Mitchell v. William Warren Group CA2/2

CourtListener 10281554Calctapp21 de nov. de 2024

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Filed 11/21/24 Mitchell v. William Warren Group CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

OLIVER B. MITCHELL III, B335504

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23STCV10822)

WILLIAM WARREN GROUP,
INC.,

Defendant and
Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Cherol Nellon, Judge. Affirmed.

Oliver B. Mitchell III, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Bremer, Whyte, Brown & O’Meara, Kyle P. Carroll, and
Sukayna Jaidi for Defendant and Respondent.

******
Oliver B. Mitchell III (plaintiff) argues that the trial court
erred in dismissing his complaint with prejudice when he did not
file an amended complaint after the court granted him leave to do
so following the sustaining of a demurrer. This ruling was not an
abuse of discretion, so we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
In November 2019, plaintiff signed a monthly rental
contract with StorQuest for a 5-foot by 10-foot storage unit.
StorQuest is the business name used by William Warren Group,
Inc. (the Group). He owed $136 per month.
When a Los Angeles city ordinance went into effect in the
early days of the COVID-19 pandemic that placed a moratorium
on evictions, plaintiff stopped paying rent in August 2020. By
May 2022, plaintiff owed $3,257 in unpaid rent; by October 2023,
that amount had risen to $6,509.15.
II. Procedural Background
Plaintiff sued the Group in 2022, and the trial court
dismissed the operative complaint without prejudice when
plaintiff opted not to file an amended complaint after the court
sustained a demurrer with leave to amend.
Three days after that May 2023 dismissal, plaintiff sued
the Group again. Plaintiff’s 119-paragraph complaint (the new
complaint) alleged the same eight claims as in the prior lawsuit—
namely, (1) sexual harassment under the Unruh Act (Civ. Code, §
51), (2) sex discrimination under the Unruh Act (ibid.), (3) gender

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violence (id., § 52.4), (4) breach of contract, (5) negligence, (6)
conversion, (7) civil conspiracy, and (8) intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive
damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
In June 2023, the Group filed a demurrer to the new
complaint as well as a motion to strike its punitive damages
allegations. After a full round of briefing and a hearing, the trial
court in October 2023 sustained the demurrer with leave to
amend. The court reasoned that the bulk of the new complaint’s
allegations copied those in the previously dismissed complaint
and that res judicata precluded re-litigation of those allegations.
The court nevertheless recognized that the new complaint alleged
two acts occurring after the last case was filed and that the res
judicata bar did not apply to those acts; while the allegations of
these acts were insufficient by themselves to state any of the
eight claims in the new complaint, the court recognized that
those allegations might support other claims and granted
plaintiff leave to amend to articulate those other claims. The
court granted plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint. In
light of this disposition, the court simultaneously denied as moot
plaintiff’s earlier-filed motion to amend the new complaint to add
a claim seeking to rescind a settlement agreement plaintiff
signed in this case.
Twenty-one days later, plaintiff filed a motion asking the
trial court to reconsider its ruling on the demurrer, which the
trial court denied. Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint
within 30 days of the demurrer ruling.
After the 30-day window closed, the Group filed an ex parte
application seeking dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to

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Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (f)(2).1 When
plaintiff did not appear at the scheduled hearing despite being
properly served, the trial court continued the hearing for a week.
When plaintiff did not appear at the continued hearing despite
being properly served with notice of the new hearing’s date and
time, the trial court granted the application and dismissed
plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.
Plaintiff filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s chief argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred in dismissing his new complaint with prejudice.
This argument lacks merit.
A trial court may dismiss a complaint with prejudice if it
has sustained a demurrer with leave to amend and the plaintiff
does not file an amended complaint within the allotted time. (§
581, subd. (f)(2); Cano v. Glover (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 326, 329-
330; Leader v. Health Industries of America, Inc. (2001) 89
Cal.App.4th 603, 613-614.) We review such a dismissal for an
abuse of discretion. (Gitmed v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 26
Cal.App.4th 824, 827.) Because it is undisputed that plaintiff did
not file an amended complaint within the allotted time, the court
acted squarely within its discretion in dismissing the new
complaint with prejudice.
Plaintiff resists this conclusion with what boils down to
four further arguments.
First, plaintiff argues that the trial court “misapplied” the
doctrine of res judicata when sustaining the demurrer in the first
place; had the demurrer been overruled, plaintiff continues, he

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

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would never have been required to file an amended complaint.
Although plaintiff’s attack on the underlying demurrer ruling is
cognizable (Shaw v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 740, 753), it falters on the merits because the trial
court correctly applied res judicata. The species of res judicata
relevant here—namely, claim preclusion—“‘prevents relitigation’”
in a second suit “involv[ing] (1) the same cause of action (2)
between the same parties (3) after a final judgment on the merits
in the first suit.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61
Cal.4th 813, 824-825.) There is no dispute that the operative
complaint in the prior litigation and the new complaint involve
the same causes of action between the same parties. A prior
dismissal for failure to file an amended pleading after sustaining
a demurrer constitutes a preclusive “‘judgment on the merits to
the extent that [the demurrer] adjudicates that the facts alleged
do not constitute a cause of action,’” but not to the extent that
‘“new or additional facts are alleged that cure the defects’” in that
prior pleading. (Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29
Cal.3d 781, 789.) Thus, the trial court correctly applied res
judicata to the allegations adjudicated in the prior lawsuit while
declining to apply res judicata to the “new or additional facts” set
forth in the new complaint.
Second, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in
denying his 41-page motion to reconsider the October 16, 2023
order sustaining the demurrer with leave to amend; had it been
granted, plaintiff continues, he would never have been required
to file an amended complaint. This argument also falters on the
merits. The court ruled that plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration
was untimely (because it was filed more than 10 days after the
challenged ruling), and not a proper motion for reconsideration

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because it “simply re-argue[d] the demurrer” rather than
presenting new facts or new law, as required by section 1008.
Plaintiff does not challenge either of those findings; nor could he,
as they are both correct. Instead, plaintiff urges that the court
erred in reading only the first 15 pages of his 40-page motion.
This was consistent with the Rule of Court limiting such motions
to 15 pages. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(d).) What is more,
nothing in the last 25 pages alters the motion’s untimeliness or
its failure to do anything beyond re-argue the demurrer.
Third, plaintiff argues that the trial court did not “afford[]”
him “an opportunity to correct any potential deficiency through
an amended complaint,” and thereby violated due process, equal
protection, and the First Amendment. We need not delve into the
complexities of his constitutional claims because their factual
premise is incorrect. The record unequivocally establishes that
plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to “correct any potential
deficiency through an amended complaint.” He simply elected
not to use it.
Fourth and finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court
violated due process because the court had “conspicuous animus
towards” him and “seemed impulsive.” For support, plaintiff cites
the fact that the court ruled against him on the merits. Because
adverse rulings are not, without more, evidence of judicial bias
(e.g., Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC (2014) 224
Cal.App.4th 665, 674), plaintiff’s argument is without any factual
foundation.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Group is entitled to its costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST

_________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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