CourtListener 10284262•Washington v. Burson CA1/1
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Filed 11/26/24 Washington v. Burson CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
MATTHEW WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A168553
v.
JAMIE LATRICE BURSON et al., (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. RG17881145)
Defendants and Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Plaintiff Matthew Washington appeals from an August 2023 minute
order granting defendant Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District’s (AC
Transit) motion to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.2 At the outset of our review, it was
apparent that Washington filed his notice of appeal from a nonappealable
order. “[A] reviewing court is ‘without jurisdiction to consider an appeal from
a nonappealable order, and has the duty to dismiss such an appeal upon its
own motion.’ ” (In re Mario C. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1307.)
Accordingly, we requested and received supplemental briefing from the
We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to the
1
California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
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parties to determine whether we had jurisdiction to review this appeal. We
now conclude the appeal must be dismissed for lack of an appealable order.
This case arises from a vehicle collision involving a bus owned by AC
Transit and a car driven by defendant Jamie Latrice Burson. Washington
was a passenger on the bus. He sued Burson, AC Transit, and the bus driver,
Elaine Simmons, for negligence. AC Transit and Burson cross-complained
against each other for indemnification and other claims. Washington later
stipulated to the dismissal of Simmons without prejudice.
In 2022, the remaining parties orally agreed to a settlement, whereby
Burson and AC Transit would pay Washington a specified sum in exchange
for a release of claims. After Washington failed to sign a release, AC Transit
moved to enforce the settlement agreement pursuant to section 664.6. The
trial court granted the motion. The resulting minute order directed Burson
and AC Transit to dismiss their cross-complaints and pay Washington the
agreed-upon settlement amounts, set a “compliance” hearing for October
2023, and stated the court would dismiss the action with prejudice “unless
good cause is shown why the case should not be dismissed.” This appeal
followed.
“The right to appeal is wholly statutory.” (Dana Point Safe Harbor
Collective v. Superior Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5.) Section 904.1 “lists
appealable judgments and orders” in civil cases. (Dana Point Safe Harbor
Collective, at p. 5.) Section 904.1 codifies “the common law one-final-
judgment rule,” which provides that an appeal is only permitted from a final
judgment that completely disposes of the matter. (Walton v. Mueller (2009)
180 Cal.App.4th 161, 172, fn. 9.) Interlocutory orders generally “ ‘ “are not
appealable, but are only ‘reviewable on appeal’ from the final judgment.” ’ ”
(Wilson v. County of San Joaquin (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1, 7.) Section 904.1
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sets forth exceptions to the one final judgment rule by specifying the
interlocutory orders that are appealable. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012)
206 Cal.App.4th 751, 780, disagreed with on another ground by Burrill v.
Nair (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 357, 380–382.)
An order granting a motion under section 664.6 is not included among
the appealable interlocutory orders listed in section 904.1. (§ 904.1, subd.
(a)(1)–(14).) However, section 664.6 authorizes a trial court to enter a formal
judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement upon granting a motion to
enforce the settlement. (Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182;
§ 664.6, subd. (a).) A judgment entered pursuant to section 664.6 is
appealable. (Critzer v. Enos (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1251.)
Although AC Transit filed a “Notice of Entry of Judgment or Order”
(some capitalization omitted) attaching the minute order granting its section
664.6 motion, no judgment appears in the record. Nevertheless, in
determining whether an “order is interlocutory and nonappealable, or final
and appealable,” we disregard the order’s form and analyze “the substance
and effect of the adjudication.” (Doran v. Magan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1287,
1293.) “If no issues in the action remain for further consideration, the decree
is final and appealable. But if further judicial action is required for a final
determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory” and not
appealable unless it is otherwise statutorily appealable. (Ibid.; see Jackson v.
Wells Fargo Bank (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 240, 244 [“no effect can or should be
given to [a final judgment] label if the judgment does not in fact conclude
matters between the parties”].)
Applying the foregoing principles, courts have held that “[a]bsent a
formal entry of judgment, an appellate court may amend an order [granting a
section 664.6 motion] to include a judgment if the effect of the order is to
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finally determine the rights of the parties in the action.” (Hines v. Lukes,
supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1183; accord, Critzer v. Enos, supra,
187 Cal.App.4th at p. 1252.)
Citing Hines and Critzer, we asked the parties to address whether the
order granting AC Transit’s section 664.6 motion is appealable. Having
considered the parties’ supplemental briefs, we answer this question in the
negative. In granting the section 664.6 motion, the trial court found that
none of the settling parties had performed under the settlement agreement,
as Washington failed to sign a release of claims and Burson and AC Transit
had not paid him the agreed-upon settlement amounts. The court’s order
directed Burson and AC Transit to pay Washington the settlement amounts
and set a date for a “compliance” hearing, stating that the court would
dismiss the action with prejudice “unless good cause is shown why the case
should not be dismissed.” Thus, the order contemplated the possibility of a
future dispute and left the issue of dismissal unresolved. From the register of
actions included in the record, the court dismissed the action with prejudice
approximately eight months later after issuing a tentative ruling and
continuing the compliance hearing several times. As such, this is not a case
in which the trial court left no issue for future consideration and merely
failed to enter a formal judgment, allowing us to “amend the order to include
an appealable judgment.” (Critzer v. Enos, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1246.) Accordingly, the order granting AC Transit’s motion under section
664.6 did not finally dispose of the case and is therefore not appealable.
Washington does not persuade us otherwise. Most of his supplemental
brief presents substantive challenges to the order granting AC Transit’s
section 664.6 motion. He dedicates one sentence to the appealability issue,
summarily concluding the order is appealable under section 904.1.
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We also observe that Washington’s opening brief focuses almost
entirely on a 2020 order granting AC Transit’s motion for summary
adjudication, yet his notice of appeal makes no mention of any order other
than the order granting AC Transit’s section 664.6 motion.3 Even if we could
construe his notice of appeal as encompassing the trial court’s summary
adjudication order, we agree with AC Transit and Simmons, who filed a joint
brief, that the appeal would be untimely. The order granting the summary
adjudication motion was dated February 13, 2020, and did not request that
counsel prepare a formal order. Under those circumstances, the time for
filing a notice of appeal would have been 180 days after the February 13,
2020, entry date. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(C), (c)(2); Cuenllas v.
VRL International, Ltd. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1053–1054.)
Washington did not file his notice of appeal until August 22, 2023, long after
the time to appeal the summary adjudication order had lapsed.
Since no appealable order or judgment is before us, we must dismiss
this appeal. (In re Mario C., supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. AC Transit and Simmons shall recover their
costs on appeal.
3 Washington’s opening brief is unclear, but he also appears to
challenge the stipulation dismissing Simmons without prejudice. The
stipulation likely did not result in an appealable judgment because it
permitted Washington to revive his claims against Simmons. (See Don Jose’s
Restaurant, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 115, 118.) In
any event, his claims are forfeited for failing to present a cogent argument
supported by relevant authority, and we would dismiss the appeal on that
basis. (See Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247.)
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_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
We concur:
_________________________
Humes, P.J.
_________________________
Banke, J.
A168553, Washington v. Burson
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