R.G. v. A.M. CA4/2

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Filed 10/23/24 R.G. v. A.M. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

R.G.,

Plaintiff and Appellant, E082117

v. (Super.Ct.No. DVIN2200827)

A.M., PUBLIC—REDACTED
VERSION OF OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Redacts material from conditionally
sealed record.1 (Cal. Rules of Court,
rules 8.45, 8.46(f)(1)(2), and (g).)

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Russell L. Moore, Judge.

Affirmed.

1 On April 29, 2024, we granted appellant’s March 12, 2024, motion to place the
unredacted reporter’s transcript under seal and to seal portions of appellant’s appendix,
opening brief, and reporter’s transcript to protect the privacy of the parties’ minor child.
In accordance with California Rules of Court, rule 8.46(f)(1) and (f)(2), we have prepared
both public (redacted) and sealed (unredacted) versions of this opinion. We hereby order
the unredacted version of this opinion sealed.

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Family Violence Appellate Project, Judith Cheney Lewis, Jennafer Dorfman

Wagner, Shuray Ghorishi; Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, Thomas G.

Sprankling, Kyle T. Edwards, Charlotte Geaghan-Breiner, Arjun Parikh for Plaintiff and

Appellant.

No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.

Plaintiff and appellant R.G. appeals the denial of her request to renew a domestic

violence restraining order (DVRO) pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act

(DVPA) against defendant and respondent A.M.

R.G. and A.M. had two children together, Au.M. and Ro.G. (collectively, Minors),

but they did not have a good relationship with A.M. R.G. had obtained several

restraining orders in the past to keep A.M. away from her and Minors. In May 2022 R.G.

was granted a one-year term DVRO against A.M. for acts committed by him, including

unexpectedly showing up at her house and speaking with Minors when he was only

allowed supervised visits with Minors. He also called the police repeatedly to do welfare

checks at R.G.’s house and at MGM’s home over the period of several years. A.M. was

ordered to stay away from R.G. and to participate in a 52-week domestic violence

program. One year later, R.G. requested that the trial court renew the DVRO

permanently or for a five-year term. The trial court found no evidence that A.M. had

violated the DVRO during the one-year term and found that he was benefitting from the

domestic violence program. The trial court denied the request for renewal of the DVRO.

On appeal, R.G. insists the trial court erred by denying the DVRO by applying the

wrong legal standard for renewal of a DVRO order. She additionally argues that even if

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the trial court applied the correct legal standard, it abused its discretion by denying the

renewal of the DVRO.2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. REQUEST FOR DVRO

On April 1, 2022, R.G. filed a request for a DVRO against A.M. for her and

Minors, who were 11 and 9 years old. R.G. alleged she had two previous restraining

orders granted against A.M.; one in 2013, and one in 2020, but both had expired. R.G.

and A.M. had been involved in two previous domestic violence cases in 2013. She

sought a no-contact order for herself, Minors and S.A. (Minors’ grandmother; hereafter

MGM).

R.G. provided a declaration in support of the DVRO. A.M. had subjected her and

Minors to emotional and physical abuse “in the past.” She had sole legal and physical

custody of Minors but she and A.M. were involved in a custody dispute in the Santa

Clara Superior Court. Au.M. told R.G. that he had observed A.M. outside his school

despite the school information being protected. A.M. contacted the local sheriff’s

department five or six times each year asking them to do a welfare check on Minors and

R.G. He had asked for the same welfare checks when Minors stayed with MGM. The

welfare checks scared Minors. She insisted that her home address was protected based

on their custody agreement but A.M. had found their home. On March 23, 2022, A.M.

pulled into their driveway in a black truck. Minors were playing outside. He told them

2 A.M. has not filed a respondent’s brief in this appeal.

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“see you soon.” Minors were traumatized by his presence [redacted]. She called the

police. The restraining order was expired at the time and they advised her to get a new

restraining order.

She also stated that at some time a white van was parked outside her home. There

was a Hispanic man in a security shirt in the van who refused to identify himself to

R.G.’s friend. Over the prior six months, she had seen vehicles parked outside her home.

She insisted that A.M. was using these people to stalk her and Minors.

[Redacted.] R.G. further alleged that between 2021 and 2022 she received several

fraudulent emails from several companies. These companies included strip clubs and

drug rehabilitation centers. The emails all included her name and address, and that she

had inquired of them for employment and treatment. She insisted that A.M. was

responsible for sending the information to these companies.

R.G. provided exhibits to the DVRO request. This included the DVRO issued on

September 6, 2013, expiring on September 5, 2018. Minors and R.G. were the protected

persons. A.M. was to stay away from their home, work and school. R.G. also provided

documentation that she had sole legal and physical custody of Minors. A.M. was only

allowed supervised visits on Saturdays. R.G. attached photographs of a van parked

outside her home. She also provided emails from the various companies that she

believed were fraudulent.

A.M. filed a response to the request for the DVRO on April 14, 2022. He insisted

that R.G. had only temporary custody of Minors and the custody case was ongoing.

[Redacted.] A.M. insisted that between 2013 and 2018 there were joint restraining orders

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for R.G. and A.M. to stay away from each other. In 2018, Mother was granted temporary

sole physical and legal custody of Minors. He had visits with Minors in 2019 and Minors

did not exhibit any fear of him. Between 2018 and 2020 he claimed that R.G. tried to

make false reports to CPS about him but they were found to be inconclusive. Minors had

texted him that they loved him on May 29, 2020.

He claimed that on March 23, 2022, he drove near R.G.’s house for work and saw

Minors playing outside where they appeared to be unsupervised. He stopped and spoke

with Minors, who seemed excited to see him. He did not see R.G. A.M. denied that he

was having persons sit outside R.G.’s home in vehicles to watch her. She had no proof

that he had anything to do with emails sent to her by various companies. He asked that

the request for the DVRO be denied.

A.M. also included a minute order from the custody proceedings taking place in

the Santa Clara Superior Court. During the proceedings on April 15, 2021, A.M. was

granted three hours of supervised visits with Minors one time each week. R.G. was

ordered to cooperate and transport Minors. He provided information that the company

that was to help supervise the visits had not been able to set up the visits as R.G. was

refusing to make Minors available to start the process. A.M. also included a minute order

dated September 18, 2020, from Riverside County Superior Court, which dismissed the

temporary restraining order that was issued on June 19, 2020, against A.M.

B. HEARING AND RULING ON DVRO

R.G. testified. She admitted that she and A.M. were involved in a custody battle

in Santa Clara Superior Court since 2013. R.G. and Minors lived in the Santa Clara area

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previously but had since moved to Palm Desert. She testified regarding their relationship

and that she had to obtain a restraining order in 2013 against him. On September 13,

2018, it was ordered that R.G. would have sole custody of Minors. A.M. was only

allowed supervised visits one time each week. She insisted that the supervised visits had

not been occurring because she was having trouble with the company that A.M. chose to

supervise the visits. The custody case was still ongoing.

R.G. had requested the DVRO based on A.M. unexpectedly arriving at her home.

Au.M. was terrified when A.M. showed up at the house. R.G. called the police but they

told her that the prior DVRO had expired. She was also concerned about unknown

vehicles parked in front of her house on various occasions. She believed that A.M. was

involved because he was aware that another man was living with her and Minors, and

could only know this if he was stalking her. A.M. was not supposed to know her address.

She also claimed that A.M. constantly called the local sheriff’s department to do

welfare checks on her, Minors and MGM. She insisted that a responding sheriff’s deputy

advised her that A.M. had made the calls claiming that R.G. was dead. The last call was

three months prior.

[Redacted.] The trial court noted that A.M. had no contact with Minors for the

prior three years. [Redacted.] She admitted that A.M. had no contact with Minors for the

prior three years. Au.M. had informed R.G. that he had seen A.M. out in front of his

school on multiple occasions.

The trial court believed that R.G. was afraid of A.M. but was focusing on any

recent events in deciding whether to grant the DVRO. The trial court looked up R.G.’s

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address and it appeared the house could be seen by a person driving by on the nearby

highway. The trial court found credible evidence that R.G. was in fear of A.M. and that

Au.M. still had trauma. The trial court wanted to focus on the recent conduct of A.M. in

determining whether to grant the DVRO. R.G. insisted that he was stalking and

harassing her based on coming to her home, which was a protected address, going to

Minors’ school and sending the police to do welfare checks.

MGM testified that Minors stayed with her one night each week and on some

weekends. She indicated that on several occasions while Minors were staying with her,

the sheriff’s department came to her house to do a welfare check. They told her that

A.M. had called and indicated that someone was dead at her house. There had been no

calls for the prior six months. MGM also claimed that CPS had been to her home 15 to

20 times based on calls from A.M. that Minors were not safe. The sheriff’s department

and CPS only came to her house when Minors were with her. R.G. also testified that

A.M. called CPS on her on multiple occasions. She did not know what he told them.

A.M. also testified. He insisted that he was driving down Highway 74 to a job site

when he saw Minors playing outside their home. He had not seen Minors since

September 2019 and was “overfilled with joy.” He rolled down his window. He said

hello and that he loved them. He also told Minors that he would see them soon. Minors

did not appear scared and Au.M. did not immediately run into the house. He insisted he

knew R.G.’s address because she put it on one of her filings in court and provided the

document with the address. He was excited to see Minors because R.G. was not

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complying with the visitation orders. He had not had a supervised visit since September

2019. R.G. had been impeding the supervised visits with Minors.

A.M. insisted he had only called CPS one time after a visit in September 2019

because Au.M. had a bruise [redacted]. A.M. called the sheriff’s department only three

times to do welfare checks on the advice of his attorney based on the failure of R.G. to

respond on those dates to the company attempting to set up supervised visits. A.M. only

had two contacts with Minors in the prior three years. On the day he went to R.G.’s

house he only wanted to see Minors. He had no intent to harm them. He just wanted to

get back custody of Minors. He had been married to another woman for three years and

had a daughter who wanted to meet Minors.

The trial court was concerned that A.M. was not getting his supervised visits. The

trial court also noted that the identity of a person who called CPS would be confidential.

R.G. admitted that documents she obtained from CPS blacked out the name of the

reporting party, but she insisted that a supervisor told her orally it was A.M. who was

calling.

R.G. testified that she was granted sole custody of Minors because A.M. was

deemed mentally unstable. She insisted that he was mentally and physically abusive to

her during both her pregnancies. He told her that he killed small animals. He also ran

over some of her things, including a mattress, when they broke up.

The trial court noted that it was not sure who was credible as to who was calling

the sheriff’s department and CPS. The trial court found MGM credible although her

testimony was not detailed. The trial court stated, “So calling CPS and the sheriff’s

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department unjustifiably and repeatedly, if that be a fact, in my opinion, can support a

restraining order.” It was a significant “piece of evidence.” The trial court sought proof

from R.G. as to who was behind the calls and that there were more than three calls.

The trial court continued the matter and encouraged the parties to try to find

evidence of who made the calls. Based on the current evidence, the trial court was not

inclined to issue the restraining order.

During the continuance, R.G. filed further documents. She provided

documentation pertaining to the custody proceedings, information regarding her

interactions with the company that was to supervise visits, documentation from the prior

restraining orders, photographs of her house from Highway 74, a declaration regarding

Minors being terrified of A.M. based on past events, and details of A.M.’s past abuse of

her.

A.M. filed a declaration and exhibits on April 29, 2022, in opposition to the grant

of the DVRO. He provided evidence of only four welfare checks at R.G.’s residence.

One in January 2021, two in April 2021, and one in June 2021. Each of those days was

days that Minors were to be at supervised visits with A.M. There were two welfare

checks at MGM’s house in 2019 and 2020.

The second hearing on the grant of the DVRO was held on May 4, 2022. R.G.

again testified about the welfare checks at her home. She admitted she had no proof on

the logs of the calls that the calls were from A.M. She brought hundreds of pages of CPS

records but they only went up to 2020. The trial court was unsure if they were relevant to

the recent request for a DVRO. The last welfare check call to the sheriff’s department

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was July 25, 2021. She did not have the records for any calls to CPS after 2020. She

insisted there were recent calls to CPS from A.M. making unfounded allegations that

Minors were neglected. There were calls to CPS from A.M. made in 2022.

Representatives from the company that was hired to supervise A.M.’s visit with

Minors testified that Minors, A.M. and R.G. had to participate in an in-person orientation

prior to the visits being scheduled. R.G. refused to do the orientation in person or have

Minors participate in the orientation. No supervised visits had occurred.

R.G. testified that in 2013, A.M. was ordered to complete a 52-week domestic

violence course. A.M. admitted he only completed 24 weeks. A.M. acknowledged the

welfare check calls but only two to MGM’s residence and four to R.G.’s residence on

days he was supposed to have visits with Minors. He only called based on the advice of

his attorney. The last call was on June 30, 2021.

The matter was continued to May 9, 2022. At the next hearing, R.G. had

additional CPS records. She had documentation of a call to CPS on April 23, 2021, by

A.M. and a notation that he had made 18 previous referrals. The last call was on June 4,

2021. R.G. complemented the trial court for being the first to “truly” listen to all of her

concerns and reasons for a restraining order.

The trial court noted there had been many unfounded reports made by A.M. to

CPS over the years. This was a form of harassment. A.M. was aware that R.G. believed

that he had [redacted], injured animals and damaged her belongings. She clearly did not

want to have contact with him.

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The trial court in ruling on the DVRO found that the definition of disturbing the

peace under Family Code section 6320, subdivision (c), was so broad that it had “no

choice” but to grant the DVRO. The trial court ruled there was insufficient evidence

presented to grant the DVRO for Minors. It only granted the DVRO for R.G. and for a

time period of one year. A.M. was ordered to complete the 52-week domestic violence

program. The trial court noted that A.M. had already completed 24 weeks so he only had

to complete the additional weeks. If he completed the program, the trial court would be

inclined to terminate the DVRO early.

The trial court also noted that it believed that the case was on the “outer edge” of

what constitutes disturbing the peace to justify the DVRO. The trial court also was

concerned that R.G. seemed to be thwarting visitation but A.M. had no right to just visit

Minors without supervision. [Redacted.] The DVRO would expire on April 1, 2023. On

December 14, 2022, A.M. enrolled in the domestic violence course, which was set to start

on December 20, 2022.

C. DVRO RENEWAL REQUEST AND RULING

On January 3, 2023, R.G. filed a request to renew the DVRO on the grounds that

A.M. had not completed the 52-week domestic violence program. She also filed a

declaration. She stated that she was afraid that A.M. would “abuse me in the future” if

the DVRO was allowed to expire. She acknowledged that since the issuance of the

DVRO, there had been no welfare checks or harassment by A.M. She alleged that A.M.

was mentally unstable. She was concerned that A.M. knew her address and would come

to her home and harass her in the future. She was concerned that if A.M. did not

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complete the domestic violence program prior to the expiration of the DVRO, he would

again harass her. She requested a permanent restraining order, or for at least a period of

five years.

A.M. filed a response to the request for renewal of the DVRO. He had not

violated the DVRO and was enrolled in the domestic violence program.

A hearing was conducted on March 22, 2023, in front of the same trial court that

granted the DVRO. A.M. had completed nine domestic violence classes. A.M. provided

a progress report to the trial court. The trial court was “pleased” with A.M.’s progress.

The trial court noted on the record, “If I didn’t think that those concerns previously were

valid, I wouldn’t have granted the restraining order last year. . . . However, we’re in a

different posture now.” The trial court stated its tentative ruling was to deny the renewal

of the DVRO. The trial court believed that the prior concerns of R.G. were legitimate but

it did not appear there was enough evidence presented in the written request to renew the

DVRO.

R.G. now claimed that she had evidence that the harassment, stalking and abuse

had not stopped. The trial court stated it was not fair to bring in new evidence that A.M.

had to defend against without prior knowledge. She insisted that she had other “things”

and that she was constantly trying to keep herself and Minors safe. She insisted the

harassment by A.M. was contained in court filings in family court. She asked for a

continuance to present the claims but the trial court denied any continuance. She insisted

all she did was file things in court to respond to A.M.

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The trial court advised R.G., “But there’s a happy medium, which is hard to find

in life, between protecting and overprotecting. Right? You have to see it from my

perspective. I see the worst of the worst. [A.M.] is not the worst of the worst. Not close.

I’m not even saying he’s a bad person. I’m just saying, is he perfect? No. Are you

perfect? No.” He noted that Minors likely sensed the stress and anxiety of the court

proceedings.

The trial court noted that the two parties oftentimes were in court on the custody

matters and the restraining order and it wondered “if either of you have stepped back and

said, are we really doing our children any good as opposed to doing what we think is

good for ourselves?” The trial court expressed concern about R.G. It advised R.G. that

she was an excellent parent but that life would be better for her, A.M. and Minors if they

all spent less time in court.

R.G. expressed that Minors did not want to see A.M. The trial court stated that it

hoped the relationship between A.M. and Minors could be repaired. The trial court also

advised R.G. that she had a duty to foster a relationship between Minors and A.M. R.G.

was concerned if the DVRO was not extended he would have no reason to complete the

domestic violence program. The trial court stated that it was a good point but if he did

not complete the course he would have no chance of getting joint custody of Minors.

The trial court advised R.G. that in granting the DVRO, it had made a finding of

harassment. That finding was relevant in the custody proceedings. Further, even if the

trial court denied the renewal of the DVRO, it did not stop her from filing a further

request in the future. However, “It’s just, here’s what got us here and here’s what new

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and different events have happened since the time that you issued the first one. [¶] So I

know you’d prefer not to have to do that. But what I’m trying to tell you is that the

courthouse doors aren’t necessarily closed in the future.” R.G. stated that she never

wanted to see A.M.’s face again. The trial court reminded R.G. that she was forever

linked to A.M. because of Minors.

The trial court noted it had issued the DVRO because it found her credible.

However, the evidence supporting the DVRO was not “overwhelming”; it was just

enough. She “barely” met the burden of proof for issuing the DVRO. The trial court

stated, “But I take that into consideration in determining whether or not to extend the

restraining order now.”

R.G. stated that the only thing that was keeping her safe was the DVRO. She

acknowledged that CPS and the sheriff’s department had not been called during the time

of the DVRO but she insisted that “he’s still watching me.” A.M. insisted that he had

moved on. He was benefitting from the classes. He would continue the classes because

they were helping him. He had never been a threat to R.G. either physically or

emotionally. He had been married to another woman for four years. They had one child

and she was pregnant. He just wanted to be a father to Minors. He opposed the renewal

of the DVRO for five years.

The trial court again noted that if A.M. failed to complete the domestic violence

program, he would not be given joint custody of Minors. The trial court stated, “So he

has all sorts of reasons to stay on the straight and narrow, as they say.” He encouraged

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R.G. to focus on Minors. He also warned A.M. that he would be subject to another

restraining order if he harassed R.G.

The trial court concluded, “It’s not going to take a whole lot more for me to grant

another one. I hope we don’t get to that point. But if she requests another one, she’s not

going to be charged fees. The sheriff will be probably likely the one to serve you. It will

be heard on the next basis. We’ll be right back where we are now. [¶] And no matter

how well you’re doing in the 52-week program, I’ll still issue another restraining order if

the evidence is there. Lord knows you’ve been in this building a lot. Don’t do it to

yourself. Don’t do it to the kids. Both of you. Just stress and anxiety is not good for

your kids.” The request for renewal of the DVRO was denied. No formal judgment was

filed and R.G. submitted a notice of appeal on September 12, 2023.

DISCUSSION

R.G. contends the trial court erred by denying her request to renew the DVRO by

relying on the wrong standard of law. The trial court failed to consider the mandatory

factors in Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275 (Ritchie). Even if the trial

court applied the correct standard, it abused its discretion by refusing to renew the

DVRO.

Family Code section 6345, subdivision (a)3 provides that a DVRO shall have an

initial duration not exceeding five years, but “may be renewed, upon the request of a

3 All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise
indicated.

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party, either for five or more years, or permanently, at the discretion of the court, without

a showing of further abuse since the issuance of the original order. . . . The request for

renewal may be brought at any time within the three months before the expiration of the

orders.”4 “The legal standard for renewal of a DVRO is whether the protected party

entertains a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. [Citation.] ‘[T]his does not mean

the court must find it is more likely than not that abuse will occur if the protective order

is not renewed. It only means the evidence demonstrates it is more probable than not

there is a sufficient risk of future abuse to find the protected party’s apprehension genuine

and reasonable.’ [Citation.] An imminent and present danger of abuse is not required;

there must only be a reasonable apprehension that ‘abuse will occur at some time in the

future if the protective order is allowed to expire.’ ” (Michael M. v. Robin J. (2023) 92

Cal.App.5th 170, 179 (Michael M.).)

“In evaluating whether the requesting party has a reasonable apprehension of

future abuse, the trial court ordinarily should consider the evidence and findings on which

the initial DVRO was based.” (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 180.) “ ‘Also

potentially relevant are any significant changes in the circumstances surrounding the

events justifying the initial protective order. For instance, have the restrained and

protected parties moved on with their lives so far that the opportunity and likelihood of

future abuse has diminished to the degree they no longer support a renewal of the order?’

[Citation.] ‘Also relevant are the seriousness and degree of risk, such as whether it

4 Section 6345 was modified effective January 1, 2024, but the modification is not
relevant to this appeal. (Stats. 2023, c. 874 (S.B. 459), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2024.)

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involves potential physical abuse, and the burdens the protective order imposes on the

restrained person, such as interference with job opportunities.’ ” (Id. at p. 180.)

On appeal, we review the trial court’s decision on a renewal of a DVRO under the

abuse of discretion standard. (Rybolt v. Riley (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 864, 874-875.)

“ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the

bounds of reason.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of G. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 773, 780) “In

reviewing the evidence, we examine the entire record to determine whether there is any

substantial evidence—contradicted or uncontradicted—to support the trial court's

findings.” (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 12.) “We must accept as true all

evidence supporting the trial court’s findings, resolving every conflict in favor of the

judgment. [Citation.] We do not determine credibility or reweigh the evidence.

[Citation.] If substantial evidence supports the judgment, reversal is not warranted even

if facts exist that would support a contrary finding.” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “If the court’s decision is

influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of

the full scope of its discretion, the court has not properly exercised its discretion under

the law.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 116; see also

Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 178-179.)

A. CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD

Initially, R.G. is incorrect that the trial court applied the wrong standard in

denying the renewal of the DVRO. .

In Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, the appellate court addressed the

standard of review in determining whether to renew a DVRO and the factors relevant to

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the renewal. (Id. at p. 388) The Ritchie court identified three factors that a trial court

should consider in deciding whether to renew a DVRO. These include, (1) “the evidence

and findings on which [the] initial [protective] order was based”; (2) “any significant

changes in the circumstances surrounding the events justifying the initial protective

order”; and (3) “the ‘burdens’ the protective order imposes on the restrained party.” (Id.

at pp. 1290-1291.) The court concluded, “A trial court should renew the protective order,

if, and only if, it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the protected party

entertains a ‘reasonable apprehension’ of future abuse. So there should be no

misunderstanding, this does not mean the court must find it is more likely than not future

abuse will occur if the protective order is not renewed. It only means the evidence

demonstrates it is more probable than not there is a sufficient risk of future abuse to find

the protected party’s apprehension is genuine and reasonable.” (Ritchie, supra, 115

Cal.App.4th at p. 1290.) At least one court has concluded that at least two of the Ritchie

factors must be applied by trial courts in determining whether to renew a DVRO. (See

G.G. v. G.S. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 413, 422.)

We need not decide if the Ritchie factors are mandatory—as will be shown post,

the trial court did consider these factors in refusing to renew the DVRO.

We also note that R.G. contends the trial court failed to give a statement of

decision as required by section 6340, subdivision (b). Under subdivision (b) of section

6340, the trial court need only give “ ‘a brief statement of the reasons for the decision in

writing or on the record.’ ” (Salmon v. Salmon (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1047, 1060.) The

trial court, at the hearing on the renewal of the DVRO, stated several reasons for the

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denial. The trial court stated that it was pleased with A.M.’s progress in the domestic

violence program and that he had an incentive to continue in order to obtain custody of

Minors. Further, the trial court noted that A.M. was not the worst of the worst when it

came to the reasons for granting the original DVRO. A.M. had not physically abused

R.G., and the trial court had made no finding that [redacted]. The trial court also relied

on the fact that the evidence supporting the original DVRO was minimal and barely

supported issuing the original DVRO. These statements were clearly sufficient to satisfy

section 6340, subdivision (b).

B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION

R.G. further contends that if this court does not find the trial court misapplied the

law, it was an abuse of discretion to deny the renewal of the DVRO. R.G. contends the

facts underlying the initial DVRO supported renewing the DVRO; there were no changes

in the parties’ lives that weighed against renewal; and A.M. did not identify any

meaningful burden imposed by a renewal of the DVRO.

The trial court did consider the evidence underlying the original DVRO in denying

the renewal. The trial court presided over the original DVRO proceedings. In the

original proceedings, the trial court allowed in years of records and heard testimony from

R.G. about abuse that had occurred during their entire relationship. R.G. presented

evidence that A.M. had called CPS with unfounded allegations that R.G. was not taking

care of Minors. There was also testimony and records that A.M. called the local sheriff’s

department to initiate welfare checks at both R.G.’s and MGM’s houses claiming they

were deceased and the Minors needed care. It was undisputed that A.M. arrived

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unannounced at R.G.’s house to speak with Minors when he was only supposed to have

supervised visits with Minors. [Redacted.]

While the trial court did not find that the abuse occurred, it did find in support of

the DVRO that there were unnecessary calls to CPS and the sheriff’s department, and

A.M. should not have gone to R.G.’s house. However, in determining whether to renew

the DVRO, the trial court noted there were no further calls that had occurred since 2021.

In addition, no calls to the police or CPS were made while the restraining order was in

place. It found that the DVRO was “barely” supported by the evidence and could

reasonably conclude that the need for a five-year extension or permanent order was not

necessary to protect R.G.

Further, A.M. reported that he was learning how to deal with the situation in the

domestic violence program. He had maintained his relationship with his wife, they had a

daughter, and another baby on the way, evidencing that he had “moved on” from R.G.

He wanted to be a father to Minors and had no intention to unnecessarily contact R.G.

Although A.M. had only completed 9 weeks of the domestic violence program, he

previously completed 24 weeks. He was near completion of the 52-week program.

Further, as reasonably considered by the trial court, A.M.’s desire to obtain custody of

Minors gave him an incentive to finish the program.

The trial court reasonably concluded that A.M. had made positive changes since

the issuance of the DVRO, that there had been no further incidents, and that A.M. had

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moved on. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the DVRO did

not need to be renewed.5

DISPOSITION

The order of the trial court is affirmed in full. Appellant is to bear her own costs

on appeal.6 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MILLER
J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

McKINSTER
J.

5 R.G. makes a final claim that the trial court erred by denying her request for a
continuance of the renewal request hearing in order to provide additional information
about A.M. stalking an harassing her after the issuance of the DVRO. The trial court did
allow R.G. to testify that there were statements in the court papers filed in the custody
proceedings that R.G. considered harassing but the court found it did not make a
difference. R.G. does not provide what additional information would have been provided
if granted the continuance. Such failure to provide this information makes it impossible
to review the issue on appeal.

6 We do not award costs to A.M. because he did not make an appearance in this
court.

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