Halbert v. Texas Turbine Conversions CA4/1

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Filed 11/21/24 Halbert v. Texas Turbine Conversions CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH HALBERT et al., D083197

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2022-
00052060-CU-PL-NC)
TEXAS TURBINE CONVERSIONS,
INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Earl H. Maas III, Judge. Affirmed.
Robinson Calcagnie, Allen F. Davis, and Patrick B. Embrey for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Leader Berkon Colao & Silverstein, Arthur I. Willner for Defendant
and Respondent.
Plaintiffs Kenneth and Shannon Halbert (collectively, the Halberts)
appeal an order granting defendant Texas Turbine Conversions, Inc.’s (Texas
Turbine) motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The Halberts contend the trial court erred in concluding that they failed to
establish that California has specific jurisdiction over Texas Turbine in this
action. We conclude that the Halberts’ arguments lack merit and affirm the
order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This litigation arises from a June 2022 airplane accident that occurred
in the vicinity of the Oceanside Municipal Airport, resulting in the death of

Paige Halbert.1 The Halberts are Paige’s parents and heirs. The aircraft
involved in the accident was a Cessna Caravan 208B converted to a
“Supervan 900” (the Cessna) using a conversion kit sold by Texas Turbine.
I. The Cessna and its Conversion
The Cessna was manufactured and sold some time prior to 2002. In

2012, Desert Sand Aircraft Leasing, Inc. (DSAL)2 owned it. DSAL is a
Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in Nevada. In 2012,
DSAL contacted Texas Turbine about converting the Cessna’s engine. Texas
Turbine is located in Texas, and its business involves selling and installing
engine conversion kits for certain types of aircraft, including, among others,
the Cessna Caravan 208B. That same year, DSAL and Texas Turbine
entered into a contract for the sale and installation of an engine conversion
kit for the Cessna. The contract is governed by Texas law.
Texas Turbine sometimes referred customers to authorized installers,
such as Intercontinental Jet Services Corp. (Intercontinental Jet).
Intercontinental Jet installed the conversion kit on the Cessna in

1 Because the decedent and her parents share the same surname, we
refer to Paige by her first name throughout this opinion.

2 The Halberts sued several defendants in this litigation, including
DSAL. Texas Turbine is the only defendant involved in this appeal.
2
Oklahoma.3 After the conversion, DSAL used the Cessna at various
locations. Texas Turbine had no involvement in the operation of the Cessna
at any time, including at the time of the accident.
In 2022, DSAL leased the Cessna to GoJump Oceanside, LLC, a
California skydiving company.
II. The Airplane Accident and the Halberts’ Lawsuit
On the day of the accident, pilots Paige and Matthew Glenn Wampler,
were performing skydiving flights. Wampler was training Paige. They
completed six flights without incident. On the seventh flight, after they
dropped off the skydivers and lined up to land on the airfield, the Cessna lost
power and descended rapidly. The pilots were unable to regain control of the
Cessna, and the Cessna crashed in a dirt field on the approach to the
Oceanside Municipal Airport runway. Paige died as a result of her injuries
from the crash.
In December 2022, the Halberts filed a complaint for the wrongful
death of Paige. The complaint alleged liability against Texas Turbine under
theories of strict and negligent products liability, as well as breach of
warranty.
III. Texas Turbine’s Motion to Quash
After the Halberts served Texas Turbine with the summons and
complaint, Texas Turbine filed a motion to quash service for lack of personal

jurisdiction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure4 section 418.10. The
Halberts opposed the motion.

3 Texas Turbine has never authorized a facility in California to perform
these installations.

4 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
3
The jurisdictional facts here are undisputed. Texas Turbine is
incorporated in Texas. Its principal place of business is also in Texas. It does
not have any offices, facilities, property, or employees in California. Its only
officer and director, Bobby Bishop, is domiciled and resides in Texas. Texas
Turbine performs no services in California, is not registered to do business in
California, has never been licensed to do business in California, and has no
agent for service of process in California. It has no corporate affiliates or
related companies in California. It has never performed engine conversions
outside of Texas. It has never sent any mechanics or maintenance personnel
to any location in California.
Since its founding in 1995, Texas Turbine has sold three conversion
kits to California businesses. In each of these three cases, the aircraft owner
contacted Texas Turbine in Texas to initiate the transaction, purchased the
engine and installation kit in Texas, entered into contracts governed by
Texas law, and had the installations performed either by Texas Turbine in
Texas or Intercontinental Jet in Oklahoma.
Between approximately 2012 and 2018, Texas Turbine completed five
conversions for DSAL, including the conversion for the Cessna. Texas
Turbine became aware after their first sale to DSAL that DSAL sometimes
leased airplanes to third parties.
In addition to its five sales with DSAL, Texas Turbine has sold and
installed conversion kits for other non-California companies that took the
aircraft to California after the conversion was performed. Texas Turbine was
not aware at the time of the sale and/or the installation of the conversion kits
that the aircrafts would later operate in California. Texas Turbine does not
inquire into, track, or know the locations or whereabouts of their customers.

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Further, Texas Turbine does not market by geographic region and does
not target California in its advertising activities. It does not solicit business
through salespeople, agents, or representatives in California. It has not
sought to market to California consumers through a California-specific
medium. It does not market in California newspapers, on California
television, on California radio, or through California-directed mailers.
Instead, Texas Turbine engages in nationwide marketing efforts
through email, social media, and air and trade shows. For instance, Texas
Turbine occasionally advertises through email blasts, but these are sent only
to generalized lists of aircraft owners throughout the United States or
worldwide. The air and trade shows that Texas Turbine attends are typically
held in Wisconsin, Florida, and Arizona. Texas Turbine may have attended
one air and trade show in California about eight to 10 years ago.
IV. The Trial Court’s Order
The trial court found that while Texas Turbine has some connection to
California, the connection is not substantial or significant. It also found
there was no evidence that Texas Turbine deliberately engaged in significant
activities within California. It further found that if any of Texas Turbine’s
marketing or advertising efforts reached California or California-based
customers, that occurred through means not specifically directed at
California. It concluded the Halberts did not meet their burden of showing
Texas Turbine’s contacts with California rise to the level of purposeful
availment and granted the motion to quash.
The Halberts timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles of Jurisdiction
California courts may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with
the United States and California Constitutions. (§ 410.10; Pavlovich v.
Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 268 (Pavlovich), abrogated on another
ground in David L. v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 359, 369-370.)
“The exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with
these Constitutions” if the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with
the state “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘ “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ ” (Pavlovich, at p. 268;
International Shoe Co. v. Wash. (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.)
Under the minimum contacts test, courts examine the quality and
nature of the defendant’s activities in the forum state to determine whether it
is fair and reasonable to require the defendant to submit to the jurisdiction of
that state. (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 268; Strasner v. Touchstone
Wireless Repair & Logistics, LP (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 215, 221 (Strasner).)
Personal jurisdiction may be either general (sometimes called “all-purpose”)
or specific (sometimes called “case-linked”). (Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court (2021) 592 U.S. 351, 358 (Ford Motor).) Only specific
jurisdiction is at issue in this appeal.
It is well-established that specific jurisdiction exists when: (1) “the
defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits”;
(2) “the ‘controversy is related to or “arises out of” [the] defendant’s contacts
with the forum’ ”; and (3) “ ‘the assertion of personal jurisdiction [over the
defendant] would comport with “fair play and substantial justice.” ’ ” (Vons
Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 446–447 (Vons

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Companies); accord, Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 269, 273.) There are
no bright line rules for determining jurisdiction. “ ‘[R]ather, the facts of each
case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite “affiliating
circumstances” are present.’ ” (Pavlovich, at p. 268.)
When a defendant moves to quash service of process based on lack of
personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing the
first two elements of specific jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.
(In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 110
(Automobile Antitrust); Vons Companies, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 449.) If a
plaintiff proves purposeful availment and relatedness, then the defendant
has sufficient minimum contacts with the state to warrant the court’s
exercise of jurisdiction. (See Vons Companies, at p. 447.) Thus, after the
plaintiff meets its burden of proof, the burden shifts to the defendant to
convince the court “that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.”
(Id. at p. 449.)
When the evidence of jurisdictional facts is in conflict, we resolve that
conflict in favor of the trial court’s order, as long as it is supported by
substantial evidence. (Vons Companies, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 449.) Where,
as here, the evidence is undisputed, then “the question of jurisdiction is
purely one of law and [we] engage[ ] in an independent review of the record.”
(Ibid.)
II. Specific Jurisdiction: Purposeful Availment
We first consider whether the Halberts have established that Texas
Turbine purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within California.
Purposeful availment focuses on the defendant’s intentions. (Snowney
v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1062 (Snowney).)

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“[P]urposeful availment occurs where a nonresident defendant ‘ “purposefully
direct[s]” [its] activities at residents of the forum’ [citation], ‘ “purposefully
derive[s] benefit” from’ its activities in the forum [citation], ‘create[s] a
“substantial connection” with the forum’ [citation], ‘ “deliberately” has
engaged in significant activities within’ the forum [citation], or ‘has created
“continuing obligations” between [itself] and residents of the forum’
[citation].” (Id. at p. 1063.) Thus, purposeful availment only exists when a
“defendant purposefully and voluntarily directs his [or her] activities toward
the forum.” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269.) The benefits defendants
receive from their targeted activities at the forum puts them on notice that
they are subject to suit in that forum’s jurisdiction. (See Snowney, supra, 35
Cal.4th at pp. 1062-1063; Pavlovich, at p. 269.)
However, a defendant will not be subject to a forum’s jurisdiction solely
because “of random, fortuitous[,] or attenuated contacts[,] or because of the
unilateral activity of a third party.” (Automobile Antitrust, supra, 135
Cal.App.4th at p. 108.) Neither will a defendant be subject to a forum’s
jurisdiction solely because he or she places a product into the stream of
commerce with the “awareness that the stream . . . may or will sweep the
product into the forum [s]tate.” (Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court
(1987) 480 U.S. 102, 112 (Asahi Metal).)
Instead, the defendant must take some action purposefully directed
toward the forum state, such as “designing the product for the market in the
forum [s]tate, advertising in the forum [s]tate, establishing channels for
providing regular advice to customers in the forum [s]tate, or marketing the
product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in
the forum [s]tate.” (Asahi Metal, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 112; accord, Vons
Companies, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 447 [purposeful availment exists when

8
defendant delivers product into stream of commerce with expectation
consumers in forum will purchase product]; Preciado v. Freightliner Custom
Chassis Corp. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 964, 978 (Preciado) [purposeful
availment exists in products liability cases when nonresident manufacturer
knows and intends product will enter and be used in forum].)
Here, Texas Turbine is incorporated in and has its principal place of
business in Texas. It has no offices, facilities, employees, or property in
California. It performs no services in California, is not registered to do
business in California, has never been licensed to do business in California,
and has no agent for service of process in California. It also has no corporate
affiliates or related companies in California. Because Texas Turbine
conducts no activity in California, it has not created any connection, let alone
a substantial one, with California. (See Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at
p. 1063.)
Further, since its founding in 1995, Texas Turbine has sold three
conversion kits to California businesses. In each of these three cases, the
aircraft owner contacted Texas Turbine in Texas to initiate the transaction,
purchased the engine and installation kit in Texas, entered into contracts
governed by Texas law, and had the installations performed either by Texas
Turbine in Texas or Intercontinental Jet in Oklahoma. The same can be said
for the Cessna that DSAL purchased from Texas Turbine in 2012. Texas
Turbine has never performed engine conversions outside of Texas. It also has
never sent any mechanics or maintenance personnel to California. Simply
stated, in every aspect of the sale, purchase, and installation of its conversion
kit, the customer comes to Texas Turbine. Texas Turbine does not go to the
customer. Accordingly, Texas Turbine does not purposefully direct its
activities at California. (See Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1063.)

9
In addition, as the Halberts concede, Texas Turbine does not market by
geographic region and does not target its advertising in California. Rather,
Texas Turbine engages in nationwide marketing. For instance, Texas
Turbine occasionally sends email blasts to generalized lists of aircraft owners
throughout the United States or worldwide. It also attends air and trade
shows, which are typically held in Wisconsin, Florida, and Arizona. It does
not market in California newspapers, on California television, on California
radio, or through California-directed mailers. If any of Texas Turbine’s
marketing or advertising efforts have reached California or California-based
customers, that has occurred through means not specifically directed at
California.
The Halberts point out that Texas Turbine became aware after the first
sale to DSAL that DSAL would sometimes lease airplanes to third parties.
Thus, presumably Texas Turbine was aware that the airplanes installed with
their conversions could operate in California. But Texas Turbine does not
inquire into, track, or know the locations or whereabouts of their customers.
Texas Turbine does not deliver its conversion kits into the stream of
commerce with any awareness, let alone the expectation, consumers in
California will purchase it. (See Vons Companies, supra, 14 Cal.4th at
p. 447.) Therefore, Texas Turbine’s contacts with California are attenuated
at best. (See Automobile Antitrust, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 108.)
Moreover, Texas Turbine has not taken the “something more” actions
required to establish purposeful availment: it has not designed the
conversion kit for the California market, it has not established channels for
providing regular advice to customers in California, nor has it marketed the

10
conversion kit through a distributor who serves as the sales agent in

California.5 (See Asahi Metal, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 112.)
The three main cases the Halberts rely on in support of their position
do not compel a different conclusion. The Halberts contend Texas Turbine
purposefully availed itself of the benefits of California because it made
substantial sales to California residents and made substantial efforts to

market and sell its products nationally, including to California.6 They point
us to two cases that allegedly define “substantial” in the purposeful
availment context: Thurston v. Fairfield Collectibles of Georgia, LLC (2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 1231 (Thurston) and As You Sow v. Crawford Laboratories,
Inc. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1859 (As You Sow).
Texas Turbine contends that how “substantial” is defined in these cases
is not the critical question. Rather, the critical question is whether the
nature and quality of the defendant’s conduct shows the defendant engaged
in purposeful conduct directed towards the forum state. (See Thurston,
supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 1240; As You Sow, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1869–1870.) We agree with Texas Turbine. (See Pavlovich, supra, 29
Cal.4th at p. 268 [minimum contacts test requires examination of nature and
quality of defendant’s activities in forum]; Strasner, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at
p. 221 [same].)

5 While Texas Turbine’s nationwide advertising efforts may reach
California, their efforts do not target California.

6 The Halberts also contend purposeful availment exists because Texas
Turbine benefited from exploiting the market of skydiving aircraft in
California. The Halberts do not develop this argument, so they fail to carry
their burden to show the trial court erred in this respect. (See Bianco v.
California Highway Patrol (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1125.)
11
Further, Thurston and As You Sow are distinguishable from this
matter. In Thurston, the court found the defendant made a substantial
number of sales of goods or services to California residents through its
website, and these sales were the equivalent of having a virtual store in
California. (Thurston, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1235, 1239-1241.) In As
You Sow, the court found the defendant “contract[ed] directly with private
distributors located in California,” “purposefully consummated business
arrangements with California companies on 16 separate occasions [over a
period of six years] so it could profit from the products’ use in California,” and
made a direct effort to serve the California market. (As You Sow, supra, 50
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1863, 1870-1871.) Both courts found these facts sufficient
to establish purposeful availment. (Thurston, at pp. 1240-1241; As You Sow,
at pp. 1870-1871.)
In contrast to Thurston, here there is no evidence that Texas Turbine
maintains a website or does anything to solicit sales from California
residents. And, as the Halberts concede, Texas Turbine’s marketing efforts
do not target California.
Further, in this case, unlike in As You Sow, Texas Turbine did not
contract with anyone in California regarding the Cessna. The contract for
the Cessna is between Texas Turbine and DSAL, a Nevada corporation. This
contract is governed by Texas law. The Halberts point to the three
conversion kits Texas Turbine sold to California businesses as evidence Texas
Turbine purposefully consummated business arrangements in California.
But, as noted previously, in each of these three cases, the aircraft owner
initiated the transaction, purchased the conversion kit in Texas, entered into
contracts governed by Texas law, and had the installations performed in
Texas or in Oklahoma. Because in each instance the California business

12
initiated the sale and no part of the transaction had anything to do with
California, Texas Turbine’s sales to California businesses do not show
purposeful availment.
Therefore, this case is different from Thurston and As You Sow because
the quality and nature of Texas Turbine’s activities in California do not show
purposeful availment. (See Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 268; Strasner,
supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 221.)
Finally, we address West Corporation v. Superior Court (2004) 116
Cal.App.4th 1167 (West Corporation), which the Halberts rely on for the
proposition that companies who engage in nationwide marketing efforts
should reasonably expect to be subject to lawsuits in the states where they
solicit business. But that is not what West Corporation holds.
In West Corporation, a nonresident telemarketing corporation argued
the California court did not have jurisdiction over it because, among other
reasons, the plaintiff contacted it to purchase a product. (West Corporation,
supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1171.) The court found while plaintiff initiated
the call to the corporation for the purpose of purchasing one product, it was
the corporation who initiated the upsell of another product. (Id. at p. 1176.)
It viewed the upsell as a separate transaction and as an intentional sales
pitch aimed at a California resident. (Id. at pp. 1176-1177.) It therefore
concluded the corporation purposefully availed itself of the privileges of
conducting activities within California. (Id. at p. 1176.) While it stated
telemarketers who engage in nationwide marketing could be subject to the
personal jurisdiction of every state in the nation, that was in context of the
fact that upselling is a big business in telemarketing, and upselling is
considered targeted activity towards a consumer. (See id. at pp. 1179-1180.)

13
In contrast to West Corporation, there is no evidence here that Texas
Turbine intentionally aimed a sales pitch at a California resident or tried to
sell a California resident an upsell of the conversion kit. Nor have the
Halberts made this contention. West Corporation is therefore not applicable.
Because Texas Turbine has not purposefully availed itself of the
benefits of conducting activities in California, the trial court correctly found
that the Halberts did not meet their burden of proof on the element of
purposeful availment. (See Automobile Antitrust, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at
p. 110; Vons Companies, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 446-447, 449.)
III. Specific Jurisdiction: Relation of the Halberts’ Claims to Texas Turbine’s

Contacts7
We next examine whether the Halberts have established that their
claims against Texas Turbine in this lawsuit arise out of or are related to
Texas Turbine’s contacts with California. (See Vons Companies, supra,
14 Cal.4th at p. 446; Preciado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 980.) While a
plaintiff’s claim does not have to arise directly from the defendant’s contacts
with the forum state, the claim must have a “substantial connection” to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state to warrant the court’s exercise of
specific jurisdiction. (Vons Companies, at p. 452; accord, Ford Motor, supra,
592 U.S. at pp. 359-360 [“ ‘[T]here must be “an affiliation between the forum
and the underlying controversy.” ’ ”].)
The Supreme Court recently explained the “ ‘arise out of or relate to’ ”
language in the specific jurisdiction context: “The first half of that standard
asks about causation; but the back half, after the ‘or,’ contemplates that some

7 The trial court made no finding regarding whether the Halberts’ claims
in this litigation arise out of or are related to Texas Turbine’s contacts with
California. In our de novo review, we examine this factor. (See Ghirardo v.
Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799.)
14
relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing. That does
not mean anything goes. In the sphere of specific jurisdiction, the phrase
‘relate to’ incorporates real limits, as it must to adequately protect defendants
foreign to a forum.” (Ford Motor, supra, 592 U.S. at p. 362, italics omitted.)
In this case, Texas Turbine sold a conversion kit that was installed in
the Cessna that eventually operated in California. The Halberts concede the
Cessna and Texas Turbine’s sale of the conversion kit for the Cessna had no
direct connection to California at the time of the conversion. Instead, they
contend the fact that the Cessna was later taken to California establishes a
substantial connection between their claims and Texas Turbine’s contacts
with California.
However, as indicated above, Texas Turbine’s involvement with the
Cessna had nothing to do with California. Texas Turbine’s involvement with
the Cessna begins and ends with selling an engine conversion kit in Texas to
DSAL in 2012. Texas Turbine did not install the conversion kit, so it did not
modify the Cessna: It simply sold the conversion kit for the modification.
There is no evidence that Texas Turbine had anything to do with the Cessna
after 2012. Thus, it is a far stretch for the Halberts to contend Texas
Turbine’s activities in Texas (and not in California) relate to the airplane
accident in California (that happened 10 years later) simply because the
Cessna eventually ended up in California. The connection between the
Halberts’ claims and Texas Turbine’s contacts with California is attenuated

at best. (See Vons Companies, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 452.)8

8 Because we conclude the Halberts have failed to demonstrate
purposeful availment and relatedness, we need not address whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction would be fair or reasonable in these
circumstances.
15
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The Halberts to pay Texas Turbine’s costs on
appeal.

O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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