CourtListener 10275982•People v. Kishor CA3
Texto completo
Filed 11/18/24 P. v. Kishor CA3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C099684
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 98F01523)
v.
CHANDRA KISHOR,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 1999, defendant Chandra Kishor pleaded no contest to attempted murder and
robbery. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied his petition for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 On appeal, Kishor challenges the trial court’s
consideration of his admissions at a parole suitability hearing and in a comprehensive risk
assessment report. He additionally asserts that insufficient evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of attempted murder as a
direct aider and abettor. We will affirm.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Effective June 30, 2022,
the Legislature renumbered former section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.) Kishor filed this petition under former section 1170.95, but we will cite to
the current section 1172.6.
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BACKGROUND
I.
The amended information charged Kishor and three codefendants with conspiracy
to commit murder, robbery and carjacking, burglary, robbery, mayhem, and attempted
murder in connection with a violent attack on Kishor’s wife in her home.
Kishor pleaded no contest to robbery and attempted murder pursuant to People v.
West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595. (§§ 211, 664, 187, subd. (a).) At the change-of-plea hearing,
the prosecutor recited a factual basis for the plea: In January 1998, Kishor’s
codefendants entered the victim’s home and “proceeded to attempt to drown her, smother
her with a rag soaked in bleach, doused her in bleach and attempted to set her on fire,
struck her repeatedly and stabbed her twice in the back. [¶] In addition, upon entry of
these three co-defendants to the residence, they demanded jewelry . . . and money from
the victim . . . and ultimately after the victim was attacked by these three co-defendants,
her automobile was stolen from inside her attached garage. [¶] During the investigation
of the case, it was determined that [Kishor] . . . enlisted the aid of these three individuals
for the specific purpose of having them attack and kill his estranged wife [the victim] and
to rob her.” The prosecutor further stated his “understanding that the remaining co-
defendants . . . if called to testify, would indicate that they were to be compensated with
the property that they recovered from [the victim’s] residence and the automobile, and
they were exchanging the property that was to be stolen by force from the victim . . . . [¶]
They were to be compensated for that money in exchange for killing her.”
Defense counsel responded that his client had “always maintained that it was
never his intent to elicit these individuals to kill his wife, but pursuant to [People v. West,
supra, 3 Cal.3d 595], he understands that he really has no choice in—it is in his best
interest to take this deal.” Counsel further represented that he understood that the “co-
defendants were all prepared to testify that they were directed to go to the residence to
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kill the victim, correct, to kill her rather than rob her. The robbery was secondary to the
killing . . . .”
The trial court accepted Kishor’s plea and subsequently sentenced him to four
years for the robbery plus life with the possibility of parole for the attempted murder.
II.
In 2019, Kishor filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. The trial
court initially denied the petition at the prima facie stage, but we reversed and remanded
with directions that the court issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing.
On remand, the prosecution asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the
entire file in the case, including the complaint, information, abstract of judgment,
probation report, transcript of Kishor’s plea, and transcript of the imposition of judgment
and sentencing. The prosecution also requested that the court consider excerpts from the
transcript of Kishor’s 2015 parole suitability hearing, a handwritten apology letter he had
written to his wife, and a comprehensive risk assessment report prepared for the Board of
Parole Hearings.
At the 2015 parole suitability hearing, while under oath, Kishor told the presiding
commissioner that he was in prison “for attempting to kill my ex-wife.” He stated: “I
hired some people. I conspired with a couple of friends, my drinking buddies. They say,
no don’t worry about it man, we’ll take care of it. I wanted to punish her, and I let them
do what they want to do. I told them, go ahead.” He admitted that he hired two people to
kill his wife. He told them he wanted “to get rid of her because she’s causing me a lot of
trouble.” Kishor said that he tried to kill his wife because he was a “selfish, self-
centered, uncaring, ignorant alcoholic.” He admitted that part of the plan was for him to
have the children out of the house when the crime was committed.
The presiding commissioner read the following description of the crimes from the
probation report into the record: “On 1/13/1998, officers responded to [the victim’s]
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home to investigate a home-invasion robbery. When interviewed, she indicated
approximately 12:45 a.m. she heard someone knocking on the door. Her family,
including her two children and 58-year-old father, had gone to bed. The victim observed
the female codefendant, Jasmine (phonetic), standing on the front porch. When she
opened the door, Jasmine indicated her car had broken down and that she needed to use
the telephone. At that point, two men, Harmeet . . . and Balgeet . . . appeared and the
three used force and forced their way into the home. Once inside, the two men began
beating the victim’s father. While one of the male[s] was cutting rope, the other began
breaking furnishings including the lamps and television set. Jasmine (inaudible) [the
victim’s] purse. The trio made the two victims go to the bedroom in the back of the
residence. The two victims were tied up. Jasmine’s been going through [the victim’s]
jewelry while the two male suspects were looking for car keys. The male suspects then
dragged [the victim] into the bathroom, filled the bathtub with cold water. They
demanded that she give them the jewelry. However, she stated she did not have it
anymore. One of the male suspects accused her of lying and hit her in the eye with his
fists. He then made her get into the cold bathtub. They then dragged her into the living
room. Hit the victim in the head with a bar. Harmeet soaked a towel with bleach and put
it up her nose. He jumped on her back, held the towel over her face. Harmeet then
poured bleach all over her body. Both male suspects attempted to open [the victim’s]
mouth to get her to try to drink the bleach. However, she spit the bleach out and acted
. . . as if she lost consciousness. One of the men began lighting matches and attempted to
set her on fire. When . . . that did not work, they taped her mouth shut. Balgeet
proceeded to stab [the victim] twice in the back. The trio then stole the car, drove away.
The victim’s daughter came to her assistance and helped get the rope off. The victim
then called 911. [The victim] had never seen the three suspects before, but she related
that she was going through an ongoing bitter custody battle with Kishor for the last year,
and he had previously threatened to make her life miserable, even threatened to kill her.
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He had reportedly tried to strangle her in the past. She . . . claimed that Kishor knew her
father was in the residence and that her father probably brought the jewelry they were
looking for. Balgeet and Harmeet admitted guilt and implicated Kishor in devising the
plan to break into the residence and requesting that [the victim] be killed. Mr. Kishor
later admitted to sending the three to his ex-wife’s residence.”
Kishor stated that he had read this report and did not disagree with anything in it.
He further agreed that was what happened. Kishor told one of the deputy commissioners
that he “caused [his ex-wife] a lot of pain that she didn’t deserve” and that he had “deep
regrets for what happened.”
Kishor’s apology letter to his wife said: “What I did was horrible & wrong. You
did not deserve that nor did the kids, nor your father. All the pains fear hurt suffering and
losses I caused. I am very ashamed and deeply regret it. . . .[¶] If I could undo that
night’s horror, I would but I can’t.” He also wrote, “Fact that I hurt you cannot be
changed. I am ashamed and deeply regret my action & poor choices. It will not happen
again, I promise you sincerely.”
In the comprehensive risk assessment report, the evaluator wrote that Kishor
“described a series of frustrations in his relationship that led to his ultimate decision to
have his wife killed.” He was “venting these frustrations to his codefendants when the
plan was hatched to kill her.” The report stated that Kishor “has consistently described
being intoxicated at the time he encouraged his co-defendants to kill his wife in
retaliation.”
Kishor objected to and moved to strike the change-of-plea hearing transcript, the
sentencing transcript, the probation report, the parole suitability hearing transcript, his
handwritten letter, and the comprehensive risk assessment report.
Kishor also presented the testimony of one of his codefendants, Harmeet Singh.
On direct examination, Singh testified that Kishor told him that there was money and
jewelry at his wife’s house; Singh interpreted that statement to be an offer to rob the
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house and take those items. About a week later, Singh and his codefendants went to the
victim’s house to commit the robbery. Singh testified that Kishor did not tell him to kill
the victim. Singh did not see the victim get stabbed or have bleach poured on her.
On cross-examination, Singh was impeached by a statement he had made at a
parole suitability hearing in which he admitted to pouring bleach on the victim to kill her.
Singh was also confronted with a statement he made to a sheriff’s detective that Kishor
had co-planned the murder and told one of their codefendants to kill his wife. Singh
testified that was what the detective wanted him to say.
Kishor also presented the transcripts of the two prior parole suitability hearings in
which he chose not to make any statements. At the 2008 hearing, Kishor did not appear,
and his counsel requested a postponement. After the Board of Parole Hearings stated it
was willing to grant the request, Kishor stipulated that the hearing could be conducted in
his absence. At the 2010 hearing, his defense attorney represented that Kishor did “not
want to physically participate verbally in these proceedings for a variety of reasons,
which were elucidated to me, which he feels it’s in his best interest, since he is attempting
to work in other legal arenas.”
The trial court denied Kishor’s section 1172.6 petition. The court first considered
Kishor’s motions to exclude evidence. The court agreed with Kishor that the sentencing
transcript and probation report contained inadmissible hearsay. The court declined to
strike the transcript of Kishor’s change-of-plea hearing, concluding that it could consider
defense counsel’s statement that Kishor’s codefendants were prepared to testify that
Kishor directed them to kill his wife. And the court concluded that the parole suitability
hearing transcripts, the risk assessment report, and Kishor’s handwritten letter all were
admissible.
Based on the evidence before it, the trial court found “beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant is guilty of attempted murder as a direct aider and abettor.” It explained
that the evidence showed that Kishor knew his codefendants intended to kill the victim;
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that he wanted her killed; and that the codefendants were hired for that purpose. The
evidence also demonstrated that Kishor intended to aid the killing of the victim and did in
fact aid the attempted murder. The court further found that Kishor’s own statements at
his parole suitability hearing showed that he harbored the intent to kill. His unambiguous
statement “to his codefendants to ‘kill her and get rid of her’ ” left no question in the
court’s mind as to his mental state. The evidence thus established beyond a reasonable
doubt that Kishor was guilty of attempted murder under a still-valid theory.
Kishor filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Kishor challenges the trial court’s denial of his petition on two
grounds. First, he contends that his admissions in the parole suitability hearing and
comprehensive risk report were inadmissible at the evidentiary hearing. Second, he
asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was guilty of attempted
murder as a direct aider and abettor. We reject both contentions.
I.
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) narrowed
the scope of the felony-murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for murder liability. (People v. Das (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 954, 959
(Das).) The Legislature adopted the law “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed
on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Among other things, the enactment amended
section 188 to require that a principal convicted of murder “act with malice
aforethought.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2, subd. (a)(3).) It further provided that malice
“shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(Ibid.) And it added a procedure, now codified in section 1172.6, to permit individuals
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convicted of murder under prior law to request that their conviction be vacated and to be
resentenced on any remaining counts. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; Das, at p. 959.)
In 2021, the Legislature adopted Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) to
expressly allow those convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to seek resentencing under section 1172.6. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551,
§ 2, subd. (a); Das, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 959.) The Legislature enacted the
provision to clarify “that persons who were convicted of attempted murder or
manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the natural [and] probable
consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those persons convicted of murder
under the same theories.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a).) The law took effect on
January 1, 2022. (Das, at p. 959.)
As amended (and as relevant here), section 1172.6 provides that a person
convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
may file a petition to have his or her conviction vacated when: (1) the charges filed
against the person allowed the prosecution to proceed on a theory of attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine; (2) the person was convicted of
attempted murder after trial or accepted a guilty plea in lieu of a trial at which he or she
could have been convicted of attempted murder; and (3) the person could not presently be
convicted of attempted murder because of changes to section 188 made effective
January 1, 2019. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)
Upon the issuance of an order to show cause, the prosecution bears the burden to
“prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted
murder under California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) With certain exceptions, admission
of evidence at an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6 is “governed by the Evidence
Code.” (Ibid.) “The prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new or additional
evidence to meet their respective burdens.” (Ibid.) “If the prosecution fails to sustain its
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burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to
the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining
charges.” (Ibid.)
The elements of “attempted murder [include] the specific intent to kill and the
commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.”
(People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623.) “[T]o be guilty of attempted murder as an
aider and abettor, a person must give aid or encouragement with knowledge of the direct
perpetrator’s intent to kill and with the purpose of facilitating the direct perpetrator’s
accomplishment of the intended killing—which means that the person guilty of attempted
murder as an aider and abettor must intend to kill.” (Id. at p. 624.)
Claims challenging the erroneous admission of evidence are ordinarily reviewed
for abuse of discretion. (People v. Zavala (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 366, 373, petn. for
review pending, petn. filed Oct. 31, 2024.) But when, like here, the admissibility of
evidence turns on a question of law, our review is de novo. (Ibid.)
II.
Invoking People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 (Coleman) and its progeny,
Kishor contends that the trial court erred in admitting his parole suitability hearing
testimony and the admissions he made in connection with the comprehensive risk
assessment report. “In Coleman, the California Supreme Court held that a defendant’s
testimony at a probation revocation proceeding was inadmissible against him at a later
trial to prove guilt on the related criminal charges. (Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at
pp. 889-890.) The court reasoned that a defendant should not be forced to choose
between the privilege against self-incrimination at trial and the right to be heard at a
probation revocation hearing. (Id. at p. 878.) Coleman expressed its holding in terms of
a judicially created exclusionary rule (id. at p. 889)[;] however, later cases have treated
Coleman as creating a limited species of use immunity grounded in California’s
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. (See Ramona R. v. Superior Court
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(1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 808-809.) Whether considered a judicially devised exclusionary
rule or a type of use immunity, the basis for the decisions remains the same two policies
that underlie the privilege against self-incrimination: first, the policy which requires the
state to carry its burden of proving guilt without the defendant’s compelled personal
assistance; and second, the policy against subjecting a defendant to the ‘ “cruel trilemma
of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.” ’ (Coleman, at p. 878; see id. at pp. 875-876;
Ramona R., at pp. 809-810.)” (People v. Zavala, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 374.)
Kishor acknowledges that Courts of Appeal have consistently declined to extend
Coleman’s exclusionary rule to hearings held under section 1172.6; but he urges us to
depart from their holdings and to follow the reasoning of the dissenting opinion in People
v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 602-605. We decline to do so. As this court and
others have comprehensively explained, Coleman’s rationale is inapplicable to
section 1172.6 hearings, which are postconviction proceedings based on an act of lenity
by the Legislature. (People v. Zavala, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 376; People v. Duran
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 920, 928-931; People v. Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 588-590; People v. Anderson (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 81, 89-93; People v. Myles
(2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 704-706.)
Kishor argues that admitting this category of evidence is unfair, but such concerns
can be addressed on a case-by-case basis. As one court observed, the “trial judge is
ideally situated to determine whether the incentives at a specific parole hearing mesh
with [the resentencing statute’s] goal of aligning punishment with true culpability. When
there are valid reasons to doubt the probity of a parole hearing statement, the trial judge
can hear and appraise arguments in the case’s context and accord the statement due
weight. Trial judges are expert at evaluating—word by word—whom and what to
believe in individual situations. No reason exists to preempt trial judges’ particularized
evaluation with our own blanket rule of exclusion.” (People v. Mitchell, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 590.) In this case, as we discuss more fully below, we see no merit
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to Kishor’s challenge to the trial court’s “particularized evaluation” of the facts before it.
(Ibid.)
III.
Kishor’s second contention on appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to find
him guilty of attempted murder as a direct aider and abettor. In reviewing a trial court’s
finding that the prosecution has proven a defendant is guilty of attempted murder under
current law, “[w]e review the trial judge’s factfinding for substantial evidence.” (People
v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.) “We ‘ “examine the entire record in the
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial
evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would
support a rational trier of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable
doubt.” ’ [Citation.] Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding
the petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and
resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable
doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.)
The People concede, and we agree, that the factual basis for Kishor’s plea did not
show that he admitted to aiding and abetting the attempted murder with the intent to kill.
That is because Kishor pleaded under People v. West, supra, 3 Cal.3d 595, which allowed
him to take advantage of a plea bargain while still asserting his innocence. (People v.
Rauen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 421, 424.) The People also concede, and we also agree,
that the trial court should not have considered defense counsel’s statements at the change-
of-plea hearing about how he expected witnesses to testify. That is because their
testimony was hearsay. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); Evid. Code, § 1220.)
But Kishor’s own words—at the parole suitability hearing, as recorded in the
comprehensive risk assessment, and in his apology to the victim—provided substantial
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evidence of Kishor’s guilt. In his testimony before the parole board, Kishor admitted
under oath that he hired two people to kill his wife. He agreed that his codefendants
implicated him in devising the plan to break into his wife’s home and that he requested
that she be killed. He said the plan included having the children come to his house at the
time of the murder. He stated that he did not disagree with anything in the detailed
recitation of the facts of the crimes and specifically agreed that was what happened.
Kishor told the parole commissioner he caused his wife a lot of pain and had deep regrets
for what happened.
In the comprehensive risk assessment report, Kishor described frustrations that led
to “his ultimate decision to have his wife killed.” He repeatedly admitted to being part of
the plan to kill her.
His handwritten apology letter to his wife admitted that he did something
“horrible” and “wrong.” He admitted that he hurt her and said that he was ashamed of his
actions and “poor choices.”
All of this evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Kishor
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Kishor admitted that he hired others to kill his
wife, agreed to a factual recitation that he did exactly that, and then wrote an apology
letter that provided further circumstantial evidence of his guilt. These facts demonstrated
Kishor’s specific intent to kill his wife and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act
toward accomplishing the intended killing. (People v. Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 623.)
The evidence was sufficient to establish that he directly aided and abetted the attempted
murder of his wife.
Kishor challenges the reliability of the inculpatory evidence by pointing to his
counsel’s statement at the change-of-plea hearing that he maintained his innocence,
Singh’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and the fact that Kishor said nothing at prior
parole suitability hearings. But the trial court heard and saw all the evidence and was in
the best position to weigh it and to assess its credibility. (People v. Mitchell, supra,
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81 Cal.App.5th at p. 590.) For example, the trial court was entitled to discount Singh’s
exculpatory testimony at the evidentiary hearing in the face of his prior statement to law
enforcement that Kishor had directed Singh to kill Kishor’s wife. And we see nothing in
the record that suggests that the circumstances of his parole suitability hearing or the risk
assessment interview were so inherently coercive or untrustworthy that no reasonable
trier of fact could have credited the statements he made in them. On the record before us,
we have no difficulty concluding that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
We concur:
/s/
KRAUSE, Acting P. J.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
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