People v. Olvera CA5

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Filed 11/5/24 P. v. Olvera CA5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F082428
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 19CR-06497C)
v.

MARTIN SANTOYO OLVERA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Carol K. Ash
and Steven K. Slocum, Judges.

William I. Parks, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell and Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorneys General,
Eric L. Christoffersen and John Merritt, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-
A jury found Martin Santoyo Olvera (defendant) guilty of being an accessory after
the fact to a murder committed by a codefendant. The killing was alleged to be gang
related for purposes of Penal Code section 186.22 (all undesignated statutory references
are to this code), but the jury rejected the allegation. However, gang allegations
regarding defendant’s conduct as an accessory were found true.
Defendant was convicted in a retrial following the trial court’s sua sponte
declaration of a mistrial based on the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant argues the
mistrial, which was ordered over defense objections, was not legally necessary and,
therefore, the retrial violated his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy.
In the alternative, he argues insufficiency of the evidence. Both issues are close, but we
conclude error has not been shown.
Defendant’s opening brief includes a third claim based on People v. Duenas
(2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 and the trial court’s imposition of fines and fees at
sentencing. In supplemental briefing filed after the Legislature passed Assembly Bill
No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333), defendant argued for reversal of
the judgment based on changes to section 186.22 and the creation of section 1109.
Section 1109 provides for bifurcation of gang enhancement allegations upon a
defendant’s request.
In a prior opinion, this court agreed with defendant’s claims regarding Assembly
Bill 333. We concluded the amendments to section 186.22 and the new procedures set
forth in section 1109 both applied retroactively, and we reversed the judgment on those
grounds. The People petitioned for review, and the California Supreme Court accepted
the case on a grant-and-hold basis pending its decision in People v. Burgos (2024) 16
Cal.5th 1.
The Burgos opinion holds that section 1109 is not retroactive. (People v. Burgos,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 8.) In light of this holding, defendant’s case was transferred back
to this court with directions to vacate the prior decision and reconsider the cause. After
such further consideration, we conclude defendant is entitled to a new trial based on (1)
the amendments to section 186.22 and (2) an abuse of discretion made in connection with
the bifurcation rulings. The judgment will be reversed, which moots the Duenas issues.

2.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
July 14, 2019
On July 14, 2019, at 11:31 p.m., a 911 caller reported hearing gunshots near
Merced Avenue in the City of Merced. The caller lived on Rose Avenue, which
intersects with Merced Avenue, but his residence was approximately 15 houses away
from the intersection and he was unable to provide more information.
A second 911 caller, F.G., requested police assistance at the 1300 block of Merced
Avenue. He had heard gunshots and could see “somebody laying down” in the street.
When asked if there were any vehicles in the area, F.G. told the dispatcher, “There’s a
white ca—it was a—it was a white Cadillac. It’s—I don’t know if it’s—if this is the
car.” A few questions later, the dispatcher asked, “Is the white Cadillac still parked
there?” F.G. replied, “No, he took off. He took off. He’s long gone.” The next question
was, “Which way did the Cadillac go?” F.G. answered, “Going towards the Marriott out
by the freeway by Motel Drive.”
Police officers soon discovered the dead body of a 48-year-old man, Juan Ramirez
(the victim). He was found lying on his stomach in the eastbound lane of Merced
Avenue, near the address F.G. had provided to the dispatcher. An autopsy confirmed the
victim sustained six bullet wounds, though one was characterized as a “graze wound.”
There was a front wound to the left shoulder and multiple posterior wounds, including
one to the back of the head.
Investigators found 11 expended .40-caliber bullet casings and a bullet hole in a
vehicle parked approximately 40 feet northwest of the victim’s body, all in the vicinity of
the 1400 block of Merced Avenue. It was determined the victim resided on the 1600
block of Merced Avenue, a considerable distance to the east of where he was evidently
shot and killed. The police found no blood trails or droplets between the two locations.

3.
July 15, 2019
In the early hours of July 15, 2019, a homicide detective conducted recorded
interviews with F.G. and his friend, A.D. Another detective located video evidence
captured by security cameras at the west end of Merced Avenue and along the northern
stretch of Motel Drive. Later in the day, the police spoke to the victim’s neighbors and
executed a search warrant at the victim’s home.
F.G.’s Recorded Statements
F.G. had been visiting A.D. on the night of the shooting. A.D. lived on Merced
Avenue, approximately one block east of where the victim’s body was found.
Late that evening, F.G. and A.D. had a strange encounter with an unidentified
woman. F.G. described her as a “really skinny” Hispanic female with black hair and a
tattoo on her left arm. She was approximately 19 or 20 years old, was sweating
profusely, and appeared to be “on drugs.” The woman had attempted to enter A.D.’s
home, and she seemed startled and/or frightened when F.G. opened the front door. She
claimed to be looking for someone named “Jesse” before wandering off toward the 1300
block of Merced Avenue.
F.G. exited the house and saw the woman behaving suspiciously outside of
another residence. A.D. called the police, and officers came out to the neighborhood to
investigate. The police departed after failing to locate the woman. Approximately 10 to
20 minutes later, F.G. and A.D. heard gunshots.
F.G. recalled hearing a man “arguing with somebody” immediately prior to the
shooting. He and A.D. hurried outside after hearing the shots, looked to their right
(west), and saw a white car in the westbound lane of Merced Avenue. Although F.G. had
said it was a Cadillac during the 911 call, he told the detective it was a two-door
Chrysler. After further questioning about the make, model, and year, F.G. said, “I had
told the cops 2015. But [A.D.] was like, ‘No that had to be like, older—2005.[’] And he
pulled up a picture and it looked exactly the same as the car.”

4.
When F.G. first saw the white vehicle, its brake lights were illuminated. The car
remained stationary for approximately five seconds before slowly proceeding to a stop
sign at the intersection of Merced Avenue and Motel Drive, then it “took off fast.”
A.D.’s Recorded Statements
A.D.’s statements were generally consistent with those of F.G. regarding the
events prior to the shooting. After hearing gunfire, A.D. and some of his relatives exited
the house to see what had happened. Similar to F.G.’s account, A.D. remembered
running outside, looking to his right, and seeing the brake lights of a car in the westbound
lane of Merced Avenue. But whereas F.G. had indicated the vehicle was stopped close to
the body, A.D. said the car was approximately “two houses down” from it, meaning west
of the body, “[r]ight before Rose Avenue.”
The details provided by A.D. further differed from F.G.’s account in two
significant respects. First, A.D. was certain the white car had turned onto Rose Avenue,
i.e., “[t]he street before the stop sign.” In other words, the vehicle did not traverse Motel
Drive. Second, A.D. was “pretty sure” it was a four-door Cadillac CTS.
The detective asked A.D. if he had shown F.G. “a picture of a car” (presumably
referring to the one F.G. described as looking “exactly the same” as the suspect vehicle),
and A.D. responded affirmatively. He then showed the detective the results of a Google
images search he had performed on his phone for the term “2006 cadillac cts.” All the
images were of four-door vehicles. The detective informed A.D. that F.G. had said he
thought it was a Chrysler. A.D. replied, “He didn’t—he didn’t really see. He was more
payin’ attention to the [dead] body.”
Security Camera Footage
A resident of the 1200 block of Merced Avenue had a video surveillance system
with a camera mounted above his garage. The home was located between Rose Avenue
and Almond Avenue (Rose to the east and Almond to the west), and the camera was
pointed toward Merced Avenue. The grainy, low-resolution video feed showed cars

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passing by the house in the eastbound and westbound lanes of Merced Avenue. To a
lesser extent, the feed also showed the headlights of vehicles traveling northwest and
southeast on Motel Drive.
In reviewing the Merced Avenue video, the police saw a white- or light-colored
two-door vehicle entering the neighborhood in the eastbound lane at approximately 11:22
p.m. A second white- or light-colored vehicle, which appeared to have four doors, passed
by the camera in the eastbound lane at approximately 11:26 p.m. Next, at approximately
11:29 p.m., a car resembling the previously seen two-door vehicle passed by the camera
in the westbound lane.1
Security cameras at nearby businesses captured video of a white two-door vehicle
traveling northwest on Motel Drive, toward State Highway 140 (also known as Yosemite
Parkway), at approximately 11:30 p.m. Earlier footage from those cameras showed a
white two-door vehicle traveling southeast on Motel Drive, toward Merced Avenue,
between approximately 11:21 and 11:22 p.m.
Collectively, the videos appeared to show that a white two-door vehicle entered
the victim’s neighborhood from Motel Drive at 11:22 p.m. and departed from the
neighborhood via Motel Drive between 11:29 and 11:30 p.m.
Neighbors’ Statements
Witness M.A. was contacted by the police at approximately 7:00 a.m. the day after
the shooting. M.A.’s bedroom faced the victim’s backyard, and she recalled waking up

1A 24-hour screen clock showed the cars passing by at 23:21:28, 23:25:38, and 23:28:42.
However, according to police testimony, the clock was approximately one minute slow. This
was a rough estimate, as the officer’s comparison of the video clock to his “department-issued
iPhone” was only in relation to the hour and minutes, not the hour, minutes, and seconds. For
the sake of readability, most subsequent time references concerning video evidence are stated in
a 12-hour format based on the approximations of the police witnesses. For example, video from
a security camera at 11 West 15th Street in Merced captured footage of a moving vehicle at the
purported date and time of “07/15/2019 13:59:22.” But according to the police testimony, the
video clock was about “14 hours and 38 minutes ahead of time.” We will simply describe what
the video showed on July 14, 2019, at approximately 11:21 p.m., without further noting or
explaining the discrepancy.

6.
sometime “after midnight” to the sound of voices from that area. The voices were
described “as being two males and one female.” One of the males spoke in English, but
the other two conversed in Spanish, and the female had seemed “kind of mad.” M.A. did
not report hearing any gunshots. When asked about vehicles, M.A. claimed to have
previously seen a white car parked outside of the victim’s home.
Another neighbor, D.M., remembered seeing the victim “drinking beers with a
light-skinned male and two female friends that were at his house” on the date of the
incident. D.M. also claimed to have heard the victim “breaking bottles in the front yard”
at approximately 10:00 p.m., i.e., 90 minutes prior to the shooting. A third neighbor,
A.V., reported seeing the victim sometime between 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. on the night
of the shooting. According to this witness, the victim had appeared drunk and angry,
“and was throwing cans of beer against the wall.”2
Search of the Victim’s Home
Outside the victim’s residence, along a walkway leading to the backyard, the
police found remnants of a food order from In-N-Out Burger. The items consisted of an
upside-down French fry tray or serving boat, scattered fries, and a ketchup packet.
Several aluminum cans were strewn about the same area.
Also found outside was a laminated key tag, such as might be used by a car
dealership or body shop to keep track of multiple sets of keys. The preprinted strip of
paper had blank spaces next to the words “Year,” “Make,” “Model,” “Body” and
“Color.” Someone had scrawled “CADDY” in handwritten letters across the entire tag.
Inside the victim’s home the police found photographs of a man named Stuart
Nagata, a piece of mail addressed to Nagata, and another document with his name on it.
There was a receipt from a Big 5 sporting goods store dated July 1, 2019, for the

2The information in this paragraph comes from police testimony at the preliminary
hearing. Witnesses D.M. and A.V. did not testify in court. According to the lead detective on
the case, A.V. further reported that “a white Dodge four-door vehicle came to the [victim’s]
house” on the day of the shooting.

7.
purchase of a flashlight, golf balls, two pairs of shoes, and a $19 charge listed as “STD
AMMO BCKGRND CK FEE.” A separate document indicated the same store had
initiated a background check for someone named Karla Perez within minutes of the
transaction shown on the receipt.
Other items found inside the residence included a packaged component of a
medical neck brace. According to preliminary hearing testimony, there was also an
eviction notice indicating the victim was being evicted.
July 16, 2019
By July 16, 2019, Nagata had become a suspect in the case. He was believed to
own a 1999 Cadillac Eldorado, and the police had determined the license plate number.
It was a two-door coupe with white paint. While conducting a “grid search” in the
nearby town of Planada, the police located the vehicle at the residence of a man named
Felix.
Undercover law enforcement agents surveilled Felix’s residence for the remainder
of the day. A dark-colored Buick eventually pulled up to the house. Defendant was seen
exiting the Buick and, a few minutes later, relocating to the driver’s seat of the Cadillac.
At approximately 8:45 p.m., defendant departed from Felix’s residence in the
Cadillac. The Buick, which was then occupied by two females, followed behind
defendant as he proceeded to State Highway 140. The undercover agents tailed both
vehicles for approximately 15 minutes before police officers in marked cars effectuated a
stop in the City of Merced.
Driving due west on State Highway 140 is the most direct path between where the
Cadillac and Buick started and ended their journey. However, the vehicles took what the
People describe as a “serpentine” route by detouring north on Plainsburg Road, west on
Bear Creek Drive, and south on Arboleda Road. The cars resumed westbound travel on
State Highway 140 at roughly the midway point between Planada and Merced.

8.
The driver of the Buick is not identified in the record. The passenger was
Annabelle Perez (Annabelle). Annabelle is the sister of Karla Perez (Karla), i.e., the
person whose name and address were listed on a document found inside the victim’s
home.
Further Investigation
In late July, detectives obtained store surveillance video of the transaction
documented on the Big 5 receipt found in the victim’s home. The video showed Nagata,
Karla, and a man named Fernando Luna shopping together on July 1, 2019 (two weeks
prior to the shooting). Portions of the video showed Nagata wearing a neck brace and
being physically affectionate toward Karla. It also appeared to show him paying for the
items listed on the receipt.
On July 29, 2019, Karla’s then 17-year-old daughter, D.P., was hospitalized for
alcohol intoxication and a stab wound sustained during an incident unrelated to this case.
As the police had not yet located Nagata or Karla, detectives went to the hospital to
question D.P. about the victim’s death. D.P. was still intoxicated at the time of the
interview, which lasted approximately three hours.
D.P. claimed to have killed the victim herself while under the influence of alcohol,
cocaine, and marijuana. She referred to the victim by his first name, describing him as “a
Mexican man that my mom was renting a room from.” D.P. then added, “Her and her
boyfriend were living there.” She also remarked that her mother’s boyfriend “wears a
neck brace.” Later in the interview, D.P. alleged that her mother (Karla), her aunt
(Annabelle), and someone named “Martin” had all witnessed the victim’s death. D.P.
spoke disparagingly of Martin, referencing his “big ears” and saying that she hated him.
Although D.P. claimed to have shot the victim, her story conflicted with some of
the physical evidence. The major discrepancy was in her account of the victim being shot
“in the face” while inside his home and then going “into the road asking for help.” But

9.
she did accurately describe the interior and exterior of the victim’s residence, and she
knew the shooting “happened, like, around 11:30 [p.m.] almost 11:31.”
On July 30, 2019, detectives obtained security camera footage from Casino
Merced, located at 1459 Martin Luther King Jr. Way in the City of Merced. One video
showed Nagata, Karla, Annabelle, and the victim in the casino on the night of the
shooting. Nagata was wearing a neck brace. Exterior camera footage showed the group
leaving together in Nagata’s Cadillac, with Karla behind the wheel, at approximately
11:10 p.m.
On July 31, 2019, detectives obtained surveillance video from a business located
on West 15th Street, a few blocks east of Casino Merced. It showed a car resembling
Nagata’s Cadillac approaching the intersection of 15th and G Streets at approximately
11:21 p.m. on the night of the shooting. After pausing for traffic, the car turned left and
proceeded northbound on G Street.
In early August, the police obtained surveillance video from an In-N-Out Burger
located across the street from Casino Merced. It showed Nagata’s Cadillac was in the
drive-thru lane on the night of the shooting from approximately 11:11 p.m. to 11:18 p.m.
The license plate was clearly visible in the footage.
The police eventually received information that Nagata was in Tulare County. On
August 10, 2019, Nagata and Karla were arrested together in the City of Lindsay.
Charges and Trial Proceedings
Nagata, Karla, Annabelle, and defendant were jointly charged by information for
their alleged involvement in the victim’s death. Nagata and Karla were accused of
premeditated murder (§§ 187, 189; count 1). Karla was also charged as an accessory
after the fact, as were defendant and Annabelle (§ 32; count 2). Nagata and Karla were
further charged with attempted unlawful possession of ammunition (§§ 664, 30305; count
3). All counts included gang enhancement allegations pleaded pursuant to a former
version of section 186.22, subdivision (b). Defendant was alleged to have suffered a

10.
prior strike conviction for purposes of the “Three Strikes” law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i),
1170.12.)
In January 2020, Nagata filed a motion pursuant to section 995 to set aside the
information. Defendant joined in the motion and filed separate points and authorities
regarding count 2. On February 18, 2020, the motion was granted as to the count 3 gang
enhancement against Nagata but denied in all other respects.
Nagata also filed motions to be tried separately from his codefendants and to
bifurcate the trial of the gang enhancements. Defendant joined in the motion to bifurcate.
The trial court ordered severance of the case against Karla, but the motions were
otherwise denied.
A jury trial commenced on February 25, 2020. On March 19, 2020, the trial court
declared a mistrial due to the COVID-19 pandemic. All proceedings relevant to the
mistrial are summarized in the Discussion, post.
Retrial began in September 2020 and continued into the following month.
Renewed motions to bifurcate the gang enhancement allegations and/or limit the
introduction of gang evidence at trial were denied. Nagata, Annabelle, and defendant
were jointly tried before a single jury.
Trial Evidence re: Counts 1 & 2
A neighbor testified to seeing the victim outside his residence at approximately
10:30 p.m. on the night of the shooting. The victim was “throwing beer bottles or cans
around” and yelling to someone inside the house “that he just wanted to go for a ride.”
He seemed “really upset.” The witness did not know to whom he was speaking, but on
prior occasions she had seen “two ladies and a gentleman that would usually let
themselves into the home.” The man wore a neck brace, and the trio had come and gone
in a white Cadillac that “looked like an Eldorado.”
Video evidence clearly showed Nagata, Karla, Annabelle, and the victim departing
from Casino Merced in Nagata’s Cadillac on the night of the shooting. The casino

11.
footage was edited to focus on the activity between 11:06 p.m. and 11:11 p.m. The
evidence did not reveal when the group arrived at the casino, but a detective testified to
Karla’s cell phone data showing her phone was “in the area of Casino Merced” from
11:00 p.m. to 11:19 p.m. The same witness testified that Annabelle’s cell phone data
showed her phone was “in the area of Casino Merced” from 9:53 p.m. to 11:30 p.m.
The In-N-Out Burger videos showed the Cadillac in the drive-thru lane from
approximately 11:11 p.m. to 11:18 p.m. According to the People’s theory, the Cadillac
then drove on West 15th Street, passing a security camera at 11:21 p.m. as it approached
the G Street intersection. It proceeded northbound on G, then east on 16th Street, and
eventually made its way to Motel Drive. Between 11:21 and 11:22 p.m., the Cadillac
traveled southeast on Motel Drive and entered the victim’s neighborhood in the
eastbound lane of Merced Avenue.
The People’s trial exhibit No. 114 was a video consisting of seven minutes and 40
seconds of footage captured by the security camera on the 1200 block of Merced Avenue.
It depicted the activity there from approximately 11:22 p.m. until just prior to 11:30 p.m.
(See fn. 1, ante.) The exhibit was a recording of the recording. The detective who
authenticated it explained there was a problem converting the video files from the
homeowner’s security system to a viewable format. He improvised a solution: “I …
used my department-issued iPod with the Axon Video Capture to actually record the
monitor while I played the video [on the homeowner’s equipment] so I could actually
capture what was on screen.” The detective stopped recording when the video clock hit
23:28:47, which he explained was approximately one minute behind the actual time.3

3The defense criticized the detective for failing to record the “three minutes” preceding
the first 911 call. The three-minute estimate assumed the video clock was not approximately one
minute slow. The detective conceded it was possible other cars had driven past the camera
during the relevant time period. He also testified to having attempted to review the original
video again in preparation for the preliminary hearing, whereupon he discovered that it had been
erased.

12.
Based on the Merced Avenue video and the In-N-Out Burger items found outside
the victim’s residence, the People argued Nagata, Karla, Annabelle, and the victim
arrived back at the victim’s home at approximately 11:22 p.m. The People theorized the
victim had said or done something at the casino that made Nagata feel disrespected,
which led to an argument at the house. Nagata was alleged to have shot the victim to
death, but no theory was offered as to why the shooting occurred roughly two blocks
away from the victim’s home.
Witness M.A. was called to testify about waking up to the sound of people arguing
on the night of the shooting. She was unsure of the time but again estimated it was “after
midnight.” She did not recall hearing any gunshots.
F.G. and A.D. both testified to having little memory of the incident. Their
recorded interviews were played for the jury, as was F.G.’s 911 call. A police officer
who had spoken to A.D. at the crime scene testified that he reported hearing someone
say, prior to the shooting, “‘Why are you mad?’” During the same conversation, A.D.
claimed to have seen a 2005 or 2006 Cadillac CTS turn right onto Rose Avenue.
The 911 caller who lived on Rose Avenue, D.W., testified he was on his front
porch when he heard the gunshots. He called 911 from inside his home approximately
one minute later. The location of his garage obstructed his view such that he would not
have seen a vehicle approaching from Merced Avenue before going into the house.
There was also a period of approximately 45 to 60 seconds during which he would not
have seen any vehicles that might have passed by his house. After calling 911 and
returning to his porch, D.W. saw a police officer driving south on Rose Avenue toward
Merced Avenue. He flagged down the officer and told him about the gunshots.
The People’s theory was that Karla served as the getaway driver. Karla, Nagata,
and Annabelle were alleged to have fled the scene in Nagata’s Cadillac, passing multiple
security cameras while heading northwest on Motel Drive at 11:30 p.m. However, the
People’s cell phone mapping expert testified the data for Karla’s and Annabelle’s phones

13.
showed both devices were one or two miles southwest of the crime scene at 11:30 p.m.,
“in the area of East Childs Avenue and Brantley Street.” Upon further questioning, the
witness explained the data was classified as having “a low confidence level,” meaning the
phones were more than 300 meters away from that location.
Karla’s daughter, D.P., testified pursuant to a grant of immunity after invoking her
constitutional right against self-incrimination. She denied ever meeting the victim or
discussing his murder with Karla or Nagata. D.P. also denied remembering what she had
said during her hospital interview. A recording of the interview was played for the jury.
Through cross-examination of the lead detective, defense counsel suggested D.P.
may have been the Hispanic female that F.G. and A.D. reported seeing prior to the
shooting. The detective admitted to having considered this possibility, saying it was why
he had asked D.P. what she wore that evening. During her interview, D.P. claimed to
have worn pants and a black sweater. F.G. had described a person wearing shorts and a
white tank top. The detective also testified that D.P.’s phone records “don’t put her in that
area” on July 14, 2019.
Felix testified about the Cadillac being found at his home in Planada on Tuesday,
July 16, 2019. Although he struggled with dates and times, the testimony indicated Karla
and Nagata had shown up at his house on the night of the shooting (Sunday) or in the
early hours of July 15, 2019 (Monday). In his words, “[T]hey just wanted a place to
rest—to rest their head. And I said that they could stay in my room, as I was in my
mom’s room … with another friend of mine. And I was—I was busy, that I didn’t have
time to talk to them, you know, but that they could spend the night. [¶] They stayed the
night. That was it.” Felix admitted he was using methamphetamine on the dates in
question.
Felix’s testimony seemed to indicate Karla and Nagata had arrived alone, i.e.,
without Annabelle. There was no mention of Annabelle being there until Monday
afternoon. Annabelle’s cell phone data reportedly showed her device was in Planada at

14.
5:19 a.m. Monday morning. Felix referred to a lunch conversation from that day during
which plans had been made for him, Nagata, Karla, and Annabelle to go to a casino. But
then defendant “happened to show up,” and Felix “didn’t want to go anymore because
[he] did not want to be, like, a fifth wheel.”4
For reasons not explained, Felix lent his car to Annabelle and defendant. The
Cadillac was left at his house. Felix admitted to placing some type of covering over the
Cadillac at Karla's request.
Karla and Nagata never returned to Felix’s home. Felix did not see Annabelle or
defendant again until Tuesday, when they finally brought his vehicle back and took
possession of the Cadillac. Annabelle’s cell phone data showed her device had traveled
south on Monday night, registering with cell towers in Madera at 10:44 p.m. and in
Tulare County at 11:59 p.m.
The People introduced an aerial map with a line depicting the route traveled by
defendant and Annabelle after they left Felix’s house on Tuesday, immediately prior to
their arrest. The prosecutor argued defendant had intended to “dump” the Cadillac at an
unknown location and would have done so but for the intervention of law enforcement.
The alleged role of the Buick, occupied by Annabelle and the unidentified driver, was to
provide transportation for defendant after he abandoned the Cadillac.
Trial Evidence re: Gang Allegations
Nagata was alleged to have killed the victim after being publicly disrespected by
him at Casino Merced. The preliminary facts of a public dispute and Nagata feeling
disrespected were alleged to be inferable from the Casino Merced videos. The victim had

4 Felix’s testimony about not wanting to be a “fifth wheel” was the only evidence
suggestive of a romantic relationship between defendant and Annabelle. The prosecutor’s
opening statement included an allegation that defendant was her “significant other,” and parts of
the record indicate this was in fact true, but the nature of their relationship was not otherwise
mentioned or proven at trial.

15.
no known involvement with gangs, but Nagata was shown to be “a high-ranking Nuestra
Familia criminal street gang member.”
According to expert testimony, Nuestra Familia or “NF” is a criminal street gang
with multiple levels of membership. Affiliates are commonly known as Northerners or
Norteños, but those terms technically refer to a certain status or membership level.
Nuestra Familia is both the name of the organization and the highest level of membership
therein. The next level down is variously known as the “Northern Structure,” “Nuestra
Raza,” and “Norteños Soldados” (abbreviated as “N-Sols”). Below that are the Norteños.
As explained at trial, “Norteños are people that still are part of the cause or part of the
Nuestra Familia, but they’re lower level and haven’t been selected or they haven’t
committed to being investigated [for advancement in the hierarchy].” Norteños may
subdivide into smaller groups (“subsets”) outside of the prison system, but “eventually it
all leads up to Nuestra Familia.”
Nuestra Familia’s primary activities reportedly include murder, carjacking,
witness intimidation, “major narcotic trafficking,” and “[a]nything to do with violence.”
Murder, if committed against a gang rival, benefits NF by helping it maintain a reputation
for violence and instilling fear and intimidation in others. The prosecution asked an
expert witness if murdering someone not affiliated with gangs is also beneficial to NF.
The expert replied, “Yes. If there was a reason for the homicide that they can articulate,
then yes, it would benefit the gang as well.” He then gave the example of an NF member
reporting to his superiors that a victim “‘totally disrespected me or disrespected the
gang,’” in which case “that murder would be authorized.” In other testimony, the expert
noted the importance of respect in NF gang culture.
Two gang experts opined Nagata had attained the status of “Carnal” (“Brother”)
and was thus a “full-fledged member of the Nuestra Familia.” According to one expert,
“the NF has three categories of Carnals …[:] Cat-1, Cat-2, Cat-3.” He opined Nagata
was at least a “Cat-2 NF member,” meaning he was involved in the overall management

16.
of the gang. The expert’s opinions regarding Nagata’s NF status were based on a
recorded telephone conversation and photographs of him in the company of “Cat-3 NF
members.” The phone conversation was played for the jurors and explained to them
through the testimony of a special agent with the FBI.
The phone call had been intercepted during a wiretapping operation conducted in
November 2017. It was a conversation between Nagata and a higher-ranking NF
member. They discussed large-scale trafficking of methamphetamine and heroin,
including a purchase that would require “about a 100 G’s.” The conversation shifted to
the topic of postponing or cancelling previously made plans to kill two women who had
stolen money from the organization. Also discussed was an NF investigation of a lower
level member for possible removal from the gang. It was decided they would “hit him” if
the findings were negative, which the expert testified meant some degree of physical
assault and “could mean death.”
As further evidence of his gang membership, the People introduced photographs
of Nagata’s tattoos. The only tattoo directly related to NF was of the number 14, inked in
large Roman numerals across his stomach and upper abdomen. According to expert
testimony, references to this number are “predominant throughout the entire
organization” because the 14th letter of the alphabet is N. The expert explained,
“Anything that you can kind of put the, you know, emphasis on the N or the F could be
used to represent the Nuestra Familia.”
A tattoo of the word “murder” across Nagata’s left forearm was deemed relevant
because murder is one of Nuestra Familia’s primary activities. This and several other
tattoos were held admissible for the dual purpose of proving the gang enhancement
allegations and showing “motive and identity of the shooter.” Nagata’s arguments for
exclusion pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 were rejected.
The prosecutor repeatedly displayed and referenced a tattoo on Nagata’s chest of
someone holding a gun to the back of a man’s head. When the gang expert was asked

17.
about it, he noted Nagata also had tattoos of dollar signs and the word “money,” opining
they were collectively “indicative of gang behavior” but did not specifically pertain to
Nuestra Familia. During closing argument, the prosecutor asked the jury to “remember
the tattoo on … Nagata’s chest that depicts someone being shot in the back of the head,
the exact same manner in which [the victim] was killed.”
The jury also saw a tattoo on Nagata’s right hand that said “get MAD,” and
another on his left hand that said “go BAD.” A handgun was tattooed above the words
on his left hand. One of the gang experts interpreted this as “indicating that when he gets
mad, it’ll go bad. So there’s a propensity for violence if things go wrong.” The trial
court sustained an objection to this testimony and ordered it stricken, but the prosecutor
was allowed to rephrase the question as follows: “So you’re saying someone with a
tattoo, based on your knowledge of criminal street gangs, like this would be signifying
that if they get mad, they go bad?” The witness answered, “Right. That—that’s what
that would indicate to me, that that person would.”
Photographs of Karla’s tattoos were admitted to show her allegiance to NF. The
relevant images were described as “one dot and then the four dots.” A gang expert
explained, “Typically they’re on separate hands, but those are separated enough that it’s
pretty clear it’s one dot/four dots for 14 to represent the Nuestra Familia.” There was no
gang evidence pertaining to Annabelle apart from her association with Karla, Nagata, and
defendant.
Defendant’s gang membership was proven by evidence of custodial statements
made in May 2019, two months prior to the victim’s death. A police officer testified he
“admitted to being an active Norteño gang member and also stated that he wanted to
house in … an active Norteño block at the Merced County Jail.” The jury saw a redacted
portion of defendant’s recorded custodial interrogation following his arrest in this case,
wherein he made implied admissions of active gang membership. The recording
included references to a prior arrest in connection with a shooting. Another officer

18.
testified to personal knowledge of defendant’s affiliation with a Norteño subset called the
Merced Ghetto Boys. The same witness testified defendant had previously been arrested
for possession of a firearm.
Photographs of defendant’s tattoos were admitted into evidence. One said
“Merced,” another was described as “the Aztec numeral 12,” and a third tattoo depicted
“someone pointing a gun.” A gang expert testified the Aztec numeral was symbolic of
the Merced Ghetto Boys, which has some type of connection to 12th Street in Merced.
To establish a “pattern of criminal gang activity” (§ 186.22, former subd. (e)), the
People relied on the prior convictions of two gang members, one of whom was Fernando
Luna. The jury learned this was the same person seen on the Big 5 video shopping with
Nagata and Karla on July 1, 2019. Luna was arrested on July 13, 2019, one day prior to
the victim’s murder, and he was eventually convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm.
It was further revealed that defendant was with Luna at the time of Luna’s arrest. The
second predicate offender was Sergio Uriostegui, who had also been convicted of
unlawful possession of a firearm.
Verdicts and Sentencing
The jury began deliberating on Thursday, October 8, 2020, at approximately 3:33
p.m. It recessed for the day at 4:44 p.m. Deliberations resumed on Friday, lasting from
10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. There was an afternoon request for a readback of Felix’s
testimony and that of the neighbor who testified to seeing the victim outside of his house
on the night of the shooting. At 3:48 p.m., the jury submitted the following question: “If
… Nagata is not found guilty can Anabelle … and [defendant] be found guilty of
accessory after the fact?”5

5The attorneys representing defendant and Annabelle had both stated, during closing
arguments, that a guilty verdict against Nagata on count 1 was a prerequisite to finding them
guilty as accessories after the fact. The trial court responded to the jury’s question by referring
to CALCRIM No. 440. The pattern instruction explained the elements of section 32 in terms of
providing aid to “the perpetrator,” which arguably implied defendant could still be liable as an
accessory even if someone other than Nagata (e.g., Karla) had killed the victim.

19.
The jury returned from a three-day weekend on Tuesday, October 13, 2020.
Deliberations lasted from approximately 10:24 a.m. to 4:07 p.m. Late that afternoon, a
request was submitted to review photographs of defendant’s tattoos. On Wednesday,
October 14, 2020, the jury deliberated for approximately 4.5 hours before returning its
verdicts.
Nagata was found guilty of first degree murder, but the gang allegations against
him were rejected as not true. Defendant and Annabelle were both found guilty of being
accessories after the fact. As to them, the gang enhancement allegations were found true.
In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted the truth of the prior strike allegation.
On December 22, 2020, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of
seven years. The sentence was calculated using the middle term of two years for count 2,
doubled because of the prior strike, plus three years for the gang enhancement.
Defendant had accrued 996 days of custody credit at the time of sentencing.
DISCUSSION
I. Double Jeopardy Claim
A. Background
On February 25, 2020, jury selection began in defendant’s first trial. Further
proceedings were held on February 26, March 5–6, and March 10-11, during which time
voir dire continued and motions in limine were heard. On March 12, amid further voir
dire, the prosecutor made a record of her concerns “regarding the Coronavirus” and “the
growing pandemic.” The trial court responded with these remarks:

“I share your concerns, and I know they’re canceling all the conferences
judges are going to even, like, retired judges conference because of
everyone’s concern about traveling and flying. [¶] I would note for the
record we were up in the jury room with 165 jurors in very cramped
quarters, certainly not a social distance apart, so I agree, but until the
presiding judge would tell me not to go forward, at this point I’d have to go
forward, but I’ll follow up with him again later this afternoon, and let him
know that the DA’s office had spoken to the Judicial Council.”

20.
Nagata stated for the record his general opposition to anything that would violate
his “constitutional rights to a speedy trial.”
On March 13, 2020, the trial court advised the parties “that the presiding judge did
say that no other courts are suspending any proceedings so far in California.” The court
also noted it had conducted research and found cases, e.g., People v. Tucker (2011) 196
Cal.App.4th 1313, holding that “public health concerns do trump the right to a speedy
trial.” Nevertheless, it did not perceive good cause to order a trial continuance. Later in
the day, a panel of 12 jurors and six alternates were sworn.
Trial resumed on March 17, 2020, with further hearings on motions in limine. The
trial court opened the proceedings with these remarks:

“I wanted to just let all parties know, um, I’ve been thinking more
and more about the current health situation, and I did want to disclose
yesterday I was on a conference call with [multiple people including the
presiding judge, the district attorney and the public defender]…. [¶] [And]
there was a conversation from [the district attorney] regarding not the
details of this case but just the DA’s office’s concern about the danger to
the jurors and so on in having this trial, so I just want to disclose that….

“But I have been thinking about it further just because of all of the
changes since Friday in the orders both nationally, state and locally, so I’ll
give you all a chance to respond, but I am thinking of declaring a mistrial
on the grounds there are extraordinary circumstances that are outside the
control of the Court that would be endangering the health of the public in
this case. [¶] I would note that six Bay Area counties have stay-at-home
orders at this time that people are to isolate themselves. There have been
several courts, including Los Angeles and Contra Costa County, that have
closed their courts and declared mistrials in even ongoing criminal cases.
[¶] As far as I know, there’s still no virus in Merced County, but only 18—
according to the paper, 18 people have been tested, and they don’t even
have the results back from all of those.

“There is a national emergency. There’s been a state emergency
declared. There’s been a county emergency declared. There’s been a city
emergency declared. This is a pandemic by the World Health

21.
Organization.[6] The Federal Government is recommending no groups over
ten—no public gatherings of over ten people, um, and I would note in this
case, um, we can’t practice social distancing for the jurors in this case.

“It was suggested, [‘]Oh, you can have jurors sit outside the jury box
and create the space,[’] but it’s a very small courtroom. Um, we have 14
regular jury seats. In this case I have six alternates. The well is taken up
with the table for counsel. There’s a small area in the well with the court
reporter. If I put jurors in the audience and spaced them out, that’s quite a
distance from the witness stand as far as judging the witnesses and the
credibility of the witnesses.

“I don’t think that would be a good idea, so just given all of these
circumstances, we do have two jurors that are over 65, and then I don’t
know if the other jurors, who they have at home. It’s just things have
changed so much since last week regarding the situation, so that’s why I’m
considering it, but I’ll give you some time until 1:30 if you want to address
it further at that time.”
The prosecutor responded with statements concerning the availability of two
witnesses needed to authenticate the In-N-Out Burger videos. Their employer had
reportedly sent a letter “saying they are not allowing their employees to travel.” The trial
court then made additional remarks:

“Okay. So I realize at this point jeopardy is attached, but under
People v. Curry in extreme circumstances outside of the Court’s control—
and that’s at 2 Cal.3d 707, a 1970 case—that does constitute legal
necessity. [¶] So I don’t know. I’m just strongly considering it at this
point. [¶] … [¶] … It’s Curry v. Superior Court, 1970 case at 2 Cal.3d
707. It doesn’t address this issue. It just talks about the fact that if it’s
extreme circumstances or physical things outside the Court’s control, that
could qualify as legal necessity; and, to me, the situation is something
outside my control, um, and you’re going to have 18 people coming risking
their health and maybe their lives.

“So that’s—I’m very, very concerned about that. I was concerned
last week but not as much since we’ve had all of these orders of people
having to stay in their homes and, you know, don’t go to restaurants or
bars, and, you know, no groups over certain numbers. They keep getting

6“On March 11, [2020,] the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a
pandemic.” (Bullock v. Superior Court (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 134, 141.)

22.
smaller. They start out not over 500, then not over 200, then not over 50,
and now it’s not over 10.”
Later in the day, the prosecutor reported that a witness whose foundational
testimony was needed in relation to the Merced Avenue video was “too high risk to come
to court.” When the afternoon session began, the trial court said, “[A]t this point I would
not be declaring a mistrial because I think it would be double jeopardy. So I’m still very,
very concerned, and I think it’s foolish, but we don’t have the orders, so …” (Original
ellipsis.) The prosecutor then requested a continuance to April 6, 2020, due to the
unavailability of witnesses. The trial court replied, “I know we can continue it for
witnesses to be present, but I don’t think we can go out a long time. That’s defeating the
whole purpose of a speedy trial. [¶] I mean, I would want some briefing on, you know,
what—if you’re expecting it would be reasonably available, then we would have to talk
to the jurors as well, who’s going to be available or not if we have to extend the ending
date of the trial.”
During a subsequent colloquy, Nagata said, “I would just object, too, to any form
of mistrial, Your Honor …. [¶] … [¶] The jury is sworn in. We’re ready to go. Both
[sides] agreed that they’re ready to go, and at this point, for the sake of a legal argument,
if the Court was to entertain the idea of a mistrial through my objections—which you
didn’t say you were, but for the sake of legal argument—I would move the Court to rule
for an acquittal barring the case from retrial under double jeopardy.” Defendant’s trial
counsel joined in Nagata’s arguments.
The jury was brought into the courtroom, and the judge asked if any of them were
“65 or older.” Two jurors who raised their hands were told they could be excused in light
of “the advisory that you should stay home.” Both declined the offer. Next, the trial
court said, “Okay. And does anyone have any issues at all regarding that? Okay. I don’t
see any hands. I just wanted to double-check because things are moving so fast with
different news coming out.” The proceedings were adjourned for the day to allow the

23.
prosecutor time to determine witnesses’ availability and potential grounds for a
continuance.
On March 18, 2020, the trial court denied the People’s request for a continuance
due to their inability to estimate when the status of certain unavailable witnesses might
change. The judge explained:

“[A]t this point I just don’t see—I think double jeopardy would
attach. I don’t see where I could just continue the case without a definite
date. It is an abuse of discretion, but all of the cases that I’ve looked at,
they have some certain date that they’re going to continue, not to just
indefinitely delay it. That’s clearly violating the defendants’ speedy trial
rights, and that’s where I have to balance, and all of the counties where I
looked up the delay that has been granted by the Chief Justice, those delays
were all trials that hadn’t started yet.

“As far as I know, every trial that’s in progress is going forward. I
know in Fresno that’s the case. I had heard these rumors of some mistrials
were declared, but we had people do research, and we could find no basis
or that there’s any truth, unless the People have something.”
The trial moved forward with opening statements and testimony from nine
prosecution witnesses.
On March 19, 2020, four additional witnesses testified during the morning session.
At the beginning of the afternoon session, the following exchange took place between the
trial court and the prosecutor:

“[THE COURT:] [Y]ou have some information regarding COVID-
19?

“[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, Your Honor. Over the lunch break I
contacted Officer Opinski to confirm his attendance in this trial tomorrow
because he is a witness. At that time he informed me that he has been sick
with a fever and is on his way to the ER to get tested for COVID-19
because another officer, Officer Jose Barajas, that he was in contact with,
has tested positive for COVID-19.

“Officer Opinski was in the Detectives Division on Monday and was
with Detective Adrian and Detective Haygood. Detective Haygood has
been in this courtroom throughout the proceedings. Detective Adrian

24.
testified today. I do not know to the extent that Officer Prevostini was
exposed to anything.

“The Detectives Division was sent home. I told Detective Haygood
and Detective Adrian not to return to the courtroom based on this—

“THE COURT: Okay.

“[PROSECUTOR]: —and so I do not think it’s safe. I think that the
jurors need to be informed that they’ve been possibly exposed to this, um—

“THE COURT: No, I agree. I think at this point I would need to
declare a mistrial because we’ve all been exposed. I’ve been exposed. I’m
going to have to contact my healthcare provider to see if I should go into
some type of self-isolation; and, as I mentioned earlier, I do have a husband
who I just had lunch with who’s 70 with underlying conditions, so it causes
me great concern.

“This was—I was fearful of this all along, but it’s just so uncertain
what my obligation was under the law.

“[PROSECUTOR]: And I was fearful, too. I brought it up every day.
I brought it to the Court’s attention, and the presiding judge did not take
this seriously, and this is the situation we’re in now where people’s health
is endangered because of his decision.

“THE COURT: So—well, I don’t want to point fingers, but I can
understand your frustration. [¶] No, and I agree we’ll have to let the jurors
know. I don’t want to panic them, but I don’t want them coming into the
courtroom—”
Nagata responded as follows:

“I mean, just there’s no medical records. The way this case has been
going, I mean, it’s—to me, it’s obviously in favor of us right now. I just
find it strange that all of a sudden that COVID-19 pops up. There’s no
medical records that have been presented. We’re just going off of [the
prosecutor’s] word, so I object to any kind of mistrial.

“We have a jury sworn. I want my trial heard before this jury that I
already started with, and I move the Court that if you are going to rule a
mistrial, that since I am objecting, that you rule this an acquittal and bar it
from retrial because it would be double jeopardy and I submit on that.”
Counsel for defendant and Annabelle joined in Nagata’s arguments. The trial
court then made its ruling:

25.
“Well, at this time, given the circumstances, I am going to declare a
mistrial. I believe that this is a case of extreme emergency. The Court is
no longer available to hear this case at this point, um, and I don’t want to
expose anyone else to anything further.

“I thought of just continuing it, but even for a couple of weeks, who
knows, and that’s not fair for the jurors, I mean, so at this point, um, I’m
going to declare it a mistrial. [¶] I’m not declaring it an acquittal….”
In April 2020, Nagata moved to dismiss the action based on double jeopardy
principles. The motion was heard on May 14, 2020, at which time counsel for defendant
and Annabelle orally joined in the motion on behalf of their clients. During the hearing,
the prosecutor represented that Officer Opinski, i.e., the witness who was reportedly “sick
with a fever and … on his way to the ER to get tested for COVID-19” when the mistrial
was declared “was, in fact, tested” and the results came back negative.
The motion to dismiss was denied. In a lengthy oral ruling, the trial court noted
the mistrial was declared two weeks after the Governor “had declared a state of
emergency in California” and six days after “[President] Trump had also declared a
national state of emergency.” The judge emphasized “the basis for the Court declaring
the mistrial was the state of emergency. It had nothing to do with whether witnesses
were available or not, whether the DA would have been available or not.” The trial court
also cited its prior statements regarding the layout of the courtroom and inability to
comply with social distancing guidelines.
The judge continued:

“So I just want to make it clear the basis for me at that point
declaring the mistrial is concern for the health and safety of everyone. It
was not based upon whether or not Officer Opinski did or did not have
COVID-19. I did accept [the prosecutor’s] representation that Officer
Barajas had tested positive. He was a member of Merced Police
Department, who was the investigating agency on this case and who had
numerous witness officers that were going to testify. [¶] The Merced
Police Department is housed in a small building next to courthouse, so I
was concerned with contact between the officers.

26.
“We did have investigating Officer Haygood present throughout jury
selection and in the courtroom. During jury selection we were basically
packed like sardines in the jury assembly room and unable to avoid any
contamination, but we kept going. We kept trying to keep going.

“Then on March 19th is when we received the information that there
actually had been a positive test of someone here in Merced County—not
only someone here in Merced County, but someone who directly works
with witnesses in this trial. [¶] So it’s on that basis that I felt it was a legal
necessity that it was physical causes outside of the Court’s control to go
forward at this time.

“It could be the jurors would have been willing to go forward, but at
that point I was not willing to have them come in the courtroom. That
would not have made a difference to me. [¶] I was—I mean, you can just
consider you have 17 jurors from all over the parts of the county. Each day
one of those jurors are going back to their loved ones. The risk of exposure
and causing the case to take off in this county with our limited medical
resources was a real concern for the Court.

“I know [Nagata] said not one person in court had concerns, but the
Court—I certainly had expressed concerns several times mainly because I
do have relatives who are older, my husband and my mother, that I was
concerned about exposing to the virus, and I was concerned for the staff of
the court, as I said, and all of the parties. I was concerned about the
defendants being exposed to the virus and taking it back to the jail. I mean,
you can imagine in that environment the horrible situation that was
possible.

“So that was the basis for me declaring the mistrial, and I don’t think
it was an abuse of my discretion. I think these are very unusual emergency
situations. Um, it was with the duty of the Court to protect the health and
safety of the public, and that was the basis of my declaring the mistrial.

“I did consider continuing the trial, but at that point it was so
uncertain what was going to take place, and I was concerned if it would be
continued with the jurors even remembering the testimony. I didn’t see the
practicality of continuing it. [¶] I didn’t think further investigation was
necessary because, again, it wasn’t based upon Officer Opinski; it was
based on the total situation that was occurring from day to day. So that was
my reason for declaring the mistrial.”

27.
B. Appealability
“[S]ections 1016 and 1017 include, among those defenses that should be
specifically pleaded, a claim of ‘once in jeopardy.’” (People v. Batts (2003) 30 Cal.4th
660, 676.) “Courts long have observed, however, that ‘a claim of double jeopardy is
most appropriately raised by way of a pretrial motion to dismiss the accusatory pleading
or portion thereof allegedly barred by double jeopardy.’ [¶] … [A]lthough an affirmative
plea of ‘once in jeopardy’ apparently was not entered, defendants’ motions to dismiss,
which were made on double jeopardy grounds and fully litigated by the parties in the trial
court, nevertheless ‘adequately covered this procedural requirement’ and preserved the
issue for review.” (Ibid.)
C. Law and Analysis
“Article I, section 13, of the California Constitution declares that ‘No person shall
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense….’ Implementing this constitutional
command, the decisions of [the California Supreme Court] have settled the now familiar
rules that (1) jeopardy attaches when a defendant is placed on trial in a court of
competent jurisdiction, on a valid accusatory pleading, before a jury duly impaneled and
sworn, and (2) a discharge of that jury without a verdict is equivalent in law to an
acquittal and bars a retrial, unless the defendant consented thereto or legal necessity
required it.” (Curry v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 707, 712.)
The right not to be placed twice in jeopardy “is as sacred as the right to trial by
jury.” (Larios v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 324, 329.) “California provides its
citizens a greater degree of protection against double jeopardy than that provided by
federal law by placing limitations on what constitutes ‘legal necessity.’” (Carrillo v.
Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1525.) In general, so long as the jury is
“not actually precluded from rendering a verdict,” the defendant must consent to a
declared mistrial in order to be retried on the same charges. (Larios, at p. 330, citing
Curry v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 717; see People v. Brandon (1995) 40

28.
Cal.App.4th 1172, 1175 [citing Curry for proposition that legal necessity exists “where
physical causes beyond the control of the court … make it impossible to continue”].)
Legal necessity typically arises “(1) from an inability of the jury to agree or (2)
from physical causes beyond the control of the court, such as death, illness, or absence of
a judge or juror.” (Larios v. Superior Court, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 330, citing Curry v.
Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 713–714.) The examples in the latter category are
not exhaustive. (See Carrillo v. Superior Court, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1526–
1527 [additional examples]; In re Carlos V. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 522, 527 [“given the
factual context of Curry, we do not read the court’s list of types of ‘legal necessity’ to be
exclusive”]; see also People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 593 [“The standards for
determining when a double jeopardy violation has occurred are not to be applied
mechanically”].)
Trial courts are “vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial
motions.” (People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 854; accord, People v. Schultz
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 623, 673.) As noted in the People’s briefing, at least one appellate
court has suggested the de novo standard may apply to review of a sua sponte declaration
of a mistrial based on legal necessity. (See Carrillo v. Superior Court, supra, 145
Cal.App.4th at p. 1523 [“Although orders denying mistrials are reviewed for abuse of
discretion, it does not appear our Supreme Court has applied this standard to orders
granting mistrials”].) We believe the ruling at issue is entitled to deference under the
abuse of discretion standard. There may be instances where a finding of legal necessity is
erroneous as a matter of law, but legal error can occur in all types of discretionary
decisions.7 (See People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 746

7By way of example, the judge below declared herself “no longer available to hear this
case” at the time of the mistrial. Had this been the only reason for declaring a mistrial, and the
evidence confirmed other judges were available to conduct the trial, the finding of necessity
would have been erroneous as a matter of law given the fact section 1053 “permits the midtrial
substitution of judges in criminal cases.” (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 427; cf.
T.P.B. v. Superior Court (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 881, 883, 886 [mistrial legally necessary where

29.
[“[W]hen a trial court’s decision rests on an error of law, that decision is an abuse of
discretion”]; People v. Cooper (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 731, 742 [“A ruling resting on a
demonstrable error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion”].)
The statement in Carrillo that “it does not appear our Supreme Court has applied
[the abuse of discretion] standard to orders granting mistrials” overlooks the common
scenario of juror deadlock. (Carrillo v. Superior Court, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p.
1523.) “Jury deadlock constitutes necessity for declaration of a mistrial and permits
retrial of the defendant.” (People v. Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 425.) “The
determination whether there is a reasonable probability of agreement rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court, based on consideration of all the factors before it.” (Id. at p.
426, citing People v. Rojas (1975) 15 Cal.3d 540, 546.)
In our view, the question of whether a public health emergency necessitates a
mistrial requires, as in other mistrial contexts, “‘a nuanced, fact-based analysis,’ which is
best performed by the trial court.” (People v. Dunn (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1086, 1094,
quoting People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 370.) Based on their arguments, the
parties appear to agree. Defendant submits that the trial court’s ruling, “while well
intended, was impulsive and an abuse of its discretion.”
Turning to the merits of the claim, we observe the trial court’s finding of an
emergency situation is uncontroverted. “On March 4, 2020, Governor Gavin Newsom
declared a state of emergency as a result of the threat of COVID-19, and on March 19,
2020 [the day the trial court declared the mistrial], [he] issued an executive order
directing all Californians not providing essential services to stay home. [Citation.] The
order did not close the courts, which provide an essential service.” (E.P. v. Superior
Court (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 52, 54–55, fn. omitted.)

juvenile court judge sitting as trier of fact “disqualified himself on the ground that he could not
fairly and impartially consider the evidence”].)

30.
“On March 23, 2020, Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye, in her capacity as
Chairperson of the Judicial Council, issued an emergency statewide order suspending all
jury trials and continuing them for a period of 60 days.” (Hernandez-Valenzuela v.
Superior Court (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1108, 1114.) “In so ordering, the Chief Justice
explained: ‘The [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention], the California Department
of Public Health, and local county health departments have recommended increasingly
stringent social distancing measures of at least six feet between people, and encouraged
vulnerable individuals to avoid public spaces. [¶] Courts cannot comply with these
health restrictions and continue to operate as they have in the past. Court proceedings
require gatherings of court staff, litigants, attorneys, witnesses, and juries, well in excess
of the numbers allowed for gathering under current executive and health orders. Many
court facilities in California are ill-equipped to effectively allow the social distancing and
other public health requirements required to protect people involved in court proceedings
and prevent the further spread of COVID-19.’” (Ibid.)
With the benefit of hindsight, defendant argues the trial court should have ordered
a continuance instead of a mistrial. The mistrial was declared on a Thursday; if only the
judge had adjourned the proceedings until the following Monday, the Chief Justice’s 60-
day order might have resolved the issues that led the trial court to rule as it did. The trial
would have been paused for three months by virtue of “a third statewide emergency
order” issued April 29, 2020, which extended the 60-day suspension/continuance by an
additional 30 days. (Hernandez-Valenzuela v. Superior Court, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1115.) However, appellate courts determine the correctness of a ruling “‘as of the time
of its rendition, upon a record of matters which were before the trial court for its
consideration.’” (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405; accord, People v. Welch
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 739.) The trial court had no way of knowing if or when the Chief
Justice would take such unprecedented measures.

31.
Defendant cites Stanley v. Superior Court (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 164 for the
proposition that “[h]ealth quarantines to prevent the spread of infectious diseases have
long been recognized as good cause for continuing a trial date.” (Id. at p. 169.) The key
phrase is “continuing a trial date.” The Stanley case and others cited in defendant’s
briefing, e.g., People v. Tucker, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th 1313 and In re Venable (1927)
86 Cal.App. 585, all involved pretrial continuances. Ordering a midtrial continuance in a
jury trial is a materially distinct scenario, especially when the continuance will
necessarily be one of indefinite duration. (Cf. People v. Santamaria (1991) 229
Cal.App.3d 269, 272 [“trial court committed reversible error when it adjourned jury
deliberations for 11 days without good cause, despite both the availability of an
alternative to interrupting the deliberations and the prejudice to appellant inherent in the
timing and duration of the adjournment”]; U.S. v. Hay (9th Cir. 1997) 122 F.3d 1233,
1235–1236 [“we have never approved a jury separation even close to forty-eight days in a
criminal case”].)
In recent cases, convicted appellants have argued that trial courts erred by refusing
to declare mistrials following lengthy midtrial continuances attributable to the COVID-19
pandemic. Despite the possibility of jurors forgetting testimony and arguments—one of
the risks cited by the trial court in this case—those claims have been resolved against the
appealing parties. (E.g., People v. Garcia (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 240, 243, 252 [103-day
delay occurring after both parties had rested but prior to closing arguments held not to
have violated appellant’s constitutional rights]; People v. Breceda (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
71, 95, 100 [same; 73-day delay occurring near the end of prosecution’s case-in chief].)
But again, the judge below had no way of knowing how future case law would turn out,
and we must evaluate her decision based on the information available in March 2020.
Defendant contends “it does not appear that the court gave any measurable
consideration to [his] right not to be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense.” He
then qualifies the statement by focusing on the trial court’s remarks immediately prior to

32.
declaring the mistrial, but either way the argument is unfounded. While the trial court
may have experienced panic in the moments preceding its decision, the record shows it
carefully considered the surrounding circumstances and competing factors over a period
of several days. The decision was obviously not arrived at lightly, and it was rendered
only after defendant’s trial counsel had joined in Nagata’s double jeopardy arguments.
Defendant also relies on Bullock v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th 134,
where the issue was whether the COVID-19 pandemic provided good cause to set a
preliminary hearing beyond the 10-court-day deadline established by section 859b.
There, the appealed decision was rendered without a reasoned explanation. (Bullock, at
p. 154.) There was no “particularized showing of a nexus between the pandemic and the
Superior Court’s purported inability to conduct Petitioner’s preliminary hearing in a
timely fashion.” (Id. at p. 140.)
In this case, the trial court made a record of its inability to comply with social
distancing guidelines and mandates. Those statements were made on March 17, 2020,
only six days prior to the Chief Justice ordering a 60-day suspension of all trial
proceedings for essentially the same reasons. Based on the facts and circumstances
known to the trial court at the time, we conclude it was not an abuse of discretion to
declare a mistrial legally necessary on March 19, 2020, due to physical reasons beyond
the court’s control.
In his briefing, defendant alleges a mere “pause in the proceedings could have
permitted the court staff to make the adjustments to continue the trial consistent with the
Chief Justice’s directive encouraging accommodations to protect the health of courthouse
users along with the due process rights of litigants.” He further contends “this is exactly
what happened, as the trial was ultimately held six months later in the same courthouse
with appropriate accommodations for staff and jurors.” The argument is based on an
advisory issued by the Chief Justice on March 20, 2020, not the 60-day order issued
March 23, 2020. Defendant fails to mention that his first and second trials were

33.
conducted in different courtrooms. There is no evidence the dimensions and layout of
those courtrooms were the same, nor evidence it was even possible to make the necessary
“adjustments” to the first courtroom. Defendant has not affirmatively demonstrated
reversible error.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant claims the evidence did not show him to be an accessory within the
meaning of section 32. He focuses on the prosecution’s alleged failure to show his
knowledge of the murder, and on the theory he and Annabelle intended to “dump” the
Cadillac on the night of their arrest.
“‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not determine
the facts ourselves. Rather, we “examine the whole record in the light most favorable to
the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is
reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citations.] We presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.
[Citation.] [¶] The same standard of review applies to cases in which the prosecution
relies primarily on circumstantial evidence …. “[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify
the jury’s findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” [Citation.] We do not
reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s credibility.’” (People v. Houston (2012) 54
Cal.4th 1186, 1215.)
“The crime of accessory consists of the following elements: (1) someone other
than the accused, that is, a principal, must have committed a specific, completed felony;
(2) the accused must have harbored, concealed, or aided the principal; (3) with
knowledge that the principal committed the felony or has been charged or convicted of
the felony; and (4) with the intent that the principal avoid or escape from arrest, trial,
conviction, or punishment.” (People v. Plengsangtip (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 825, 836;

34.
accord, People v. Nuckles (2013) 56 Cal.4th 601, 607.) “Although many ‘“‘kind[s] of
help’”’ may qualify as harboring, concealing, or aiding a principal under the statute, …
the help provided must be in the nature of ““‘overt or affirmative assistance.’”’” (People
v. Partee (2020) 8 Cal.5th 860, 868, quoting Nuckles, at p. 610.) In other words, conduct
intended or designed “to lessen the chance that the perpetrators will be captured and held
accountable for their crimes.” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1168.)
Regarding the elements of knowledge and intent, “the jury may consider ‘such factors as
[the defendant’s] possible presence at the crime or other means of knowledge of its
commission, as well as his companionship and relationship with the principal before and
after the offense.’” (Plengsangtip, supra, at p. 837.)
Arguing he “had no connection whatsoever to the events on Merced Avenue,”
defendant claims there is insufficient evidence of his knowledge “that the Cadillac was
used in a homicide.” He overlooks the recorded statements of Karla’s daughter, D.P. In
addition to claiming responsibility for the shooting, D.P. identified four eyewitnesses:
Nagata, Karla, Annabelle, and “Martin.” Defendant’s own trial counsel reasonably
inferred that he was the “Martin” to whom D.P. was referring. Counsel remarked during
closing argument, “She knows Martin as the ugly guy with big ears. Doesn’t seem like
she’s too fond of him.”
The fact D.P.’s confession to being the killer conflicted with the physical evidence
did not necessarily mean she was lying about being present at the time of the shooting.
“Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the
reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to
determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a
determination depends.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.) “A reversal for
insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever
is there sufficient substantial evidence to support”’ the jury’s verdict.” (People v.
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)

35.
As for the rendition of aid, defendant and the People are overly focused on the
prosecutor’s theory of a plan to “dump” the Cadillac. The prosecutor’s more
fundamental argument was, “The act that they did was driving away with the car.” The
fact defendant removed the Cadillac from Felix’s property was significant in and of itself
given Felix’s potential value to law enforcement as a witness and the risk he posed to
Nagata for that very reason. The jury could have reasonably concluded that moving the
Cadillac to any location other than Felix’s home was a form of aid because it would have
decreased the chances of police ever questioning Felix and learning what he knew about
Nagata’s activities on the night of the shooting. (See People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th
856, 947 [“theories suggested by the prosecutor are not the sole theories the jury may
consider in making its determination of guilt”]; People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117,
1126 [same].)
Defendant’s motive and intent to help Nagata avoid arrest and prosecution was
inferable from their shared gang membership and Nagata’s higher ranking status in NF.
In addition to a common connection with Karla and Annabelle, they were also shown to
be mutually acquainted with gang member Fernando Luna. The case against defendant
was not strong, but the evidence is minimally sufficient to support his conviction.
III. Retroactive Amendments to Section 186.22
Section 186.22 provides for enhanced punishment of gang-related crimes. A
gang-related felony is one “committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with a criminal street gang.” (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1); see People v. Albillar
(2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60.) The statute also requires “the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members.” (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)
A gang enhancement cannot be proven without showing the existence of the
relevant criminal street gang. (People v. Vasquez (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 909, 922.) At
the time of defendant’s prosecution, a “criminal street gang” was defined as “any ongoing
organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal,

36.
having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more [enumerated
criminal acts], having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose
members individually or collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal
gang activity.” (Former § 186.22, subd. (f), as amended by Stats. 2016, ch. 887, § 1; see
Stats. 2013, ch. 508, § 1.)
In 2021, while this appeal was pending, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill 333,
which took effect on January 1, 2022. (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206.) A
“criminal street gang” was redefined as “an ongoing, organized association or group of
three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities
the commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in subdivision (e), having
a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members collectively
engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity.” (§ 186.22, subd. (f),
as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 4.)
As used in the definition of a criminal street gang, a “‘pattern of criminal gang
activity’ means the commission of, attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit, or
solicitation of, sustained juvenile petition for, or conviction of” two or more offenses
listed in section 186.22, subdivision (e), if such conduct occurred within certain time
frames and under particular circumstances specified therein.8 (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).)
This is informally known as the “predicate offenses” requirement. (See People v. Cooper
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 738, fn. 2; People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 311.)
By enactment of Assembly Bill 333, predicate offenses must now be shown to
have “commonly benefited” the alleged gang, and the common benefit must have been

8A “pattern of criminal gang activity” was previously defined as “the commission of,
attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of, sustained juvenile petition
for, or conviction of two or more of the [offenses listed in paragraphs (1) to (33)], provided at
least one of these offenses occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of those
offenses occurred within three years after a prior offense, and the offenses were committed on
separate occasions, or by two or more persons ….” (Former § 186.22, subd. (e), 1st ¶, as
amended by Stats. 2016, ch. 887, § 1; see Stats. 2013, ch. 508, § 1.)

37.
“more than reputational.” (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 699,
§ 4.) “Examples of a common benefit that are more than reputational may include, but
are not limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual
gang rival, or intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous witness or
informant.” (§ 186.22, subd. (g), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 4.)
Assembly Bill 333’s amendments to section 186.22 apply retroactively to cases
not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date. (People v. Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
pp. 1206–1207.) The People thus concede defendant’s gang enhancement must be
reversed for insufficient proof of a pattern of criminal gang activity by Nuestra Familia.
We accept the concession, as the crimes committed by the alleged predicate offenders
(Fernando Luna and Sergio Uriostegui) were not shown to have “commonly benefited a
criminal street gang.” (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) “The proper remedy for this type of
failure of proof—where newly required elements were ‘never tried’ to the jury—is to
remand and give the People an opportunity to retry the affected charges.” (People v. E.H.
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 480; see People v. Cooper, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 746–
747.)
IV. Denial of Bifurcation and Failure to Limit Gang Evidence
Defendant requested bifurcation of the gang allegations in count 2 and joined in
codefendant Nagata’s motion to bifurcate the gang allegations relating to count 1, i.e., the
murder charge. Alternatively, defendant made oral motions to limit the admission of
evidence concerning his own gang membership.
Defendant also joined in codefendant Nagata’s motions in limine. Those motions
included a request to exclude all evidence of Nagata’s gang membership, which was
treated in substance as a renewed motion for bifurcation. Nagata alternatively moved to
limit, pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, the introduction of certain gang evidence
during trial of the charged crimes. Defendant’s joinder in these motions included

38.
arguments generally addressing the prejudicial nature of the gang evidence and
specifically concerning the wiretap call. Defendant’s trial counsel argued:

“I believe this evidence is actually being introduced to show that
[codefendant] Nagata is just a bad dude, and the rest of the people that are
around him are bad people because of it. And this is no longer a case about
[the victim’s] death. It’s about [codefendant] Nagata and his past. [¶] So I
would object completely under [Evidence Code section] 352 and say …
this information is completely prejudicial and substantially outweighs its
probative value.”
At the time of trial, a request to bifurcate gang enhancement allegations could be
granted or denied at the discretion of the trial court. (See People v. Hernandez (2004) 33
Cal.4th 1040, 1049–1050.) The bifurcation rulings are therefore reviewed for abuse of
discretion, “based on the record as it stood at the time of the ruling.” (People v. Franklin
(2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 938, 952.) The People correctly argue it was defendant’s burden,
as the moving party, “‘to clearly establish that there [was] a substantial danger of
prejudice requiring that the [gang] charges be separately tried.’” (Hernandez, at p. 1051.)
The abuse of discretion standard also applies to rulings made pursuant to Evidence
Code section 352. (People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th 622, 667.) “Evidence Code
section 352 provides for the exclusion of evidence ‘if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption
of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury.’” (Ibid.)
“Our review is guided by the familiar principle that ‘[a] court abuses its discretion
when its rulings fall “outside the bounds of reason.”’” (People v. Franklin, supra, 248
Cal.App.4th at p. 952.) However, “[a] court can abuse its discretion by applying an
erroneous legal standard or by making a ruling unsupported by substantial evidence.”
(People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735, 756.) “‘If the court’s decision is influenced
by an erroneous understanding of applicable law …, the court has not properly exercised
its discretion under the law. [Citation.] Therefore, a discretionary order based on an

39.
application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of
informed discretion and is subject to reversal.’” (Eneaji v. Ubboe (2014) 229
Cal.App.4th 1457, 1463; see People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 712, fn. 4; People v.
Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156.)
In People v. Nagata (Oct. 29, 2024, F082198) (nonpub. opn.) (Nagata), this court
found an abuse of discretion in the denial of codefendant Nagata’s bifurcation motion and
his separate requests to exclude or limit the gang evidence under Evidence Code section
352. We hereby incorporate the Nagata opinion by reference and take judicial notice of
the record in that appeal. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a); see, e.g., People
v. Bilbrey (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 764, 769, fn. 7 [taking judicial notice of the record in a
related appeal on the court’s own motion].) As explained in Nagata, the trial court
mistakenly concluded the gang evidence was cross-admissible to prove a gang motive for
the murder and the killer’s identity. Although gang evidence is generally admissible to
prove motive and identity (People v. Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009, 1022), there was
simply no evidence of a gang motive for the murder in this case. Any inferences
concerning motive and identity would have necessarily been based on Nagata’s bad
character and/or criminal propensity, which is not a permissible use of the evidence. (See
People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 193 [“evidence of a defendant’s criminal
disposition is inadmissible to prove he committed a specific criminal act”].)
Defendant’s joinder in Nagata’s motions allows him to seek reversal based on any
prejudice he suffered from erroneous rulings on those motions. (Cf. People v. Mitcham
(1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1048; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 78.) In addition,
the trial court’s mistake regarding the use of certain gang evidence to prove Nagata’s
identity and motive to kill tainted its analysis of defendant’s motions to bifurcate and/or
limit the evidence of his own gang membership. It is true, as the People argue, that “at
least some of the gang evidence” would have likely been admitted regardless of
bifurcation. However, as explained in the Nagata opinion, the gang evidence most

40.
heavily relied upon by the prosecutor (which was also the most inflammatory) would not
have withstood scrutiny under Evidence Code section 352.
“Erroneous admission of gang-related evidence, particularly regarding criminal
activities, has frequently been found to be reversible error, because of its inflammatory
nature and tendency to imply criminal disposition, or actual culpability.” (People v.
Bojorquez (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 335, 345; see People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at
p. 193.) We apply the Watson test to determine whether the admission of such evidence
was prejudicial. (See People v. Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1208–1209; People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.) The analysis “‘focuses not on what a reasonable jury
could do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under
consideration. In making that evaluation, an appellate court may consider, among other
things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and
the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no
reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result.’”
(People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 956.)
Defendant’s liability as an accessory was closely tied to the question of Nagata’s
guilt on the charge of murder. Nagata’s conviction on the murder count was not an
absolute prerequisite to finding defendant guilty as an accessory after the fact (§ 972), but
the prosecution’s theory was that Nagata killed the victim. Considering the relative
weakness of the case against defendant, the likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
Nagata makes it reasonably probable, i.e., there is “‘more than an abstract possibility’”
(People v. Soojian (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 491, 519) that defendant would have achieved
a better result on count 2 in a bifurcated trial or one in which the improper gang evidence
was excluded. (See Zafiro v. United States (1993) 506 U.S. 534, 539 [acknowledging
“evidence of a codefendant’s wrongdoing in some circumstances erroneously could lead
a jury to conclude that a defendant was guilty. When many defendants are tried together
in a complex case and they have markedly different degrees of culpability, this risk of

41.
prejudice is heightened”]; People v. Kelly (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1235, 1240 [“in a joint
trial of a multiple number of defendants a codefendant may suffer ‘associational
prejudice’”].)
As explained in our Nagata opinion, the gang evidence most likely to have been
excluded tended to show Nagata’s and defendant’s propensity for gun violence. This
would include the evidence of defendant’s prior arrests in connection with a shooting and
the seizure of firearms, as well as his tattoo of “someone pointing a gun.” The length of
the jury’s deliberations, as well as its questions and requests to review evidence
(including photographs of defendant’s tattoos), further demonstrates the closeness of this
case. (See People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 907; People v. Pearch (1991) 229
Cal.App.3d 1282, 1295.) It is reasonably probable defendant would have achieved a
more favorable outcome but for the errors he has identified. Defendant is therefore
entitled to a new trial on both the accessory charge and the related gang enhancement.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.

PEÑA, J.
WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, Acting P. J.

SMITH, J.

42.

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