukelaar
outweighed him by at least 100 pounds.
When Officer Ramirez walked away to put down the
clipboard, Keukelaar stepped away from the wall. Officer
Ramirez returned and attempted to push Keukelaar into the
seat; Keukelaar again leaned against the wall and stiffened his
body. Officer Ramirez tried to keep Keukelaar pinned to the
wall, but Keukelaar resisted and was able to stand up away from
the wall while the officer grabbed Keukelaar’s hands. After
almost three minutes, during which Keukelaar continued to
demand to use the bathroom and Officer Ramirez repeatedly told
him to “take a seat,” the officer called for assistance. Keukelaar

9
attempted to turn around to face Officer Ramirez, who then
pulled Keukelaar to the other side of the hallway and attempted
to pin him to the wall there. After a few seconds of struggle,
Officer Ramirez attempted to pull Keukelaar down to the ground,
but Keukelaar resisted and the two stumbled around for
approximately 15 seconds until the officer maneuvered them into
a corner and some firefighters and medical staff assisted the
officer in getting Keukelaar to the ground. Officer Ramirez
suffered a scratch on his forearm and sprained his right thumb as
a result of the altercation.
Registered Nurse Kyle Peterson testified. He was working
at the hospital when Officer Ramirez arrived with Keukelaar. In
Peterson’s opinion, Keukelaar was not listening to what the
officer was saying, and not doing what the officer told him to do.
Peterson had dealt with approximately one thousand intoxicated
patients in 10 years and outside of work had also dealt with
people under the influence of alcohol, and in his opinion
Keukelaar probably was intoxicated.
The jury was shown two video recordings of the events at
the hospital. One recording, from Officer Ramirez’s body-worn
camera, began when Keukelaar stood up and insisted on using
the bathroom, and ended as Officer Ramirez attempted to take
Keukelaar to the ground and the two stumbled around. The
other, from a hospital surveillance camera, began when
Keukelaar was sitting and ended just after Officer Ramirez and
the others were able to get Keukelaar to the ground.

10
d. Officer Ramirez abandons the blood draw after
Keukelaar repeatedly interrupts the reading of a
required notice.
After Keukelaar was under control, he was placed onto a
gurney and taken to a room. Officer Ramirez went into the room
a few minutes later and attempted to read a legally-required
admonition to Keukelaar relating to the blood draw, but
Keukelaar continually interrupted. Officer Ramirez abandoned
his effort and considered Keukelaar to have refused to proceed
with the blood draw. Keukelaar did not give a blood sample.
The jury was shown a video recording from Officer
Ramirez’s body-worn camera depicting this interaction. The
video depicts Officer Ramirez telling Keukelaar that he needed to
read an admonition and beginning to read aloud from a form, and
Keukelaar interrupting twice to discuss the altercation. At that
point, the following exchange took place:
Officer Ramirez: “[A]re you gonna take the blood draw or
are you gonna refuse?”
Keukelaar: “Blood draw for what?”
Officer Ramirez: “If you don’t answer me, I’m gonna take it
as a refusal. Okay? And your license will be suspended from one
to three years.”
Keukelaar: “Okay. I—I haven’t done anything wrong.” At
that point, Keukelaar resumed talking about the altercation;
Officer Ramirez attempted to direct Keukelaar back to the issue
of the blood draw, but Keukelaar continued to discuss the
altercation. Officer Ramirez then left the room.

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e. Keukelaar calls the Signal Hill Police
Department while his DUI case is pending.
Signal Hill police sergeant Raul Ramirez testified that,
while on duty as watch commander in the early morning hours of
May 12, 2022, he received a call from Keukelaar on the
department’s phone. Sergeant Ramirez authenticated a
recording of the call which was played for the jury.4
In the call, Keukelaar identified himself and stated, “So
about, about three years ago, we have the [§] 23152 um, that, um,
Signal Hill filed as a felony. It was a no drive. Um, no
registration, no BAC [meaning no evidence of blood alcohol
content]. Um, and we’re looking for resolution. Um, and I was
looking for your department to maybe impose upon the District
Attorney’s office to maybe look into an alternative to this. Um,
I’m in a position right now like, um, I have a ranch in South
Dakota and, um, I just sold my house in Brentwood. Um, we’re
willing to make a $25,000 contribution to your department, and
we just really would prefer that this incident went away. We got
an excessive force report that is due in court on Monday, which I
really don’t think you guys want to go down that road. Um, but if
you have to, I guess, you know, we really don’t have a lot of
choices.” Keukelaar later stated, “we’re in a position now that we
can just make you get [a] donation to your department for 25
Grand. Um, we would take a Wet Reckless.” Sergeant Ramirez

4 Defense counsel conceded in his opening statement that
Keukelaar placed the May 12 call. In addition, Sergeant Ramirez
authenticated a photograph of the department’s phone which
showed a call from “C. Keukelaar,” and Officer Ramirez listened
to the call recording during his testimony and stated that he
recognized Keukelaar as the caller.

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told Keukelaar, “We don’t accept money in exchange to make
cases disappear. Number one, that’s unethical.” Keukelaar
stated a bit later, “We don’t want to get the officer in trouble for
the excessive use of force. You know what I know, I know he, I
know he he’s [sic] doing his job out there.” Sergeant Ramirez
then responded, “This isn’t how you resolve those things. Okay.
In fact, I would be highly suspicious of a police department that
would take money and [in] exchange not to prosecute a case
because there’s a slight chance that that officer might be accused
of some wrongdoing, that, that that’s [sic] also incredibly wrong.
I would not even do that. Um, but I’m not [in] a position to do
that anyway.”
Keukelaar later stated, “there’s an excessive use of force
and I don’t have the discovery on that,” and “I don’t wanna
blemish a young officer’s record.” When Sergeant Ramirez said
that discovery requests are not made directly to the police
department by the criminal defense team, Keukelaar agreed.
Sergeant Ramirez asked, “Then why [are] we having this
conversation?” and Keukelaar responded, “Well, because I, I feel
like you might have a little bit of say on how we proceed.”
After discussing his claim that he had requested documents
from the Signal Hill Police Department relating to excessive
force, Keukelaar stated, “What I’m proposing is that we have a
civil resolution and we’ll also take, you know, and, and you, and
you have some sway there. What I don’t want, I don’t want to,
you know, file another Pitchess[5] motion. I don’t want the City
Attorney involved. I don’t want this young officer [sic]. You guys
already have a hard enough job out there. What I’m saying is

5 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.

13
let’s just, let’s just call it swift on this. Um, and then there will
be, as far as my end is concerned, I would like to, you know, make
a contribution to your department so that you guys can, and, you
know, have dashboard cams or, you know, do something that can
help out the community. That’s what, what, what I would feel
would be a, a proper resolution.” Sergeant Ramirez repeatedly
told Keukelaar he could not help him, and eventually ended the
call.
At trial, Sergeant Ramirez explained that “wet reckless”
refers to admitting to reckless driving in exchange for not being
prosecuted for DUI. He also explained that “Pitchess” refers to a
process for a criminal defendant to obtain information about a
police department’s investigation of various types of misconduct
claims asserted against its officers. In addition, Sergeant
Ramirez testified that he could hypothetically influence a
criminal case, for example by requesting the assigned district
attorney to take some action, by telling an officer to not attend
court or to testify in a certain manner, or by using his access to
department records to destroy evidence.
2. Defense Case
The defense called no witnesses.
3. The Jury Convicts Keukelaar
On April 27, 2023, the jury found Keukelaar guilty of DUI
(Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), resisting Officer Ramirez in the
discharge or attempted discharge of his duties (§ 148, subd.
(a)(1)), and bribery (§ 67). The jury found true the allegation that
Keukelaar had willfully refused Officer Ramirez’s request that he
submit to a chemical test. (Veh. Code, § 23577.)
After the jury’s verdict, Keukelaar admitted to one prior
conviction under Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a) for

14
driving under the influence of alcohol, and three prior convictions
under Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b) for driving with
a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more.
On June 1, 2023, the trial court sentenced Keukelaar to the
upper term of three years on count one (DUI), 364 days in jail on
count two (resisting a peace officer) to run concurrently with the
sentence on count one, and one year (one-third of the mid-term)
on count three (bribery) to be served consecutive to the sentence
on count one, for a total prison term of four years. Keukelaar was
given 345 days credit for time served.
DISCUSSION
Keukelaar claims insufficient evidence supported his
convictions for DUI and bribery, as well as the finding he
willfully refused to submit to a chemical test. He also claims the
trial court abused its discretion and violated his procedural due
process rights by consolidating the four charges against him for
trial.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
1. Standard of Review
In reviewing for substantial evidence, an appellate court
does not “ ‘ “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the
trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]
Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Boatman
(2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1262, italics omitted.) “[W]e
examine the entire record, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the judgment and presuming in support of the

15
verdict the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably
deduce from the evidence. The issue is whether the record so
viewed discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid
value such that a rational trier of fact could find the elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Llamas (1997)
51 Cal.App.4th 1729, 1736.) “ ‘A reviewing court neither
reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness’s credibility.’ ”
(People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 890.)
2. The DUI Conviction
Keukelaar was convicted of DUI under Vehicle Code section
23152, subdivision (a), which provides, “It is unlawful for a
person who is under the influence of any alcoholic beverage to
drive a vehicle.” Under this statute, “the prosecution may prove
intoxication . . . by showing that the alcohol made the defendant
unable to ‘drive . . . with the caution of a sober person, using
ordinary care, under similar circumstances.’ ” (People v. Lopez
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 569, 574, fn. 1, quoting CALCRIM No. 2110.)
Keukelaar’s actions at the scene of the arrest, his conduct at the
hospital, and his May 2022 phone call to Sergeant Ramirez are
substantial evidence that Keukelaar was intoxicated to a level
that he was unable to drive safely.
a. Keukelaar’s actions at the arrest scene.
Keukelaar allowed his Hyundai to roll backwards towards
Officer Ramirez’s patrol car when getting out of the vehicle.
Officer Ramirez had to alert Keukelaar that his vehicle was
moving, and Keukelaar then got back into his vehicle to stop it
just inches before it hit the patrol car. Keukelaar provided a
false explanation for why he was unable to stop the vehicle,
claiming he could not put it in gear when even if that was true he
could have stopped the vehicle with its parking brake. In

16
addition, Keukelaar stumbled and struggled with his balance. In
response to Officer Ramirez’s questions, Keukelaar confusingly
stated that he was coming from Buena Park and going to Buena
Park without further explanation. When Officer Ramirez pointed
out that this did not make sense, Keukelaar changed the subject.
Keukelaar’s speech was slow, and he fumbled over his
words. Both Officers Ramirez and Byrd smelled alcohol on
Keukelaar and observed that his eyes were bloodshot and watery
(Ramirez) and glassy (Byrd). Both officers began HGN tests and
observed that Keukelaar was unable to smoothly follow the
stimulus with his eyes, which is indicative of intoxication.
Although both officers testified they administered only
“preliminary” HGN tests, neither officer was able to complete the
test, and neither administered the test under conditions required
for a full HGN test, the evidence of Keukelaar’s involuntary eye
movement consistent with alcohol intoxication corroborates the
other evidence that he was under the influence of alcohol. (See
People v. Randolph (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 602, 612 [“an officer,
with adequate training and experience in performing the [HGN]
test . . . may . . . testify as to the significance of a defendant’s
performance on an HGN test”].)
Based on all this evidence, a rational jury could conclude
that Keukelaar was intoxicated by alcohol to the point that he
was unable to drive safely. (See, e.g., People v. McNeal (2009) 46
Cal.4th 1183, 1198 [“evidence of actual impairment may include
the driver’s appearance, an odor of alcohol, slurred speech,
impaired motor skills, slowed or erratic mental processing, and
impaired memory or judgment”].) Keukelaar contends there was
no evidence that he had “driv[en] in an unsafe, erratic, or
impaired manner.” This ignores that he got out of his vehicle in

17
the middle of a multi-lane road without first making sure it
would not roll backwards or into another lane, which shows he
lacked the ability to safely control his vehicle. In any event, a
defendant can be convicted of DUI without direct evidence of
erratic driving. (Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991)
53 Cal.3d 753, 756-757, 769-770; see People v. Wilson (1985) 176
Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 3, 8 [officers found the defendant sleeping in
a parked car with the engine running].)
Keukelaar’s argument this evidence was insufficient
disregards the standard of review, drawing inferences from the
evidence in his favor rather than in favor of the jury’s verdict.
For example, he claims his eyes were bloodshot and watery
because of the smoke coming from his vehicle and not because he
was intoxicated. Keukelaar notes that Officer Ramirez conceded
on cross-examination he could not definitively rule out that
Keukelaar’s stumbling might have resulted from Keukelaar
trying to quickly get out of a vehicle emitting smoke, and that in
Keukelaar’s view the video of the events on Willow Street did not
“depict[] anything unusual about [his] walk or coordination.” Our
task when reviewing for substantial evidence is not to determine
if one could draw inferences contrary to those made by the jury.
Before we may set aside a verdict for insufficient evidence, the
defendant must demonstrate that upon no hypothesis whatsoever
is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the conviction.
(People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 169.) Keukelaar’s
alternative interpretation of the trial evidence fails that test.
b. Keukelaar’s conduct at the hospital.
There was further substantial evidence that Keukelaar
exhibited consciousness of guilt as to the DUI charge by refusing
to cooperate in having his blood drawn. Under Vehicle Code

18
section 23612, “[a] person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed
to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her
blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic
content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense
allegedly committed in violation of [Vehicle Code s]ection . . .
23152 . . . .” (Id., subd. (a)(1)(A).) Evidence that a person
lawfully arrested for DUI (as Keukelaar indisputably was)
refused to comply with an officer’s request to take a chemical test
to detect the presence of alcohol can be admissible to show
consciousness of guilt. (People v. Sudduth (1966) 65 Cal.2d 543,
545-546; People v. Municipal Court (Gonzales) (1982) 137
Cal.App.3d 114, 119.)
Keukelaar argues there was no substantial evidence that
he refused to take the test. He points out that he agreed at the
arrest scene to take a blood test and asserts that at the hospital
he never verbally refused to take the test. We are not persuaded.
A reasonable jury could conclude based on the events at the
hospital that, despite previously stating he would prefer a blood
test, Keukelaar did not intend to cooperate in having his blood
drawn. First, a reasonable jury could conclude Keukelaar
attempted to avoid or delay a blood draw by instigating the
physical altercation with Officer Ramirez. Keukelaar portrays
the altercation as resulting from Officer Ramirez’s refusal to
allow him to use the bathroom, but Keukelaar insistently
requested to use the bathroom even after Officer Ramirez
informed him several times he would have to wait; instead, the
altercation began when Keukelaar refused Officer Ramirez’s
repeated commands and attempts at physical control.
Second, a reasonable jury could conclude that Keukelaar
failed to cooperate in having his blood drawn after the

19
altercation. Keukelaar thwarted Officer Ramirez’s attempt to
read the legally required admonition by continually interrupting
and changing the subject. When Officer Ramirez asked
Keukelaar, “[A]re you gonna take the blood draw or are you
gonna refuse?” Keukelaar responded, “Blood draw for what?”
Although Keukelaar never gave a final verbal refusal, a rational
jury could conclude he failed to cooperate with the blood draw to
the point of refusal.
c. Keukelaar’s post-arrest telephone call.
A reasonable jury could also infer consciousness of guilt
from Keukelaar’s statements during his May 2022 phone call
offering to make a payment to the Signal Hill Police Department
and/or agree not to make claims that the arresting officer used
excessive force in exchange for having his DUI case “[go] away” or
the charges reduced to reckless driving. A reasonable jury could
infer that Keukelaar made these offers because he believed he
was guilty of DUI and would be convicted at trial.
3. Keukelaar’s Willful Refusal of a Chemical Test
The jury found Keukelaar willfully refused Officer
Ramirez’s request he submit to a chemical test under Vehicle
Code section 23577. That statute provides, in relevant part, the
trial court “shall impose” specific additional penalties where “a
person is convicted of a violation of [Vehicle Code s]ection 23152
. . . , and at the time of the arrest leading to that conviction that
person willfully refused a peace officer’s request to submit to, or
willfully failed to complete, the breath or urine tests pursuant to
[Vehicle Code s]ection 23612.” (Id., subd. (a).) It further
provides, “The penalties in this section do not apply to a person
who refused to submit to or complete a blood test pursuant to
[Vehicle Code s]ection 23612. . . .” (Id., subd. (c).)

20
Substantial evidence does not support the jury’s true
finding on this allegation, because there is no evidence that
Keukelaar refused to submit to a breath or urine test.6 The
prosecutor argued to the jury that Keukelaar willfully refused a
chemical test based on his failure to cooperate with the blood
draw, and the People renew the argument on appeal. This
argument fails because Vehicle Code section 23577, subdivision
(a) does not apply to the refusal to submit to a blood test.7
Our conclusion, however, does not require reversal or
resentencing because, for reasons not disclosed by the record, the
trial court did not impose any additional penalty on Keukelaar
under Vehicle Code section 23577, subdivision (a), nor did the
jury’s finding that Keukelaar had willfully refused to submit to a
chemical test otherwise have any impact on the sentence imposed
by the court. The trial court did impose the upper term on the
DUI charge, but it did so based on its finding that several
aggravating factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421
applied, none of which related to Keukelaar’s failure to submit to
the blood test. Additionally, the true finding does not appear on
the abstract of judgment.

6 The “breath” test referenced in Vehicle Code section
23577 does not include a PAS test that can be administered at
the scene of an arrest. (See Veh. Code, § 23612, subds. (h)
[describing a PAS test as “a field sobriety test [that] may be used
by an officer as a further investigative tool”] & (i) [arrestee has
the right to refuse to take a PAS test].) Thus, Keukelaar’s refusal
to blow into the PAS device at the arrest scene cannot support a
true finding under Vehicle Code section 23577, subdivision (a).
7 For the same reason, Keukelaar’s contention that there is
no substantial evidence he refused the blood draw is irrelevant.

21
4. Bribery
Section 67 provides, “Every person who gives or offers any
bribe to any executive officer in this state, with intent to
influence him in respect to any act, decision, vote, opinion, or
other proceeding as such officer, is” guilty of a felony. Section 7
defines a “ ‘[b]ribe’ ” as “anything of value or advantage, present
or prospective, or any promise or undertaking to give any, asked,
given, or accepted, with a corrupt intent to influence, unlawfully,
the person to whom it is given, in their action, vote, or opinion, in
any public or official capacity.” (Id., subd. (b)(6).)
We disagree with Keukelaar’s contention that substantial
evidence does not support his conviction on this charge.
Keukelaar does not dispute he called Sergeant Ramirez, or what
he said during that call. Keukelaar said he was seeking
“resolution” of his DUI charge and offered “a $25,000 contribution
to your department” and not to pursue excessive force claims
expecting “this incident [would go] away” or in exchange for
dropping the DUI charge in favor of a reckless driving charge.
Based on these statements, a reasonable jury could conclude
Keukelaar was offering to pay money to the Signal Hill Police
Department, and to drop claims of excessive force against Officer
Ramirez, if Sergeant Ramirez took action to have the DUI charge
dismissed or reduced to reckless driving. As Keukelaar concedes,
it does not matter that he offered to pay money to the police
department, as opposed to Sergeant Ramirez directly, because
“under the Penal Code’s definition of ‘bribe’ a promise to make a
payment to a third party or entity may constitute a bribe.”
(People v. Moyer (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 999, 1010.) Nor does
Keukelaar dispute that there was sufficient evidence for the jury

22
to conclude that Sergeant Ramirez was an “executive officer”
under section 67.
Keukelaar’s arguments that the evidence was not sufficient
to support his bribery conviction all lack merit, as they disregard
the standard of review and ask us to draw inferences in his favor
rather than in favor of the verdict. Keukelaar claims there was
insufficient evidence he acted with the requisite intent because
his phone call was “a rambling stream of consciousness,” and
while he did “mention” a payment to the police department, he
discussed several other topics, including the excessive force claim
and his need for discovery. This mischaracterizes the
conversation between Keukelaar and Sergeant Ramirez.
Keukelaar focused on one consistent topic during the
conversation: having his DUI case dropped or reduced to a lesser
charge. He mentioned paying money to the department in
exchange for action on his DUI case three times,8 and he referred
to the excessive force claim and his need for “discovery” as part of
his effort to have his DUI case dismissed or the charge reduced.
The crime of bribery is complete when the defendant offers a
bribe with corrupt intent. (People v. Finkelstin (1950) 98
Cal.App.2d 545, 554; People v. Brigham (1945) 72 Cal.App.2d 1,
6.)
Keukelaar points out that, during a later part of the call, he
purported to deny offering a bribe after Sergeant Ramirez
pointed out that what Keukelaar was suggesting was improper.
However, a reasonable jury could discount this statement as an

8 Keukelaar’s brief contends that he only mentioned a
monetary donation once, and “made no further follow-up.” That
is not true.

23
attempt by Keukelaar to give himself plausible deniability given
that Sergeant Ramirez was unwilling to go along with the
proposed scheme and pointed out it was improper. “ ‘ “The [offer
or] solicitation of a bribe need not be stated in any particular
language; such a solicitation may be in the form of words which
carry the import of a bribe and were evidently intended to be so
understood.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Pic’l (1982) 31 Cal.3d 731,
741.)
Keukelaar argues there was no evidence he made an offer
“to influence Sergeant Ramirez’s actions.” We disagree. A
reasonable jury could conclude that Keukelaar was asking
Sergeant Ramirez to take action to influence the prosecutor to
drop the case or reduce the charge to reckless driving, or to take
steps that would undermine the case. While the jury could have
reasonably inferred this from the totality of the conversation,
Keukelaar also made it explicit, responding to Sergeant
Ramirez’s question, “why [are] we having this conversation?” by
stating, “Well, because I, I feel like you might have a little bit of
say on how we proceed.” Keukelaar also expressed his belief that
Sergeant Ramirez had “some sway” over the “resolution” of the
DUI charge.
Keukelaar argues there is insufficient evidence he offered a
bribe because the person to whom he made the offer had no
official power to control the DUI case. However, as Sergeant
Ramirez testified, he could have taken acts to influence the DUI
case, such as by making a request to the assigned district
attorney, telling an officer to not attend court or to testify in a
certain manner, or destroying evidence. These would have been
“act[s]” taken as “an[] executive officer” within the meaning of
section 67. This is so even if doing so would have been illegal or

24
contrary to Sergeant Ramirez’s official duties. For example,
People v. Gordon upheld a bribery conviction where the defendant
sought to have a police officer plant illegal drugs and then make
an arrest. (People v. Gordon (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 465, 470, 473,
disapproved on other grounds in Stark v. Superior Court (2011)
52 Cal.4th 368, 407, fn. 15.) The court held, “ ‘ ‘The giving or
receiving of money . . . for the purpose of influencing official
conduct is not deprived of its criminal character by the fact that
the action contemplated is not within the officer’s jurisdiction.” ’
[Citations.]” (People v. Gordon, at p. 474.)9
Lastly, Keukelaar asserts that, even if Sergeant Ramirez
had attempted to influence the DUI case by persuading Officer
Ramirez to not appear at trial, the tactic would not have worked
because the prosecutor had Officer Ramirez’s sworn testimony on
record from the preliminary hearing. Bribery need not succeed to
be a crime. The crime of bribery is complete when the defendant
offers a bribe with corrupt intent (People v. Finkelstin, supra, 98
Cal.App.2d at p. 554), and it is immaterial whether the official
accepts the offer, much less whether the official would have
succeeded in accomplishing the defendant’s objective had the
official accepted.

9 Keukelaar contends liability for bribery is limited to
seeking to cause acts by an official within their official duties.
The cases he cites do not support this proposition, as they all
affirmed bribery convictions without any discussion of whether
the acts which the defendants sought to induce were within the
officials’ authority. (Satten v. Webb (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 365,
383 [a “case is not authority for a proposition not considered
therein or an issue not presented by its own particular facts”].)

25
B. The Trial Court’s Consolidation of Charges for Trial
Keukelaar lastly challenges the trial court’s decision to
consolidate the charges against him for trial. Keukelaar
contends the court abused its discretion in allowing this to occur,
and that the joint trial violated his due process rights. We find
no abuse of discretion and no due process violation.
Section 954 “permits the prosecutor to combine multiple
charges in a single accusatory pleading provided they meet the
stated criteria” (People v. Earle (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 372, 386),
which include that the “different offenses [are] connected
together in their commission.” (§ 954.) If the offenses are
consolidated, they may be tried together in the same case, or “in
the interests of justice and for good cause shown,” the court has
discretion to try some or all of the offenses separately. (Ibid.)
Section 954’s provisions raise two distinct questions applicable
here: “Whether the charges are eligible for joinder, i.e., satisfy
the statutory criteria for joint pleading; and whether, despite
their eligibility, they ought to be tried separately to ensure a fair
trial.” (People v. Earle, at p. 386.)
After the trial court consolidated the accusatory pleadings
into one case, Keukelaar did not later move to sever the charges
for trial. However, the prosecutor’s motion to consolidate argued
the factors that would have been relevant to a motion to sever,
and Keukelaar opposed the motion based on those factors.
Accordingly, we reject the People’s contention that Keukelaar
failed to argue to the trial court that joinder for trial would
prejudice him. Thus, we consider whether the trial court abused
its discretion in allowing a joint trial of the four charges.

26
1. Standard of Review
“ ‘Refusal to sever may be an abuse of discretion where:
(1) evidence on the crimes to be jointly tried would not be cross-
admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of the charges are
unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) a
“weak” case has been joined with a “strong” case, or with another
“weak” case, so that the “spillover” effect of aggregate evidence on
several charges might well alter the outcome of some or all of the
charges; and (4) any one of the charges carries the death penalty
or joinder of them turns into a capital case.’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 395-396.) “If the evidence
underlying the charges in question would be cross-admissible,
that factor alone is normally sufficient to dispel any suggestion of
prejudice and to justify a trial court’s refusal to sever properly
joined charges.” (People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 774-775.)
“We review the trial court’s denial of a severance motion for
abuse of discretion.” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 510.)
In order to show a trial court abused its discretion in denying a
severance motion, a defendant “must make a ‘ “clear showing of
prejudice” ’ ” and establish that the ruling “ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘falls outside the
bounds of reason.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at
p. 774.) “The trial court’s denial of a motion to sever must be
evaluated in light of the facts and circumstances apparent to the
court at the time of its ruling.” (People v. Earle, supra, 172
Cal.App.4th at p. 387.)
“ ‘Even if a trial court’s severance or joinder ruling is
correct at the time it was made, a reviewing court must reverse
the judgment if the “defendant shows that joinder actually
resulted in ‘gross unfairness’ amounting to a denial of due

27
process.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 396.)
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
At the hearing on the prosecution’s consolidation motion,
Keukelaar conceded that evidence of his statements to Sergeant
Ramirez (the basis for the bribery charge) would be admissible in
a trial of the DUI charge to show consciousness of guilt.
Keukelaar argued that, other than the fact he was being charged
with DUI, no evidence of intoxication or the circumstances of the
DUI would be admissible in a separate trial on the bribery
charge.
Here, all of the evidence supporting the bribery case would
be admissible in a trial of the DUI case10 and a significant
portion of the evidence of DUI would be admissible in a trial of
the bribery case. The trial court thus acted within its discretion
in not severing the charges for trial. As our Supreme Court has
observed, “if evidence underlying the offenses in question would
be ‘cross-admissible’ in separate trials of other charges, that
circumstance normally is sufficient, standing alone, to dispel any
prejudice and justify a trial court’s refusal to sever the charged
offenses. [Citations.] . . . [C]omplete (or so-called two-way) cross-
admissibility is not required. In other words, it may be sufficient,

10 Keukelaar’s appellate brief disputes that evidence of his
May 2022 call to Sergeant Ramirez would have been admissible
as consciousness of guilt. However, Keukelaar conceded this
point at the trial court, and cannot now reverse course on appeal.
In any event, in rejecting his substantial evidence challenge, we
have already concluded that Keukelaar’s statements to Sergeant
Ramirez were probative of his consciousness of guilt on the DUI
charge.

28
for example, if evidence underlying charge ‘B’ is admissible in the
trial of charge ‘A’—even though evidence underlying charge ‘A’
may not be similarly admissible in the trial of charge ‘B.’ ”
(Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1221.)
Keukelaar also contends he was prejudiced because
evidence of his phone conversation with Sergeant Ramirez
bolstered a weak DUI case. This argument fails because, as the
defense conceded at trial, evidence of his statements to Sergeant
Ramirez were admissible to show consciousness of guilt even if
the bribery charge was not tried jointly with the DUI charge.
3. Joint Trial of the Charges Did Not Result in “Gross
Unfairness”
Keukelaar argues that, even if the court did not initially
abuse its discretion in allowing all the charges to be jointly tried,
we must reverse because the resulting trial was grossly unfair.
“Even if the trial court did not abuse its discretion under state
law when it denied a motion to sever under the information
available at the time, we still reverse if ‘ “events after the court’s
ruling demonstrate that joinder actually resulted in ‘gross
unfairness’ amounting to a denial of [the] defendant’s
constitutional right to fair trial or due process of law,” ’ that is, ‘if
it is reasonably probable that the jury was influenced by the
joinder in its verdict of guilt.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Turner
(2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 117, 127.)
Keukelaar’s sole argument as to “gross unfairness” is that
he was convicted of DUI “on very weak evidence based on the
inflammatory ‘bribery’ charge and evidence.” But the evidence
supporting the DUI charge was strong, not weak. In any event,
the evidence of the bribery, namely Keukelaar’s May 2022 phone
conversation with Sergeant Ramirez, was probative of his

29
consciousness of guilt. Thus, the evidence supporting the bribery
charge would have been admissible in connection with the DUI
charge regardless of whether Keukelaar was charged with
bribery.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

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