CourtListener 10287166•People v. Jimenez CA3
Texto completo
Filed 12/3/24 P. v. Jimenez CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yolo)
----
THE PEOPLE, C100123
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CR-2014-3525)
v.
SALVADOR JIMENEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2014, a jury found defendant Salvador Jimenez guilty of four counts of second
degree robbery and one count of attempted second degree robbery; the trial court then
sentenced him, under the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12),1
to an aggregate term of 110 years to life in state prison. In 2022, the Secretary of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Secretary of CDCR) sent a letter to the
1 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
1
trial court recommending that defendant’s sentence be recalled and that he be
resentenced. The trial court recalled defendant’s sentence and, after a hearing, reimposed
the same sentence as was originally imposed.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
(1) declining to resentence him to a sentence proportionate to the seriousness of his
offenses, (2) refusing to strike one or both of his prior strikes, and (3) declining to dismiss
his two five-year prior serious felony enhancements. He further asserts that (4) the trial
court erred in failing to prepare an amended abstract of judgment updating his actual
custody credits. We will direct the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment
reflecting defendant’s updated custody credits. We otherwise will affirm.
BACKGROUND
Defendant’s 2014 Trial and Sentencing
For context, we provide facts from our unpublished opinion in defendant’s appeal
from the judgment, pertaining only to those counts on which defendant was found guilty.
(People v. Jimenez (Sept. 23, 2015), C077694) [nonpub. opn.].)2
“On July 7, 2014, [M.O.] was working at [a yogurt shop] . . . in Woodland when a
man came into the store wearing a hat and sunglasses, with a piece of paper covering his
mouth. He came up to the counter, told [M.O.] to give him the money, and said he had a
gun. His left hand was in his pocket, and there was something bulky inside. She
removed about $300 from the cash register, and the man took it and fled on a bike. . . .
[¶] . . . [¶]
“On July 10, 2014, [T.M.] and [L.L.] were working together at [a beauty supply
store] . . . in Woodland when a man came into the store wearing a baseball cap and
sunglasses, with a paper towel covering his mouth. He had a zippered pouch under his
2 We granted the People’s request to incorporate by reference the record from
defendant’s previous appeal.
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arm. He came up to the counter and said, ‘I’m going to make this short but sweet
. . . give me the money.’ He told them he had a gun and pulled out the gun half way from
the zippered pouch. [T.M.] and [L.L.] quickly took out a little less than $200 and handed
it to the man. . . .
[¶] . . . [¶]
“On July 16, 2014, [M.T.] was working at [a pizza restaurant] . . . in Woodland
when a man came into the store wearing a baseball cap, sunglasses, and a medical mask
and told her to empty the register or he would pull out a gun. She emptied the register
and gave the man about $155, and the man fled on a bike. . . .
[¶] . . . [¶]
“On July 18, 2014, [F.O.] was working at [a fast food restaurant] . . . in Woodland
when a man came into the restaurant wearing a cap, dark glasses, a cup lid covering his
mouth, and holding a pouch in his hand. The man said she needed to open the cash
register and if she didn’t, he was going to pull a gun on her. [F.O.] responded that she
needed to take some tacos out of the oven or they would burn, told him to stay, and then
she went back to see her manager. He stayed for about three minutes and then left the
restaurant. . . .” (People v. Jimenez, supra, C077694).)
A 2014 information charged defendant with six counts of second degree robbery
(§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); counts 1, 3-7) and one count of attempted second degree
robbery (§§ 21a, 211, 212.5, subd. (c), 213, subd. (b); count 2). The information alleged
defendant had two prior strike convictions (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)), two prior serious felony
convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and that he had served a prior prison term for a violent
felony (§ 667.5, subds. (a), (c)).
A jury found defendant guilty of four counts of second degree robbery and one
count of attempted second degree robbery. The trial court sentenced defendant to an
aggregate term of 110 years to life consisting of consecutive terms of 25 years to life on
counts 2, 3, 5, and 7, plus two five-year terms for his section 667, subdivision (a) prior
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serious felony enhancements. The trial court imposed a concurrent term of 25 years to
life on count 6 and imposed and stayed the term for the section 667.5 prior prison term
enhancement.
Defendant’s Motion for Recall and Resentencing
In 2022, the Secretary of CDCR sent a letter to the trial court recommending that
defendant’s sentence be recalled and that he be resentenced. Months later, defendant
filed a motion for recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.1, including requests
that the trial court strike his strike priors (see People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero)), and his two five-year prior serious felony enhancements
(§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
With his petition, defendant submitted the letter from the Secretary of CDCR and
its attachments, including a case summary. The case summary detailed defendant’s
criminal and parole history; indicated that he had not tested positive in four random drug
tests; stated he had no pending disciplinary actions and that he had remained discipline-
free while incarcerated; and detailed defendant’s work history and favorable performance
reviews while incarcerated. It also noted programs and educational pursuits in which
defendant has participated.
Defendant also submitted a “social history,” detailing his background. Topics
covered included his childhood, his parental abandonment, and his history of drug use.
According to the social history, the childhood trauma of parental abandonment increased
his vulnerability to addiction.
Additionally, defendant submitted an analysis by a client advocate including
defendant’s release plan. Defendant’s Static Risk Assessment score on a scale of one to
five was one, indicating the lowest risk to reoffend. His Correctional Offender
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions or COMPAS dynamic risk assessment
also indicated he was a low risk in all respects with the exception of substance abuse, for
which he was characterized as a high risk. The analysis detailed defendant’s success at
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maintaining his sobriety for nine years while incarcerated and his plan for continuing to
do so upon his release. The analysis also stated that defendant’s supervisor at the canteen
where he worked had stated that defendant “ ‘displayed exceptional work performance,
punctuality, and leadership ability in every area of his assignment,’ ” and that “due to his
‘strong work ethic, positive attitude, leadership ability, and conformity to established
rules and guidelines,’ . . . ‘he should be considered an asset in any employment situation
within or out of prison.’ ” The client advocate stated defendant had high levels of family
support, and he intended to reside in parole-funded housing or with his mother upon
release.
Finally, defendant submitted letters in support from his mother, his sister, a teacher
at the Tulare Lake Adult School located at the substance abuse treatment facility in the
prison, and defendant’s work supervisor.
The Recall and Resentencing Hearing
The trial court began the resentencing hearing by stating that it had “read the
ample and very helpful briefing,” but wanted to hear further argument.
Defense counsel emphasized defendant’s childhood trauma resulting from parental
abandonment and neglect which led to his “serious drug addiction in adulthood.”
Defense counsel argued that defendant’s drug addiction directly contributed to the
commission of his prior and current offenses. Defendant had not used any drugs since his
arrest in 2014 and had not tested positive in random drug testing in prison. He also had
not had a rule violation in nine years of incarceration. His static risk assessment score
was the lowest possible and he was at the lowest security level possible given the nature
of his offenses. Defendant earned praise in his work assignments. Defense counsel
argued that defendant was not a public safety risk. Defense counsel also argued that, at
age 57, defendant presented a drastically reduced risk to public safety.
The trial court steered the discussion to defendant’s request to strike his strike
priors and why he did not come within the spirit of the Three Strikes law. Defense
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counsel argued that defendant’s adult criminal record was “relatively minimal” and no
one was hurt in the robberies. She emphasized he used a fake gun, if anything, in the
robberies. She also argued that defendant’s drug addiction fueled his criminal acts.
The People argued that defendant had a serious criminal history involving
numerous robberies and that he came within the spirit of the Three Strikes law. The
People emphasized that, in one prior strike, defendant brandished a knife. In the current
offenses, he committed a “string of crimes; multiple businesses, multiple victims, and
multiple days.” The People argued that what defendant had accomplished postconviction
“falls short.” The People also questioned the causal connection between defendant’s
childhood trauma and drug addiction and the robberies.
The Trial Court’s Determination
The trial court ruled: “I think this is a very challenging case. . . . Defendant is
really to be applauded for his postconviction factors, . . . to use the language from Penal
Code, § 1172.1. . . . [C]learly he’s addressing his substance abuse, clearly he’s doing a
lot of other things that I won’t get into and that I think is clear from the record, that I
think . . . really worked greatly in his favor of those factors. [¶] That being said, this is
why this is such a challenging case, is I think his sentence falls squarely in the spirit of
the three strikes law . . . for the reasons I think that the People articulate in that . . . the
prior strikes are both robberies, and that he committed this string of robberies . . . in July
of 2014 while he was paroled . . . for a robbery charge. So I think that that is something
that . . . the Court is also considering, and that . . . , when you think about [Romero,
supra, 13 Cal.4th 497] and you think about . . . whether the sentence is warranted. [¶]
. . . [T]his Court does believe that considering all of the factors in its discretion and
interest of justice, it is not going to disturb the sentence that was handed down. It is
going to keep it. I believe that that is appropriate based on what I’ve heard here. And I
say that understanding, again, that the Defendant has been doing quite a bit . . . in prison,
and I do really applaud him for that, and I don’t take that decision lightly. But . . . the
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Court does believe that that sentence is appropriate, and although I do appreciate the
motion and the Defendant’s position, the sentence shall remain.”
DISCUSSION
I
Reimposing the Same Sentence
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in resentencing him
because the sentence imposed is disproportionate to the seriousness of his offenses. He
asserts the trial court did not give serious consideration to any postconviction factors
which showed a greatly reduced risk for future violence. He also argues that his
psychological and childhood trauma led to a substance use disorder which contributed to
the commission of his offenses. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion.
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of CDCR, the trial court may “recall
the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the
same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced . . . provided the new sentence,
if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) Where
resentencing is recommended, the “presumption favoring recall and resentencing of the
defendant” in section 1172.1, subdivision (b)(2) “is intended to apply to the initial
determination of whether to grant a request to recall and resentence, but . . . the sentence
ultimately imposed by the court is left to its discretion without any further application of
the presumption.” (People v. Braggs (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 809, 820.)
“We review the trial court’s decision whether to recall a defendant’s sentence for
an abuse of discretion.” (People v. McCallum (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 202, 211.) We also
review the trial court’s discretionary sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion.
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374-375 (Carmony).) In reviewing for an
abuse of discretion, we “examine[] the ruling of the trial court and ask[] whether it
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exceeds the bounds of reason or is arbitrary, whimsical or capricious.” (People v.
Jackson (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1018.)
“In recalling and resentencing pursuant to [section 1172.1], the court shall
consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and
record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects
whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the
defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have
changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice. . . . The court shall consider if the defendant has experienced
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse,
neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence, . . . and whether those circumstances were a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(5).)
As discussed ante, defense counsel emphasized defendant’s childhood trauma
resulting from parental abandonment, which led to defendant’s “serious drug addiction in
adulthood.” Counsel also argued that defendant’s drug addiction directly contributed to
the commission of his prior and current offenses and emphasized defendant’s sobriety,
stating that he had not used drugs since his arrest in 2014. She discussed defendant’s
favorable work performance reviews and his low-risk assessment and security level
ratings. Additionally, she emphasized that, at age 57, defendant was a low risk to public
safety.
After argument concluded, the trial court referred to these postconviction factors,
praised defendant for addressing his substance abuse problems, and added that defendant
was “doing a lot of other things . . . that . . . really worked greatly in his favor of those
factors.” The court later emphasized again that defendant “has been doing quite a bit
. . . in prison, and I do really applaud him for that . . . .”
Ultimately, however, the trial court found that defendant’s case fell squarely in the
spirit of the Three Strikes law and reimposed the original sentence. The court relied on
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the fact that defendant’s “prior strikes are both robberies, and that he committed this
string of robberies . . . in July of 2014 while he was paroled . . . for a robbery charge.”
The court determined that reimposing the same sentence was “appropriate based on what
I’ve heard here.” The court concluded that it “does believe that that sentence is
appropriate . . . .”
The parties’ submissions and arguments and the trial court’s remarks plainly
establish that the court did consider defendant’s position and weighed the appropriate
factors in resentencing him. Defendant’s contention that the court did not give “serious
consideration” to any postconviction factors is belied by the record. Other than detailing
the postconviction factors he claims the court failed to seriously consider and asserting
that his trauma and addiction contributed to the commission of his offenses, defendant
does not otherwise articulate any argument as to how his sentence was an abuse of
discretion as disproportionate to the seriousness of his offenses.
“ ‘[W]here the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts
and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law,’ ” a reviewing
court “ ‘shall affirm the trial court’s ruling, even if we might have ruled differently in the
first instance.’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) Here, we cannot characterize
the trial court’s determination as exceeding the bounds of reason or as arbitrary,
whimsical, or capricious. (See People v. Jackson, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018.)
II
Prior Strike Convictions
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in declining to strike one or
both of his prior strike convictions. He asserts the trial court gave no weight to the
factors that indicated a lesser sentence would be appropriate.
Under Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497, a trial court has discretion under section
1385, subdivision (a) to strike a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction when the
defendant falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. (People v. Williams (1998)
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17 Cal.4th 148, 160-161.) In considering whether to strike one or more prior strike
convictions, the trial court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions,
and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be
deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as
though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent
felonies.” (Id. at p. 161.)
We review a trial court’s refusal to strike a prior strike conviction for abuse of
discretion. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 374.) It “ ‘is not enough to show that
reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more’ prior conviction
allegations.” (Id. at p. 378.) A “ ‘trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its
decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’ ” (Id.
at p. 377.)
Defendant’s first prior strike conviction was a 1996 second degree robbery, in
which he entered a Woodland business, showed the handle of what appeared to be a gun,
demanded and obtained money from an employee, and fled. He pled guilty to second
degree robbery and was placed on probation. His second prior strike was a 1998
conviction of second degree robbery, committed while he was on probation. In this
instance, a department store’s loss prevention officer discovered that defendant had cut
off part of a shoe. When the loss prevention officer followed defendant outside the store,
defendant brandished a knife. Defendant was found guilty of, among other things, two
felony counts of second degree robbery, and felony possession of methamphetamine, and
was sentenced to a term of 16 years four months in prison. Defendant was released to
parole supervision in 2011 and discharged from parole in 2012.
Defendant’s present felonies include four second degree robbery counts and one
attempted second degree robbery. In each of the robberies, defendant entered a business
with sunglasses on and his face concealed, indicated he had a gun, demanded and
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received money, and fled. (People v. Jimenez, supra, C077694).) In one case, he
partially drew what appeared to be a gun from a pouch. (Ibid.) Defendant followed the
same pattern in the fast food restaurant but, because he left without taking any money,
this resulted in an attempted robbery conviction. (Ibid.) When defendant was arrested,
he had in his jacket “a black toy gun that looked like a real semiautomatic handgun.”
(Ibid.)
Here again, defendant emphasizes his parental abandonment, the drug addiction
that followed, and his contention that his addiction contributed to his offenses. He argues
that he had been using methamphetamine since he was 20 years old, he was transient for
the month preceding his arrest, and he was using methamphetamine every other day at
that time, but has been sober since his arrest in 2014 and has not had a serious rules
violation, had participated in programs, and has high levels of family support.
Contrary to defendant’s contention that the trial court gave these factors
insufficient weight, the record establishes that the court considered them. These factors
were addressed in the parties’ submissions, emphasized at the hearing, and the court
commented on them more than once in rendering its decision.
Defendant relies on People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, in which the
Court of Appeal determined that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the
defendant’s Romero motion. (Id. at pp. 1138-1139, 1140.) Avila concluded that the trial
court failed to consider the remoteness of the defendant’s prior strikes, which were 28
and 26 years old. (Id. at p. 1141.) The Court of Appeal also emphasized that the
defendant committed his prior strikes when he was under the age of 21 and noted the
“increasing recognition that young adults are constitutionally different from adults for
sentencing purposes . . . .” (Id. at pp. 1141-1142.) The Court of Appeal disapproved of
the trial court’s characterization of the current offenses as “violent” and “brutal,” stating:
“When the victims refused to give [the defendant] money, he destroyed several bags of
oranges and left. While we do not make light of this intimidating behavior, it was not
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violent or brutal by any stretch. [The defendant] did not use a weapon or otherwise use
physical violence against the victims, nor did he make any specific threats. He squashed
oranges.” (Id. at p. 1142.) Additionally, the Court of Appeal noted that the defendant had
“not committed a violent felony since his strike offenses, showing that the severity of his
record is decreasing.” (Id. at p. 1143.) The Court of Appeal concluded: “Despite the
trial court’s characterization of the facts, [the defendant’s] current offenses were not
violent and, on the spectrum of criminal behavior, fall closer to the end of less
reprehensible conduct. Much of his criminal conduct appears to be related to his drug
addiction rather than to sinister motives and falls well outside the realm of what could be
considered the work of a career criminal.” (Id. at p. 1145.)
This case is distinguishable in numerous respects. At the time of his current
offenses, defendant’s prior strike convictions, while remote, were not as remote as those
in Avila, approximately 16 and 18 years earlier, and defendant was incarcerated for 12 of
the intervening years. Defendant’s prior strikes also were not committed when he was a
youth. And defendant’s current offenses are categorized as violent felonies (§§ 667.5,
subd. (c)(9), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1)), although defendant did not physically injure any
victims, and, unlike the defendant in Avila, defendant here did make threats, specifically
that he had or would pull out a gun. Additionally, while the severity of the defendant’s
crimes in Avila was decreasing, here, defendant remained on a level trajectory, repeatedly
committing the same strike offense.
Defendant also relies on People v. Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, which, the
Court of Appeal concluded, “presents that rare instance of an absurd result under the
Three Strikes law . . . .” (Id. at p. 1031.) In Dryden, the charged offenses “resulted from
a late-night, spontaneous altercation . . . . Defendant struck two members of a group of
five young men with a bamboo stick, scratching one and raising a welt on the neck of the
other. Witnesses did not provide a clear picture of the genesis of the encounter . . . .”
(Ibid.) The Court of Appeal found that the “record does not support the trial court’s
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conclusion that this nighttime encounter . . . was similar to defendant’s prior strikes
which . . . were characterized by either substantial violence or the deliberate entry into
homes to steal. We recognize, as did the trial court, that defendant has a number of
significant prior convictions, but they are not similar to the events underlying this case.”
(Ibid.) Additionally, the defendant had a “ ‘history of homelessness, mental health issues,
and alcoholism [which] most likely contributed to his actions . . . .’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, unlike Dryden, four of defendant’s five current offenses are the same as his
prior strikes. One of the two prior strikes presented a nearly identical fact pattern to the
charged offenses, and the other involved defendant brandishing a knife. Additionally, in
Dryden, the charged offenses involved an unexplained and spontaneous altercation.
Here, defendant committed three second degree robberies involving four victims, and
attempted an additional robbery, over the course of 11 days.
With regard to the overarching consideration of whether it would be appropriate to
strike his prior strike offenses to avoid an unjust sentence, defendant observes that “the
Legislature has stated that the ‘interests of justice’ under section 1385 include ensuring
defendants receive proportionate punishment.” (Nazir v. Superior Court (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 478, 495.) He asserts that his “current punishment of 110-years to life is
disproportionate to the offenses and does not serve the interests of justice, public safety,
or the community.”
The sentence reimposed by the trial court is a lengthy one. But we cannot find an
abuse of discretion. The sentence is long because of the Three Strikes law, to which
defendant became subject by committing two prior strikes, and because he was convicted
of four counts of second degree robbery and an attempted second degree robbery.
“Because the circumstances must be ‘extraordinary . . . by which a career criminal can be
deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely falls once
he commits a strike as part of a long and continuous criminal record, . . . the
circumstances where no reasonable people could disagree that the criminal falls outside
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the spirit of the three strikes scheme must be even more extraordinary.” (Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) We conclude that the trial court’s decision was not “ ‘so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’ ” (Id. at p. 377.)
III
Prior Serious Felony Enhancements
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in declining to dismiss his
two section 667, subdivision (a) five-year prior serious felony enhancements given the
presence of statutory mitigating circumstances. According to defendant, the trial court
made no finding that releasing him early would endanger public safety, and he asserts it
would not. We again find no abuse of discretion.
A. Section 1385 and Standard of Review
“Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in
the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited
by any initiative statute.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) In exercising its discretion “the court
shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that
any of the” statutory mitigating circumstances in section 1385, subdivisions (c)(2)(A) to
(c)(2)(I) are present. (Id., subd. (c)(2).) “Proof of the presence of one or more of these
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court
finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public
safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in
physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (Ibid.)
“We review a court’s decision to deny a motion to strike a five-year prior serious
felony enhancement for an abuse of discretion.” (People v. Shaw (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th
582, 587.) “ ‘ “[T]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that
the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a
showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing
14
objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be
set aside on review.” ’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376-377.)
B. Additional Relevant Background
In his motion for recall and resentencing, defendant argued that several statutory
mitigating circumstances applied, specifically: “Application of the enhancement would
result in a discriminatory racial impact as described in paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) of
Section 745” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(A)); the “current offense is connected to mental
illness” (Id., subd. (c)(2)(D)); the “current offense is connected to prior victimization or
childhood trauma” (Id., subd. (c)(2)(E)); the “enhancement is based on a prior conviction
that is over five years old” (Id., subd. (c)(2)(H)); and, although “a firearm was used in the
current offense, it was inoperable or unloaded” (Id., subd. (c)(2)(I)). He also argued that
postconviction factors supported the dismissal of the enhancements.
In opposition, the People addressed each of the statutory mitigating circumstances,
and further argued that public safety demanded that the trial court deny defendant’s
request to strike the enhancements. And at the hearing, the People emphasized that the
trial court had the discretion to strike the section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements, but
argued that, “while it certainly seems [defendant] is gaining insight,” his postconviction
efforts at rehabilitation do “not demonstrate that public safety would not still be
impacted . . . .”
Defense counsel argued that “several of the interest of justice factors apply,” and
discussed those statutory mitigating circumstances. Defense counsel also raised the
“multiple enhancements” mitigating circumstance (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)), which she
had not raised in her briefing. Defense counsel emphasized the requirement that the court
give “great weight” to those factors unless the court found dismissal would endanger
public safety. She argued defendant was “no longer a risk to public safety.”
The People reiterated that the trial court must determine if dismissing the
enhancements was in the interest of justice and weigh whether or not public safety would
15
be endangered. The People acknowledged the applicability of the mitigating
circumstance of the enhancements being based on prior convictions of more than five
years old. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(H).)
The trial court noted that, although the defense had been focused on striking the
prior strikes, “the nickel priors are important . . . .” Ultimately, in reimposing the original
sentence, the trial court concluded that, “considering all of the factors in its discretion and
interest of justice, it is not going to disturb the sentence that was handed down.”
C. Analysis
In reimposing the sentence originally imposed, the trial court did not mention the
section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements. Nevertheless, “[t]he court is presumed to
have considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the
contrary.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.) Nothing in this record
rebuts this presumption. To the contrary, the record plainly establishes that the court was
aware of defendant’s request that the enhancements be dismissed and the grounds on
which that request was based. The motion papers and hearing minutes establish the court
was aware of the scope of its discretion in considering the request, including that it gave
“great weight” to the statutory mitigating circumstances, that it must consider whether it
was in the furtherance of justice to dismiss the enhancements, and that it must also weigh
whether dismissal would endanger public safety. The record establishes that, while the
People contested several of the statutory mitigating circumstances, the People conceded
that the prior serious felony convictions were more than five years old. (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(H).)
Given the extensive briefing and argument, and the trial court’s clear consideration
of the matter, we may properly infer the trial court understood its discretion and impliedly
found that striking the enhancements would endanger public safety or that, despite giving
great weight to applicable statutory mitigating circumstances, striking the enhancements
was not in furtherance of justice. (See People v. Mejia (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1045
16
[in “the absence of an explicit ruling by the trial court at sentencing, we infer that the
court made the finding appropriate to the sentence it imposed . . . .”].)
Based on defendant’s current conviction of four violent felony offenses committed
over 11 days, his conviction of two prior violent felony offenses, and the fact that he
committed his second prior strike while on probation, we cannot conclude that the trial
court’s finding that a dismissal of the enhancements would endanger public safety or was
not in the furtherance of justice is so irrational or arbitrary that “ ‘no reasonable person
could agree with it.’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)
IV
Updated Actual Custody Credits
Defendant asserts the trial court erred in failing to issue an amended abstract of
judgment updating his actual custody credits. The People agree, as do we. When “a
prison term already in progress is modified . . . , the sentencing court must recalculate and
credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already served,
whether in jail or prison, and whether before or since he was originally committed and
delivered to prison custody.” (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29; see
§ 2900.1.) “The sentencing court must determine such time and reflect it in the abstract
of judgment.” (People v. Saibu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1012 § 2900.5, subds. (a),
(d).) Because the trial court recalled defendant’s sentence and resentenced him, the court
must prepare an amended abstract of judgment to reflect defendant’s updated actual
custody credits.
17
DISPOSITION
The order recalling defendant’s sentence and resentencing him to an aggregate
term of 110 years in state prison is affirmed. The trial court is directed to prepare an
amended abstract of judgment to reflect defendant’s updated actual custody credits and to
forward a certified copy to Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
\s\ ,
Krause, J.
We concur:
\s\ ,
Robie, Acting P. J.
\s\ ,
Mauro, J.
18
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