People v. Duckworth CA3

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Filed 12/5/24 P. v. Duckworth CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
----

THE PEOPLE, C099323

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No.
CRF210007374)
v.

JOEL MARTIN DUCKWORTH,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Joel Martin Duckworth appeals a judgment entered following his no
contest pleas to assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (a)(1)),
maintaining a place for the sale of controlled substances (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366),
and possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377), as well as his
failure to complete the residential treatment program contemplated by his plea agreement.
Defendant raises three arguments on appeal. First, he complains his right to due
process was violated when the trial court failed to honor the terms of his plea agreement
for which defendant requests specific enforcement of the agreement’s terms. Defendant

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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next complains the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow him to
withdraw from the plea agreement because there had been no “meeting of the minds as to
crucial components of the plea” agreement. (Capitalization omitted.) Finally, defendant
complains his counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to “adequately advise
appellant of the terms of the plea agreement.” (Capitalization omitted.) We will affirm
the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Charges and Plea Agreement
The People’s information charged defendant with robbery (§ 211; count 1), assault
with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 2 & 3), and false imprisonment by violence
(§ 236; counts 4 & 5). The information further alleged defendant personally used a
firearm under section 12022.53, subdivision (b) in the commission of count 1 and used a
firearm under section 12022.5, subdivision (a) in the commission of all counts.
Defendant’s jury trial started on March 8, 2022. The parties later agreed to
continue the matter to March 16, 2022, with the understanding that defendant could be
released to a treatment program or supervised while released on his own recognizance.
On March 16, 2022, the trial court approved the negotiated plea agreement
resolving the matter by adding to the information a count of assault with a deadly weapon
(§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 6), maintaining a place for the sale of controlled substances
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11366; count 7), and possession of a controlled substance (Health
& Saf. Code, § 11377; count 8) to which defendant pleaded no contest. In exchange, the
remaining counts and allegations were dismissed.
The plea agreement further provided that defendant would not be immediately
sentenced and would be on supervised release pending entry into a residential treatment
program to be selected in coordination with the public defender’s social worker; upon
completion of the program, defendant would be permitted to withdraw his plea to assault
with a deadly weapon nunc pro tunc. If, after completion of the residential treatment

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program, defendant remained free of violations while on supervised release on his own
recognizance for a year, he would be allowed to withdraw his plea to maintaining a place
for the sale of controlled substances nunc pro tunc and would then be sentenced on only
the misdemeanor possession charge.
The length of the residential treatment program had not been negotiated, although
the trial court suggested a program of “six months to one year, whichever, so long as it’s a
good program and it complies with what you need to have done.” Similarly, the exact
time for defendant to enter the residential treatment program was not specified.
However, the trial court admonished defendant not to commit any offenses or “blow[] it
while you’re pending that entry into the program,” and the court set dates to monitor
defendant’s entry into and progress in the treatment program. Accordingly, it appears the
parties understood that defendant should enter the residential treatment program as soon
as reasonably practicable.2 In fact, the court set the first review date for a month out, but
remarked “I am expecting to see you before that, though, because you are going to be
getting into a program more quickly than that. Okay?” The court further admonished
defendant that if he failed to comply with the plea agreement then all charges would be
on his record and would carry consequences for possible sentences going forward.
Finally, the court warned that if defendant failed to comply with the agreement, he would
not be allowed to withdraw his plea.
B. Defendant’s Failed Efforts at Residential Treatment
Due to defendant’s need to restore his Medi-Cal health insurance to access funds
to pay for treatment, his need to have and recover from knee surgery following

2 According to the district attorney’s declaration filed in opposition to defendant’s later
motion to withdraw his plea, that attorney spoke openly with defendant’s counsel “about
the need for defendant to go right into a residential treatment program due to his level of
addiction.”

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restoration of Medi-Cal, and the lack of bed availability, it took defendant approximately
seven months to enter his residential treatment program of choice, Empire Recovery
Center (Empire). Defendant requested and received extensions in short increments for
these delays. Empire was a 90-day program, authorized through Medi-Cal in 30-day
increments. Defendant entered the Empire program in October 2022 and was expelled in
November 2022 for violating a no visitation rule in place because of COVID-19.3
Nonetheless, defendant’s attorney reported to the trial court that defendant was in the
process of being admitted to another residential treatment program, Visions of the Cross,
but a bed was not currently available. The court and the People acquiesced in allowing
defendant that opportunity, and the court admonished defendant to comply with all the
rules of his next program.
Defendant was still pending admission to Visions of the Cross in December 2022,
but had made progress and was awaiting an open bed. Defendant was admitted to the
Visions of the Cross program on January 18, 2023.
As of March 9, 2023 (almost one year out from defendant’s plea agreement), he
was still participating in Visions of the Cross, but that program had expressed concern
about defendant’s disruptive behavior and lack of commitment. Defendant explained
there had been difficulties because of differences in “values” leading to “some
unfortunate events,” but defendant stated he had worked with the program director and
others to address those issues. The trial court admonished defendant to humbly approach
the issues and “search yourself to change it.” While commenting that defendant’s
agreement had put “sentencing out about a year,” the court elected to give defendant

3 According to a letter from Empire submitted with defendant’s presentence probation
report, defendant entered the program on October 5, 2022, and was discharged on
November 14, 2022, with credit for 40 days’ participation. Defendant was “discharged
for violating program rules” and “had a difficult time adjusting to the structure of the
program and abiding by its rules.”

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additional “time to finish the in-patient portion.” Defendant was expelled from the
program on March 13, 2023, and the People asked for the matter to be set “to address
[defendant] and his inability to follow through with the plea bargain he entered into,”
noting this was defendant’s second program.
In April 2023, defendant reported he had entered outpatient treatment, and in May
2023, defendant informed the trial court that following his discharge from residential
treatment, he had entered “IOP,” which he described as a 90-day outpatient program with
the same curricula as his previous residential programs minus the residential component,
and that he was thriving. While commending defendant on his continued commitment to
treatment, the court determined it was reasonable to set the matter for sentencing (a
notion agreed to by defendant’s attorney) and sentencing was set for June.
C. Defendant’s Request to Withdraw from the Plea Agreement and Sentencing
At the first sentencing hearing on June 22, 2023, the trial court indicated its intent
to follow probation’s sentencing recommendations, noting defendant had not complied
with “a series of preconditions to some benefits” of his plea agreement. Defendant
initially requested a Marsden4 hearing, but later asked for and was granted a two-week
continuance to allow different defense counsel to be present. In the interim, on July 12,
2023, the probation department recovered suspected methamphetamine and a
methamphetamine pipe in a search of defendant’s residence. At the next hearing,
defendant was represented by different counsel and obtained a continuance to allow him
to explore filing a motion to withdraw his plea, which he filed on August 3, 2023.
Defendant’s motion argued his plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary
and that he failed to understand the consequences of his plea. Specifically, defendant
argued his plea was not knowing because the requirements concerning the treatment

4 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

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component of his agreement shifted during negotiations, resulting in acceptance of “an
unclear term, which was accepted in haste.”
According to defendant’s declaration, he understood the People’s original offer
was that sentencing would be delayed 18-months for him to complete a three-month
residential treatment program and complete other conditions of the agreement. The
People withdrew this offer, but settlement became possible again during trial after the
victims changed part of their story. Because defendant did not want to be in custody
while awaiting admission to a residential treatment program, he accepted certain
modifications to the original deal, including “instead of a three-month treatment program
it turned into a six to twelve month program.” Defendant complained “[t]hese changes in
terms were not discussed properly with me, especially the impossibility of fulfilling the
lengthier treatment program given my religious beliefs.” Nonetheless, defendant
accepted the deal “[b]ecause [he] was tired and scared and wanted to go home . . . .”
Defendant admitted he was discharged from Empire after 40 days and discharged from
Visions of the Cross after 60 days, but complained he did not realize he could not
combine his participation in these programs or use an outpatient treatment program to
comply with the conditions of the agreement. Defendant fired his attorney because that
attorney agreed defendant had not complied with the terms of his plea agreement.
Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea was heard on August 14, 2023.
Defendant argued he thought he had to complete only a three-month residential program,
whereas the agreement he ultimately entered into required a 6- to 12-month program. He
completed “chunks of time at residential programs” as well as a 90-day outpatient
program,5 but did not understand this would not satisfy the conditions of his plea. The
People countered that the agreement required defendant to complete a residential

5 The record does not support this assertion, as defendant did not complete his outpatient
treatment program.

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treatment program without specification of length, defendant had been given multiple
opportunities to complete a residential treatment program (including authorized delays to
accommodate various issues from funding to medical conditions), but defendant had not
completed a residential treatment program and had ultimately been arrested for
possession of a controlled substance. The trial court observed the length of the program
had possibly been specified given notations to the change of plea form, but that the
application of any specification was moot because defendant had failed to complete a
residential program of any length. Ultimately, the court denied defendant’s motion,
finding he had made an insufficient showing. Defendant knew the essential terms of his
agreement, and there was “no substantive difference between what he thought the deal
was and what he thought was a good one versus what happened here.”
The trial court then proceeded to sentencing, indicating it was inclined to grant
defendant probation in light of his rehabilitative efforts and progress, despite his
noncompliance with the terms of the plea agreement and his picking up a new case. The
People agreed to dismiss defendant’s new case in the interests of justice, as well as to
dismiss count eight in the current case, which the trial court did. The court suspended
imposition of sentence and placed defendant on two years of formal probation under
specified terms and conditions. Defendant timely appealed and received a certificate of
probable cause
II. DISCUSSION
A. Due Process
Defendant complains his right to due process was violated when the trial court
failed to honor the terms of his plea agreement and requests specific enforcement of the
agreement’s terms. We are unpersuaded.
“Plea negotiations and agreements are an accepted and ‘integral component of the
criminal justice system and essential to the expeditious and fair administration of our
courts.’ [Citations.] Plea agreements benefit that system by promoting speed, economy,

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and the finality of judgments.” (People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 929.) “Because
a ‘negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract,’ it is interpreted according to general
contract principles. (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767, citing Civ. Code,
§ 1635 et seq.) Acceptance of the agreement binds the court and the parties to the
agreement. [Citations.] ‘ “When a guilty [or nolo contendere] plea is entered in
exchange for specified benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed
maximum punishment, both parties, including the state, must abide by the terms of the
agreement.” ’ ” (Segura, at pp. 930-931.) “Due process requires that both the defendant
and the prosecution abide by the terms of the plea agreement . . . .” (People v. Silva
(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 578, 587, citing People v. Villalobos (2012) 54 Cal.4th 117, 182.)
Defendant’s due process argument is premised on the assumption that the trial
court set the sentencing hearing only because of a misunderstanding that there was a one-
year limit to complete the preconditions of his plea agreement. This is a red herring.
Although the trial court made some comments suggesting a timing element (which
neither party ever contradicted nor objected to), the more serious issue and actual trigger
necessitating a sentencing hearing was defendant’s failure to complete any residential
treatment program whatsoever.
When the People learned in April 2023 that defendant had failed a second
residential treatment program, they asked for the matter to be set as soon as possible “to
address [defendant] and his inability to follow through with the plea bargain he entered
into.” The next month the trial court (as agreed to by defendant’s counsel) determined it
was reasonable to set the matter for sentencing. By the time of the August 2023
sentencing hearing, it had been approximately 17 months since defendant had agreed to
complete a residential treatment program. However, he had not done so. Defendant does
not challenge that the plea agreement required the completion of a residential treatment
program. In fact, his own declaration in support of his motion to withdraw from the plea

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agreement clearly sets forth that all iterations of this agreement included completion of a
residential treatment program.
Moreover, while defendant is correct that the parties’ plea agreement did not
expressly specify a time limit for completing such residential program (although
reasonable limits might be inferred from the lengths of any such anticipated program),
there was also no provision affording defendant the right to enter multiple residential
treatment programs, much less a third program after defendant failed two previous
programs. Rather, the agreement clearly stated defendant was to complete a single
residential treatment program. Accordingly, because defendant violated his plea
agreement by failing to complete a residential treatment program—twice—he cannot
show he was prejudiced by any alleged misinterpretation the trial court made in also
potentially imposing a deadline for him to complete the preconditions of his plea
agreement. Had the trial court proceeded to sentence defendant while he was still
engaged in a residential treatment program, we would entertain this argument, but that is
not the case here.
B. Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw His Plea
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to
allow him to withdraw from the plea agreement because there had been no “meeting of
the minds as to crucial components of the plea” agreement. (Capitalization omitted.) We
disagree.6

6 Respondent is mistaken in arguing this claim should be dismissed. We do not construe
defendant’s request for a certificate of probable cause asking permission to appeal the
trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea as equating to defendant taking an
appeal from a trial court’s order denying such motion, rather than from defendant’s
judgment. Accordingly, there is no portion of defendant’s appeal that requires dismissal,
and we will address the merits of his claims. (See, e.g., People v. Francis (1954)
42 Cal.2d 335, 336-338 [reviewing the merits of the denial of defendant’s motion to
withdraw his plea after dismissing the portion of the appeal taken directly from the trial

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“A guilty plea may be withdrawn any time before judgment for good cause shown.
(Pen. Code, § 1018; [citation].)” (People v. Hunt (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 95, 102; accord,
People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 565.) “Mistake, ignorance or any other factor
overcoming the exercise of free judgment is good cause for withdrawal of a guilty plea.
[Citations.] But good cause must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.” (Cruz, at
p. 566; see Hunt, at p. 103.) In addition, a defendant must demonstrate that he would not
have accepted the plea but for the mistake. (People v. Breslin (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th
1409, 1416.) “Grant or denial of a motion [to withdraw] lies within the trial court’s
sound discretion after consideration of all factors necessary to effectuate a just result; a
reviewing court will not disturb its decision unless abuse is clearly demonstrated.”
(Hunt, at p. 103.) “Guilty pleas resulting from a bargain should not be set aside lightly
and finality of proceedings should be encouraged.” (Ibid.) “[A] reviewing court must
adopt the trial court’s factual findings if substantial evidence supports them.” (People v.
Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254.)
Here, defendant sought to withdraw from his plea agreement after failing to
comply with it by arguing his plea was not knowing because the requirements concerning
the treatment component of his agreement shifted during negotiations, resulting in
acceptance of “an unclear term, which was accepted in haste.” The trial court rejected his
argument, finding defendant knew the essential terms of his agreement, and there was “no
substantive difference between what he thought the deal was and what he thought was a
good one versus what happened here.” Substantial evidence supports this determination.
As we have explained, there is no question that defendant understood he was
entering into an agreement that required him to complete a residential treatment program
as the first step in the process of obtaining certain specified benefits of his plea

court’s order denying defendant’s motion]; People v. Johnson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 668, 679
[defendant must obtain a certificate of probable cause to appeal denial of a motion to
withdraw from a guilty plea].)

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agreement. Defendant’s own declaration admits as much. As such, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion. (People v. Hunt, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 103.) Nor would
allowing defendant to withdraw his plea after he failed to abide by the agreement’s terms
promote a just result. (Ibid.; § 1018.) Defendant was expressly warned of the
consequences of failing to comply with the plea agreement. He was also admonished that
he would not be permitted to withdraw from his plea if he failed to comply with that
agreement, and defendant confirmed that he understood. Defendant has not shown by
clear and convincing evidence that he did not understand that he had to complete a
residential treatment program (People v. Cruz, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 566) or that he
would not have entered into that agreement but for his mistake (People v. Breslin, supra,
205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416). His apparent change of heart following his failure to
complete two residential treatment programs is not good cause. (Ibid. [“ ‘[a] plea may
not be withdrawn simply because the defendant has changed his [or her] mind’ ”].)
Nor are we persuaded by defendant’s argument that he did not understand there
was a time limit for completion of his obligations under the agreement or that he must be
permitted to withdraw from the plea agreement because it is unenforceable for failure of
the parties to agree on a material term, specifically, how long defendant had to complete
the requirements of that agreement. Again, defendant knew he needed to complete a
residential treatment program and failed two of them, thus violating his agreement as
explained earlier. The asserted ambiguity regarding the length of time to finish his
obligations under the plea agreement does not change the fact that he had already failed
to comply with the agreement’s first precondition to being allowed to withdraw any of his
pleas. Accordingly, his claim fails.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Finally, defendant complains his counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing
to “adequately advise appellant of the terms of the plea agreement.” (Capitalization

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omitted.) This claim fails because defendant cannot establish counsel’s alleged deficient
performance was prejudicial.
“[T]o establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and that the defendant suffered
prejudice as a result of such deficient performance.” (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th
181, 198; see Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-692.) “[A] court need
not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. . . . If it is
easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,
which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” (Strickland, at
p. 697.) To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must show “a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different.” (Mickel, at p. 198.)

Here, defendant complains his counsel failed to adequately inform him of the
required length for his residential treatment program, that participation in treatment
programs could not be combined to meet that requirement, and that he had a limited
amount of time to comply with his obligations under the plea agreement. However, any
asserted shortcomings of counsel could not have prejudiced him because, as we have
explained at length throughout this opinion, it was defendant’s expulsion from two
residential treatment programs that resulted in his breach of the plea agreement’s
requirement that he complete a residential treatment program, which in turn triggered
sentencing.
Although the agreement did not specify that defendant could make multiple
attempts at completing this requirement, he was afforded the opportunity to complete two
separate residential treatment programs and was expelled from both. As such, his
argument that he did not know he could not combine treatment programs is unsuccessful.
He did not complete two programs and then attempted to combine them in an effort to

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meet the agreement’s requirements (under which scenario he might have an argument he
was prejudiced). Rather, defendant completed no residential treatment programs. This is
true despite the trial court and the People accommodating numerous delays over several
months so that defendant could attend the nonsecular residential treatment program of his
choice, the Empire program. Defendant’s arguments on reply that he would not have
entered into the plea agreement had he known that he had to complete the Visions of the
Cross residential treatment program are not supported by the record as defendant’s
declaration in support of his motion to withdraw his plea did not say he would not have
entered the plea agreement under these circumstances. Further, this argument completely
ignores that this was defendant’s second residential treatment program, attempted only
after he was expelled from his preferred program. Accordingly, defendant has not
demonstrated any of his attorney’s complained-of deficiencies prejudiced him.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.*

We concur:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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