People v. Ledesma CA4/3

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Filed 11/12/24 P. v. Ledesma CA4/3

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063032

v. (Super. Ct. No. 06NF4409)

DAVID LEDESMA, JR., OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Lewis W. Clapp, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
with directions. Respondent’s motion to dismiss is denied.
Richard L. Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal and Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
In 2006, David Ledesma, Jr., was 17 years old when he shot
someone. The prosecution directly filed a case in “adult” criminal court. In
2008, Ledesma was convicted of attempted murder and street terrorism with
gang and firearm enhancements. In 2012, following two appeals, a trial court
sentenced Ledesma to life in prison with a minimum 15-year term, plus a
consecutive term of 25 years to life (effectively 40 years to life).
In 2022, a California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) analyst notified the trial court of a possible error in its
calculation of presentence credits recorded in the 2012 abstract of judgment.
After the court set the matter on calendar, Ledesma filed a motion asking the
trial court to transfer his case to a juvenile court for a retroactive fitness
hearing. (See People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299 (Lara).)
In September 2023, the trial court recalculated the number of
presentence credits, denied Ledesma’s motion for a retroactive fitness
hearing, and later filed an amended abstract of judgment.
On appeal, Ledesma claims the trial court’s recalculation of his
credits caused his prior judgment to become nonfinal, and therefore the court
erred by denying his motion for a retroactive fitness hearing. The Attorney
General (AG) argues the court’s orders were not appealable, and therefore the
AG moves to dismiss Ledesma’s appeal.
We find the court’s recalculation of Ledesma’s presentence credits
did not vacate or affect the finality of his 2012 judgment; therefore, the court
did not commit error when it denied Ledesma’s motion for a retroactive
fitness hearing. However, we also find the court’s recalculation of credits was
an appealable postjudgment order affecting his substantial rights (in fact, the
recalculation was wrong); therefore, the AG’s motion to dismiss is denied.
Effective January 1, 2024, while Ledesma’s appeal was pending

2
1
in this court, the Legislature amended Penal Code section 1172.1. In
relevant part, the statute now allows a trial court to recall and resentence a
defendant on its own motion “at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at
the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory
authority or case law.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).)
We affirm the trial court’s denial of Ledesma’s motion for a
retroactive fitness hearing. We reverse the trial court’s recalculation of
presentence credits and remand the matter so the trial court can correct its
error and amend the abstract of judgment. Further, due to the intervening
amendment of section 1172.1, and in the interests of justice, we direct the
trial court on remand to allow Ledesma to invite the court—on its own
motion— to recall his sentence and to resentence him.2

I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 26, 2007, the People filed an information charging
Ledesma with attempted murder and street terrorism. The People further
alleged gang and firearm enhancements. The crimes were alleged to have
occurred on December 13, 2006, when Ledesma was 17 years old. The People
directly filed the case in “adult” criminal court.
On September 10, 2008, a jury found Ledesma guilty of the
charged crimes and found the sentencing allegations to be true.

1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
If the trial court elects to recall (vacate) Ledesma’s sentence,
this would result in a retroactive fitness hearing (by law) as we shall discuss
in this opinion. (See People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 158 (Padilla).)

3
On July 10, 2009, the trial court imposed a sentence of 40 years
to life. The court awarded Ledesma 1,081 total days of presentence credits
(940 custody and 141 conduct credits). The sentence and credits were later
recorded on an abstract of judgment.
On October 1, 2010, this court affirmed Ledesma’s convictions,
but remanded the matter for resentencing. (People v. Ledesma (Oct. 1, 2010,
G042332) [nonpub. opn.] [“it is up to the trial court to clarify its intentions
and fulfill its original sentencing objectives”].)
On February 18, 2011, the trial court again imposed a sentence of
40 years to life. The court adjusted the presentence credits, now awarding
Ledesma 1,723 total credits (1,498 custody and 225 conduct credits). The
sentence and credits were later recorded on an amended abstract of
judgment.
On September 19, 2011, this court again affirmed Ledesma’s
convictions, and again remanded the matter for resentencing. (People v.
Ledesma (Sept. 19, 2011, G044846) [nonpub. opn.] [“the court can repeat the
sentencing choices made at the last sentencing hearing with the exception of
striking the gang enhancement”].)
On January 13, 2012, the trial court again imposed an effective
sentence of 40 years to life (life in prison with a minimum 15-year term, plus
a consecutive 25 years to life). The court again adjusted the presentence
credits, now awarding Ledesma 2,142 total credits (1,863 custody and 279
conduct credits). The sentence and credits were later recorded on an amended
abstract of judgment dated April 27, 2012.
On September 13, 2012, after Ledesma’s counsel filed a “Wende
brief,” this court affirmed the judgment. (People v. Ledesma (Sept. 13, 2012,
G046366) [nonpub. opn.]; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.)

4
On October 20, 2022, a CDCR analyst sent a letter to the superior
court, which stated:
“A review of the documents delivered with the above-named
inmate indicates the Abstract of Judgment and/or Minute Order may be in
error, or incomplete, for the following reasons:
“The Amended Abstract of Judgment and Minute Order dated
April 27 2012 reflect a total of 2,142 credits (1,863 actual and 279 local
conduct). The Appellate court . . . held that when the trial court resentences a
defendant who has already commenced serving a term for the crime, the trial
court should only compute the actual time spent in prison following the
initial sentencing. It is the responsibility of the [CDCR] to determine the
amount of worktime credit to which an inmate is entitled from the date of the
initial sentencing. At the time of defendant’s original sentencing, he was
granted a total of 1,081 days (940 actual and 141 local conduct). The
Amended Abstract should reflect the recalculated conduct credits prior to the
original sentencing date and the CDCR will apply the appropriate amount of
behavioral credits from the original sentence date to the re-sentence date.
“Please review your file to determine if a correction is required.
When notified by the [CDCR] that an illegal sentence exists, the trial court is
entitled to reconsider all sentencing choices, People v. Hill 185 CalApp.3d
831. We would appreciate your providing a certified copy of any Minute Order
or modified Abstract of Judgment to this Department. May we also request
the attached copy of this letter be returned with your response.”
On November 8, 2022, the superior court set the matter on
calendar, and forwarded copies to the Orange County District Attorney and
the Office of the Public Defender.
On August 15, 2023, Ledesma filed a document captioned:

5
“Resentencing brief: invitation for court to transfer case to juvenile court
under Proposition 57.” (Capitalization & boldface omitted.)
On September 6, 2023, the trial court: 1) denied Ledesma’s
motion for a retroactive fitness hearing; 2) reinstated the July 10, 2009,
award of 1,081 total credits (940 actual and 141 conduct credits); and 3)
ordered that an amended abstract of judgment be sent to the CDCR, along
with a copy of the CDCR’s October 20, 2022, letter. Ledesma appealed.
On August 14, 2024, this court invited the parties to address the
January 1, 2024, amendments to section 1172.1 in supplemental briefs.

II.
DISCUSSION
This appeal raises pure questions of law; therefore, we apply an
independent standard of review. (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1128.)
In this discussion, we shall: A) analyze Ledesma’s claim that he
was entitled to a retroactive fitness hearing; B) analyze the AG’s motion for
dismissal; and C) analyze the trial court’s calculation of Ledesma’s credits.

A. Retroactive Fitness Hearing
Ledesma argues: “The recalculating of credits effectively caused
what had been a final judgment to become a nonfinal judgment such that
appellant had a right to the ameliorative benefits of Proposition 57.”
(Capitalization omitted.) We disagree.
Ordinarily, when a crime is alleged against a person under 18
years old, the prosecution files a case “within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court, which may adjudge the minor to be a ward of the court.” (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 602, subd. (a).) Prior to the passage of Proposition 57, a prosecutor

6
also had the sole discretion to directly file a case against a minor 14 years of
age or older in “adult” criminal court when certain crimes were alleged.
(Former § 707, subd. (d), repealed by Prop 57, § 4.2, as approved by voters,
Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) eff. Nov. 9, 2016.)
In 2016, the electorate approved Proposition 57, which effectively
eliminated direct filing by prosecutors in criminal courts. (Lara, supra, 4
Cal.5th at p. 305.) Since November 9, 2016, a minor’s juvenile case can now
be transferred to a criminal court in certain cases, but only after the
prosecution files a motion to do so, and a juvenile court conducts a “fitness
hearing,” to consider various factors such as the minor’s maturity, degree of
criminal sophistication, prior delinquent history, and whether the minor can
likely be rehabilitated in juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707.)
In 2018, the California Supreme Court held that the ameliorative
benefits of Proposition 57—a retroactive fitness hearing in a juvenile court
prior to the transfer of a case to an “adult” criminal court—applied to all
affected criminal cases that were not yet final on appeal. (Lara, supra, 4
Cal.5th at p. 312.) “‘The amendatory act . . . can be applied constitutionally to
acts committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting the
defendant of the act is not final.” (Id. at p. 307, italics added.)
“Newly enacted legislation lessening criminal punishment or
reducing criminal liability presumptively applies to all cases not yet final on
appeal at the time of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Gentile (2020)
10 Cal.5th 830, 852.) This presumption “rests on an inference that, in the
absence of contrary indications, a legislative body ordinarily intends for
ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as possible,
distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and
sentences that are not.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 657.)

7
In 2022, the California Supreme Court further held that the
ameliorative benefit of Proposition 57 “applies during resentencing when a
criminal court sentence imposed on a juvenile offender before the initiative’s
passage has since been vacated.” (Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 158, italics
added.) In Padilla, defendant was 16 years old when he killed his mother.
(Id. at p. 159.) Prior to Proposition 57, the case was tried in adult criminal
court, where Padilla was convicted of murder and sentenced to life without
the possibility of parole (LWOP). However, “his judgment later became
nonfinal when his sentence was vacated on habeas corpus and the case was
returned to the trial court for imposition of a new sentence.” (Id. at p. 158,
italics added.) The trial court again imposed an LWOP sentence. On appeal,
Padilla claimed “that he was entitled to a transfer hearing under Proposition
57 because his case became nonfinal once his sentence was vacated.” (Id. at p.
159.) The Supreme Court agreed. (Id. at pp. 159, 170.)
“The Attorney General concedes that the vacatur of Padilla’s
sentence made the judgment in his case nonfinal. We agree. A case is final
when ‘the criminal proceeding as a whole’ has ended . . . and ‘the courts can
no longer provide a remedy to a defendant on direct review’ . . . . When
Padilla’s sentence was vacated, the trial court regained the jurisdiction and
duty to consider what punishment was appropriate for him . . . . His
judgment thus became nonfinal, and it remains nonfinal in its present
posture . . . .” (Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 161–162, italics added.)
Here, on January 13, 2012, the trial court imposed Ledesma’s
current sentence of life in prison with a minimum 15 year term, plus a
consecutive 25 years to life (effectively 40 years to life). On September 13,
2012, this court affirmed the judgment. (People v. Ledesma, supra, G046366.)
Ledesma did not challenge the 2012 opinion, so his judgment

8
became final. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.366 [an appellate decision
generally becomes final 30 days after filing]; People v. Vieira (2005) 35
Cal.4th 264, 306 [“a judgment is not final until the time for petitioning for a
writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court has passed”].)
Unlike the situation in Padilla, Ledesma’s 2012 sentence was
never vacated in a habeas corpus proceeding (or otherwise), and his case did
not return to the trial court for the purposes of altering his 40 years to life
sentence. Rather, the matter returned to the trial court because a CDCR
records analyst notified the court in October 2022 that the “Abstract of
Judgment and/or Minute Order may be in error, or incomplete” due to the
court’s mistaken calculation of presentence credits.
In short, we find that the trial court properly denied Ledesma’s
motion for a retroactive fitness hearing because his sentence was never
vacated and therefore the judgment never became “nonfinal” as in Padilla.
(Compare Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 161 [“The Attorney General
concedes that the vacatur of Padilla’s sentence made the judgment in his case
nonfinal”], italics added.) Thus, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.
Ledesma argues that section 1172.1, and the case of People v. Hill
(1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 831 (Hill), compel a different result. We disagree.
Under former section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), and currently
under section 1172.1, a trial court can recall a sentence at any time upon the
recommendation of the secretary of the CDCR and “resentence the defendant
in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced, . . .
provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.”

9
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a).)3 Under this provision, when the CDCR “notifies the trial
court of an illegality in the sentence,” “[t]he court is entitled to rethink the
entire sentence . . . .” (Hill, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 834.)
In Hill, defendant pleaded guilty to four counts, and the trial
court imposed an aggregate 16-year sentence. (Hill, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at
p. 833.) The CDCR later notified the court “that the sentence was erroneous.
According to the trial court’s understanding of the error, the 16-year sentence
was illegal . . . .” (Id. at p. 833, fn. omitted.) After receiving the notification of
an illegal sentence, the court vacated the defendant’s original sentence, and
imposed a revised sentence of 14 years, comprised of two consecutive terms
and two concurrent terms for each of the four counts. (Ibid.) Defendant
appealed, arguing that the trial court only had jurisdiction to correct an error
identified by the CDCR as to two of the four counts. (Id. at pp. 833–834.) The
appellate court disagreed. (Id. at p. 836.)
“When a case is remanded for resentencing by an appellate court,
the trial court is entitled to consider the entire sentencing scheme. Not
limited to merely striking illegal portions, the trial court may reconsider all
sentencing choices. [Citations.] This rule is justified because an aggregate
prison term is not a series of separate independent terms, but one term made
up of interdependent components. The invalidity of one component infects the
entire scheme. [Citation.] We see no reason why this reasoning should not
apply where, as here, the [CDCR] rather than the Court of Appeal notifies

3
Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch.
719, §§ 1-7) effective January 1, 2022, moved the recall and resentencing
provisions of former section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) to new section 1170.03.
Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats 2022, ch. 58, § 8)
effective June 30, 2022, renumbered section 1170.03 to section 1172.1, with
no substantive changes.

10
the trial court of an illegality in the sentence. The trial court is entitled to
rethink the entire sentence to achieve its original and presumably unchanged
goal.” (Hill, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 834; see also People v. Codinha
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 995 [the full resentencing rule applies when the
trial court is required to exercise discretion].)
Unlike the notification in Hill, the letter from the CDCR in this
case did not notify the trial court “that the sentence was erroneous.” (Hill,
supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 833.) Rather, the CDCR letter notified the court
that due to an error in calculating credits, “the Abstract of Judgment and/or
Minute Order may be in error, or incomplete.”
According to the CDCR, the trial court had awarded Ledesma
additional local conduct credits to which he was not entitled: “It is the
responsibility of the [CDCR] to determine the amount of worktime credit to
which an inmate is entitled from the date of the initial sentencing.” The Hill
opinion does not alter our analysis because no aspect of Ledesma’s sentence
was illegal, and the correction of presentence credits did not require the court
to exercise its discretion; therefore, the reasoning behind the full
resentencing rule as stated in Hill does not apply.4 (See Hill, supra, 185
Cal.App.3d at p. 834.)
Here, the only aspect of Ledesma’s 2012 judgment that changed
was his presentence credits. That type of correction “does not involve a

4
The CDCR letter alerting the trial court to a possible error in
Ledesma’s presentence credits did cite Hill, but this appears to be part of its
boilerplate language: “Please review your file to determine if a correction is
required. When notified by the [CDCR] that an illegal sentence exists, the
trial court is entitled to reconsider all sentencing choices, People v. Hill 185
Cal.App.3d 831.”(Italics added.) Notably, the CDCR letter did not notify the
trial court that any illegality existed within Ledesma’s sentence.

11
discretionary sentencing choice but is a purely mathematical calculation.”
(People v. Johnson (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1485; see also People v.
Aguirre (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1139 [“The calculation of credits is not
discretionary” because “there are no ‘choices’” for the trial court to make];
People v. Jack (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 913, 917 [“the trial court exercises no
discretion when determining the days of presentence custody”]. Therefore,
although Ledesma’s presentence credits appropriately needed to be corrected,
that adjustment did not vacate Ledesma’s 2012 sentence.

Indeed, when the trial court denied Ledesma’s motion for a
retroactive fitness hearing, the court made clear it was correcting only the
credits and not changing the sentence: “What I see is the court gave the
defendant a certain amount of time, and that sentence was not incorrect or
illegal. The court gave the defendant a legal sentence. And that legal
sentence is going to remain the sentence, at least as far as I’m concerned. The
only thing that needs to change is the calculation of how many credits he
gets. And that’s going to be done.” 5
Our reasoning is consistent with the rationale in two relatively
recent cases: People v. Humphrey (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 371 (Humphrey); and
People v. Magana (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1120 (Magana).
In Humphrey, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th 371, defendant was
sentenced to a 19-year prison term. (Id. at p. 373.) About five years later, an
employee of the CDCR sent a letter to the trial court, “stating that the
abstract of judgment ‘may be in error, or incomplete.’” (Ibid.) The abstract
properly reflected the 19-year sentence, but “the component parts of the

5
The trial court, in fact, incorrectly recalculated Ledesma’s
presentence credits as we will review more fully later in this opinion.

12
sentence related to each count and enhancement did not track what the court
stated at the sentencing hearing.” (Id. at pp. 374–375.) In response to the
letter from the CDCR case records analyst, the trial court set a hearing and
“clarified” the sentence, then issued an amended abstract, which again
imposed the same, original 19-year prison sentence. (Id. at pp. 373–374.) A
month later, defendant filed a motion for resentencing, asking the trial court
to strike a firearm enhancement under the amelioratory authority of Senate
Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, §§ 1-2, eff. Jan. 1,
2018). (Id. at p. 376.) The trial court denied the motion and the Court of
Appeal affirmed. (Id. at pp. 379–380.)
The Humphrey court rejected defendant’s claim that the trial
court had recalled (voided) the sentence, finding the court had merely
“correct[ed] a clerical error in the abstract of judgment.” (Humphrey, supra,
44 Cal.App.5th at p. 379.) The CDCR letter from the analyst “made no
reference to the court’s authority to recall the defendant’s sentence” and at
the hearing the “court did not mention [former] section 1170, subdivision
(d)(1).” (Id. at p. 378.) Rather, the court had “specifically stated” it was
correcting clerical errors. (Id. at p. 379.) The court held that because
defendant’s sentence had not been recalled, the trial court had properly
denied defendant’s motion for a full resentencing hearing. (Id. at p. 380.)
Similarly in Magana, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th pages 1122-1123,
defendant was given a sentence consisting of determinate and indeterminate
terms. About 12 years later, “the CDCR notified the trial court that the
abstract of judgment ‘may be in error, or incomplete.’” (Id. at p. 1123.)
Defendant filed a motion asking the court to dismiss a firearm enhancement
and two prison priors due to intervening, ameliorative changes in the law.
(Ibid.) The court denied defendant’s motion, issued an amended abstract of

13
judgment, and imposed the same total aggregate sentence. (Id. at p. 1124.)
“The trial court found that the CDCR’s letter concerned a ‘technical issue in
the abstract,’ and that no legal authority permitted a resentencing.” (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal agreed. (Id. at pp. 1125–1126.)
The Magana court rejected defendant’s claim that the CDCR’s
letter was a recommendation for a recall and resentencing. (Magana, supra,
63 Cal.App.5th at p. 1125.) The court noted that “nothing in the CDCR’s
letter referenced [former] section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), and the letter did
not use any form of the terms ‘recall’ or ‘resentencing.’ Rather, the CDCR’s
letter specifically asked the trial court to determine whether ‘a correction is
required.’” (Ibid.) “Thus, as in Humphrey [,supra, 44 Cal.App.5th 371], the
trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a full resentencing hearing
because defendant’s sentence was not recalled pursuant to section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1).” (Magana, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 1126.)
Here, as in Humphrey and Magana, the instant CDCR letter
from an analyst—not the secretary of the CDCR—made no reference to the
court’s statutory authority to recall (vacate) and resentence, nor did the letter
recommend that Ledesma’s sentence be recalled and that he be resentenced.
(See § 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) And, similar to what happened in Humphrey, the
trial court specifically stated that it was not correcting an illegal sentence.
(Humphrey, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 379.)
Ledesma’s case may be contrasted with other cases in which the
CDCR specifically recommended that a trial court resentence a defendant.
(See People v. McCallum (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 202, 206 [the CDCR
recommended defendant’s sentence be recalled and that he be resentenced
“based on his violation-free conduct while in prison and his completion of nine
college classes, a substance abuse program, and other counseling and self-

14
awareness programs”]; see also People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1158
[CDCR “recommended that defendant’s sentence be recalled”].)
Ledesma argues Humphrey, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th 371, and
Magana, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th 1120, are distinguishable because they both
involved a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the
abstract of judgment, whereas in this case the trial court miscalculated the
presentence credits. We find this to be a distinction without a meaningful
difference. Here, as in Humphrey and Magana, the CDCR never made a
recommendation to the court to recall (vacate) Ledesma’s sentence, and the
court never did so; therefore, Ledesma’s sentence never became nonfinal as in
Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th 152, and Hill, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d 831.
To reiterate and conclude, Ledesma was not entitled to a
retroactive fitness hearing because his 2012 judgment never became
“nonfinal” due to a vacatur of his sentence. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s
denial of Ledesma’s request for a retroactive fitness hearing.

B. Motion to Dismiss
The AG moves to dismiss claiming the trial court’s correction of
credits did not affect Ledesma’s substantial rights and therefore the court’s
orders on September 6, 2023, were not appealable. We disagree.
Generally, a criminal defendant has the statutory right to appeal
“a final judgment of conviction.” (§ 1237, subd. (a).) A criminal defendant also
has the right to appeal “any order made after judgment, affecting the
substantial rights of the party.” (§ 1237, subd. (b).)
“[A] postjudgment order ‘affecting the substantial rights of the
party’ (§ 1237, subd. (b)) does not turn on whether that party’s claim is
meritorious, but instead on the nature of the claim and the court’s ruling

15
thereto.” (Teal v. Superior Court (2014) 60 Cal.4th 595, 600.)
Ordinarily, a postjudgment order regarding presentence credits is
appealable. (People v. Grainer (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 636, 642 (Grainer).) In
Grainer, defendant was sentenced to prison, but he was released on bail
pending appeal. After losing on direct appeal, defendant surrendered into
custody and the trial court later denied a motion for resentencing. (Id. at pp.
637–638.) Defendant then appealed, in part, from the court’s alleged error
when it computed his credits for the “days he had spent in custody between
his surrender and the commitment.” (Id. at p. 638.) The Court of Appeal held
this “was an order ‘affecting . . . [defendant’s] . . . substantial rights’ because
it will figure in the calculation of the time he must serve pursuant to the
sentence imposed on him . . . . In the unusual sequence of this case, it was
also an ‘order made after judgment.’” (Id. at p. 642.)

Here, on September 6, 2023, the trial court recalculated
Ledesma’s credits and denied his motion for a retroactive fitness hearing. The
court rejected Ledesma’s claim that the trial court’s recalculation of credits
caused his prior judgment to become nonfinal. On that same day, Ledesma
filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s orders. We find the court’s
postjudgment recalculation of credits affected Ledesma’s substantial rights
“because it will figure in the calculation of time he must serve pursuant to
the sentence imposed on him.” (See Grainer, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at p. 642.)
Therefore, he had the right to appeal from that order, which was also the
basis of his motion for a retroactive fitness hearing.
Thus, we deny the AG’s motion to dismiss Ledesma’s appeal.
The AG argues that the Court of Appeal’s opinion in Magana,
supra, 63 Cal.App.5th 1120, compels a different result. We disagree.
As we have already discussed, the Magana court held that a

16
notification from the CDCR that the defendant’s abstract of judgment may be
in error or incomplete was not a recommendation for recall and resentencing.
(See 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) The court further “found that the trial court ‘was
without jurisdiction to resentence’ and thus that the order denying the
defendant’s motion for resentencing was not an appealable order.” (Magana,
supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 1127.) The Magana court then dismissed
defendant’s appeal. (Id. at p. 1128.)
Here, unlike Magana, the CDCR’s letter was not a notification to
correct a possible error regarding Ledesma’s sentence. Rather, the CDCR’s
letter in this case was a notification to correct a possible error regarding the
calculation of Ledesma’s presentence credits. As the AG concedes, a trial court
has the inherent authority to correct a clerical error that does not amount to
a substantive change to a sentence. (See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th
181, 185; see also People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954, 958–959.)
Thus, unlike the situation in Magana, the trial court had proper
jurisdiction of Ledesma’s case, and he has the statutory right to appeal.
(§ 1237, subd. (b) [a criminal defendant has the right to appeal “any order
made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party”].)
To reiterate and conclude, we hold that (1) the trial court had
jurisdiction to correct its calculation of Ledesma’s presentence credits, (2) the
court’s calculation of Ledesma’s presentence credits was a postjudgment
order affecting Ledesma’s substantial rights; and (3) Ledesma had the right
to appeal. Thus, we deny the AG’s motion to dismiss Ledesma’s appeal.

C. Presentence Credits
We now turn to the trial court’s 2023 purported correction of
Ledesma’s credits, as recorded in the 2012 amended abstract of judgment.

17
(See People v. Norwood (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 148, 152 [“An appellate court
may note errors not raised by the parties if justice requires it”].)
In this part of the discussion, we shall: 1) review relevant
principles of law; 2) summarize the trial court proceedings; and 3) analyze
the law as applied to the facts.

1. Relevant Principles of Law
A defendant convicted of a felony is generally entitled to credits
applied against an eventual “term of imprisonment” for any actual time spent
in custody before sentencing (custody credits). (§ 2900.5, subd. (a).) The
location of a defendant’s custody commitment includes “any time spent in a
jail, camp, work furlough facility, halfway house, rehabilitation facility,
hospital, prison, juvenile detention facility, or similar residential institution.”
(§ 2900.5, subd. (a), italics added.)
In addition to custody credits, additional credits are ordinarily
available to a prisoner for good conduct during presentence confinement
(conduct credits). (See, e.g., § 4019, subd. (c) [“For each four-day period in
which a prisoner is confined in or committed to a facility as specified in this
section, one day shall be deducted from the prisoner’s period of confinement”];
see also § 2931, subd. (a) [“In any case in which a prisoner was sentenced to
the state prison . . . the [CDCR] shall have the authority to reduce the term
prescribed under such section . . . for good behavior and participation”].)
In the event that a defendant is resentenced in a trial court
following an appeal, the California Supreme Court has determined how
custody and conduct credits are ordinarily to be calculated. (See People v.
Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20.) At the time of resentencing, a court should:
(1) grant custody credits for all actual days served prior to resentencing (both

18
in local custody and in prison); and (2) add the conduct credits for any time
spent in local custody prior to the initial sentencing. (Id. at pp. 23–24.) Any
conduct credits earned after the initial sentencing are not to be computed by
the resentencing court (because after the initial sentencing and CDCR
commitment, the defendant remains in the custody of CDCR, regardless of
where he or she may be temporarily housed). (Id. at pp. 29–30.) That is, any
conduct credits for any time after the initial sentencing are to be computed by
the CDCR using formulas that apply to postsentence prison time. (Ibid.)

2. Trial Court Proceedings
At Ledesma’s three sentencing hearings, the trial court awarded
credits as follows (the same effective sentence of 40 years to life was imposed
at each sentencing hearing):

Date Total Credits Custody Credits Conduct Credits
July 10, 2009 1,081 940 141
(Initial Sentencing)
February 18, 2011 1,723 1,498 225
(First Resentencing)
January 13, 2012 2,142 1,863 279
(Second Resentencing)
The trial court recorded the above credits in the three abstracts
of judgment, which were filed shortly after the respective hearings. The
abstract of judgment for the second resentencing was filed on April 27, 2012.
On October 20, 2022, the superior court received the CDCR letter
regarding Ledesma’s 2012 abstract of judgment. The letter stated: “The

19
Amended Abstract of Judgment and Minute Order dated April 27 2012 reflect
a total of 2,142 credits (1,863 actual and 279 local conduct).” The CDCR
informed the court “that when the trial court resentences a defendant who
has already commenced serving a term for the crime, the trial court should
only compute the actual time spent in prison following the initial sentencing.
It is the responsibility of the [CDCR] to determine the amount of worktime
credit to which an inmate is entitled from the date of the initial sentencing.”
On September 6, 2023, after reading briefs filed by both parties,
and hearing arguments from opposing counsel, the trial court denied
Ledesma’s motion for a retroactive fitness hearing.
The court said the CDCR’s letter had informed the court that it
had made a mistake “by recalculating additional credits once he came back
on appeal . . . . And so I’m going to say fine, go ahead and recalculate them.”
The court continued: “But I’m not going to change the sentence. It’s going to
be the same sentence, the same credits as he was granted at the time of the
original sentencing. And the [CDCR] will take it from there as far as the
calculation of any additional credits he should receive. [¶] The [CDCR] is also
asking us to provide a certified copy of our minute order or our modified
abstract of judgment, which we will do, and we’ll attach a copy of the letter
and send that back to them.”
On September 8, 2023, the trial court filed an amended abstract
of judgment, regarding the change in credits it had determined on September
6, 2023, regarding the relevant resentencing hearing on January 13, 2012.
The court did not change Ledesma’s 2012 sentence. The court amended the
2012 abstract of judgment to record 1,081 total credits (940 actual custody
and 141 local conduct credits). These were the credits that were awarded at
the initial sentencing on July 10, 2009.

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3. Application and Analysis
The trial court’s recalculation of custody credits on September 6,
2023, and the recording of those credits in the amended abstract of judgment
were incorrect. This is because the court awarded Ledesma the same number
of local custody credits (jail time) he was granted at the initial sentencing on
July 10, 2009, without accounting for his additional time spent in custody
(prison time) until his second resentencing on January 13, 2012.
Again, at the time of resentencing, a trial court should: (1) grant
custody credits for all actual days served in custody prior to resentencing
(both in local custody and in prison); and (2) add the conduct credits for any
time spent in local custody prior to the initial sentencing.

Date Total Credits Custody Credits Conduct Credits
July 10, 2009 1,081 940 141
(Initial Sentencing)
February 18, 2011 1,723 1,498 225
(First Resentencing)
January 13, 2012 2,142 1,863 279
(Second Resentencing)
Therefore, in order to calculate the correct number of total credits
for the January 13, 2012, resentencing, the court should have granted 1,863
days of custody credits, which is the number of credits for all the actual days
Ledesma was in custody prior to the second resentencing (both in jail and in
prison). The court then should have added 141 days of conduct credits, which
is the number of conduct credits that Ledesma earned while in local custody
prior to the initial sentencing.

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Thus, we are reversing the trial court’s September 6, 2023, order
regarding Ledesma’s presentence credits because it was wrong. On remand,
we are instructing the court to correctly recalculate Ledesma’s credits; and
prepare and forward to the CDCR an amended abstract of judgment that
accurately reflects the total number of presentence credits that should have
6
been given on January 13, 2012, at the second resentencing hearing.
Additionally, in the interests of justice, we are instructing the
trial court on remand to allow Ledesma to invite the court—on its own
motion—to recall (vacate) his sentence and to transfer his case to juvenile
court for a retroactive fitness hearing, due to recent changes in the law.
Prior to January 1, 2024, a trial court could only recall and
resentence a defendant sentenced to state prison on its own motion within
120 days after the date of commitment. (§ 1172.1, former subd. (a)(1) by
Stats. 2022. ch. 58, § 9.)
After January 1, 2024, section 1172.1 now provides:
“When a defendant, upon conviction for a felony offense, has been
committed to the custody of the Secretary of the [CDCR] . . . the court may,
on its own motion, within 120 days of the date of commitment or at any time
if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are
subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law . . . recall the
sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant
in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced, whether or
not the defendant is still in custody, and provided the new sentence, if any, is
no greater than the initial sentence. Recall and resentencing under this

6
It appears that the correct adjusted number should have been
2,004 total credits (1,863 custody and 141 local conduct credits), rather than
1,081 total credits (940 custody and 141 local conduct credits).

22
section may be initiated by the original sentencing judge, a judge designated
by the presiding judge, or any judge with jurisdiction in the case.” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(1), italics added.)
In recalling and resentencing, the trial court “shall apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any changes in law that
reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity
of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(2).)
Criminal defendants, although not expressly permitted to initiate
recall and resentencing proceedings themselves, may nonetheless “invite” the
court to exercise its discretionary powers. (Cf. People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497; People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375
[“A defendant has no right to make a motion, and the trial court has no
obligation to make a ruling, under section 1385. But he or she does have the
right to ‘invite the court to exercise its power’”].)
Here, the trial court denied Ledesma’s motion for a retroactive
fitness hearing and recalculated his custody credits on September 6, 2023.
We presume that if this matter had been before the trial court judge after
January 1, 2024, Ledesma would have also filed a motion to “invite” the court
to exercise its new discretionary powers to recall and resentence (grant his
request for a retroactive fitness hearing) under section 1172.1. (Cf. People v.
Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th 497; People v. Carmony, supra, 33
Cal.4th 367.) Further, the instant appeal was not yet final in this court on
January 1, 2024. (See In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744–745.)
In the interests of justice, we are directing the trial court on
remand to allow Ledesma to invite consideration for relief. (See § 1260
[appellate court “may, if proper, remand the cause to the trial court for such
further proceedings as may be just under the circumstances”].)

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III.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Ledesma’s motion for a retroactive
fitness hearing is affirmed. The court’s order recalculating Ledesma’s
presentence credits is reversed. The matter is remanded.
The trial court is directed to allow Ledesma to invite the court to
7
exercise its discretion to recall and resentence him. The court is further
directed to recalculate Ledesma’s presentence credits, to award him the
correct number of credits, and to prepare an amended abstract of judgment
and forward a copy to the CDCR as needed.

MOORE, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

SANCHEZ, J.

7
We take no position on whether the trial court should exercise
its discretion. “If a defendant requests consideration for relief under this
section, the court is not required to respond.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (c).)

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