CourtListener 10266156•People v. Hernandez CA4/1
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Filed 11/6/24 P. v. Hernandez CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083020
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN377747)
JOSHUA HERNANDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of San Diego
County, Carlos O. Armour, Judge. Affirmed.
Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Arlene A. Sevidal, James M. Toohey
and Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
In 2019, Joshua Hernandez pleaded guilty to willful, deliberate, and
premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 1)
and admitted allegations that he personally and intentionally used a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a)), and committed the offense for the benefit of, at the direction of,
and in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). The
parties stipulated that Hernandez’s preliminary hearing transcript would
serve as the factual basis for his plea. The court sentenced Hernandez to a
stipulated prison term of 18 years.2 In 2023, Hernandez petitioned for
resentencing under section 1172.6 (formerly section 1170.95) and the court
appointed him counsel. Following briefing and declining to consider the
preliminary hearing evidence, the trial court denied the petition, finding
Hernandez did not make a prima facie showing he was entitled to relief.
Hernandez contends his guilty plea along with the record properly
considered by the court do not conclusively establish he is ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. He asks us to vacate the order,
remand, and direct the trial court to issue an order to show cause so as to
hold an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) before
making a determination on his petition’s merit. We affirm the order.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The sentence consists of a five-year low term for the attempted murder,
a consecutive 10-year enhancement for the firearm use finding, and a
consecutive three year enhancement for the infliction of personal injury
finding. The court struck the punishment for the gang enhancement.
2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Underlying Offenses
Though the parties stipulated that Hernandez’s preliminary hearing
provided a factual basis for his plea, as stated, the trial court declined to
consider it in determining the merits of Hernandez’s section 1172.6 petition.3
We likewise do not rely on those facts in this opinion (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 972 [court should not engage in factfinding at threshold
prima facie stage]; see also People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 51),
but summarize some of the preliminary hearing testimony for context only.
3 Courts are presently split on the question of whether a trial court may
rely on a preliminary hearing transcript to deny a section 1172.6 petition at
the prima facie stage. (Compare People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158,
review granted May 1, 2024, S284232 [ordering briefing deferred pending
decision in People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, review granted June
28, 2023, S279670]; People v. Pickett (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 982, 988, review
granted Oct. 11, 2023, S281643 [stating the “record of conviction may include
the transcript of the defendant’s preliminary hearing testimony when the
transcript ‘reliably reflect[s] the facts of the offense for which the defendant
was convicted’ ”]; with People v. Williams (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 375, 398-
399, review granted Sept. 11, 2024, S286314 [preliminary hearing transcript,
even if stipulated as the factual basis for a plea, does not conclusively
establish the elements of attempted murder under a valid theory, disagreeing
with Mares and Pickett]; People v. Davenport (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, 481-
482 [rejecting argument “that the preliminary hearing transcript is never
part of the record of conviction” but finding trial court engaged in
impermissible factfinding at prima facie stage by relying on facts taken from
transcript that defendant did not stipulate to or admit]; People v. Flores
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 989 [acknowledging “Courts of Appeal are split on
the import of the preliminary hearing transcript in determining whether a
petitioner has made a prima facie case for resentencing under [former]
section 1170.95”].)
3
In 2016, Hernandez began dating S.T., who had previously been the
girlfriend of Hernandez’s friend A.S. A.S. and S.T. later began talking again,
and one day ended up having sexual relations. A few days later, A.S.
messaged Hernandez, told him what happened, said he was trying to work
things out with S.T., and questioned why Hernandez would be with her.
Hernandez responded in part by indicating laughter, saying A.S. “was done
and dealt with” and Hernandez would “see [him] soon.” A few nights later,
Hernandez asked A.S. if he was still mad, and A.S. responded that he was
never mad.
The next morning A.S. was walking back to his apartment looking
down at his phone when he heard gunshots. He looked up and saw
Hernandez, who was holding a gun, and another man, Sergio Michel,
standing in the middle of the hallway to his apartment. Hernandez shot A.S.
seven times: in the chest, abdomen, cheek, leg, and back, the last time
holding the gun to A.S.’s mouth. The other man did not have anything in his
hands, and the men did not exchange words during the shooting.
A witness that morning saw two Hispanic males, one with a handgun,
exit a white vehicle and walk between two apartment buildings in the
complex. He heard multiple gunshots, then saw the men run back to the
vehicle and leave. Police later discovered the vehicle was registered to
Michel’s mother.
Hernandez’s Charges and March 2019 Guilty Plea
The People initially charged both Hernandez and Michel with
attempted murder, with allegations that Hernandez personally used a
firearm in the attempted murder’s commission; personally inflicted great
bodily injury on A.S., who was not an accomplice; and that both Hernandez
and Michel committed the offense in association with a criminal street gang.
4
In March 2019, the People filed a third amended information charging only
Hernandez with premeditated attempted murder, shooting at an inhabited
dwelling, robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, assault by means likely to
produce great bodily injury, vandalism, and the various gun and personal
injury enhancements.
That same month, Hernandez entered into his guilty plea. He pleaded
guilty to attempted murder and admitted that he personally and
intentionally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53,
subdivision (b); personally inflicted great bodily injury on A.S. within the
meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a); and committed the offense for the
benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang.
The court sentenced him as indicated above, striking the gang enhancement.
Hernandez’s Section 1172.6 Petition for Resentencing
In February 2023, Hernandez filed a form section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing on his conviction for attempted murder. The court appointed
counsel for him and set a briefing schedule.
The People opposed the petition on the ground Hernandez “is not an
accomplice to the attempted murder for which he was convicted, but rather,
he is the direct perpetrator” and thus ineligible for relief. Pointing to this
court’s opinion in People v. Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 45, they argued
Hernandez’s admission to the section 12022.7 allegation made him ineligible
as a matter of law because it made clear he was the actual attempted
murderer. According to the People, this admission, as well as the admission
that Hernandez “intentionally and personally discharg[ed] a handgun within
5
the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b)” [sic],4 coupled with his
attempted murder conviction, made it clear Hernandez “himself desired the
victim’s death and had express malice.” The People submitted parts of the
record, including Hernandez’s preliminary hearing transcript.
Hernandez responded that he had made out a prima facie case by
alleging facts that if found true, entitled him to relief. He argued that a
prima facie case was a legal term of art with a “low threshold of production”
and “not a burden of proof” requiring him to provide substantial evidence of
eligibility.
The trial court denied Hernandez’s petition without considering the
facts of Hernandez’s preliminary hearing, finding him ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. It ruled “the cold record . . . , the change of plea, the minute
order reflecting the change of plea, the minute order reflecting sentencing,
the abstract of judgment in this case” showed Hernandez did not establish
entitlement to relief. Specifically, the court found based on his plea that
Hernandez was not an accomplice, but a direct perpetrator. Further,
pointing to Hernandez’s admission to the section 12022.7, subdivision (a) and
12022.53, subdivision (b) allegations, it ruled there was “no evidence on the
face of the petition that malice was imputed upon him . . . .”
Hernandez filed this appeal.
4 The People misstated the nature of the section 12022.53, subdivision
(b) allegation as involving “intentionally and personally discharging a
handgun” (italics added), when by that allegation Hernandez admitted he
personally used a firearm in the commission of the felony. The trial court
repeated that error in its ruling, but as stated below, we review the
correctness of the ultimate result, not the court’s reasoning.
6
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles
Senate Bill No. 1437 became effective January 1, 2019 (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015). It substantially changed the law governing “murder liability for those
who were neither the actual killers nor intended to kill anyone, including
certain individuals formerly subject to punishment on a felony-murder
theory.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707.) In part, it “imposed a
new requirement that, except in cases of felony murder, ‘a principal in a
crime shall act with malice aforethought’ to be convicted of murder. (§ 188,
subd. (a)(3).) ‘Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or
her participation in a crime.’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448-
449.) The statute also created “a procedural mechanism for those convicted
of murder under prior law to seek retroactive relief.” (People v. Wilson (2023)
14 Cal.5th 839, 869; see Curiel, at p. 449; People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 957; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.)
Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature clarified that Senate Bill No.
1437’s changes and procedure for relief applied to individuals convicted of
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a); People v. Lezama (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th
583, 588; People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921, 931; People
v. Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 747.) Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) now
reads in part: “A person convicted of . . . attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine . . . may file a petition with the court that
7
sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s . . . attempted murder . . .
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts.”5
A petition under this procedure must contain a declaration that all
requirements for section 1172.6 eligibility are met (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A)),
including that: “[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of . . .
attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 . . . made effective
January 1, 2019.” (People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) The trial
court must then determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing
that he or she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)-(c); accord, Strong, at
p. 708.) “ ‘ “[T]he court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and
makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be
entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
5 We observe that though Senate Bill No. 1437 was in effect at the time
of Hernandez’s March 2019 plea, appellate courts were then in disagreement
as to whether it applied to attempted murder. The trial court was not bound
to follow only those cases concluding that the law eliminated the natural and
probable consequences theory for attempted murder. (See Auto Equity Sales,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456 [when “appellate decisions
are in conflict” a “court exercising inferior jurisdiction can and must make a
choice between the conflicting decisions”].) Thus, until the Legislature
clarified the law in 2022 and the split was resolved, Hernandez could have
still been convicted under a natural and probable consequences theory of
attempted murder. The People do not argue to the contrary, or rely on recent
cases such as People v. Lezama, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th 583, which held that
a defendant who had entered a plea to voluntary manslaughter in June 2019
after the imputed malice theories had been statutory eliminated, could not
have been convicted of murder under an invalid theory and was thus
ineligible for section 1172.6 relief. (Id. at p. 590; see also People v. Gallegos
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 434, 442 [petitioner who entered plea to voluntary
manslaughter in 2019, after Senate Bill No. 1437’s effective date, was
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because he could not show he
“could not presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to
[s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019”].)
8
must issue an order to show cause.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971;
see People v. Curiel, at p. 460.) “[T]he ‘prima facie bar was intentionally and
correctly set very low.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 972.) “ ‘[A] court should not reject the
petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting
an evidentiary hearing.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 971.)
At this preliminary stage, the court may consider the record of
conviction, which will “necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry
under section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (People v. Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971; see People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 463-
464.) “In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary
juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 972; see also
People v. Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 51.)
The court “may appropriately deny a petition at the prima facie stage if
the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. ‘ “[I]f the record,
including the court’s own documents, ‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations
made in the petition,’ then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner,’ ” ’ thereby deeming the petitioner
ineligible.” (People v. Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 52; see People v.
Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460; People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
971.) For example, where “the record of conviction irrefutably establishes as
a matter of law that the jury determined [the petitioner] was the actual
killer,” the trial court may properly deny the petition “at the prima facie
stage.” (Harden, at pp. 56, 60; see § 189, subd. (e)(1).) Or where the record
conclusively shows the petitioner was otherwise convicted under a theory of
liability not affected by the amendments to the law of murder and attempted
9
murder, such as under direct aiding and abetting, the trial court may dismiss
the petition. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 [section 1172.6
“applies by its terms only to attempted murders based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine,” and “[d]irect aiding and abetting remains a
valid theory of attempted murder”].) “If the court declines to make an order
to show cause, it shall provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons for
doing so.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
If the court issues an order to show cause, within 60 days the court
must then hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction and resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).) At this
hearing, either party may present new evidence and the prosecution bears
the burden of proving the petitioner could still be convicted beyond a
reasonable doubt. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
This court independently determines whether the petitioner has made
a prima facie showing. (People v. Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 52.)
We uphold the trial court’s decision if it is correct, regardless of its reasoning.
(People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 145 [“On appeal we consider
the correctness of the trial court’s ruling itself, not the correctness of the trial
court’s reasons for reaching its decision”]; People v. Eynon (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 967, 976.)
II. Contentions
Hernandez advances several reasons why the trial court assertedly
erred by denying his section 1172.6 petition for resentencing. He first
contends the court “implicitly disregarded” his petition’s allegations, when it
was required to accept their truth without engaging in credibility
determinations. He next contends the record did not conclusively refute his
10
petition’s allegations, and that his March 2019 guilty plea did not establish
proof beyond a reasonable doubt he was guilty of attempted murder under
the newly revised statutes. Hernandez maintains his general stipulation to
the preliminary hearing transcript did not constitute an admission to the
truth of all the testimony for all purposes. He characterizes his guilty plea as
pleading to attempted murder “on an unspecified theory,” as the defendant
did in People v. Eynon, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 967. Citing People v. Offley
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588; People v. Cooper (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 106,
People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, and People v. Elder (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 411, Hernandez further contends his admission to the firearm
and bodily injury allegations do not conclusively prove his mens rea, and thus
they cannot support a finding of section 1172.6 ineligibility as a matter of
law. According to Hernandez, his petition remains unrebutted for purposes
of prima facie review, entitling him to an evidentiary hearing.
III. Analysis
As an initial matter, Hernandez’s focus on the trial court’s findings or
rulings is misplaced given our de novo review, and the fact the court’s actual
reasoning is irrelevant to whether he made a prima facie showing. Turning
to that inquiry, we reject Hernandez’s contentions.6
Hernandez’s section 1172.6 petition for resentencing averred that the
People filed a complaint against him that allowed the prosecution to proceed
under a theory of attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine; that he accepted a plea in lieu of a trial at which he
could have been convicted of attempted murder; and that he could not
6 Because neither the trial court nor we considered the preliminary
hearing transcript in this inquiry, there is no basis for Hernandez’s
contention concerning his admission to that transcript as the factual basis for
his plea.
11
presently be convicted of attempted murder because of the changes to
sections 188 and 189. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-(3).) We accept these
averments as true, unless the record of conviction establishes that Hernandez
is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 460; People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971; People v. Beaudreaux
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1232 [relief properly denied at prima facie stage
where the record of conviction “refute[s] conclusively” the petition’s
averments].)
Here, Hernandez’s record—which includes the charging document and
his plea form (see e.g., People v. Saavedra (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 444, 448)—
refutes his averment that the People filed a complaint against him allowing
them to proceed under a theory of attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).) That is the only
theory of attempted murder identified for resentencing eligibility in section
1172.6. (See People v. Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548 [the statute
“applies by its terms only to attempted murders based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine”].) Under that doctrine, “ ‘an accomplice is
guilty not only of the offense he or she directly aided or abetted . . . , but also
of any other offense committed by the direct perpetrator that was the
“natural and probable consequence” of the crime the accomplice aided and
abetted.’ ” (People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449, italics added.) While
the People initially charged both Hernandez and Michel, Hernandez was
charged alone in the operative third amended information.
Thus, contrary to the information in People v. Eynon, supra, 68
Cal.App.5th 977, which alleged generically that codefendants murdered the
12
victim and did not allege the defendant to be the actual killer,7 the operative
information in this case does not identify or charge any codefendants. It
unequivocally alleges that only Hernandez unlawfully attempted to murder
A.S.; that Hernandez “personally inflicted great bodily injury upon [A.S.], not
an accomplice to the above offense, . . . within the meaning of . . . section
12022.7[, subdivision] (b)”; and that “in the commission and attempted
commission” of the attempted murder, Hernandez “personally used a firearm
. . . within the meaning of . . . section 12022.53[, subdivision] (b).” It was to
that charge and those allegations—identifying him as the direct perpetrator,
not as an accomplice or an indirect aider and abettor—that Hernandez
pleaded guilty under penalty of perjury in the executed and initialed plea
form. At the hearing on his change of plea, Hernandez was placed under oath
and confirmed to the court that his plea form statements were true and
correct. His admission to attempted murder as alleged in the operative
charging document carries with it an intent to kill (see People v. Mumin
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 217 (conc. opn. Liu, J.) [“Every attempted murder
conviction requires the ‘ “specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct
but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing” ’ ”]) and the
plea “cannot reasonably be construed as potentially imposing liability under
7 Further, in Eynon, the defendant’s plea statements included: “I agree
that I did the things that are stated in the charges that I am admitting”
(Eynon, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 971), and that “this was a first-degree
murder by virtue of being a felony murder; that being murder that occurred
during the commission of a robbery.” (Id. at p. 972.) And the generic manner
in which the People pleaded the charge did not preclude them from
proceeding on theories of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, additionally the defendant’s factual
admissions did not preclude conviction based on either theory. Thus, the
defendant remained legally eligible for resentencing relief under section
1172.6 as a matter of law. (Eynon, at p. 979.)
13
the natural and probable consequences doctrine because [that doctrine] is a
theory of vicarious liability . . . .” (People v. Saavedra, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th
at p. 448.)8
It is true that a defendant’s admission to personal use of a firearm and
personally causing great bodily injury may not be itself sufficient to establish
the necessary intent to kill to disqualify that defendant from an evidentiary
hearing under section 1172.6. (See e.g., People v. Offley, supra, 48
Cal.App.5th 588, 597-599; People v. Cooper, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 125
[discussing point in the context of holding the court’s failure to appoint
counsel before denying the defendant’s section 1172.6 petition was prejudicial
error].) But unlike here, in Offley, which involved five defendants who took
part in a gang-related shooting, a jury had been instructed on conspiracy and
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, so it was possible it found
the defendant had not intended the kill the victim. (Offley, at p. 599; see
People v. Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 56, fn. 9 [discussing Offley].)
Under those circumstances, the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s
section 1172.6 petition based solely on the jury’s true finding on a section
12022.53, subdivision (d) allegation that the defendant personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm, proximately causing great bodily injury
and death to the victim. (Offley, at pp. 597-598.)
In contrast here, Hernandez was charged as a single defendant, and
neither the charges against him nor his plea referenced a natural and
probable consequences theory. As discussed above, his ineligibility is based
8 Hernandez cites People v. Lashley (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938 for the
proposition that intent to kill is a factual question that would have to be
gleaned from his preliminary hearing transcript. But Lashley did not involve
a guilty plea; it was an appellate challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
of the defendant’s specific intent to kill. (Id. at pp. 944-945.)
14
on his plea to attempted murder combined with his admission to the firearm
and personal injury enhancements. Where Hernandez pleaded guilty under
oath that he “personally inflicted great bodily injury on A.S.” within the
meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a), his plea was to being the person
who actually inflicted the injuries to A.S., making him ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law. (Accord, People v. Harden, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at p. 56, fn. 9.) “The natural meaning of ‘personally inflicted’ is
that the defendant [him]self inflicted the injury.” (Id. at p. 55.)
Thus, while it may be that admitting section 12022.7, subdivision (a)
and 12022.53, subdivision (b) allegations standing alone, is not tantamount to
a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Hernandez was the actual shooter,
our inquiry is broader than that. Here, we conclude that Hernandez’s record
of conviction—the operative charging document as well as his plea form and
colloquy—refutes his petition’s allegations, and that Hernandez is not
entitled to section 1172.6 relief.
15
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
O’ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
IRION, J.
16
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