People v. Hurtado CA5

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Filed 11/12/24 P. v. Hurtado CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F087630
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. VCF099625-02)
v.

RICHARD HURTADO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Nathan G.
Leedy, Judge.
Lindsey M. Ball, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Brook A.
Bennigson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Franson, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.
Richard Hurtado was found guilty by jury in 2004 of child endangerment (Pen.
Code, § 273a, subd. (a); count 1),1 corporal injury to a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a);
count 2), and making criminal threats (§ 422; count 3). In a bifurcated proceeding, the
trial court found true that Hurtado had sustained a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)),
and a serious felony prior (§ 667, subd. (a)). Hurtado was sentenced to 31 years to life,
consisting of three concurrent 25-year-to life terms pursuant to the “Three Strikes” law
(§§ 1170.12, subd. (c), 667), plus, on count 3, an additional six years, consisting of
five years for the serious felony prior and one year for the prison prior. One-year prison
priors attached to counts 1 and 2 were stayed. On direct appeal, this court affirmed
Hurtado’s conviction. (People v. Hurtado (May 19, 2006, F047195) [nonpub. opn.].)
On March 1, 2022, Hurtado, in propria persona, filed a motion to be resentenced
under Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 483). On April 4, 2022,
without appointing counsel and outside the presence of the parties, the trial court struck
the prison prior enhancement by minute order from the judgment and filed an amended
abstract of judgment.2

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Hurtado did not appeal the trial court’s April 4, 2022, order for reasons that are not
clear in the record, but instead, on July 17, 2023, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to
the California Supreme Court, challenging the ex parte order and arguing, in the
alternative, that he was entitled to the constructive filing of a notice of appeal pursuant to
In re Benoit (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72. His petition for writ of habeas corpus alleged the trial
court erred when it resentenced him on April 4, 2022, by failing to appoint counsel for
resentencing (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(5)), failing to consider various postconviction factors
when resentencing him (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3)), and by resentencing him without his
personal presence (§ 1172.75, subd.(e)).
On December 13, 2023, the California Supreme Court granted an order to show
cause returnable to the trial court, ordering the court to determine whether Hurtado
should be granted an opportunity to appeal the court’s order under the Benoit procedure.
On February 13, 2024, the trial court granted the relief and ordered Hurtado to file a
notice appeal within 60 days, which he has done.

2.
On appeal, Hurtado contends the trial court’s ex parte motion striking the prison
prior enhancements without granting him a resentencing hearing pursuant to the plain
language of section 1172.75 was improper, and asks that we remand for a resentencing
hearing. Respondent contends the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider
Hurtado’s motion and, as a result, Hurtado’s appeal must be dismissed as the order
striking Hurtado’s section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement is void. For reasons we
explain below, we agree that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and the April 4, 2022,
resentencing order is void. We will remand to the trial court to review the judgment and
recall and resentence Hurtado pursuant to section 1172.75.
DISCUSSION
Section 1172.75
Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b) required trial courts to
impose a one-year sentence enhancement for each true finding on an allegation the
defendant had served a separate prior prison term and had not remained free of custody
for at least five years. (Former § 667.5, subd. (b).) Effective January 1, 2020, Senate
Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 136) amended section 667.5 by limiting
the prior prison term enhancement to only prior terms for sexually violent offenses.
(§ 667.5, subd. (b); Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1; People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th
664, 681.) Enhancements based on prior prison terms served for other offenses became
legally invalid. (Id. at p. 682.) The amendment was to be applied retroactively to all
cases not yet final on January 1, 2020. (Id. at pp. 681–682.)
Later, in 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 483. This bill sought to make
the changes implemented by Senate Bill 136 retroactive. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1 [“it is
the intent of the Legislature to retroactively apply … Senate Bill 136 of the 2019–20
Regular Session to all persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison
for these repealed sentence enhancements”].) It took effect on January 1, 2022, and

3.
added former section 1171.1, now 1172.75 to the Penal Code.3 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3;
Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part, that any sentence
enhancement imposed under section 667.5, subdivision (b) before January 1, 2020,
except for an enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense,
is legally invalid. The statute also establishes a specific “mechanism to provide affected
defendants a remedy for those legally invalid enhancements.” (People v. Burgess (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 375, 380 (Burgess).)
The resentencing process begins with corrections officials. Section 1172.75,
subdivision (b) directs the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) and the county correctional administrator to, within statutorily prescribed
timelines, identify persons in their custody who are serving a term of judgment that
includes an enhancement subject to the statute, and to “provide the name of each person,
along with the person’s date of birth and the relevant case number or docket number, to
the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) “This
information shall be provided as follows: [¶] (1) By March 1, 2022, for individuals who
have served their base term and any other enhancements and are currently serving a
sentence based on the enhancement. For purposes of this paragraph, all other
enhancements shall be considered to have been served first. [¶] (2) By July 1, 2022, for
all other individuals.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (b)(1)–(2).)
Senate Bill 483 provides a process for recall of sentences rendered invalid by
Senate Bill 483 and resentencing of affected defendants. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).)
“Upon receiving the information described in subdivision (b),” the court shall review the
judgment and recall and resentence the defendant if it determines the judgment includes a

3 There were no substantive changes to the statute. We cite to section 1172.75 for
ease of reference.

4.
sentence enhancement subject to section 1172.75. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (c) also provides a staggered timeline for when the review
and resentencing of eligible defendants shall be completed: By October 1, 2022, for
individuals who have served their base term and any other enhancements and are
currently serving a sentence based on the enhancement (§ 1172.75, subd. (c)(1)), and by
December 31, 2023, for all other individuals. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c)(2).)
Further, “[r]esentencing pursuant to [section 1172.75] shall result in a lesser
sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed
enhancement, unless the court find by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a
lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) The court is to
apply the current sentencing law, including all the recent ameliorative legislation.
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) The court may consider “postconviction factors, including, but
not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while
incarcerated” and any circumstances which “have reduced the defendant’s risk for future
violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original
sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(5) provides that the trial court shall appoint
counsel and subdivision (e) provides that the parties may waive a resentencing hearing.
If the hearing is not waived, it may be conducted remotely through remote technology if
the defendant agrees.
Hurtado’s Section 1172.75 Petition and Proceedings
Hurtado filed a motion, in propria persona, on March 1, 2022, stating he was
subject to a prison prior enhancement and entitled to a new sentencing proceeding under
section 1172.75. His petition included allegations that he had “done his base[] term and
has done the time for the actual crime,” he had done “over 30 self help courses …
received his G.E.D. and is currently enrolled in college.” The petition also alleged

5.
Hurtado was diagnosed with cancer in December 2021 and his “situation has become
dire.”
On April 4, 2022, the trial court, without appointing counsel and outside the
presence of the parties, struck the prison prior enhancement by minute order from the
judgment and filed an amended abstract of judgment.
Subsequently, on June 28, 2022, as evidenced in the filed augmented clerk’s
transcript, the CDCR identified Hurtado as potentially eligible for resentencing under
section 1172.75.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under Section 1172.75
We first address respondent’s contention that the trial court’s order striking
Hurtado’s section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements is void for lack of jurisdiction.
Hurtado contends, for the first time in his reply brief, that the fact that he was serving an
invalid prison prior, alone, gave the trial court ongoing subject matter jurisdiction to
resentence him on his own motion. We, however, agree with respondent that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction and that the April 4, 2022, order is void.
In Burgess, the court held that section 1172.75 “simply does not contemplate
resentencing relief initiated by any individual defendant’s petition or motion.” (Burgess,
supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 384.) Rather, “any review and verification by the court in
advance of resentencing is only triggered by receipt of the necessary information from the
CDCR Secretary or a county correctional administrator, not by any individual
defendant.” (Ibid., italics added.) As such, Burgess held that the trial court “lacked
jurisdiction to adjudicate [the defendant’s] motion for resentencing .…” (Id. at p. 382.)
Other courts, including ours, have taken the same view as Burgess. (See., e.g.,
People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 332 (Cota) [“We begin by acknowledging
that section 1172.75 does not authorize a defendant to seek resentencing on his or her
own motion or petition. Rather the process is triggered by the [CDCR] identifying a
defendant as a person serving a sentence that includes a prior prison term enhancement”];

6.
People v. Escobedo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 440, 447–448 [same]; People v. Newell
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 265, 268 [“ ‘[S]ection 1172.75 simply does not contemplate
resentencing relief initiated by any individual defendant’s petition or motion’ ”].)
Here, the filed augmented clerk’s transcript established that the CDCR identified
Hurtado as potentially eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75 on June 28, 2022.
However, Hurtado initiated the process for resentencing himself on March 1, 2022. This
is not authorized under section 1172.75. (See Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 384;
Cota, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 332; People v. Escobedo, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 447–448; People v. Newell, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 268.)
Therefore, the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction and had no authority to
adjudicate Hurtado’s motion for resentencing under section 1172.75. (See Burgess,
supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 382; see also People v. Ford (2015) 61 Cal.4th 282, 286 [“A
court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense when it has no authority at all over the
subject matter or the parties, or when it lacks any power to hear or determine the case”].)
We therefore vacate the court’s resentencing order as void. (See People v. Boyd (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 56, 71 [where a court lacks fundamental jurisdiction, its order is void
and not simply voidable]; Doe v. Regents of University of California (2022) 80
Cal.App.5th 282, 292 [courts have “inherent power to vacate void orders”].)
Hurtado argues the trial court had no lack of jurisdiction, citing this court’s
opinion in Cota, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 318. However, Cota is distinguishable.
In Cota, the defendant, in propria persona, filed his petition for resentencing
pursuant to Senate Bill 483 on April 19, 2022. At some point, counsel was appointed for
the defendant, and the parties appeared before the court on May 19, 2022, and the matter
was continued. By June 16, 2022, the CDCR had included the defendant on a list of
persons identified as potentially eligible for resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill 483 and
had made this list available to the trial court through a secure file transfer portal. The

7.
parties appeared again on July 14, 2022, and the hearing was again continued.4 On
November 17, 2022, counsel for defendant filed a “ ‘Motion for Hearing on Resentencing
and Sentencing Statement.’ (Some capitalization omitted.)” Therein, the defendant
argued the prior prison term enhancements were legally invalid and must be dismissed.
He further argued he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing on other statutory grounds.
The matter was heard on December 13, 2022. At the resentencing hearing, the trial court
struck the prior prison term enhancements but denied the defendant’s additional request
to strike the prior serious felony enhancement. (Cota, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 326–
328.)
This court requested supplemental briefing in Cota on the question of whether the
trial court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the defendant’s request for resentencing
inasmuch as section 1172.75 does not expressly provide for a petition or a motion
process. The defendant in Cota contended the trial court’s resentencing jurisdiction was
triggered by the CDCR, which was required to submit information regarding the
defendant’s resentencing eligibility to the trial court by July 1, 2022, months before the
court resentenced the defendant. The respondent countered that the trial court had no
jurisdiction to consider a resentencing request brought by the defendant and the resulting
order was therefore void. (Cota, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 328.)
We concluded in Cota that the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence the
defendant pursuant to section 1172.75. We acknowledged that section 1172.75 does not
authorize a defendant to seek resentencing on his or her own motion or petition, but that
the process is triggered by the CDCR identifying a defendant as a person serving a

4 The minute order for this date states arguments were presented and evidence
submitted to the court for ruling, and the matter was taken under submission. But the
reporter’s transcript for that date reflects only that the following statement was made by
the court, “[s]ame as Barboza, with the same scheduling dates.” (Cota, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 326, fn. 3.)

8.
sentence that includes a prior prison term enhancement. (See § 1172.75, subd. (a).)
Since the defendant filed an unauthorized motion for resentencing, the motion was
procedurally improper, and the trial court could have denied it on that basis. However,
the court did not do so. Rather, the court took no immediate action on the defendant’s
motion. Eventually, during the pendency of the motion, the CDCR identified the
defendant as an individual potentially eligible for resentencing. (See § 1172.75,
subd. (a).) As such, we concluded that, when the CDCR provided this identification to
the trial court, it triggered the court’s review and resentencing obligations under
section 1172.75, subdivision (b), thereby placing the matter within a statutorily
authorized exception to the general rule that a trial court has no jurisdiction to modify a
final judgment. Once the trial court received that identification information from the
CDCR, it had authority over the matter and was statutorily authorized to act. (Cota,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 332–333.) As such, we concluded that, under the facts of
Cota, the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence defendant pursuant to section 1172.75,
and we affirmed the resentencing order.
As noted by the timeline in Cota, although the defendant incorrectly filed his own
motion pursuant to section 1172.75, the CDCR identified the defendant as potentially
eligible for resentencing before the trial court ruled on the motion. Here, in contrast,
Hurtado filed his motion on March 1, 2022, the ex parte order resentencing Hurtado was
filed on April 4, 2022, and the CDCR did not identify Hurtado as eligible for
resentencing until June 28, 2022. The April 4, 2022, order is therefore void.
Remand for Resentencing
We now turn to the proper remedy for Hurtado. Both parties agree that Hurtado
must be resentenced pursuant to section 1172.75. We agree remand for a resentencing
hearing pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 1172.75 is the proper remedy in
this case.

9.
In Burgess, the defendant’s conviction became final and he began serving his
sentence in 2010. In February 2022, the defendant filed his motion, in propria persona,
for resentencing under section 1172.75. The trial court denied the motion, finding
section 1172.75 did not allow the defendant to seek such relief on his own motion. The
defendant, through appointed counsel, filed an appeal contending the trial court erred in
refusing to recall his sentence and resentence him in accord with section 1172.75. The
appellate court in Burgess agreed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the
defendant’s motion for resentencing. (Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 378–379,
381–382.)
Although there was no dispute in Burgess that the one-year section 667.5,
subdivision (b) enhancement as to the defendant was invalid under section 1172.75, at the
time the Burgess opinion was filed on December 15, 2022, the defendant had not yet
begun serving the now invalid prison prior enhancement. As such, the court in Burgess
did not remand his case for resentencing because doing so “at this juncture would
undermine the purpose of the staggered statutory deadlines [(§ 1172.75, subd. (c)(1)–(2))]
and could allow [the defendant] to obtain relief before others who are currently serving
time on legally invalid enhancements.” (Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 383.)
Here, however, both deadlines, October 1, 2022, and December 31, 2023
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c)(1)–(2)), have long passed and remand for resentencing at this point
would not, as cautioned in Burgess, allow Hurtado to “jump the line” ahead of other
defendants serving a sentence based on an enhancement that section 1172.75 repeals.
(Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 384; § 1172.75, subd. (c)(1)–(2).)
DISPOSITION
The sentence as modified on April 4, 2022, is void and therefore vacated. The
matter is remanded to the trial court to review the judgment and recall and resentence
Hurtado pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 1172.75.

10.

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