CourtListener 10287165•People v. Najdawi CA3
Texto completo
Filed 12/3/24 P. v. Najdawi CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C099913
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 21FE005575)
v.
TEYSEER ZAID NAJDAWI,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appointed counsel for defendant Teyseer Zaid Najdawi asked this court to review
the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We will affirm.
FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant was charged in June 2019 by way of an amended information with
battery on a nonconfined person by a prisoner. (Pen. Code, § 4501.5; statutory section
citations that follow are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.) It was alleged that
defendant had a prior strike, based on a 2011 conviction for murder. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-
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(i), 1170.12.) Three aggravating factors were alleged. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules
4.421(a)(1), 4.421(b)(1), 4.421(b)(3)); rules citations that follow are to the California
Rules of Court unless otherwise stated.)
In December 2022, defense counsel and the prosecution filed a stipulated
statement noting that defendant was currently being prosecuted in Kern County case
No. DF015855A (case No. 15855A) (case No. 15855A is not at issue in this appeal). In
case No. 15855A, defense counsel had twice declared a doubt as to defendant’s
competency to stand trial. (§ 1367 et seq.) The first time, the trial court found defendant
not competent to stand trial and referred defendant for competency training. Defendant
was subsequently found competent to stand trial, and criminal proceedings were
reinstated. His counsel then declared a doubt again, and an evaluating psychologist
opined that he was incompetent. In November 2022, the trial court again found
defendant was not competent to stand trial and referred defendant for competency
training to the Department of State Hospitals or the prison psychiatric inpatient program.
Accordingly, in the instant case, defense counsel declared a doubt as to
defendant’s competency to stand trial. Both defense counsel and the prosecution asked
the trial court to suspend proceedings and consider the issue of defendant’s current
competency. The statement included a copy of the psychologist report prepared in case
No. 15855A. The parties asked the trial court to issue the same placement order as in
case No. 15855A.
Later that month, the trial court in this matter found defendant mentally
incompetent to stand trial and suspended proceedings. (§ 1367 et seq.) As requested by
the parties, the trial court referred defendant to the California Department of State
Hospitals or the prison psychiatric inpatient program.
In May 2023, the trial court received a report saying defendant had been restored
to competency. In a hearing later that month, the trial court found defendant was
competent to stand trial and reinstated criminal proceedings.
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During a pretrial conference in October 2023, the trial court granted defendant’s
request to bifurcate proceedings regarding the aggravating factors and the prior strikes.
Defendant also requested that, if he were to be shackled, he be secured to the chair by his
waist. This would (1) allow him to have his hands and legs free and (2) permit any
chains to be tucked in and not visible to the jury. The prosecution did not object, and the
court granted this request. Prior to voir dire, defense counsel confirmed that defendant
was waist-chained to the chair and there were no visible chains, and the court ordered the
deputies to remove the handcuffs.
During voir dire, the trial court denied the prosecution’s request to dismiss two
jurors for cause. And, neither party exercised any peremptory challenges to prospective
jurors.
On the morning of June 5, 2019, Correctional Officer Philip McNamara was
checking inmates with a wand metal detector prior to yard release. Suddenly, without
any warning, defendant struck Officer McNamara in the mouth with a closed fist. Officer
McNamara pushed defendant to the ground and ordered defendant to stop resisting, but
defendant continued to try to strike him. As defendant continued to resist, Officer
McNamara struck defendant again three more times. Eventually, Officer McNamara and
other officers were able to restrain defendant. As a result of the incident, Officer
McNamara suffered bruising and swelling on his mouth, as well as back pain and
headaches. The jury was shown photographs of Officer McNamara’s injuries. Officer
McNamara had not had any prior interactions with defendant that day.
Defendant testified at trial that he punched Officer McNamara in the face during
the incident. Defendant acknowledged that, before defendant punched him, Officer
McNamara had not struck or verbally threatened defendant.
Defendant had consumed methamphetamine that morning and believed his life
was in danger from other inmates. Defendant said another inmate owed him money. In
addition, according to defendant, his cell had been “gassed” while he was sleeping that
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morning, although he did not know what the substance was, and there was no residue left
over from any spraying. Defendant claimed officers regularly gassed his cell while he
was sleeping, causing his ears to ring and headaches. In addition, officers had previously
assaulted him in 2013, although nothing had happened to him since. Defendant also said
someone had tried to kill him when he was housed at a different prison. Defendant
claimed he had at one point gotten into a disagreement with Officer McNamara over
defendant’s personal property. Although defendant did not fear that any of the officers
present on June 5 would hurt him, he wanted to remove himself from the environment.
So, he punched Officer McNamara, knowing this would result in him being assigned to a
different prison housing unit.
During his testimony, defendant also acknowledged he had a 2011 conviction for
murder, and he was incarcerated at the time of the incident. He also had a 2012
conviction for moral turpitude.
At the close of evidence, over defendant’s objection, the trial court ruled it would
no longer be bifurcating proceedings regarding the aggravating factors, the prior strike,
and whether defendant was incarcerated at the time of the incident (which was a required
element of the crime). The court reasoned defendant had testified about his 2011 murder
conviction, which was the basis for the prior strike allegation, and about his incarceration
at the time of the incident. Over defendant’s objection, the court also admitted a certified
969(b) packet that only included defendant’s 2011 conviction for murder.
At defendant’s request, the jury instructions included CALCRIM No. 3470
regarding self-defense. The jury instructions also included CALCRIM No. 2723 (battery
by a prisoner on a nonprisoner), although the trial court denied defendant’s objection and
excluded the portion of that instruction that defines when a custodial officer is failing to
perform his or her duties lawfully. The court reasoned that lawful performance was not
at issue because there was no evidence that Officer McNamara was unlawfully
performing his duties when defendant punched him in the mouth.
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At defendant’s request, the trial court struck the aggravating factor that defendant
had served a prior prison or jail term pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (h). (Rule
4.421(b)(3).) The court reasoned defendant was still in prison, and the rule only
described those who had served prior prison terms. As to the prior strike and the
aggravating factors, the court instructed the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 3100 (prior
conviction: nonbifurcated trial), 3224 (great violence, great bodily harm, or high degree
of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness), and 3234 (danger to society).
During closing argument, defendant argued he acted in self-defense because he
honestly feared for his safety from the other inmates. The prosecution responded that
there was no evidence defendant feared an imminent danger, and belief in a future harm
is not sufficient for self-defense. Moreover, defendant’s fear of harm was not reasonable,
given that none of the officers posed any sort of danger to him.
During deliberation, the jury sent multiple questions to the trial court, including
asking for the definition of “serious danger to society.” The court responded there was
no distinct legal definition of the phrase, so it should be applied using its ordinary and
everyday meaning. The jury also asked for a readback of defendant’s testimony, a
readback of closing argument, and a copy of the transcript to read. The court provided a
readback of defendant’s testimony, instructed there would be no readback on argument
since it was not evidence, and stated no transcript would be provided. In addition, the
jury asked the court to define “moral turpitude,” and the court responded that it meant
“readiness to do evil.”
The jury deadlocked as to the truth of the aggravating factor that defendant had
engaged in violent conduct that indicated a serious danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1)),
and the trial court declared a mistrial as to that allegation. At the prosecution’s request,
the trial court dismissed the allegation.
The jury found defendant guilty of violating section 4501.5. The jury also found
true the aggravating factor that the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm,
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threat of great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness,
or callousness. (Rule 4.421(a)(1).) The jury also found true that defendant had a prior
strike.
Prior to sentencing, defendant requested to forgo a probation report, and the trial
court agreed to not refer the matter. The court asked both parties to file sentencing briefs.
In his October 2023 sentencing memorandum, defendant asked the trial court to
dismiss the entire action under section 1385. According to defendant, he had been
sentenced in 2012 to two 25-years-to-life consecutive sentences, plus a nine-year and
four-month consecutive determinate term. As such, defendant argued, he would already
be serving his entire life in prison, making the current prosecution meaningless.
The prosecution asked the trial court to sentence defendant to the upper term of
four years, doubled due to the prior strike. The prosecution argued there were no
mitigating circumstances, and the jury had found true one aggravating factor. Dismissal
was inappropriate because defendant should not be rewarded for his continued violent
behavior.
During the November 2023 sentencing hearing, the trial court declined to dismiss
the convictions pursuant to section 1385. The court reasoned that the efforts by the jury
would be “rendered further irrelevant” if the case against defendant was dismissed.
Moreover, defendant’s multiple life sentences neither justified his behavior nor gave
cause to permit defendant to evade punishment.
The court sentenced defendant to the upper term of four years, doubled to eight
years due to the strike. (§§ 4501.5, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.) The court reasoned the
jury had found the aggravating factor to be true, and there were no mitigating factors.
The court also imposed a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a corresponding
$300 parole revocation fine (suspended unless parole is revoked) (§ 1202.45), a $40 court
operations fee (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), and a $30 criminal conviction assessment fee
(Gov. Code, § 70373).
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Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Appointed counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and
asking this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable
issues on appeal. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised by
counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing the
opening brief. More than 30 days have elapsed, and we have received no communication
from defendant.
Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no arguable error
that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HULL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
MAURO, J.
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
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