People v. Hillmon CA2/4

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Filed 10/2/24 P. v. Hillmon CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B330675

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A790968)
v.

CARLTON KERGE HILLMON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gustavo N. Sztraicher, Judge. Affirmed.
Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Allison H. Chung, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Carlton Kerge Hillmon appeals the order
denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code former
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6)1 following an evidentiary
hearing. Defendant argues substantial evidence did not support
the trial court’s finding he directly aided and abetted murder
with implied malice, or alternatively, that the matter must be
remanded for the court to consider his youth at the time of the
murder. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Shooting of Richard Lewis
On July 30, 1985, Richard Lewis was shot and killed at
101st Street and Figueroa Street in Los Angeles County. In
October 1986, defendant was arrested for a parole violation:
possession of a firearm by a felon. Two days later, Los Angeles
Police Department Detective Aaron Martin interviewed
defendant about the Lewis shooting. Detective Martin read
defendant his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S.
436, and defendant waived them. Defendant admitted to the
detective that he was involved in the shooting.

B. Preliminary Hearing
At defendant’s preliminary hearing in December 1986, the
parties stipulated to the following facts: (1) Lewis was shot and
killed at 101st Street and Figueroa Street on July 30, 1985, (2) an

1 All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code. Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There
were no substantive changes to the statute. All further references to
the statute will be to the new section number.

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autopsy determined the cause of death was multiple gunshot
wounds, and (3) the autopsy report would be made part of the
preliminary hearing transcript and considered as evidence for
purposes of the preliminary hearing.
Detective Martin testified about his interview of defendant.
The following facts are taken from Detective Martin’s testimony.
On the evening of July 30, 1985, defendant and his
companion, Michael Johnson, along with their respective
girlfriends, drove to a hamburger stand at Florence and Vermont
Avenues. As defendant went to order, there was an “exchange of
looks” between defendant and Lewis. Defendant was a member
of the Eight Tray Hoover Crips gang. Lewis was a member of the
9-0 Hoover Crips gang. There was animosity between the gangs.
Defendant told Johnson about Lewis and that he was a 9-0
Hoover Crip. Defendant also told Johnson he overheard Lewis
and his friends discussing going to another hamburger stand at
101st Street and Figueroa Street.
Defendant drove his companions to 1022 West 84th Street
and dropped off his and Johnson’s girlfriends. Defendant and
Johnson got into a different car registered either to defendant or
someone in his family. Defendant then drove to Johnson’s house,
and Johnson retrieved a handgun. Defendant and Johnson
returned to the original hamburger stand, but Lewis and his
friends were no longer there. Defendant assumed Lewis went to
101st Street and Figueroa Street based on what defendant
previously overheard. Defendant drove himself and Johnson
there. Defendant drove past the location, made at least two right
turns, and then drove up an alley in the back of the hamburger
stand, where they located Lewis’s car. Defendant pulled up

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beside Lewis’s car, and Johnson fired more than 10 shots. Lewis
sustained seven gunshot wounds and died.
After the shooting, defendant drove back to Johnson’s
house, and Johnson dropped off the handgun. They returned to
1022 West 84th Street and had their girlfriends follow them in a
separate car. Defendant then drove to a shopping center where
he parked the car used in the shooting, wiped it clean of
fingerprints, and left it.
Detective Martin initially testified that defendant said he
“planned” the killing with Johnson, but during his cross-
examination by defense counsel, the detective was asked whether
defendant used the word “planned.” Detective Martin did not
recall if defendant used the word “planned” and could not say
“exactly what the words were,” but he said they “implied that it
was definitely discussed what was going to occur.” The detective
also stated his written summary of the interview did not include
any mention of the discussion between defendant and Johnson.
However, Detective Martin explained that “the actual wording
was somewhat to the effect of [defendant] knew what was going
on. It was at one point in the confession, he stated that as they
drove up, ‘he knew what time it was,’ as to the victim, that he
knew he was going to be shot.”

C. Information, Plea, and Sentence
By information, defendant was charged with murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)), and it was further alleged a principal was armed with
a firearm in the commission of the murder (§ 12022, subd. (a)).
In December 1988, defendant pleaded guilty to second degree
murder. In January 1989, defendant was sentenced to 15 years

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to life. On the People’s motion, the firearm allegation under
section 12022, subdivision (a), was stricken.

D. Defendant’s Resentencing Petition and Evidentiary
Hearing
In January 2021, defendant filed a resentencing petition
under section 1172.6. The trial court determined defendant made
a prima facie showing that he was entitled to relief under section
1172.6 and issued an order to show cause. Defendant filed a brief
and objections to the admission of the preliminary hearing
transcript at the evidentiary hearing. The People filed a
memorandum of admissibility regarding its evidence, which
included defendant’s preliminary hearing transcript and Lewis’s
autopsy report. The People argued the preliminary hearing
transcript was admissible under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3), and that defendant’s statements in the
transcript relating to the murder fell under the hearsay exception
for party admissions under Evidence Code section 1220.2
The trial court heard argument from the parties at the
evidentiary hearing and took the matter under submission.

2 Regarding an evidentiary hearing, section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3), provides in part, “[H]earsay evidence that was
admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of
[s]ection 872 shall be excluded from the hearing as hearsay, unless the
evidence is admissible pursuant to another exception to the hearsay
rule.” Evidence Code section 1220 states, “Evidence of a statement is
not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered against the
declarant in an action to which he is a party in either his individual or
representative capacity, regardless of whether the statement was
made in his individual or representative capacity.”

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E. Order Denying Defendant’s Resentencing Petition
The trial court issued its memorandum of decision in May
2023, denying defendant’s petition. The court found the
statements made by defendant to Detective Martin in the
preliminary hearing transcript were admissible under Evidence
Code section 1220.
The trial court recognized Detective Martin could not recall
whether defendant said the word “planned” during the interview.
However, the court also found Detective Martin’s testimony was
sufficiently consistent to establish what defendant said, and thus,
it was unnecessary to corroborate defendant’s statements with
other evidence.3
The trial court found defendant “aided in the shooting of
Lewis at every step,” thereby aiding and abetting the commission
of the life-endangering act. Furthermore, the court found
defendant shared “Johnson’s intent to kill [Lewis], or at the very
least, was aware of and consciously disregarded the dangers of
shooting a rival gang member.” The court concluded the People
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with
implied malice. Defendant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) to clarify the felony-murder rule and eliminate the
natural and probable consequences doctrine “to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual

3 Detective Martin tape recorded and memorialized the interview
in writing. Neither the recording nor written statement were produced
for the evidentiary hearing.

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killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f);
accord, § 189, subd. (e); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
957, 959.) The Legislature also added what is now section
1172.6, providing a procedure for individuals convicted of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine to seek retroactive relief by petitioning the sentencing
court to vacate the conviction and resentence on any remaining
counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
If a petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement
to relief, the resentencing court must issue an order to show
cause and hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the
relevant conviction, recall the sentence, and resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).)
At the evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under
California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The
court may consider evidence admitted at any prior hearing or
trial that is admissible under current law, or any new or
additional evidence submitted by the parties. (Ibid.) The trial
court acts as an independent factfinder and determines whether
the prosecution has met its burden. (People v. Ramirez (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 970, 984.)
We review the trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6
petition following an evidentiary hearing for substantial
evidence. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes).)
“[W]e review the record ‘in the light most favorable to the

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judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence–that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value–such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v.
Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 713.)

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s
Finding Defendant Aided and Abetted Implied
Malice Murder
Defendant argues the trial court’s finding that defendant
acted with implied malice is unsupported by substantial
evidence. We disagree.
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice “may be express
or implied.” (§ 188, subd. (a).) Express malice is the
manifestation of intent to kill. (§ 188, subd. (a)(1).) Malice is
implied when no considerable provocation appears or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned or
malignant heart. (§ 188, subd. (a)(2); see People v. Soto (2018) 4
Cal.5th 968, 976 [“[t]he primary difference between express
malice and implied malice is that the former requires an intent to
kill but the latter does not”].)
“When a person directly perpetrates a killing, it is the
perpetrator who must possess . . . malice. [Citations.] Similarly,
when a person directly aids and abets a murder, the aider and
abettor must possess malice aforethought.” (People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 844–845, superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
576, 584.) “Guilt as an aider and abettor is [thus] ‘based on a
combination of the direct perpetrator’s acts and the aider and

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abettor’s own acts and own mental state.’” (People v. Powell
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 710.)
A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he
or she “(i) with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator, (ii) and with the intent or purpose of committing,
facilitating or encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or
advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission
of the crime.” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164.)
Courts may consider various factors when determining whether a
person is an aider and abettor, including “‘presence at the scene
of the crime, failure to take steps to attempt or prevent the
commission of the crime, companionship, flight, and conduct
before and after the crime.’” (People v. Garcia (2008) 168
Cal.App.4th 261, 273 (Garcia).)
“‘In the context of implied malice, the actus reus required of
the perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act. For
the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever
acts constitute aiding the commission of the life-endangering act.
Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider
and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the
life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The mens rea,
which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and
abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the
act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act,
knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in
conscious disregard for human life.’” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 991.)
In this case, all factors probative of aiding and abetting the
murder of Lewis are present. As the trial court found, the

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evidence shows defendant aided Johnson in the shooting of Lewis
“at every step,” before, during, and after the crime.
Defendant identified Lewis as a rival gang member at the
original hamburger stand and informed Johnson of Lewis being
there. Defendant also informed Johnson he overheard Lewis and
his friends discussing going to the hamburger stand at 101st
Street and Figueroa Street. Defendant then drove to 1022 West
84th Street to drop off his and Johnson’s girlfriends and change
into the car they would later abandon. Thereafter, defendant
drove to Johnson’s house where Johnson retrieved the gun used
in the shooting. (See People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 593,
fn. 5 [obtaining a deadly weapon in advance of killing can support
inference of planning activity].) Defendant then drove back to
the original hamburger stand. Because Lewis and his friends
were not there, defendant assumed they went to the hamburger
stand at 101st Street and Figueroa Street, so defendant drove
there. When he and Johnson arrived, defendant circled the
location searching for Lewis. Defendant drove up to Lewis’s car
after finding it in the alley, bringing Johnson and his gun near
enough to shoot Lewis. According to his confession to Detective
Martin, defendant “knew what time it was”; in other words, he
knew Lewis was going to be shot before the murder occurred.
After the shooting, defendant drove Johnson away from the
scene to Johnson’s house to drop off the gun. From there,
defendant drove himself and Johnson back to where they dropped
off their girlfriends and had them follow in a separate vehicle.
Defendant drove the vehicle used in the shooting to a shopping
center, parked it, wiped it clean of fingerprints, and left it.
(People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 924 [evidence
defendants fled after the shooting was treated as an additional

10
factor suggesting aiding and abetting liability]; see also People v.
Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 329 [flight and failure to seek
assistance imply consciousness of guilt].)
In sum, all probative factors indicate defendant knew
Johnson intended to commit the shooting, intended to aid
Johnson in the commission of the act, aided the shooting, knew
the act of shooting a person was dangerous to human life, and
acted in conscious disregard for human life. (Reyes, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 991; see People v. Swanson-Birabent (2003) 114
Cal.App.4th 733, 743–744 [aider and abettor can be “‘one who is
present . . . to take charge of an automobile and to keep the
engine running, or to drive the “getaway” car and to give direct
aid to others in making their escape from the scene of the
crime’”].)
Defendant argues his admission that “he knew what time it
was” does not show he knew Johnson would shoot Lewis because
he thought Johnson would only confront Lewis with the gun. 4
However, the trial court was entitled to credit Detective Martin’s
testimony that defendant meant he knew Lewis was going to be
shot. (People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142 [“‘“Conflicts
and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not
justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province
of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness
and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination
depends”’”].) Furthermore, the court could reasonably conclude
based on defendant’s involvement in the many steps leading up to

4 Defendant also asserts there was no evidence he knew the gun
was loaded, but a defendant does not show the evidence is insufficient
by arguing about what evidence is not in the record. (People v.
Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.)

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the murder that his statement meant he knew Johnson was going
to shoot Lewis.
Defendant also cites Reyes in arguing there is insufficient
evidence to sustain a finding he aided and abetted Lewis’s
shooting. In Reyes, gang members, including Reyes, rode their
bicycles “to an area on the edge of territory belonging to a rival
gang.” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 985.) One of them had a
gun, and it was used to shoot a passing driver. (Ibid.) In
assessing Reyes’s mental state, the trial court considered
whether the act of traveling in the group that had the gun to
rival gang territory was done with implied malice. (Id. at p. 991.)
The Supreme Court found this was error. The trial court failed to
recognize “that implied malice murder requires, among other
elements, proof of the aider and abettor’s knowledge and intent
with regard to the direct perpetrator’s life endangering act.” In
Reyes, the life endangering act was shooting the victim, not
traveling with the group to rival territory. (See Id. at pp. 991–
992.)
To the extent defendant suggests Reyes’s facts are
analogous to this matter, comparison with other cases “is of
limited utility” in deciding issues of sufficiency of evidence
because “each case necessarily depends on its own facts.” (People
v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 516.) Indeed, defendant
acknowledges “[his] conduct went beyond that of Reyes because
he drove Johnson to retrieve the firearm, told Johnson where the
victim would likely be, and then drove Johnson to the victim’s
location and pulled the vehicle alongside the victim’s vehicle.”
We conclude there was substantial evidence to support the trial
court’s finding that defendant aided and abetted Lewis’s
shooting.

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C. Defendant is Not Entitled to Remand for the Trial
Court to Consider His Youth at the Time of the
Shooting
Defendant asserts the order denying his petition must be
vacated and the matter remanded for the trial court to consider
the impact of his youth on his conduct and mental state at the
time of the murder. Defendant was 19 years old at the time of
the shooting.
Defendant cites People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
400 (Pittman), in support of his argument. In Pittman, the
defendant, who was 21 years old at the time of the offense,
argued for the first time on appeal from the denial of a section
1172.6 petition that his youth was “relevant to whether he acted
with implied malice and therefore could be found guilty of second-
degree murder.” (Id. at p. 416.) Pittman found “policy interests
underlying the felony murder cases–that youth is relevant to a
criminal defendant’s ability to perceive risk and consequences,
and therefore to the level of culpability–apply equally in the
context of implied malice murder.” (Id. at p. 417.) The Pittman
court then looked to felony murder cases “to determine whether
there [was] a reasonable possibility that the failure to consider
[the defendant’s] youth impacted the trial court’s decision.”
(Ibid.) Pittman noted “[t]he cases discussing the role of youth in
relation to criminal culpability ‘stress two areas’: youthful
offenders’ ‘relative impulsivity’ and ‘their vulnerability to peer
pressure.’” (Id. at p. 418.) The circumstances of the offense in
Pittman and the evidence suggested “some of these ‘hallmark
features of youth’ may have been at play.” (Ibid.) Pittman
concluded the trial court’s failure to consider the defendant’s
youth was not harmless, given there was trial evidence indicating

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“[the defendant] and his peers acted impulsively and under the
influence of ‘transient rashness,’” used weapons that appeared to
be “spontaneous,” and the motivation for the crime was
“happenstance.” (Ibid.)
In this case, the parties did not address defendant’s
youthfulness in the trial court, and the court did not specifically
state whether it considered defendant’s youth in making its
ruling.5 But even if the trial court was required to consider
defendant’s youth in addressing whether defendant acted with
implied malice, any error was harmless.
Defendant does not present any evidence indicating his
youth impeded his ability to appreciate the risks associated with
his own conduct or that of Johnson. (People v. Oliver (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 466, 490 [“Oliver has failed to present on appeal or
in the court below any specific support for the proposition that his
level of maturity somehow lessened his culpability for this
murder”].) Defendant merely speculates that Johnson was also
young, based solely on the fact he was “hanging out” with
defendant, and implies that youth “likely impacted” defendant’s
decision to pursue Lewis. While youth “can distort risk
calculations,” the “fact of youth cannot overwhelm all other

5 Pittman was decided months after the trial court issued its
ruling in this case. Defendant does not contend he asked the court to
consider his youth when determining whether he acted with implied
malice. (See People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435 [“A party
cannot argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was
not asked to conduct”].) However, the People do not argue defendant
forfeited the argument by not raising it. We exercise our discretion to
consider defendant’s argument regarding whether the matter must be
remanded for the court to consider his youth at the time of the
shooting.

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factors” bearing on the assessment of defendant’s mental state.
(People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 595 [“every 18 year
old understands bullet wounds require attention”].)
Based on the trial court’s finding that defendant “aided in
the shooting of Lewis at every step,” and evidence that defendant
“shared Johnson’s intent to kill the victim, or at the very least,
was aware of and consciously disregarded the dangers of shooting
a rival gang member,” we find no reasonable possibility the
failure to consider his youth impacted the court’s decision.
(Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 417; accord, Oliver, supra,
90 Cal.App.5th at p. 489, fn. 8.)

DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

MORI, J.
We concur:

COLLINS, Acting P. J.

ZUKIN, J.

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