CourtListener 10274228•People v. Gwin CA2/4
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Filed 11/14/24 P. v. Gwin CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B328696
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA101332)
v.
GEVONTE DESHAWN GWIN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
John A. Colucci, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Blythe J. Leszkay, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Gevonte Gwin appeals from the denial of his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.61 for failure to
make a prima facie showing. Gwin contends the superior court
erred by considering the preliminary hearing transcript and
direct appellate opinion in his case, relying on a finding that
Gwin personally used a firearm, and concluding the jury
instructions did not allow for malice to be imputed to him. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
Gwin was tried for three incidents that occurred in 2007.
One incident involved the negligent discharge of a weapon,
another involved a fatal shooting outside a gas station in
Bellflower, and the third involved a non-fatal shooting at a
Gardena strip club. (See People v. Gwin (Aug. 15, 2012, B230533)
[nonpub. opn.].) In 2010, a jury found Gwin guilty of first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)); willful, premeditated, and deliberate
attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)); and
discharge of a firearm with gross negligence (§ 246.3, subd. (a)).
The jury also found that Gwin personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury or death to the
victims of both the murder and attempted murder (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)). Both convictions were also enhanced based upon a
finding that Gwin committed the murder and attempted murder
for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a
criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). The trial court
sentenced Gwin to a total term of 92 years to life. A different
panel of this court affirmed the convictions on appeal. (See People
v. Gwin, supra.)
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise specified.
2
In 2022, Gwin filed this petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 and the superior court appointed counsel. The
People opposed, arguing Gwin was ineligible for relief because he
was neither prosecuted under nor was his jury instructed on the
felony murder or natural and probable consequences doctrines.
The People attached the opinion in People v. Gwin, supra, and
reporter’s transcripts from Gwin’s preliminary hearings to their
opposition. They later filed the jury instructions and verdict
forms from Gwin’s trial. In reply, Gwin argued he made a prima
facie showing of eligibility for relief because the jury instructions,
specifically CALCRIM Nos. 400, 401, 520, and 521, “created
sufficient confusion that it can not precisely be determined
whether the theory relied upon by the jury would be allowed
today,” and the firearm finding did not prove he had the intent to
kill.
At a prima facie hearing, the superior court stated that it
had considered Gwin’s petition, the People’s opposition and
supplemental filings, and Gwin’s reply. It did not specifically
mention the prior appellate opinion or preliminary hearing
transcripts. After the parties submitted on the papers, the court
made the following oral ruling: “The court has read and
considered all of that, and the court is well aware that we’re at
the prima facie phase and what I can and cannot do. I am not
doing any fact-finding. I’m not doing any credibility call. I’m just
merely looking at the state of the record, and, in this case, part of
the record is the verdict forms, certainly. And the jury came back
that the defendant was guilty of first degree murder, plus that he
personally used a firearm; and that he was guilty of willful,
premeditated, deliberate attempted murder, and he personally
used a firearm. The court also took a look at the jury
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instructions, and I noted that no felony murder instruction was
given, no natural and probable consequence instruction was
given, nor was there any instruction where malice could be
imputed to the defendant. As such, the court is going to rule the
defendant is legally ineligible for relief pursuant to 1172.6, and I
will deny the petition.”
Gwin timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Governing Principles
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature “‘amend[ed] the
felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is
not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.’” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448 (Curiel),
quoting Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f).) One new provision, section
189, subdivision (e), narrowed the application of the felony
murder rule. (Ibid.) Another, section 188, subdivision (a)(3),
effectively eliminated aiding and abetting liability for murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine by
providing, “to be convicted of murder, a principal shall act with
malice aforethought,” and prohibiting the imputation of malice
“to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3), Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.) The
Legislature later expanded the law to eliminate liability for
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as well. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a); People v. Hurtado
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 891.) Under this framework, a person
is guilty of murder only if he or she was “the actual killer, acted
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with the intent to kill, or ‘was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life, as described in subdivision (d) of [Penal Code] Section
190.2.’” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710 (Strong).)
A person convicted of murder or attempted murder under a
now-invalid theory may petition the superior court under section
1172.6 to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any
remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) A properly pleaded
petition requires the court to appoint counsel when requested
under Section 1172.6, subdivision (c). (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 963, 966 (Lewis).) The court must allow further
briefing by the parties and “hold a hearing to determine whether
the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) In determining whether the petitioner has made a
prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6, the court may
consider the record of conviction. The bar for such a showing is
“‘very low,’” and it is passed if the petitioner’s allegations, taken
as true, would entitle him or her to relief. (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 971-972.) Although the court should not engage in
factfinding at the prima facie stage, “‘if the record, including the
court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations
made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a
credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.’”” (Id. at p.
971.)
If the petition states a prima facie claim for relief, the
superior court must issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing. At the evidentiary hearing, the People bear
the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under current
law. (§ 1172.6, subds. (d)(1), (d)(3).) If the People fail to meet
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their burden, the trial court must grant the petition, vacate the
conviction, and resentence the petitioner on any remaining
charges. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
We review de novo whether the superior court properly
denied a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. (People
v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545; People v. Harrison (2021)
73 Cal.App.5th 429, 437.)
II. Analysis
In its ruling, the superior court expressly referenced only
the jury instructions and verdict forms, both of which
indisputably are part of the record of conviction upon which it
could rely at the prima facie stage. (People v. Morris (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 1016, 1023.) Gwin contends the court erred because
it also considered the preliminary hearing transcript and
appellate opinion. He also contends the court improperly relied
on the finding that he personally used a firearm, which alone
“does not show that a defendant acted with malice aforethought.”
(People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 598 (Offley).) As we
explain, Gwin has not carried his burden of demonstrating error.
(See People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292-293.)
Gwin acknowledges that it was permissible for the superior
court to consider “the procedural history of the case recited in any
prior appellate opinion” in reaching its prima facie
determination. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) But he does not show
that the superior court went beyond this limitation. He also
points out that hearsay evidence admitted at a preliminary
hearing pursuant to section 872, subdivision (b) is inadmissible
at a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing unless another hearsay
exception applies (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)), and that the extent to
which a trial court may rely upon preliminary hearing transcripts
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at the prima facie stage is an open question currently pending
before the Supreme Court. (See People v. Patton (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 649, review granted June 28, 2023, S279670 [“Did
the trial court engage in impermissible judicial factfinding by
relying on the preliminary hearing transcript to deny defendant’s
Penal Code section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage?”].)
But, again, Gwin does not identify any portion of the preliminary
hearing transcript on which the court relied. Nor does he show
that the court relied exclusively on the firearm finding, or how
his case is analogous to Offley, where (1) the jury was instructed
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine and (2) the
defendant was convicted of second degree murder.2 (See Offley,
supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 593.)
But even if we were to assume that Gwin’s assertions of
error have merit, which they do not, he has not demonstrated a
reasonable probability that, absent such errors, an order to show
cause would have issued at the prima facie stage. (People v.
Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 986.) Error is harmless in the
context of section 1172.6 if the record of conviction, which
includes the jury instructions and verdict, refutes the petitioner’s
prima facie showing and establishes as a matter of law that he or
she is not entitled to relief. (See Lewis, supra, at pp. 971-974;
People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 47-48; People v.
Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 676 [“‘jury instructions given
at a petitioner’s trial may provide “readily ascertainable facts
from the record” that refute the petitioner’s showing,’ permitting
2 Gwin explains in his reply brief that he raises this
argument only “to forestall the argument that should the
imputation of malice argument succeed, that the firearm
enhancement standing alone would support the ruling.”
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a trial court to determine that a petitioner is not entitled to
relief”].) We agree with the Attorney General that the jury
instructions and verdicts in this case establish that Gwin is not
entitled to relief as a matter of law.
Gwin does not raise any challenge to his conviction for
attempted murder, and he acknowledges that the jury found him
guilty of first degree murder after being instructed that such a
verdict required an intent to kill (CALCRIM No. 521). He asserts
that the first degree murder verdict is not dispositive, however,
because “that finding could have been based upon firing from a
motor vehicle.” Not so. The jury was instructed with a modified
version of CALCRIM No. 521 setting forth two theories under
which Gwin could be guilty of first degree murder. First, the jury
could find that Gwin was “guilty of first degree murder if the
People have proved that he acted willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation. The defendant acted willfully if he intended to
kill.” Second, the jury could find that Gwin was “guilty of first
degree murder if the People have proved that the defendant
murdered by shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle. The
defendant committed this kind of murder if: 1. He shot a firearm
from a motor vehicle; 2. He intentionally shot at a person who
was outside the vehicle; AND 3. He intended to kill that person.”
Thus, to find Gwin guilty of first degree murder under either
theory, the jury had to find that he intended to kill the victim.
That requirement precludes his eligibility for relief under section
1172.6 as a matter of law. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th 698, 710
[“relief is unavailable if the defendant was either the actual
killer, acted with the intent to kill, or ‘was a major participant in
the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life’”].)
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Gwin disputes this conclusion, citing People v. Curiel
[(2023)] 15 Cal.5th 433 for the proposition that intent to kill does
not alone conclusively establish ineligibility for section 1172.6
relief. In Curiel, the Supreme Court clarified that a section
1172.6 petition may be denied at the prima facie stage only where
“the record conclusively establishes every element of the offense,”
and the intent to kill “is only one element” that “does not by itself
establish any valid theory of liability.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 463.) For instance, to establish liability under an aiding and
abetting theory, the People must prove “‘(a) the direct
perpetrator’s actus reus — a crime committed by the direct
perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea’ — which here
includes knowledge that the direct perpetrator intends to commit
the crime or life-endangering act, ‘and (c) the aider and abettor’s
actus reus — conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists
the achievement of the crime.’” (Id. at p. 467.)
Gwin contends “the actus reus element is missing here.”
But his contention ignores the jury’s finding that Gwin personally
used a firearm and caused bodily injury or death to the victim.
(See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 463 [“additional jury findings[
] might be relevant to the remaining elements of the relevant
homicide offense and conclusively refute a petitioner’s allegation
that he or she could not be convicted of murder under current
law”].) It also ignores the fact that Gwin’s jury was not
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
The only crime at issue here was murder. Where the only
unlawful purpose charged is an unlawful killing, “one cannot
knowingly and intentionally help another commit an unlawful
killing without acting with malice.” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25
Cal.4th 1111, 1123.) This distinguishes Gwin’s case from Curiel,
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where the jury was instructed on the now-impermissible natural
and probable consequences theory. The scenario discussed in
Curiel, “where a defendant is liable for murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, and acts with malice
aforethought, but is not liable as a direct aider and abettor,” is
“‘quite narrow’ and relevant only to a ‘very small set of cases.’”
(Id. at p. 470.) This case is not one of them.
Gwin recognizes that there was no natural and probable
consequences instruction given in his case. Instead, he contends
that the jury instructions on aiding and abetting (CALCRIM No.
401) and second degree murder (CALCRIM No. 520) created an
ambiguity that could have allowed the jury to find him guilty of
murder by imputing the shooter’s malice to him, rather than by
finding he personally harbored the requisite intent. He supports
this argument by primarily relying upon People v. Powell (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 689 (Powell) and People v. Langi (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi.) Both cases are distinguishable.
In Powell, on direct appeal, the court determined that the
standard aiding and abetting instruction, CALCRIM No. 401, is
“not tailored for” aiding and abetting an implied malice murder.
(Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 714.) Specifically, the
instruction “couches direct aiding and abetting liability in terms
of the aider and abettor knowing the perpetrator intended to
commit the crime, the aider and abettor intending to aid and abet
the perpetrator in committing the crime, and that, by words or
conduct, the aider and abettor in fact aided the perpetrator's
commission of the crime.” (Ibid.) But in the context of implied
malice murder, the relevant inquiry is whether the aider and
abettor “intend[s] the commission of the perpetrator’s act [that
proximately causes death], the natural and probable
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consequences of which are dangerous to human life, intentionally
aid[s] in the commission of that act and do[es] so with conscious
disregard for human life.” (Ibid.) The court therefore concluded
that giving CALCRIM No. 401 in the circumstances was error,
although it ultimately concluded the error was harmless. (Ibid.)
In Langi, the same issue arose in the context of a section
1172.6 resentencing petition. The defendant was part of a group
who beat and robbed the victim. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 975.) The victim was killed when he fell and hit his head after
someone in the group punched him. (Ibid.) Langi contended that
he did not throw the fatal punch. The jury convicted him of
robbery, battery, and second degree murder. (Id. at p. 977.)
The superior court summarily denied Langi’s resentencing
petition, concluding that the jury had found him guilty as the
actual killer. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 977.) On
appeal, the court rejected the superior court’s conclusion and
assumed that the jury had convicted Langi as an aider and
abettor. (Id. at p. 980.) The appellate court then held that,
although the jury had not been instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, the standard instructions given
on second degree murder and aiding and abetting were
ambiguous, as they permitted the jury to find Langi guilty on a
theory under which malice was imputed to him based solely on
his participation in the crime. (Ibid.) The court observed that
while the aiding and abetting instruction stated that a person
aids and abets a crime if the person acts with knowledge of the
perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and with the intent to commit or
encourage that crime, “the second-degree-murder instruction
specified that the direct perpetrator of that crime need not act
with the unlawful intent of causing death.” (Id. at p. 982.) The
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perpetrator’s unlawful purpose did not need to be killing the
victim, but could have been “only to strike or to injure, or
conceivably only to embarrass, the victim.” (Ibid.) Thus, the
court reasoned that “the aider and abettor’s knowledge of that
purpose similarly need not have been knowledge that the
perpetrator aimed to kill.” (Ibid.) Because the aiding and
abetting instruction did not require Langi to act with conscious
disregard for human life, the appellate court concluded that the
jury could have convicted him as an aider and abettor simply for
intending to aid the perpetrator’s act, without express or implied
malice. (Id. at p. 983.)
The ambiguity identified in Powell and Langi is not present
here. For aider and abettor liability, CALCRIM No. 401 requires
the defendant to know that the perpetrator intended to commit
the crime. The only crime charged here was murder, either first
or second degree. In Langi the defendant was also charged with
and found guilty of robbery and battery. (Langi, supra, 73
Cal.App.5th at p. 976.) Thus, the jury instructions in Langi
permitted Langi to be convicted for aiding and abetting murder
based on a finding that he intended to aid and abet a battery or
some other crime. But here, murder was the only crime charged,
and required one of two different intents: either intent to kill
(express malice) or conscious disregard for human life (implied
malice). The jury unambiguously found that Gwin intended to
kill. There is no reasonable possibility that the jury could have
found Gwin guilty of murder as an aider and abettor because he
knowingly helped the perpetrator commit a specific crime yet did
not harbor the requisite mens rea.
Gwin also cites People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th
1257 (Maldonado), emphasizing that, unlike Powell and Langi,
12
the defendant in Maldonado was found guilty of first degree
murder. However, in Maldonado, the jury was instructed on a
lying in wait theory of first degree murder, and the “lying in wait
instruction did not instruct the jury that the perpetrator needed
to intend to cause death.” (Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1266.) The court thus concluded that, “using Langi’s
reasoning, the jury could have construed the instructions such
that, ‘to be guilty as an aider and abettor of [lying in wait first
degree] murder, appellant need only have intended to encourage
the perpetrator’s intentional act—in this case, [a surprise attack
on the victim]—whether or not appellant intended to aid or
encourage [the victim’s] killing, and whether or not he personally
knew of and disregarded the risk of such a killing.’’ (Ibid.)
Gwin’s jury was not instructed on an alternative basis for murder
such as lying in wait. As discussed above, both first degree
murder theories expressly required the jury to find that Gwin
intended to kill the victim.
The jury instructions here required the jury to find that
Gwin personally harbored express or implied malice whether he
was a direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor. He accordingly
is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law, and
any error in denying his petition without issuing an order to show
cause was harmless.
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
**SIGGINS, J.
We concur:
CURREY, P. J.
MORI, J.
** Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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