CourtListener 10266449•People v. Logan CA2/7
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Filed 11/7/24 P. v. Logan CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B335358
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A638508-02)
v.
GREGORY LOGAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Pat Connolly, Judge. Affirmed.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Gregory Logan, convicted in 1990 of first degree murder
and second degree robbery, appeals from the superior court’s
order following an evidentiary hearing denying his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 (now
section 1172.6).1 Logan argues substantial evidence did not
support the court’s finding he is guilty of murder under current
law as a major participant in an underlying felony who acted
with reckless indifference to human life. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Trial Court Convicts Logan of First Degree
Murder, and We Affirm
On the evening of September 24, 1986 Logan, Randolph
Hawkins, and Willie Hearod walked to the Hoover Plaza
apartments. Logan and Hawkins left, and Hearod stayed behind
to play cards. Logan and Hawkins saw a Cadillac belonging to
Raymond Curtis stopped in the middle of the street with blinking
lights. Hawkins said, “Let’s get that car.” When Curtis
approached the car, Logan and Hawkins ran toward it. Hawkins
pulled out a gun and told Curtis to freeze. Curtis dropped the
keys, and Logan picked them up. Hawkins said, “Let’s take him
with us . . . so he can’t call the police and report his car stolen.”
Logan said, “All right.” Hawkins and Logan put Curtis in the
trunk of the car, drove to an alley behind the Hoover Plaza, and
went inside Hearod’s apartment.
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Hawkins told Hearod he had a car and “wanted to go do
some robberies.” Hearod went outside with Hawkins and Logan.
Logan stood near the trunk of the car while Hawkins searched
the front seat. Hearod asked Logan where they got the car, and
Logan said they took it from a man down the street. Hearod said,
“If you just got it down the street, then the police are going to be
hot around here, so why don’t you all take the car away.”
Hawkins said, “The police ain’t going to be hot around here
because we got the man in the trunk.” Hearod went back inside.
Logan and Hawkins moved Curtis to the back seat of the
car and drove to a dead end near the freeway. Logan let Curtis
out of the car. Curtis began to run away, Hawkins chased him,
and Curtis fell. Curtis grabbed Hawkins’s leg, and Hawkins shot
Curtis six to nine times. Logan ran away.
A security guard at a hospital that was closed for
construction heard gunshots at 1:00 a.m. When he went outside,
he saw Curtis stagger down the street and sit down. The security
guard called the 911 emergency operator. Police and paramedics
arrived and found Curtis was dead.
Meanwhile, Hawkins picked up Logan, and they returned
to the Hoover Plaza. Hawkins asked Hearod to go with them to
Santa Monica to “do some robberies,” but Hearod wanted to finish
playing cards. Hearod asked what happened to Curtis, and
Hawkins said that Logan “was going to let the man go, but he’s
stupid,” and that Hawkins did not want to go back to jail.
Hawkins told Hearod he shot Curtis six or seven times. He
showed Hearod a black .25 caliber automatic gun with a wooden
handle, Western-style writing, and a gold design, and opened it to
show “he had shot all the bullets out the gun.” Hawkins said
“a dead man can’t testify in court.” Logan told Hearod he shot at
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Curtis, but Hawkins called Logan a liar and said Logan shot in
the air.
Logan and Hawkins drove to Santa Monica and returned to
the Hoover Plaza two hours later. Hawkins told Hearod they did
not make any money that night. Logan and Hawkins drove to
Hawkins’s house, where they slept. In the morning Logan and
Hawkins drove to the home of Antwanette Jordan and her sister
Cynita Boone. Inside the home, Hawkins showed Jordan a silver
gun and showed her “how it was used.” Logan drove Hawkins
and the teenage girls to their high school, stopping at a store on
the way. While they were at the store, Boone left her purse in
the car, giving Logan and Hawkins an opportunity to put a gun
in it.
Police officers saw Logan, Hawkins, and the two teenage
girls getting out of Curtis’s stolen car outside the school. When
the officers approached, Hawkins fled, and Logan walked into the
school with Jordan and Boone. The officers apprehended
Hawkins and Logan.
Boone later discovered a silver gun in her purse. At lunch
Boone showed the gun to Jordan, who recognized it as the gun
Hawkins showed her earlier. Boone gave the gun to a friend.
Police ultimately recovered the gun. Police also found a black
gun with gold writing and a brown wooden handle in Hawkins’s
bedroom.
A medical examiner from the Los Angeles County Coroner’s
Office determined Curtis had been shot four times in the back.
Two of the gunshot wounds were fatal.
The People charged Logan with first degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)), kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), kidnapping for robbery
(§ 209, subd. (b)), and second degree robbery (§ 211), and alleged
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Logan committed murder while he was engaged in the
commission of kidnapping (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The People
also alleged that Logan personally used a firearm, within the
meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a), and that Logan had a
prior serious felony conviction, within the meaning of section 667,
subdivision (a).
At Logan’s first trial the court granted his motion for
judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping and kidnapping for
robbery charges. After closing argument a juror notified the
court she had received an anonymous threatening telephone call,
and the court declared a mistrial. The People and Logan agreed
to a court trial based on the transcripts and evidence presented
at the first trial. The People agreed to dismiss the kidnapping-
murder special-circumstance allegation and to amend the firearm
enhancement to principal-armed (§ 12022, subd. (a)), rather than
personal use. (People v. Logan (Mar. 7, 2022, B304591) [nonpub.
opn.] (Logan II).)
The trial court found Logan guilty of first degree murder
and second degree robbery. The court also found true the firearm
allegation. The court sentenced Logan to a prison term of
25 years to life on the murder conviction, plus one year for the
firearm enhancement. The court imposed and stayed execution
of a three-year sentence on the robbery conviction. We affirmed
the judgment after Logan’s appointed counsel filed an opening
brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 raising no
issues. (People v. Logan (July 15, 1992, B051646) [nonpub. opn.]
(Logan I).)
5
B. The Superior Court Twice Denies Logan’s Petition for
Resentencing Under Section 1172.6
In January 2019 Logan filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6, checking boxes on a form petition stating
he was eligible for relief and asking the court to appoint counsel
to represent him. The superior court appointed counsel, the
People filed a written response to the petition, and Logan filed a
reply.
Although the superior court did not issue a formal order to
show cause, the court scheduled an evidentiary hearing, after
which the court denied the petition, ruling Logan “was a major
participant and is not eligible for the relief sought.” Logan
appealed, and we reversed. (Logan II, supra, B304591.) We held
the superior court erred in applying an incorrect evidentiary
standard and in failing to make a finding on whether Logan acted
with reckless indifference to human life. We directed the
superior court to hold a new evidentiary hearing. (Ibid.)
At the evidentiary hearing in September 2023, the court
stated that, at the previous evidentiary hearing, it found beyond
a reasonable doubt Logan was a major participant in the robbery.
After considering the evidence in light of the factors articulated
by the Supreme Court in People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522
(Clark), the court found Logan also acted with reckless
indifference to human life. The court ruled that Logan “went out
with a plan of violence,” that both Logan and Hawkins had guns,
and that Logan fired his gun. The court also stated that while
Curtis was restrained in the trunk, “Mr. Curtis’s life was one
filled with terror.” The court continued: “This was truly a
showing of reckless indifference to human life. There was no
caring about it, what was going to occur to Mr. Curtis.” Finally,
6
regarding Logan’s actions after the murder, the court stated:
“What do they do afterwards? They use that car to try and pick
up women. There is no thought about what they had just done.”
The court denied the petition, and Logan timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 1172.6
Effective 2019, the Legislature substantially modified the
law governing accomplice liability for murder, eliminating the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of murder (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th
433, 448; People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986; People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843) and significantly
narrowing the felony-murder exception to the malice requirement
for murder (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see People v.
Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957). Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now
prohibits imputing malice based solely on an individual’s
participation in a crime and requires proof of malice to convict a
principal of murder, except under the revised felony-murder rule
in section 189, subdivision (e). That provision requires the
People to prove specific facts relating to the defendant’s
culpability: The defendant was the actual killer (§ 189,
subd. (e)(1)); the defendant, though not the actual killer, with the
intent to kill assisted in the commission of the murder (§ 189,
subd. (e)(2)); or the defendant was a major participant in a felony
listed in section 189, subdivision (a), and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, “as described in subdivision (d) of
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Section 190.2,” the felony-murder special-circumstance provision
(§ 189, subd. (e)(3)). (See Curiel, at p. 448; Strong, at p. 708.)
Section 1172.6 authorizes a person convicted of felony
murder or murder based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to petition the superior court to vacate the
conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts, if he or
she could not now be convicted of murder because of the changes
the Legislature made effective 2019 to the definitions of the
crime. (See People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 449-450;
People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708; People v. Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957.) If a section 1172.6 petition contains
all the required information, the court must appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner, if requested. (Lewis, at pp. 962-963; see
§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A), (3).) The prosecutor must then file a
response to the petition, the petitioner may file a reply, and the
court must hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie showing he or she is entitled to relief.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
Where, as here, the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing he or she is entitled to relief under section 1172.6, the
court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction
and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At that hearing the court may consider
evidence “previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law,” including witness testimony.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The petitioner and the prosecutor may
also offer new or additional evidence. (Ibid.; see People v. Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 853-854.)
8
On appeal from an order denying a petition under
section 1172.6, we review the superior court’s factual findings for
substantial evidence. (People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
1055, 1066; People v. Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245, 270.)
“In reviewing the trial court’s findings for substantial evidence,
we . . . examine the entire record in the light most favorable to
the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial
evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding
[the necessary fact] beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]
. . . While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence,
evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as
to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is
to determine whether there is any substantial evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s
findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Pittman (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 400, 414, internal quotation marks omitted; see
Montanez, at pp. 270-271.) “‘“Substantial evidence includes
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn
from that evidence.”’” (People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285,
339; see People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57; Montanez, at
p. 271.)
B. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Denying Logan’s
Petition Under Section 1172.6
1. Applicable Law
Section 189, subdivision (e)(3), provides that a person who
participates in one of the felonies listed in section 189,
subdivision (a), may be liable for murder if the prosecution proves
9
he or she “‘was a major participant in the underlying felony and
acted with reckless indifference to human life,’” within the
meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (d). (People v. Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 448; see People v. Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 708; People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
pp. 842-843.) The Supreme Court in People v. Banks (2015)
61 Cal.4th 788 and Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522 “clarified the
meaning of the special circumstances statute” (In re Scoggins
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 676 (Scoggins)) and identified
“a nonexhaustive list of considerations” relevant to whether a
defendant was culpable for murder under section 189,
subdivision (e)(3) (Strong, at pp. 706-707; see People v. Ramirez
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 986).
“Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and
an objective element. [Citation.] As to the subjective element,
‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the
violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,’ and
he or she must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death
his or her actions create.’ [Citations.] As to the objective
element, ‘“[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and
degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s
conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation.”’” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677; see People v.
Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 557.) “Awareness of no more
than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any armed crime is
insufficient; only knowingly creating a ‘grave risk of death’
satisfies the constitutional minimum.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th
at p. 808.)
10
To determine whether a defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life under section 190.2, subdivision (d),
courts consider, among other factors: “Did the defendant use or
know that a gun would be used during the felony? How many
weapons were ultimately used? Was the defendant physically
present at the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to
restrain the crime or aid the victim? What was the duration of
the interaction between the perpetrators of the felony and the
victims? What was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her
confederate’s propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal
force? What efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks
of violence during the felony?” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 677; see Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-623.) No “‘one of
these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them
necessarily sufficient.’” (Clark, at p. 618.)
2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Superior
Court’s Finding Logan Acted with Reckless
Indifference to Human Life
Logan does not challenge the superior court’s finding he
was a major participant in the underlying felony (here, robbery)
within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (d). The only
issue is whether substantial evidence supported the court’s
finding Logan acted with reckless indifference to human life. It
did.
First, both Logan and Hawkins were armed and fired their
weapons. Logan concedes that he had “a gun on him” and that he
used it “after letting Curtis go from the trunk.” Hearod testified
Logan claimed he shot at Curtis (though Hawkins said Logan
shot in the air). Logan does not deny he knew Hawkins was
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armed, and in any event, Hawkins “drew down” on Curtis with a
gun when Logan and Hawkins first encountered him. Witnesses
saw two different guns: the silver gun Logan or Hawkins put in
Boone’s purse and the black gun with the wooden handle
Hawkins showed Hearod. (See People v. Bradley (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1033 [“defendants were aware they all had
firearms and used them during the attempted robbery”];
cf. Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677 [defendant “did not use a
gun, nor did he know that a gun would be used during the
felony”]; People v. Keel, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 559
[defendant’s gun was unloaded].)
Second, Logan was physically present during the entire
sequence of events leading to Curtis’s murder. He and Hawkins
put Curtis in the trunk, drove to the Hoover Plaza apartments,
and then drove to the dead end where Hawkins shot Curtis.
Logan missed several opportunities to restrain Hawkins: He
could have agreed to steal Curtis’s car but refused to put Curtis
in the trunk. He could have released Curtis when he and
Hawkins stopped at the Hoover Plaza. Or he could have stayed
at the Hoover Plaza with Hearod and declined to continue
participating with Hawkins in the crime. (See Scoggins, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 678 [“‘“the defendant’s presence gives him an
opportunity to act as a restraining influence on murderous
cohorts,”’” and if “‘“the defendant fails to act as a restraining
influence, then the defendant is arguably more at fault for the
resulting murders”’”]; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619
[“[p]roximity to the murder and the events leading up to it may
be particularly significant where . . . the murder is a culmination
or a foreseeable result of several intermediate steps”]; People v.
Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 593 [defendant “could have
12
rejected the planned crime or could have adjusted the method to
take victim welfare into account”].)
And even in the moments before Hawkins shot Curtis,
Logan had a final opportunity to restrain Hawkins. When Logan
let Curtis out of the car and Hawkins began chasing him, Logan
could have yelled at Hawkins to stop. Instead, Logan either shot
Curtis or fired his gun in the air. (See In re McDowell (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 999, 1014 [after the defendant’s accomplice fired a
warning shot, “there was a brief but critical opportunity” for the
defendant “to say or do something to deescalate the situation,”
but “he remained silent”]; In re Loza (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 38, 54
[after the shooter said he would count to five and then shoot, the
defendant had five seconds to do “any number of things to
intercede or assist the victims—e.g., yell at [the shooter] to stop,
try to halt the countdown, demand that they leave, distract [the
shooter], or attempt to calm [the shooter], to name a few,” but
instead the defendant “did nothing during that crucial time
period other than stand idly by with indifference—with reckless
indifference to human life, to be precise”]; cf. Scoggins, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 678 [defendant “did not arrive at the crime scene
until after the shooting occurred,” and it was not clear whether
he could see the shooting]; People v. Ramirez, supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at p. 989 [the “attempted carjacking was
executed quickly, providing [the defendant] no realistic
opportunity to intervene before [the shooter] opened fire”]; In re
Taylor (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 543, 559 [defendant “never got out
of the car” and “could not even see” the shooter’s interaction with
the victim].)
Nor did Logan aid Curtis after Hawkins shot him. Logan
did not call 911, try to get help, or drive Curtis to a hospital.
13
Instead, he fled the scene, leaving Curtis to die at the dead end of
a dark street, and later reconvened with Hawkins to commit
more robberies in Curtis’s car. (See In re Loza, supra,
10 Cal.App.5th at p. 54 [defendant’s failure to aid the victim after
the shooting and his subsequent flight supported the finding the
defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life];
cf. Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 672 [after the shooting the
defendant “walked over to [the victim] and checked if [he] was
still breathing”]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 978, 990 [after the shooting the defendant fled with a
confederate, who told the shooter he had “made a mess of things”
and “‘[y]ou’re on your own’”].)2
Third, the duration of the crime supported the superior
court’s finding Logan acted with reckless indifference to human
life. Although Logan and Hawkins did not hold Curtis for hours,
they did not merely steal his car at gunpoint and drive away.
Instead, they placed him in the trunk, drove him to the Hoover
Plaza, moved him to the back seat, and drove him to a dead end
street, where Hawkins shot him. The multiple interactions with
Curtis at different times and in different locations increased the
risk of violence. (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620 [where
“a victim is held at gunpoint, kidnapped, or otherwise restrained
in the presence of perpetrators for prolonged periods, ‘there is a
2 In his reply brief Logan argues that he could not call 911
because cellphones were not available in 1986 and that “there
was help nearby” because he and Hawkins left Curtis 322 feet
from a hospital. But Logan did not look for a phone to call 911 or
call from Hearod’s apartment. Nor is there any evidence that
Logan knew a hospital was nearby or that he went to the hospital
(which, according to the security guard who heard the gunshots,
was closed for construction anyway) to seek help.
14
greater window of opportunity for violence’”]; cf. People v.
Underwood (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 303, 318 [only a few minutes
passed between the time the defendant and the killer approached
the victim and the time they fled].)
Fourth, Logan did not do anything to minimize the risk of
violence during the robbery. Logan brought a loaded gun and
knew Hawkins had a gun. Although Hawkins was the instigator,
Logan went along with Hawkins’s increasingly dangerous
conduct, from stealing Curtis’s car, to putting Curtis in the trunk,
to driving him to an isolated area. (See In re Harper (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 450, 466 [although the defendant “may not have
had the opportunity to minimize the risk of violence during the
planning stage, he did nothing to minimize the risk of violence
when it became clear the original plan had unraveled”];
cf. Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 683 [defendant planned an
unarmed robbery in a public parking lot during the daytime,
when witnesses might be present].)3
Logan argues he did not act with reckless indifference to
human life because, when he let Curtis out of the car, he
intended to let him go. Logan argues that he believed the plan
was to release Curtis, take his car, and commit more robberies
and that he could not have anticipated Hawkins would shoot
Curtis. Logan points to Hawkins’s statement Logan “was going
to let the man go, but he’s stupid,” which the superior court
3 The fifth factor, Logan’s knowledge Hawkins was likely to
use lethal force, neither supports nor undermines the superior
court’s finding Logan acted with reckless indifference to human
life. It is not clear from the record what Logan knew about
Hawkins’s propensity to kill.
15
described as “the most compelling” evidence in favor of finding
Logan did not act with reckless indifference to human life.
Reckless indifference “encompasses a willingness to kill (or
to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the
defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome
of his actions.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.) Even if
Logan did not intend to kill Curtis, his conduct during the
robbery supported the superior court’s finding he was willing to
assist Hawkins in killing Curtis to get Curtis’s car and use it to
commit robberies. While Logan may not have intended that he or
Hawkins would kill Curtis, “the evidence concerning the manner
in which they carried out the robbery is sufficiently weighty to
support” (People v. Bascomb (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1090)
the superior court’s finding Logan acted in reckless disregard for
human life.
Logan also argues “nothing [he] could have done would
have stopped” Hawkins from killing Curtis. Logan relies on the
following statement by the superior court: “I don’t believe that
Mr. Hawkins could have been stopped. I think that once they put
Mr. Curtis in that trunk, he was going to die.” However, in
determining whether Logan acted with reckless indifference to
human life, the issue is not whether Logan could have stopped
Hawkins from killing Curtis, but whether Logan was “‘willingly
involved in the violent manner’” of the crime and consciously
disregarded “‘the significant risk’” Curtis would die. (Scoggins,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.) The decision by Hawkins and Logan
to put Curtis in the trunk significantly increased the risk of
death to Curtis. And there is no evidence that, once Curtis was
in the trunk, Logan tried to stop Hawkins from killing him,
regardless of whether Logan would have succeeded. As the
16
superior court stated, “I don’t think that the reality of the
situation is [Logan] could have stopped [Hawkins]. . . . But I also
don’t believe that he cared to stop him.”
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The People’s request for judicial
notice of the clerk’s transcript in Logan’s direct appeal is granted.
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
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