People v. Perez CA4/3

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Filed 11/20/24 P. v. Perez CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062571

v. (Super. Ct. No. 20CF1392)

JOHNNY JOSE PEREZ, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Scott A. Steiner, Judge. Affirmed.
Ava R. Stralla, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant
Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and Michael J. Patty, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Johnny Jose Perez was convicted of mayhem and assault
stemming from his participation in the beating of a fellow jail inmate. He
does not appeal the substance of his convictions; instead, he argues the court
erred at sentencing when it failed to dismiss all but one of the enhancements
alleged against him.
Perez contends that because Penal Code1 section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(B), contains the phrase “all enhancements beyond a single
enhancement shall be dismissed,” it required the court to do so in this case.
We must disagree.
Numerous other courts have concluded that, when the phrase at
issue here is read in the context of the broader statutory language the court
must dismiss enhancements only if it makes the discretionary determination
that “it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.” (§ 1385, subdivision (c)(1).)
We agree with that analysis. As a result, we find no error here.
Perez also argues the court abused its discretion by declining to
consider his childhood trauma as a mitigating factor in connection with
dismissing an enhancement. But the court specifically referenced the
evidence of Perez’s childhood trauma before finding that evidence did not rise
to the level of persuasive mitigation.
Evidence of childhood trauma, standing alone, does not
automatically constitute a mitigating factor under section 1385,

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All subsequent statutory refences are to the Penal Code.

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subdivision (c). Such evidence is mitigating only if the court concludes the
trauma is connected to the defendant’s current offense(s). The record here
reflects the court did not view Perez’s childhood trauma as connected to his
offenses in this case. We find no abuse of discretion in that determination.
We affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Perez does not challenge the substance of his convictions, and we
consequently need not set forth a detailed recitation of the underlying facts.
It is sufficient to state the evidence demonstrated that Perez, along with four
other prison inmates, severely beat another inmate at the direction of a
prison gang.
The victim was rendered unconscious and suffered permanent
vision loss and facial fractures. After the beating, Perez moved the victim
from his cell and dropped him on the concrete. The incident was captured on
surveillance video.
Perez was charged with attempted murder (§§ 664, subd. (a),
187, subd. (a)) (count one); mayhem (§ 203) (count two); and assault with
force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) (count three).
The information alleged as to all counts that Perez personally inflicted great
bodily injury on the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and that he committed the
offenses for the benefit and at the direction of a criminal street gang, and
with the specific intent to promote further and assist in criminal conduct by
members of that gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).
The information further alleged that Perez was previously
convicted of (1) a violation of section 12021, subdivision (a) with a gang
enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), which qualified as a strike prior and a

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serious felony prior. (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (b),
(c)(1)).
The court granted a motion for acquittal on the attempted
murder charge; at the request of the prosecutor, it dismissed the
enhancement for great bodily injury as to the mayhem charge.
The jury found Perez guilty of mayhem (count two) and assault
with force likely to produce great bodily injury (count three); it found true the
great bodily injury enhancement on count three.
Perez chose to proceed with a court trial on the remaining
enhancements. The court found true that Perez had a prior conviction in 2007
for violating section 12021, subdivision (a), with a gang enhancement
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), which qualified as both a strike prior and a prior
serious felony (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(1)). The
court found true all but two of the alleged aggravating factors.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court declined to strike
Perez’s prior strike under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
13 Cal.4th 497; it also declined to strike any of his enhancements under
Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c), finding that it would not be in the
interest of justice to do so.
The court sentenced Perez to a 16-year prison term; it designated
count three as the principal term and imposed a four-year prison term, then
doubled that to eight years for the strike. The court added three years for the
great bodily injury enhancement and five years for the prior serious felony.
The court stayed the sentence on count two pursuant to section 654.

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DISCUSSION
I.
MANDATORY STRIKING OF ENHANCEMENTS
Perez first argues the court erred when it refused to dismiss all
but one of his enhancements as required by section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(B).
“Prior to January 1, 2022, section 1385 provided trial courts with
discretion to dismiss sentencing enhancements in the interest of justice. The
statute did not provide direction as to how courts should exercise that
discretion. In October 2021 the Legislature passed and the Governor signed
Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 81) (Stats. 2021,
ch. 721, § 1), which, effective January 1, 2022, amended section 1385 to
provide guidance regarding the exercise of discretion in dismissing
sentencing enhancements.” (People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233,
238, review granted Apr. 19, 2023, S278786 (Anderson).)
Perez argues that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B)2 required the
court to dismiss all but one of his sentence enhancements. A narrow reading
of that section might support Perez’s argument, but this subdivision does not
exist in isolation. (People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 396, review
granted Mar. 22, 2023, S278309 (Walker) [“we are not permitted to pluck this
phrase out of its placement in the statute and consider it in isolation; instead,
we are required to consider where it fits into the ‘‘“context of the statute as a
whole”’”’].) Numerous courts have concluded that, when read in the context of

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That section states in part “[m]ultiple enhancements are
alleged in a single case. In this instance, all enhancements beyond a single
enhancement shall be dismissed.”

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the broader statute, section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B), and the statute’s
similarly worded subdivision (c)(2)(C) impose no such mandate. (Walker,
supra, at p. 396; Anderson, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 239; accord, People v.
Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 290-291 (Mendoza); Anderson, supra, at
pp. 240-241; People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 17-18 [rejecting
mandatory dismissal under similarly worded § 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C)].)
We agree. Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1), requires the court to
dismiss enhancements “if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.” The
mandate to dismiss is consequently subject to the court’s discretionary
determination of whether it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.
Subdivision (c)(2) of section 1385 provides guidance for the court
“[i]n exercising its discretion under this subdivision.” It requires the court to
“consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to
prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I)
are present,” and states that “[p]roof of the presence of one or more of these
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless
the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public
safety.” (Ibid., italics added.)
Thus, subdivision (c)(2)(B) of section 1385, the provision Perez
claims requires dismissal of his enhancements, is one of the “circumstances
[that] weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement.” In this case,
the court specifically found it was not in the interest of justice to dismiss any
enhancements. We find no error.

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II.
CONSIDERATION OF CHILDHOOD TRAUMA
Perez also argues the court abused its discretion by refusing to
consider his childhood trauma as a mitigating factor under section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(E). We find the argument unsupported by the record.
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), guides the court in exercising its
discretion to dismiss enhancements. It requires the court to “consider and
afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of
the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present,” and
states that “[p]roof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances
weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds
that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.” (Ibid.)
The circumstance referenced in subdivision (c)(2)(E) is “[t]he
current offense is connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma.”
According to Perez, “the dismissal of both or least one of the
enhancements is necessary . . . because the trial court did not expressly find
that appellant was a danger to public safety, both in terms of facts present at
the time of the sentencing hearing and at the time appellant would be
released from prison if either the section 12022.7 great bodily injury
enhancement or the section 667, subdivision (a) serious felony prior was
dismissed.” We find several flaws in the argument.
First, as we have already observed, the statute does not require
the court to dismiss an enhancement even if it finds a mitigating factor
exists. Instead, the statute directs the court to “afford great weight to
evidence offered by the defendant to prove” the mitigating circumstance is
present. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) We presume the court complied with that
standard. (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 [the “court is

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presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an
affirmative record to the contrary”]; People v. Gillispie (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th
429, 433.)
Next, the evidence in this case did not categorically satisfy the
standard in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(E). As described by Perez, the
evidence before the court was “that [Perez] was placed in Orangewood
Children’s Home as an infant, and that he did not know why he was placed
there. He and his four siblings were separated from each other throughout
the ‘system.’ Although he lived with his maternal uncle at one point, he was
returned to placement. He never met his father and believed his mother
suffered from schizophrenia. At Orangewood, [Perez] was in the Resource
Specialist Program and took Special Education classes for an unknown
learning disability. [Perez] stated that ‘being in custody is all he knows and
described himself as “institutionalized.””
While this evidence may be sufficient to demonstrate Perez
suffered childhood trauma, that fact alone does not qualify as a mitigating
circumstance under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(E), which requires a
finding that “[t]he current offense is connected to . . . childhood trauma.”
(Italics added.)
The statute provides that the trial court “may conclude that a
defendant’s childhood trauma was connected to the offense if, after reviewing
any relevant and credible evidence, . . . the court concludes that the
defendant’s childhood trauma substantially contributed to the defendant’s
involvement in the commission of the offense.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(6)(A).)
Perez fails to identify any evidence in this record that
demonstrates his childhood trauma “substantially contributed to [his]
involvement” in these offenses, nor does he explain how the court would have

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abused its discretion in failing to find that it did. Some evidence of a
connection between the childhood trauma and the current crimes was
required here.
The trial court explicitly “acknowledged” that Perez had suffered
trauma in his childhood—which demonstrates the court did consider that
trauma evidence—but it concluded that section 1385, subdivision (c), did not
apply to it. That conclusion reflects a determination by the court that Perez’s
early trauma was not connected to his crimes. We find no abuse of discretion
in that conclusion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

GOETHALS, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

MOTOIKE, J.

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