CourtListener 10266155•People v. Lang CA4/1
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Filed 11/6/24 P. v. Lang CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082993
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. FSB22000828)
FLOYD LANG,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Cheryl C. Kersey, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Steve Oetting and Kristen Ramirez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
A jury convicted Floyd Lang of murder and attempted murder and
found true related allegations. It was undisputed Lang was driving in the
area hours before surveillance video captured the drive-by shooting, but his
counsel argued the real killer was someone else in a similar white SUV. On
appeal, Lang raises two categories of issues.
First, Lang claims prejudicial error when the trial court prohibited
(1) the surviving victim’s testimony and past statements about being a gang
dropout, and his belief that a Hispanic gang member shot him as a result;
and (2) expert testimony about gang dropouts being targets of gang violence.
We agree with the People that this third-party culpability evidence was
irrelevant, and thus properly excluded, because it offered only a speculative
motive without tying anyone else to the crime. And the ruling did not
deprive Lang of his mistaken-identity defense, as he elicited testimony from
the survivor describing the shooter as a different race than Lang, a fact
emphasized in closing arguments.
Second, Lang contends the court prejudicially erred by permitting a
detective to identify Lang as (1) the driver of the white SUV and (2) the
shooter. Because that lay opinion testimony helped the jury tease out details
from the surveillance video, it was admissible for the detective to identify
Lang as the driver and the white SUV as his. Although it was improper for
the detective to essentially opine on guilt by calling Lang the shooter, Lang
neither preserved that issue for appeal nor was prejudiced by the error.
Thus, we affirm.
I.
Around 1:11 a.m. in Colton, a white SUV with black rims drove
alongside and fired a gun into a vehicle containing Richard Laguna and
Able S. Laguna died, and a bullet struck Able’s arm.
A.
Shortly after, a law enforcement officer spoke with Able, who believed
two people were in the SUV. According to Able, “a white SUV car pull[ed] up
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on the side of us,” the SUV’s window rolled down, and “the passenger pulled
out his hand,” which Able thought looked “Hispanic or white.” Seeing
“bullets fly towards” his face, Able “ducked.” He heard three shots.
At trial, Able testified he was “high on crystal meth and Xanax” that
night, and “when you are on Xanax, you don’t realize a lot of stuff that’s
happening.” He said he saw a white SUV with a driver who “looked
Mexican.” He could not remember what the shooter wore beyond a mask, but
he recalled “the skin color” “wasn’t dark.” On cross-examination, Able
described seeing “a flash and that’s it,” and he “could have swor[n] it was a
Mexican skin color”—but when pressed, he admitted he was “uncertain.”
Able did not recall telling law enforcement he thought two people were in the
white SUV, instead testifying he did not know.
B.
Detective Anthony Jaeger spent “three to four days” sifting through
surveillance video from around where the shooting occurred to identify and
track both the victim vehicle and the “white SUV with the black rims.” He
created a compilation video and an annotated series of eight maps tracking
the vehicles’ movements.
At trial, Jaeger testified about what the video and maps depicted. The
jury watched the video and viewed the maps.
A couple hours before the shooting, Laguna and Able were at a
convenience store. Surveillance video shows Lang exited a white SUV with
black rims and a black roof rack and entered the store around the same time.
Lang wore a black skull cap and a black hooded sweatshirt with a sports
team logo on the front. The interior of the sweatshirt’s hood is light gray.
While Lang was there, Able entered the store and walked past him. Lang
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eventually returned to his SUV and drove off, and later Able and Laguna
walked away from the store.
Not long after, Lang drove his white SUV to a nearby liquor store.
After Lang drove away from the liquor store, no surveillance video
captured a white SUV until a little over ten minutes and a couple blocks
later. The license plate is not clear, yet Jaeger testified he believed it was the
same white SUV Lang was driving in the convenience store surveillance
video because it had the same “black rims, the black running boards, and . . .
the same roof rack.”
The white SUV parked “directly across” from a hotel, “about five cars
north of the victim’s vehicle.”
The victim vehicle later drove to a gas station and eventually parked
along a curb by a hotel facing north. “Simultaneously,” as Jaeger testified
while the video played, the white SUV “with black rims” drove southbound on
the same street.
About one minute before the shooting, the white SUV pulled into a
nearby parking lot. Jaeger testified about a still photograph from that point
in the video. According to him, it shows the same white SUV as seen at the
convenience store with “the roof rack” and “the black rims that match.”
Jaeger pointed out how the driver of the white SUV in the photograph wore a
sweatshirt with “what looks like” the sports team logo seen on Lang’s
sweatshirt at the convenience store and the same “lighter color” inside the
hood as well as the same “skull cap, [and] dark subject.”
The video proceeds to show the white SUV exit the parking lot onto the
same street on which the victim vehicle was parked. The white SUV drove
northbound and passed the parked vehicle. It then pulled into a driveway,
turned around, and drove southbound on the same street. As it passed the
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victim vehicle, “the shooting occurs.” The video shows, and Jaeger testified,
“the muzzle flash” came “from the driver’s side compartment of the vehicle.”
C.
Lang was eventually arrested, and Jaeger interviewed him. The
interview was played for the jury.
Lang originally denied being in Colton or driving a white SUV. Later,
however, he recalled being at the convenience store in Colton and seeing a
Hispanic man “wearing a jersey”—Able. Lang remembered Able and another
man because they seemed “cocky” and “too arrogant.” Lang claimed he left
the store to go home but, when pressed, admitted he may have gone “to get
more drugs.”
D.
At trial, the prosecutor presented testimony from an expert in cell
phone records and geolocation data. The expert identified Lang’s phone
number based on footage of and phone usage during a traffic stop the evening
after the shooting. The expert used the phone number to approximate the
locations where Lang’s phone made or received calls leading up to and after
the shooting.
About three hours before the shooting, a call placed Lang’s phone
“someplace west of our significant locations.” When the video shows Lang at
the liquor store, his phone received a call in that area. About twenty minutes
before the shooting, an outgoing call from Lang’s phone placed the device in
the “area that would include the [hotel].” About twenty minutes after the
shooting, an outgoing call placed Lang’s phone “south of the relevant
locations, which is the same direction” the surveillance video shows the white
SUV “leaving to or towards” post-shooting.
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E.
Lang’s counsel argued mistaken identity. He told the jury “there were
two white SUVs” the night of the shooting, “one contain[ing] the real shooter”
and the other Lang. Defense counsel emphasized a gap in the videos to
suggest a different white SUV—driven by “the real shooter,” not Lang—was
the vehicle shown in the video of the shooting. That Lang and the shooter
drove the same white SUV was a “bad coincidence.” The still photograph
from the video in the parking lot was “not enough,” defense counsel argued,
because “[n]obody can tell you that that is Mr. Lang.”
Instead, “it makes so, so much more sense if it’s somebody else.” Lang’s
counsel emphasized Able told law enforcement (1) “it was a Mexican guy not
a black guy” who shot him and (2) he saw two people in the car. Lang had no
motive, defense counsel explained, while the shooter did. But “w[e] don’t
know what that [motive] is because we don’t know who that person is.”
According to defense counsel, “it doesn’t make sense at all if it’s Mr. Lang,
and it makes complete sense if it’s somebody else” who specifically targeted
Laguna and Able. “And so the obvious answer is somebody else was in a
similar car.”
F.
The jury found Lang guilty of first degree murder and attempted
murder, finding true for each charge that Lang intentionally discharged a
firearm causing death or great bodily injury. The trial court sentenced Lang
to a total prison term of 82 years to life.
II.
We group Lang’s appellate challenges into two categories—(1) gang-
related third-party culpability evidence and (2) identification evidence—and
address them in turn.
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A.
Lang claims the court erred by excluding testimony from (1) Able about
how he “believed” the shooting was “a hit placed on him by his former gang”
and (2) an expert on how gang dropouts “are frequently the targets of gang
violence.” We disagree.
1.
Trial courts have “broad discretion” in deciding the relevance of
evidence and whether to exclude expert testimony. (People v. Harris (2005)
37 Cal.4th 310, 337; People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 426.) We
review rulings on the admissibility of evidence and expert testimony for
abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
Although Lang argues we should independently review his claims
because the exclusion of evidence “vital to his defense” purportedly denied
him his “federal constitutional rights to fair trial and due process,” we
disagree for the reasons discussed below.
2.
Lang sought to introduce gang-related evidence before, during, and
after trial.
Pretrial, the People moved to exclude evidence suggesting “rival
Hispanic gang members” had “motive or opportunity” to commit the charged
crimes. Lang planned to introduce statements Able made to law enforcement
about how he thought a gang member shot him for leaving his gang.
Although nobody told Able “they were gonna get” him, he “guess[ed] the word
got out” that he dropped out because “that’s when [gang members] come
lookin’ for us.” Lang’s counsel wanted to explore this topic with Able, as the
“entire theory of the defense” was that Lang did not shoot the victims, but
rather “a rival gang member” did, and “here’s all the reasons” Able thought
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so, “and then the expert can explain that gang culture to elaborate on [Able’s]
belief.” The evidence would “provide[ ] the motive” and why Able “thought it
was a Hispanic male who shot him, not a black male.”
The trial court prohibited Lang’s counsel from (1) mentioning Able’s
“speculative statements” and (2) asking Able questions to make him
“speculate about the motive.” It observed the defense had “not even
identified someone who committed this crime or did this shooting.” Finding
“no nexus” between Able’s speculation and the charged offenses, the court
excluded the evidence. Defense counsel, however, could ask Able who shot
him, and if Able identified the shooter as a Hispanic male, “then clearly that’s
relevant.”
The court reserved ruling on the expert.
During Jaeger’s testimony and outside the jury’s presence, the court
noted it had yet to hear “sufficient evidence” to warrant allowing a gang
expert to testify. Lang’s counsel did not then argue otherwise.
Later, Lang’s counsel claimed any limit on third-party culpability
evidence “does not apply to victim statements,” so only relevance or
materiality could restrict exploring this “gang issue” with Able. Yet, the
court noted, “nothing has been presented regarding anybody else at the
scene” or in the white SUV. The court stood by its original ruling finding the
proffered evidence inadmissible. Thus, Lang could not “invite” Able “to
speculate regarding who might have targeted him or shot him.”
After trial, Lang moved for a new trial on this ground. For the first
time, Lang asserted a gang expert would have testified a witness would not
identify another gang member “under any circumstances.” The court held
firm: Able’s “belief” he was targeted as a gang dropout was inadmissible
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speculation. The jury heard Able describe the shooter as someone not
matching Lang, “and the jury rejected that” testimony.
3.
Third-party culpability evidence “tend[s] to show that a party other
than the defendant committed the offense charged.” (People v. Hall (1986)
41 Cal.3d 826, 829.) Third-party culpability evidence “must meet minimum
standards of relevance.” (People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1017.)
“[E]vidence that another person had a motive or opportunity to commit the
crime, without more, is irrelevant because it does not raise a reasonable
doubt about a defendant’s guilt.” (People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547,
558.) Instead, “to be relevant, the evidence must link this third person to the
actual commission of the crime.” (Ibid.)
Lang disputes the at-issue evidence was third-party culpability
evidence and contends the trial court “misunderstood the law” when treating
it as such. According to Lang, the evidence instead would have (1) “bolstered”
Able’s “identification of the shooter as a Mexican male, and not Mr. Lang”
and (2) “provided a motive for someone else to have shot” the victims. Thus,
the evidence would have supported Lang’s “defense of mistaken identity.”
Even so, it remains evidence that someone other than Lang committed the
charged offenses, making it third-party culpability evidence. (See Hall,
41 Cal.3d at p. 829.)
The trial court properly excluded Lang’s proffered gang-related
third-party culpability evidence from both Able and a gang expert. Evidence
Able was a recent gang dropout who believed he would be targeted as a result
and corresponding expert testimony on gang dropout shootings are
insufficient to link someone else to the shooting, making the testimony
irrelevant. At most, the evidence suggests a possible motive by another
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unknown person, which is “not capable of raising a reasonable doubt of a
defendant’s guilt and is thus inadmissible.” (Edelbacher, 47 Cal.3d at
p. 1018.)
4.
We see no merit in Lang’s corresponding constitutional claims based on
his right to present a “complete defense.” Our Supreme Court has rejected
this argument. (Hall, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 834-835.) And, as the People note, the
ruling here did not prevent Lang from asserting a third-party culpability
defense. Lang’s counsel elicited testimony from Able describing the shooter
as Hispanic, which he emphasized in closing arguments, claiming “somebody
else” in a “similar car” was the real shooter. Thus, the court did not prevent
Lang from presenting his defense; it “merely rejected certain evidence
concerning the defense.” (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1325.)
Similarly, although Lang asserts a constitutional right to bolster the
credibility of Able’s description of the shooter as Hispanic on cross-
examination, “trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation
Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination”
for “only marginally relevant” questions. (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986)
475 U.S. 673, 679.) We therefore perceive no error in limiting irrelevant
cross-examination.
5.
Because the trial court did not err, we need not reach Lang’s related
prejudice arguments.
B.
Next, Lang argues the trial court erred by allowing Jaeger to identify
(1) the white SUV in the surveillance video as Lang’s and Lang as the driver
and (2) Lang as the shooter. We conclude the first category of identification
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testimony was permissible. Although the second category was improper,
Lang did not preserve that claim and, in any event, that testimony did not
prejudice Lang.
1.
The parties agree Jaeger testified as a lay person, not as an expert, so
we need not address Lang’s theoretical arguments about why his testimony
would be inadmissible “[e]ven if” he were an expert.
We review the admission of lay opinion testimony for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 600.) Lang suggests we
should review de novo because he claims prejudicial error affecting his
constitutional rights. But because we find no infringement on his
constitutional rights, as discussed below, we review for abuse of discretion.
2.
We first address Jaeger’s testimony and notations on a map exhibit
identifying the white SUV as Lang’s and the driver as Lang.
The annotated series of maps Jaeger created to show the movements of
the victims’ vehicle and the white SUV displays Lang’s name twelve times,
most often to describe the suspect vehicle’s actions, such as “Lang drives” a
particular direction and “Lang is parked behind the victim’s vehicle.”
At trial, Jaeger explained the maps and the activity shown in the
compilation video. Sometimes, he referred to the white SUV as “the suspect.”
But other times he testified, for example, “suspect Lang leaves” a location.
As Jaeger discussed the maps, Lang’s counsel interjected to “ask the
witness to just refer to the white vehicle that’s parked there as opposed to
Mr. Lang driving that vehicle,” arguing it was a “legal conclusion.” The
prosecutor countered that Jaeger was expressing “his opinion” based on his
understanding of the evidence, “which the jury is free to reject or accept,
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depending on their conclusions and findings at the end of the case.” The trial
court viewed it as a “factual conclusion” and permitted Jaeger to continue
identifying Lang, explaining “the evidence will be evaluated on its weight, not
its admissibility.”
Defense counsel also objected to the map exhibit as being “labeled with
legal conclusions which are inappropriate to publish in front of the jury.” He
argued it was inappropriate for the labels to “say Mr. Lang this or that”
because, aside from the convenience store and liquor store footage where
Lang appears in view, the video shows “a similar car and that’s it.” The trial
court disagreed that the labels were legal conclusions. It viewed Lang’s
objection as being the same “argument regarding identification,” which it
overruled because “all of those things go to weight, not admissibility.”
Lay witnesses may offer opinion testimony if it is (1) rationally based
on their perception and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of their
testimony. (Evid. Code, § 800.) “[T]he identity of a person is a proper subject
of nonexpert opinion.” (People v. Perry (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 608, 612.)
California courts “have long upheld admission of testimony” from law
enforcement officers “identifying defendants in surveillance footage or
photographs.” (Leon, 61 Cal.4th at p. 601.) To be helpful in this context, the
testimony need only to “have aided the jury’s identification” of the subject
depicted in the surveillance video or photograph. (People v. Mixon (1982)
129 Cal.App.3d 118, 131.)
Here, Lang challenges only the helpfulness of Jaeger’s testimony, so we
need not address the rational basis issue. Lang asserts the videos “were
either unmistakably clear or hopelessly obscure,” so Jaeger was “no better-
suited than the jury to make identifications.” Lang focuses on how the driver
was not visible “at the time shots were fired.”
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We disagree. Jaeger’s testimony was helpful because the video, as the
People argue, “lacked the clarity or definition at times to allow jurors to
easily identify the shooter.” Jaeger helped the jury understand which details
to scrutinize in determining if Lang was the person depicted in the video. For
example, surveillance video captured the driver of the white SUV “[a]bout a
minute” before the shooting. Even in the still photograph of the driver taken
from the video, it is difficult at first to discern any clear features. Jaeger
pointed out details, like the color and text of the sweatshirt and the skull cap,
that allow the image of Lang to come into focus. Thus, “the jury was able to
speed up the process of teasing out obscure details in the video with the aid of
[the detective’s] testimony. That was helpful.” (People v. Son (2020)
56 Cal.App.5th 689, 697.) As a result, the trial court did not err by admitting
Jaeger’s testimony identifying Lang as the driver of the white SUV.
3.
Lang contends Jaeger went “beyond identifying” Lang in the video
when he testified Lang was the shooter. We agree Jaeger went “one step too
far” in expressing an opinion on guilt, but we conclude (1) Lang did not
preserve the issue and (2) it did not prejudice the verdict.
To preserve a claim of erroneous admission of evidence, a party must
make a timely and specific objection. (Evid. Code, § 353(a).) “Failure to
object on the specific ground later asserted . . . forfeits that ground on
appeal.” (People v. Nadey (2024) 16 Cal.5th 102, 150.) This requirement
“allows the trial judge to consider excluding the evidence or limiting its
admission.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434.) The objection
must “fairly inform” the trial judge of the specific reason for exclusion so the
court “can make a fully informed ruling.” (Id. at p. 435.) “A party cannot
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argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to
conduct.” (Ibid.)
Here, Lang never objected when Jaeger testified that “suspect Lang . . .
shoots into the vehicle” and “that’s when the shooting occurs.” As a result, he
cannot claim error on that basis on appeal.
Although Lang objected to the annotated maps Jaeger created, Lang
did not call the trial court’s attention to where the maps went beyond
identifying Lang as the driver of the white SUV. Of the twelve times Lang’s
name appears on the maps, two labels say, “Lang pulls up next to the victims
and shoots them” and, “[a]fter shooting the victims[,] Lang leaves the area.”
Defense counsel objected generally to the labels saying “Lang this or that”
but did not specify the two labels identifying Lang as the shooter. Instead,
despite arguing “the only legal question for this whole trial is the identity of
the shooter,” defense counsel focused on how “it’s a similar car and that’s it.”
The trial court understood the objection as Lang’s “argument regarding
identification” more generally and overruled it.
We conclude the objection did not fairly inform the trial court there was
a potential issue beyond identifying Lang as the driver of the SUV—which
testimony, as discussed above, was admissible. Thus, any objection going
specifically to the parts of the maps saying Lang was the shooter is forfeited.
Moreover, in his appellate briefing, Lang takes issue with his “name
appearing on maps used as prosecution exhibits” without distinguishing
between Jaeger identifying Lang’s vehicle and Lang as the driver versus
Jaeger asserting Lang shot the victims. Thus, to the extent Lang intended to
include the map labels in his shooter argument on appeal, his argument is
forfeited as underdeveloped. (See Badie v. Bank of America (1998)
67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785.)
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In any event, even if the claim were preserved, we conclude Jaeger’s
testimony and map labels calling Lang the shooter did not prejudice Lang.
“A witness may not express an opinion on a defendant’s guilt,” not
because it goes to the “ultimate issue” of the case—“as opinion testimony
often goes to the ultimate issue”—but because it does not help the jury.
(People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 77.)
Lang contends the testimony identifying Lang as the shooter violated
his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to have a jury decide the case
and “rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process.”
Thus, he believes we should assess prejudice under Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. But “[a]bsent fundamental unfairness,
state law error in admitting evidence is subject to the traditional” test under
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (Partida, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439.)
We are not persuaded admitting this evidence violated Lang’s
constitutional or due process rights. We agree a “trial court cannot
constitutionally direct a verdict of guilt,” but Lang identifies no such action
here. Rather, the trial court instructed the jurors they “must decide what the
facts are” and could “disregard all or any part of an opinion” they found
unsupported by the evidence. In closing, the prosecutor never mentioned
Jaeger identified Lang as the shooter, instead reminding the jurors their “job
here is to tell us who did it.”
To the extent Lang claims fundamental unfairness because “the jurors
may well have believed [Jaeger] had some special knowledge or expertise
which made his observations credible even if not supported by their own
viewing of the videos,” we disagree. Lang relies on United States v.
Grinage (2nd Cir. 2004) 390 F.3d 746, 750; unlike the defendant in Grinage,
however, he fails to point us to any testimony about Jaeger basing his
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identification on his “‘knowledge of the entire investigation’” or evidence not
before the jury. Although Lang suggests the jury might have been confused
because it was “instructed on both expert and lay opinion testimony, without
specifying whether Jaeger was an expert,” that argument ignores the record,
which shows all experts and their areas of expertise were expressly identified
during trial. As the People point out, the jury already knew Jaeger, as one of
the arresting officers, thought Lang was the shooter. (Citing People v.
Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 300.) And “[t]here was no implication from the
questions or answers that [Jaeger’s] opinions were based upon evidence that
had not been presented to the jury.” (Ibid.) Under these circumstances, our
Supreme Court applied Watson. (Id. at p. 301.) We do the same here.
We conclude it is not reasonably probable Lang would have obtained a
more favorable verdict absent this evidence. (Watson, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
Lang focuses on how Able testified there were two people in the white SUV
and the shooter was Hispanic to argue “it was likely Mr. Lang was not the
shooter.” But the image, although blurry, of Lang driving the white SUV
moments before the shooting, coupled with (1) cell phone records placing
Lang in the area close in time before and after the shooting and (2) Lang
lying to Jaeger about never being in Colton or associated with a white SUV,
persuade us Jaeger’s testimony did not prejudice the verdict.
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4.
Lastly, Lang argues the identification error, “[a]t least in combination”
with the other claimed errors, requires reversal. Because we have found no
preserved nor prejudicial error, this claim fails.
III.
We affirm the judgment.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.
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