People v. Escamilla CA5

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Filed 11/5/24 P. v. Escamilla CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F086103
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F21901794)
v.

MIGUEL ANGEL ESCAMILLA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Kimberly A.
Gaab, Judge.
Robert F. Kane, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue and Craig S.
Meyers, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Franson, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.
Defendant Miguel Angel Escamilla pled no contest, pursuant to a negotiated plea
agreement, to gross vehicular manslaughter, felony driving under the influence of alcohol
and drugs, and leaving the scene of an accident. He also admitted the truth of various
enhancement allegations and four circumstances in aggravation. The trial court imposed
the stipulated sentence of 12 years. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused
its discretion by imposing a 12-year term of imprisonment and erred in imposing fines
and fees without establishing defendant’s ability to pay. The People disagree on both
accounts. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On March 22, 2022, the Fresno County District Attorney filed an information
charging defendant with vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5,
count 1),1 driving under the influence of drugs and alcohol causing injury (Veh. Code,
§ 23153, subd. (g); count 2), driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or higher
(Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b); count 3), driving under the influence of alcohol causing
injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count 4)), leaving the scene of an accident (Veh.
Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2); count 5), misdemeanor driving without a license (Veh.
Code, § 12500, subd. (a); count 6), traffic infractions for failure to stop at a stop sign
(Veh. Code, § 22450, subd. (a); count 7), and driving at an unsafe speed (Veh. Code,
§ 22350; count 8).
As to count 1, the information further alleged that defendant personally used a
deadly weapon (a vehicle) (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23), 1192.8), fled the scene of the crime
(Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (c)), caused bodily injury or death to more than one victim
(Veh. Code, § 23558), refused a chemical test (Veh. Code, § 23577), and caused great
bodily injury (§ 969f). As to count 2, the information further alleged defendant inflicted
great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), caused bodily injury or death to more than

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code except as otherwise noted.

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one victim (Veh. Code, § 23558), and refused a chemical test (Veh. Code, § 23577). As
to counts 1 and 2, the information alleged four circumstances in aggravation: the crime
involved great violence, great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of
cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1));2 defendant
used a weapon in commission of the offense (rule 4.421(a)(2)); the victim was
particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)); and the crime involved damage of great
monetary value (rule 4.421 (a)(9)). As to count 5, the information alleged the crime
involved great violence, great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of
cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (rule 4.421(a)(1)).3
On January 19, 2023, defendant pled no contest, pursuant to a negotiated plea
agreement, to counts 1, 2, and 5. He further admitted the following: as to count 1, he
inflicted great bodily injury on a nonaccomplice (§ 969f), he personally used a deadly or
dangerous weapon (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23), 1192.8), he refused a chemical test (Veh.
Code, § 23577), and the truth of the four alleged circumstances in aggravation; as to
count 2, he personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), he refused a
chemical test (Veh. Code, § 23577), and the truth of the four alleged circumstances in
aggravation; and as to count 5, the truth of the one alleged circumstance in aggravation.
The plea agreement provided for a stipulated term of 12 years and dismissal of the other
counts alleged in the information. During the change of plea colloquy, the trial court
reiterated that the plea agreement stipulated a 12-year term and that was “the sentence [it]
intend[ed] to impose ….”4 The trial court also advised defendant that, absent a plea

2 All further rules references are to the California Rules of Court.
3 Additional enhancement and circumstance in aggravation allegations were made
as to counts 3 and 4, however, we omit mention of them because they were dismissed
pursuant to the plea agreement.
4 Defendant contends that the plea agreement did not provide a stipulated term of
imprisonment, but a 12-year lid. That contention is not well taken. It is inconsistent with
the plain language of the plea agreement—indicating “a 12[-]year stipulated term”—

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agreement, his maximum exposure on the charges to which he pled no contest was
16 years.
On April 7, 2023, the trial court indicated it intended to sentence defendant to the
stipulated 12-year term. It asked defense counsel if it was “defendant’s request … that
the 12-year term be imposed?” Defense counsel responded, “Yes.” The trial court then
imposed the 12-year stipulated term as follows: on count 1, six years (the middle term),
plus a five-year enhancement pursuant to Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (c),
plus a one-year enhancement pursuant to Vehicle Code section 23558; on count 2, two
years (the middle term), plus a three-year great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7),
plus a one-year enhancement pursuant to Vehicle Code section 23558, stayed pursuant to
section 654; and on count 5, three years (the middle term), stayed pursuant to section 654.
The court then imposed a restitution fine in the amount of $3,600 (§ 1202.4), a stayed
parole revocation restitution fine in the same amount (§ 1202.45), “a separate
agreed-upon restitution” amount of $14,326.28 for headstone and funeral expenses
(§ 1202.4, subd. (f)), a courtroom security fee of $120 (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), and a
criminal conviction fee of $90 (Gov. Code, § 70373).
On the same date, after the trial court imposed the direct victim restitution, fees,
and fines, defendant’s counsel requested in light of the large direct victim restitution, that
the court suspend the fines imposed. He clarified that he did not mean the restitution
fines because “those cannot be suspended, but the other fines imposed in this case.” The

defense counsel’s statement at the change of plea hearing—“this is a stipulated plea …
12 is the stipulation” —the prosecutor’s statement at the change of plea hearing—the plea
agreement provides for a “stipulated term of 12 years”—and the trial court’s statement at
the change of plea hearing—it understood the plea agreement to provide a 12-year
stipulated term and “that is the sentence [it] intend[ed] to impose …”—the trial court’s
statement at sentencing—“[t]he district attorney’s offer was a 12-year term …”—and
defense counsel’s statement at sentencing—“it’s a negotiated term.” Without any doubt,
the plea agreement provided for a 12-year stipulated term. Appellate counsel’s
representation to the contrary is misleading, at best.

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court declined the request, noting that the only fines at issue were the restitution fine
under section 1202.4 and parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45, both of
which were “appropriate fine[s].” As to the courtroom security fee and criminal
conviction fee, the court noted that those fees were small relative to restitution, and it
would not waive or suspend those fees.
On June 23, 2023, the trial court held a restitution hearing on the amounts not
stipulated by the parties. The court awarded $3,486.56 for the burial plot and $1,029.40
for the victim’s ambulance service. In total, the restitution award was $18,842.24.
On April 10, 2023, defendant filed a notice of appeal. He checked none of the
boxes. For example, he did not check the box reflecting that the “appeal is based on the
sentence or other matters occurring after the plea that do not affect the validity of the
plea” or the box reflecting that the “appeal challenges the validity of the plea or
admission.” Nor did he request or obtain a certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION5
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Imposing the Stipulated Term of
Imprisonment
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
defendant to the stipulated middle-term sentence. We disagree.
A. Defendant Failed to Obtain a Certificate of Probable Cause
As a threshold matter, on defendant’s notice of appeal he did not check any of the
available boxes. Significantly, he did not check the box indicating “[t]his appeal
challenges the validity of the plea or admission. (You must complete the Request for
Certificate of Probable Cause … and submit it to the court for its signature.)” And
defendant did not seek or obtain a certificate of probable cause.

5 Because defendant’s claims on appeal are purely legal issues, we provide no
factual summary.

5.
“The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not appeal a trial court’s
judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made appealable by statute.” (People
v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159.) “In general, [however,] a defendant may appeal
from a final judgment of conviction, unless otherwise limited by sections 1237.1 and
1237.5.” (People v. Maultsby (2012) 53 Cal.4th 296, 298–299, citing § 1237 &
rule 8.304(b).)
“Section 1237.5 provides that an appeal may not be taken after a plea of guilty or
no contest unless the defendant has filed a statement showing reasonable grounds for
appeal and the trial court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause. This
requirement does not apply, however, if the appeal is based upon grounds that arose after
entry of the plea and that do not affect the validity of the plea.” (People v. French (2008)
43 Cal.4th 36, 43 (French).)
“ ‘In determining whether section 1237.5 applies to a challenge of a sentence
imposed after a plea of guilty or no contest, courts must look to the substance of the
appeal: “[T]he crucial issue is what the defendant is challenging, not the time or manner
in which the challenge is made.” [Citation.] Hence, the critical inquiry is whether a
challenge to the sentence is in substance a challenge to the validity of the plea, thus
rendering the appeal subject to the requirements of section 1237.5.’ ” (French, supra, 43
Cal.4th at p. 44.)
Here, despite defendant’s arguments to the contrary, as noted above, he entered a
negotiated plea agreement with a stipulated sentence. By challenging “the very sentence
he negotiated as part of the plea bargain, [the] defendant is, in substance, attacking the
validity of the plea.” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 78.) The portion of
defendant’s appeal that challenges his sentencing therefore fails for lack of a certificate of
probable cause.
Even if defendant was correct that the plea agreement only negotiated a lid—he is
not—an appeal challenging such a plea agreement where the sentence is within the

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agreed range of the plea agreement also requires a certificate of probable cause. (People
v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 763.) In French our Supreme Court described its prior
holding in Shelton:

“[A] defendant’s claim—that the sentence imposed by the trial court, which
was within the agreed-upon maximum term, violated the multiple
punishment prohibition of section 654—constituted an attack upon the
validity of the plea and required a certificate of probable cause. The
defendant in Shelton had pleaded guilty to two of the charged counts and
agreed to a maximum sentence of three years eight months in exchange for
dismissal of three other counts, reserving the right to argue for a sentence
lower than the maximum but not reserving the right to argue that the
agreed-upon maximum was an unauthorized sentence. The trial court
sentenced the defendant to the maximum term of three years eight months,
imposing the upper term on one count and a consecutive term on the other
count. In challenging his sentence pursuant to section 654, the defendant
argued that the trial court lacked authority to impose the agreed-upon
maximum term. We explained that ‘inclusion of a sentence lid [in a plea
agreement] implies a mutual understanding and agreement that the trial
court has authority to impose the specified maximum sentence and
preserves only the defendant’s right to urge that the trial court should or
must exercise its discretion in favor of a shorter term. Accordingly, a
challenge to the trial court’s authority to impose the lid sentence is a
challenge to the validity of the plea requiring a certificate of probable
cause.’ ” (French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 44.)
B. Defendant’s Claim Fails on Its Merits
Despite defendant’s failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause, we address
the merits of his claim to forestall any future claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
based on that failure.
On the merits, defendant argues that People v. De La Rosa Burgara (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 1054, 1064 (De La Rosa Burgara), requires a trial court to determine
whether the plea agreement was consistent with the lower term presumption due to
defendant’s youth—he was 24 years old at the time of the offense—as required by
rule 4.420(e)(2) and by section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(B).

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We disagree that De La Rosa Burgara is applicable in this situation. In that case,
after the defendant was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement with a stipulated term of
imprisonment, Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567) was
enacted, and defendant sought its retroactive application. (De La Rosa Burgara, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1060.) The appellate court explained “that [a] defendant, who had
entered a plea agreement with a stipulated sentence that included an upper term before
Senate Bill 567, should be permitted the opportunity to seek resentencing in compliance
with amended section 1170[, subdivision] (b).” (De La Rosa Burgara, at p. 1062, italics
added.) It vacated the sentence and remanded with the notation that the defendant could
“ ‘ “waive or invoke the requirements of section 1170[, subdivision] (b)” ’ ” upon
remand. (De La Rosa Burgara, at p. 1063.)
In contrast, in this case, defendant’s negotiated plea was entered more than a year
after the effective date of Senate Bill 567. This is not a situation in which we must
consider whether defendant is entitled to the ameliorative benefit of a change in law.
Defendant entered his no contest plea, admitting circumstances in aggravation and
stipulating to the middle term. The stipulated sentence did not run afoul of section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6)(B)6 as modified by Senate Bill 567.
Even assuming De La Rosa Burgara applied outside of the context of retroactive
application of Senate Bill 567, this court has reached the opposite conclusion regarding
whether a defendant who enters a negotiated plea agreement with a stipulated term of
imprisonment is entitled to the retroactive benefit of Senate Bill 567. In People v. Sallee
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 330, review granted April 26, 2023, S278690, this court explained
that when a trial court “impose[s] a stipulated sentence pursuant to a negotiated plea
agreement,” the court’s discretion is “limited to approving or rejecting the bargain. The

6 We do not reach the issue of whether defendant’s youth “was a contributing factor
in the commission of the offense.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B).)

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court [does] not exercise discretion to select between the lower, middle, or upper term
based on any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.” (Sallee, at p. 338.) “Thus,
section 1170, subdivision (b), which governs the court’s exercise of discretion with
regard to a sentencing triad, does not apply.” (Ibid.) Here, even assuming De La Rosa
Burgara applied outside of the context of the retroactive application of Senate Bill 567—
and we conclude that it does not—we would disagree with its analysis. We would
instead reach the same conclusion as Sallee for the same reasons stated in Sallee.
Defendant’s claim would fail for that independent reason.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Declining to Reduce Defendant’s Fines and Fees
Defendant contends that the trial court was required to determine defendant’s
ability to pay before imposing fines and fees in reliance on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30
Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas) and People v. Son (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 565 (Son).
Defendant does not challenge the restitution award. The People argue that defendant
failed to request an ability to pay hearing or show his inability to pay. We conclude
defendant forfeited any challenge to the restitution fines and that the court did not err in
declining to impose the courtroom security and criminal conviction fees.
A. Additional Background
At the April 7, 2023 sentencing hearing, after the trial court imposed the
$14,326.28 restitution award, $3,600 restitution fine, $3,600 stayed parole revocation
fine, $120 courtroom security fee, and $90 criminal conviction fee, defendant’s counsel
made the following argument:

“There is another issue that I wanted to ask the Court before we
conclude. [¶] … [¶] It’s the issue of fines imposed to [defendant]’s case.
Being the fact that he has a significant restitution order and the very low
likelihood that he’s going to be employed at the prison, when he comes out,
he’s going to have a civil judgment against him for over $14,000. I would
like to ask that his fines be⸻fines in this case be suspended in light of the
weightiness and his progeny at this point. [¶] Not the restitution fines,
those cannot be suspended, but other fines that the Court has imposed on

9.
this case. The Court has jurisdiction and authority to not⸻not impose
those fines. I’d like⸻I would like the Court to use its discretion to do
that.”
The trial court responded:

“The only additional fines we’re talking about is the restitution⸻in
addition to the $14,000⸻is the restitution fine under [section] 1202.4. It’s
not appropriate for the Court to waive that fine. And the restitution⸻if a
period of parole is ordered, that fine is suspended unless parole is revoked.
That’s another appropriate fine to encourage [defendant] to abide by the
terms of his parole. [¶] And the courtrooms, we’re talking about $120 and
$90 for a courtroom security fee and the criminal conviction fee. I’m not
going to suspended those fines. The bulk of the fines are restitution, and
it’s restitution that is appropriate in this case. So the request to waive or
suspend the fines is denied.”
B. Forfeiture
“In general, a defendant who fails to object to the imposition of fines and fees at
sentencing forfeits the right to challenge those fines and fees on appeal.” (People v.
Ramirez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175, 224.) Here, defendant’s trial counsel explicitly
asked the court to suspend the fines in this case, but “[n]ot the restitution fines.”
Defendant’s sentencing hearing was held on April 7, 2023, more than four years
after the Second District, Division 7 Court of Appeal filed their opinion in Dueñas,
supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 on January 8, 2019. Moreover, because the restitution fine
exceeded the minimum restitution fine, subdivision (c) of section 1202.4 permitted the
trial court to consider “[i]nability to pay … in increasing the amount of the restitution
fine in excess of the minimum fine ….” Nevertheless, defendant’s trial counsel explicitly
excluded restitution fines from his request for suspension of fines. For that reason,
defendant forfeited his claim that the trial court erred in imposing a $3,600 restitution
fine. (People v. Ramirez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 225.)
C. Merits
As an initial matter, in this case, the trial court imposed a restitution fine of
$3,600—above the minimum amount of $300. (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).) In doing so, the

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court was required to “consider … the defendant’s ability to pay.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (d).)
The court stated that it found the amount of the restitution fine to be appropriate and we
presume the court followed and applied the applicable law. (People v. Martinez (2000)
22 Cal.4th 106, 125; Evid. Code, § 664.) Nothing in the record before us suggests
anything to the contrary.7 Therefore, because we must presume that the trial court
followed the law in determining that defendant had the ability to pay in imposing the
$3,600 restitution fine, there is no reason to believe that the court erred in concluding that
defendant had the ability to pay the far lesser $120 courtroom security fee and
$90 criminal conviction fee.
Moreover, the same court that decided Dueñas8 explained that it is the defendant’s
obligation to contest and prove his or her inability to pay and “Dueñas does not support
th[e] conclusion [that the defendant is unable to pay] in the absence of evidence in the
record of a defendant’s inability to pay.” (People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th
485, 490; accord, People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 624.) Defendant did not
request an ability to pay hearing or present any evidence of his inability to pay; that is not
the fault of the trial court. In so doing, defendant failed to demonstrate that he had an
inability to pay. Defendant’s trial counsel’s bare statement that there was a “very low

7 Indeed, the probation report indicates that defendant was employed full time in a
sanitation role at a restaurant at the time of the offense in this case, was in “ ‘good’ ”
physical health, and owned the vehicle involved in the offenses at issue. In assessing
ability to pay, a trial court may appropriately consider future income. (People v. Cowan
(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 32, 48, review granted June 17, 2020, S261952.) The trial court
could reasonably have found that defendant could find a similar job when no longer
incarcerated or in prison. (People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 96, review granted
Nov. 13, 2019, S257844.) Despite defense counsel’s comment about defendant’s
“progeny” as a reason to stay imposition of the fines, defendant told the probation officer
at the interview on March 13, 2023—less than a month prior to sentencing—that he was
single, had no children, had custody of no children, and paid no child support.
8 Our decision does not turn on whether Dueñas was correctly decided. The issue
decided in Dueñas is now before our Supreme Court. (People v. Kopp, supra, 38
Cal.App.5th 47, review granted.)

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likelihood that [defendant]’s going to be employed [in] prison [or] when he comes out”
was not proof of inability to pay. In short, we find no error in the court’s conclusion.
Finally, even if we were to consider the restitution fine, courtroom security fee,
and criminal conviction fee through the lens of the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, the fines are not excessive. An aggregate of $3,810 in restitution
fines and administrative fees is not disproportionate to the criminality in this case—
driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs, resulting in the death of one person and
serious injury to another. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005)
37 Cal.4th 707, 728 [proportionality is the touchstone of Eighth Amendment analysis];
see People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1056 [$10,000 restitution fine not invalid due
to inability to pay].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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