People v. Davis CA2/1

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Filed 11/22/24 P. v. Davis CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B337542

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA068464)
v.

COLLIN ROBERT DAVIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, James D. Otto, Judge. Affirmed.
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________
Defendant Collin Robert Davis appeals from the denial of
his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section
1172.6.1 We find no error and affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Conviction and Direct Appeal
In 2008, a jury found Davis guilty of one count of second
degree murder and three counts of premeditated attempted
murder.2 In 2009, on Davis’s direct appeal, this court reversed
one of the three attempted murder convictions for insufficient

1 All unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
At the time Davis initially filed his resentencing petition, the
statute at issue was codified at section 1170.95. The Legislature
renumbered the statute as section 1172.6 effective June 30, 2022
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10). For ease of reference, we use the
current citation at section 1172.6 throughout this opinion.
2 The jury also found true certain firearm and gang-related
allegations. Davis argues we should strike his “gang
enhancement [because it] is invalid due to [Assembly Bill No.]
333.” Section 1172.6 addresses whether a defendant could
presently be convicted of murder and/or attempted murder
despite changes to sections 188 and 189 (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)); it
does not provide a means to attack a true finding on a gang-
related enhancement. In any event, Davis’s conviction became
final in 2009, and Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
was not enacted until 2021. (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th
1169, 1206.) Davis makes no cogent argument that Assembly Bill
No. 333 applies to convictions that were already final before the
bill’s enactment. (Huntsman-West Foundation v. Smith (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 1117, 1134 [when the appellant does not supply
cogent argument supported by legal analysis, reviewing court
need “not address the claim.”].)

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evidence but otherwise affirmed the judgment. (People v. Davis
(Jul. 29, 2009, B207319) [nonpub. opn.] (Davis I).)
B. Section 1172.6
In 2018, the Legislature enacted what eventually became
section 1172.6 as part of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg.
Sess.). The legislation’s overall purpose was “to amend the felony
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with
the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) To accomplish this,
the bill added section 189, subdivision (e) “to amend the felony-
murder rule,” and added section 188, subdivision (a)(3) “to amend
the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843.)
C. Resentencing Proceedings
In 2019, Davis filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6. His petition alleged that he had been convicted of
murder and attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, and that he could not now be convicted of
those crimes because of changes to sections 188 and 189. In
2021, the resentencing court denied the petition, finding:
(1) Davis had failed to make a prima facie case as to his murder
conviction because “he was tried on an express[ ] malice murder
theory in addition to a natural and probable consequences
theory”; (2) that even if Davis had made a prima facie showing as
to his murder conviction, “the People have proved to the court at
the hearing beyond a reasonable doubt based on the record of
conviction that he was/or would have been convicted on the

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theory of express[ ] malice”; and (3) Davis was not entitled to
relief as to his two attempted murder convictions because the
then-current version of section 1172.6 did not apply to the crime
of attempted murder.
Davis appealed. While the case was on appeal, the
Legislature amended section 1172.6 to allow persons convicted of
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine to apply for resentencing. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
In 2022, we held the resentencing court erred in finding
Davis had failed to make a prima facie case as to his murder
conviction and remanded for the court to conduct an evidentiary
hearing under subdivision (d)(3) of section 1172.6 as to that
conviction. We affirmed the denial of the petition as to the
attempted murder convictions because the natural and probable
consequences instruction given to Davis’s jury applied only to the
murder charge not the attempted murder charges. (People v.
Davis (Feb. 1, 2022, B312149) [nonpub. opn.] (Davis II).
Following remand, the court received supplemental
briefing. It conducted an evidentiary hearing on March 4, 2024,
at which it received into evidence among other things the
preliminary hearing transcript and the evidence presented at
Davis’s 2008 trial (including transcripts of trial testimony).
During the hearing, Davis argued that he was entitled to section
1172.6 relief on both the murder and attempted murder
convictions.
On April 2, 2024, the court issued a written ruling denying
the resentencing petition. The court observed it had spent
considerable time reviewing the evidence and the applicable law,
and ruled as an independent factfinder that the evidence
established beyond a reasonable doubt that Davis acted with

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malice aforethought and remained guilty of murder under
current law as a direct aider and abettor. The court further ruled
it did not have jurisdiction to reconsider whether Davis was
eligible for relief as to his attempted murder convictions given
our holding in Davis II that “the record of conviction establishes
that [Davis] was convicted under an express malice theory on the
attempted murder charges.” (Davis II, supra, B312149.)3
Davis now appeals the denial of resentencing relief. His
appointed appellate counsel filed a brief raising no issues and
requesting that we exercise our discretion to independently
review the record for error pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216. In Delgadillo, our Supreme Court established
procedures for cases in which counsel determines that an appeal
from an order denying postconviction relief lacks merit. In such
cases, “(1) counsel should file a brief informing the court of that
determination, including a concise recitation of the facts bearing
on the denial of the petition; and (2) the court should send, with a
copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the
defendant of the right to file a supplemental letter or brief and
that if no letter or brief is filed within 30 days, the court may
dismiss the matter.” (Id. at pp. 231-232.) If the defendant does
not file a supplemental brief, we “may dismiss the appeal as
abandoned.” (Id. at p. 232.) In that instance, we do “not need to
write an opinion but should notify the defendant when [we]
dismiss[ ] the matter.” (Ibid.) Because a defendant who has been

3 The court further ruled that even if it could find Davis
had made a prima facie case for relief as to the attempted murder
convictions, the court would still deny the petition because the
evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that Davis was
guilty of attempted murder under current law.

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denied postconviction relief has no constitutional right to an
appeal, we are not required to conduct an independent review of
the record before dismissing the appeal, but we may conduct such
a review at our discretion. (Id. at pp. 227-228, 232.)
If the defendant does file a supplemental brief or letter, we
are “required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in
that brief and to issue a written opinion. The filing of a
supplemental brief or letter does not compel an independent
review of the entire record to identify unraised issues.” (People v.
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
On October 15, 2024, we notified Davis by letter of the no-
merits brief filed by his counsel and informed him that he had 30
days to file a supplemental brief.4 We received Davis’s
supplemental brief on October 30, 2024.
DISCUSSION
“While the superior court acts as an independent fact finder
in determining whether the People have met their burden, on
appeal, the reviewing court applies the substantial evidence
standard to the superior court’s findings. [Citation.] Under this
familiar standard, ‘ “we review the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
[Citation.] We determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of

4 In a declaration submitted with his brief, Davis’s counsel
averred that he sent Davis a copy of counsel’s brief along with a
copy of the record.

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fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing court
“presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” ’
[Citations.] Substantial evidence also ‘ “includes circumstantial
evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that
evidence.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
943, 951.) We analyze the application of facts to the statute de
novo. (People v. Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 383.)
Davis identifies two alleged errors in the court’s denial of
his resentencing petition. One is a claim that the prosecutor
committed misconduct during his trial by misstating certain
evidence. “[T]he limited jurisdiction afforded by section 1172.6
does not provide the trial court broad jurisdiction to correct
alleged errors in the original judgment on alternative grounds”
beyond changes in the law concerning imputed malice. (People v.
Hernandez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1122.) Davis’s claims of
prosecutorial misconduct do not relate to whether he remains
guilty of murder despite changes in the law regarding imputed
malice. Further, this argument essentially repeats claims about
prosecutorial misconduct Davis made, and we rejected, in his
direct appeal. (Davis I, supra, B207319.)
Davis also argues there is no substantial evidence he was
an aider and abettor who harbored implied malice. Davis does
not identify any particular count(s) as to which his argument
applies. We consider this claim only as to the murder conviction
given our holding in Davis II that Davis is ineligible for relief
under section 1172.6 as a matter of law on his two attempted
murder convictions.

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The resentencing court recited the following evidence in
finding Davis guilty of murder under current law: “Davis acted
with malice aforethought when he drove [with others] to the area
[where the murder took place] . . . [knowing] the purpose was to
hunt for [rival] gang members that had had [sic] confronted him
and [another individual] earlier in the day, or if not them other
Hispanics.” Davis’s supplemental brief does not dispute there
was substantial evidence to support this finding, which is
sufficient to find malice supporting a conviction for second degree
murder under current law. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th
981, 991.)
Davis instead claims questions from the jury during
deliberations demonstrate it likely determined he lacked malice
aforethought and convicted him based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. When conducting an evidentiary
hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d), “ ‘it is the
[trial] court’s responsibility to act as independent fact finder and
determine whether the evidence establishes a petitioner would be
guilty of murder under amended sections 188 and 189 and is thus
ineligible for resentencing under section [1172.6].’ ” (People v.
Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 110, quoting People v. Ramirez
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 984.) Thus, the basis for the prior
jury verdict (to the extent one could even determine it) is
irrelevant and has no bearing here on whether substantial
evidence supports the resentencing court’s independent
determination regarding malice.
Finally, we decline counsel’s request that we independently
review the record, as nothing before us suggests such an exercise
is necessary. (People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)

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DISPOSITION
The order denying Davis’s resentencing petition is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

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