People v. Blanche CA2/7

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Filed 9/30/24 P. v. Blanche CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B329475

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA011531)
v.

ANTHONY BLANCHE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Chet L. Taylor, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________
Anthony Blanche appeals from a postjudgment order
denying his motion for a Franklin1 proceeding. The superior
court found Blanche was ineligible for a youth offender parole
hearing under Penal Code section 30512 because he was
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for his
convictions of two counts of special circumstance first degree
murder. He was also convicted of attempted murder. Blanche
was 24 years old when he committed the offenses.
On appeal, Blanche contends section 3051 violated his
federal and state constitutional rights to equal protection because
under that section young adult offenders serving LWOP
sentences for crimes they committed between the ages of 18 and
25 are ineligible for youth offender parole hearings but young
adult offenders serving non-LWOP sentences and juvenile
offenders who committed crimes before the age of 18 serving
LWOP sentences are eligible. Blanche also argues his LWOP
sentence constituted cruel or unusual punishment in violation of
the California Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) We affirm.

1 In People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 283-284, the
Supreme Court held a juvenile offender who is eligible for a youth
offender parole hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 3051 is
entitled to a hearing to develop and preserve evidence of his or
her youth-related characteristics and the circumstances at the
time of the offense.
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Evidence at Trial3
1. The November 1991 murder and attempted murder
On the night of November 20, 1991 Blanche went to
Heather Donham’s house to visit her and to retrieve his jacket
and other belongings. Donham lived with her mother, her
mother’s boyfriend Omeli Aulai, and her mother’s children with
Aulai. Aulai and Blanche walked out to the sidewalk, followed by
Keith Jones and Stephen Jordan, who had been visiting the
residence. Blanche and Jordan got into an argument over
Donham, with each man claiming she was his girlfriend. Blanche
stabbed Jordan in the upper abdomen, and Jordan punched
Blanche in the chin. Jordan went inside the house to call 911,
and Aulai followed. Blanche chased Jones and fatally stabbed
him in the back, shoulder, and mouth before fleeing.

2. The May 1992 murder
On May 17, 1992 Blanche was living at an apartment with
his close friend Michele Cespuglio, her young son, and Brenda
Zaidi. Brenda’s husband, Safar Zaidi,4 paid the rent for the
apartment, but he did not live there. Brenda told Blanche that
he had to move out. Blanche became enraged, tore a picture off

3 We grant Blanche’s March 11, 2024 request for judicial
notice of our prior unpublished opinion in People v. Blanche
(Dec. 2, 1995, B087391) [nonpub. opn.] (Blanche). (Evid. Code,
§§ 452, subd. (d)(1) & 459.) We summarize the trial evidence
recounted in our prior opinion.
4 We refer to Brenda and Safar Zaidi by their first names to
avoid confusion.

3
the wall, knocked over an entertainment center, and broke all the
windows in the living room before leaving. When Safar arrived
at the apartment, he became furious when he saw the damage.
Blanche called Cespuglio to apologize, but Safar grabbed the
phone and cursed and yelled at Blanche. Two minutes later
Blanche returned to the apartment, and Safar again yelled and
cursed at him. Banche grabbed a butcher knife from the kitchen,
chased Safar out of the apartment and down the stairs, and
stabbed him in the back before fleeing. Safar survived an
emergency surgery, but he later died due to blood clotting
complications.
After his arrest, Blanche gave a recorded confession while
in police custody, which was played for the jury.

3. The defense case
Blanche testified at trial on his own behalf. His testimony
was substantially similar to what he told police at the time of his
arrest. Blanche admitted he committed the crimes, but he
claimed he acted in self-defense.

B. The Verdicts, Sentencing, and First Appeal
On July 7, 1994 the jury found Blanche guilty of the first
degree murder of Safar (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), the first degree
murder of Jones (§ 187, subd. (a); count 2), and the attempted
murder of Jordan (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 3). The jury found
true the multiple-murder special circumstance allegation.
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).) The jury also found true with respect to
counts 1 and 2 that Blanche personally used a deadly or
dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)) and as to count 3 that
Blanche inflicted great bodily injury on Jordan (§ 12022.7).

4
On August 24, 1994 the trial court sentenced Blanche to
LWOP on the two murder convictions. On the attempted murder
conviction the court sentenced Blanche to a consecutive term of
life with the possibility of parole, plus an additional determinate
term of four years for the weapon use and great bodily injury
enhancements.
Blanche appealed, and we affirmed. (Blanche, supra,
B087391.)

C. Blanche’s Motion for a Franklin Proceeding
On February 10, 2023 Blanche moved for a Franklin
proceeding to make a record of mitigating evidence tied to his
youth. (See In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 451 [“an offender
entitled to a hearing under sections 3051 and 4801 may seek the
remedy of a Franklin proceeding even though the offender’s
sentence is otherwise final”]; People v. Franklin, supra,
63 Cal.4th at pp. 283-284.) Blanche asserted he was convicted of
two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder; he was
24 years old at the time of the crimes; and he was sentenced to
LWOP. Blanche argued the exclusion from eligibility for youth
offender parole hearings for 18-to-25-year-old young adult
offenders who had been sentenced to LWOP violated his federal
and state constitutional rights to equal protection (U.S. Const.,
14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a)) and the state
Constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment (Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 17).
On February 24, 2023 the superior court denied Blanche’s
request for a Franklin proceeding. The court explained in a
written order, “In 1994, Petitioner was found guilty of two counts
of murder in the first degree and one count of attempted murder.

5
He was twenty-four years old at the time he committed his crime
and, consequently, was sentenced to a state prison term of life
without the possibility of parole. [¶] Under Penal Code
section 3051, certain juvenile and youthful offenders are entitled
to a youth offender parole hearing for the purpose of reviewing
whether an offender is suitable for parole. However, the terms of
Penal Code section 305l(h) expressly exclude life without the
possibility of parole offenders who were 18 years old or older at
the time they committed the offenses from having such a hearing.
Therefore, Petitioner’s request for such a hearing is denied.”
Blanche timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Section 3051 Does Not Violate Blanche’s Constitutional
Right to Equal Protection
“Section 3051 provides that, at a time designated in the
statute, the Board of Parole Hearings must hold a parole hearing
‘for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner
who was 25 years of age or younger . . . at the time of the
controlling offense.’ (§ 3051, subd. (a)(1); id., subd. (d).) How
much time must pass before an eligible youth offender receives a
parole hearing depends on the length of the original sentence for
the ‘“[c]ontrolling offense,”’ a term defined to mean ‘the offense or
enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed the longest
term of imprisonment.’ (Id., subd. (a)(2)(B).) An offender
sentenced to a determinate term becomes eligible for parole after
15 years (id., subd. (b)(1)); an offender sentenced to an
indeterminate life term of fewer than 25 years to life becomes
eligible after 20 years (id., subd. (b)(2)); and an offender
sentenced to an indeterminate life term of 25 years to life, or an

6
offender sentenced to life without parole for a crime committed
before the age of 18, becomes eligible after 25 years (id.,
subd. (b)(3), (4)).” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 842-
843 (Hardin).)
“Certain persons are, however, categorically ineligible for
youth offender parole hearings, including offenders sentenced for
multiple violent or serious felonies under the ‘Three Strikes’ law
(Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12); offenders sentenced
for sex offenses under the One Strike law (id., § 667.61); and
offenders who, ‘subsequent to attaining 26 years of age, commit[]
an additional crime for which malice aforethought is a necessary
element of the crime or for which the individual is sentenced to
life in prison.’ (§ 3051, subd. (h).) The statute also excludes those
who . . . are sentenced to life without parole for a controlling
offense committed after reaching the age of 18. (Ibid.)” (Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 843.)
Blanche contends section 3051’s exclusion of young adult
offenders with LWOP sentences from eligibility for a youth
offender parole hearing violated his federal and state
constitutional rights to equal protection. The Supreme Court
recently rejected this argument in Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
page 864.
In Hardin, Tony Hardin was sentenced to LWOP following
his conviction of first degree murder with a special circumstance
finding for an offense he committed when he was 25 years old.
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 840.) Hardin asserted
section 3051 violated his right to equal protection because “once
the Legislature decided to expand [youth offender parole]
opportunities to young adults, it could not rationally treat those
sentenced to life without parole differently from those convicted

7
of other serious crimes and serving lengthy parole-eligible
sentences.” (Hardin, at p. 846.) The Supreme Court clarified the
standard for rational basis review of an equal protection claim,
explaining, “[W]hen plaintiffs challenge laws drawing
distinctions between identifiable groups or classes of persons, on
the basis that the distinctions drawn are inconsistent with equal
protection, courts no longer need to ask at the threshold whether
the two groups are similarly situated for purposes of the law in
question. The only pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged
difference in treatment is adequately justified under the
applicable standard of review. The burden is on the party
challenging the law to show that it is not.” (Id. at pp. 850-851.)
Under rational basis review, applicable here, a court
“presume[s] that a given statutory classification is valid ‘until the
challenger shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment
is reasonably conceivable.’ [Citation.] The underlying rationale
for a statutory classification need not have been ‘ever actually
articulated’ by lawmakers, nor ‘be empirically substantiated.’”
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 852.) The court reviewed
section 3051’s legislative history and observed that “in designing
section 3051, the Legislature consciously drew lines that altered
the parole component of offenders’ sentences based not only on
the age of the offender (and thus the offender’s amenability to
rehabilitation) but also on the offense and sentence imposed. The
lines the Legislature drew necessarily reflect a set of legislative
judgments about the nature of punishment that is appropriate for
the crime.” (Hardin, at p. 855.) The court acknowledged that it
“may be true,” as Hardin had argued, that the crime-based
categories that affect at what age an offender is eligible for relief
may not be rationally related to the purpose of expanding

8
opportunities for early release based on the attributes of youth.
(Ibid.) But, the court continued, the Legislature was aware of
this point, and “nonetheless crafted a statutory scheme that
assigns significance to the nature of underlying offenses and
accompanying sentences.” (Ibid.) Therefore, the court reasoned,
“[t]he statutory framework indicates that the Legislature aimed
to increase opportunities for meaningful release for young adult
offenders, while taking into account the appropriate punishment
for the underlying crimes, depending on their severity.” (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court held Hardin could not establish that
“the Legislature’s decision to exclude offenders convicted of
special circumstance murder from the youth offender parole
system” is ‘so devoid of even minimal rationality that it is
unconstitutional as a matter of equal protection.’”5 (Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 859.) The court explained that
section 190.2 adequately separates out the most egregious
murders (special circumstance murders), which are subject to the
most severe punishment—death or LWOP—from other murders
(id. at p. 859), and therefore, “it is difficult to see how the
Legislature that enacted section 3051 could have acted
irrationally in singling out special circumstance murder as a
particularly culpable offense.” (Id. at p. 860.) Accordingly,
Hardin failed to show “that the exclusion of offenders who are
serving sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole
for a crime committed after the age of 18 from youth offender
parole eligibility is irrational.” (Id. at p. 864.)

5 In Hardin, the defendant only raised an equal protection
challenge under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Hardin, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 847, fn. 2.)

9
Similar to the defendant in Hardin, Blanche was sentenced
to LWOP after he was convicted of special circumstance murder.
In his reply brief Blanche contends Hardin does not preclude his
equal protection argument that there is no rational basis to
distinguish between young adult offenders and juvenile offenders
sentenced to LWOP. Blanche is correct that the Supreme Court
in Hardin did not consider this equal protection challenge, but
the court observed that the Court of Appeal (this court) had held,
and Hardin did not dispute, that it was unnecessary to address
this argument because “the Legislature acted reasonably in
distinguishing between offenses committed before and after the
age of 18 because the Eighth Amendment (and the law more
generally) makes the same distinction.” (Hardin, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 846.)
Blanche fails to show that the Legislature acted
irrationally in granting youth offender parole hearings to juvenile
offenders with LWOP sentences but denying such hearings to
young adult offenders with LWOP sentences. As explained by
the Court of Appeal in People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193,
204 in rejecting a similar equal protection challenge to
section 3051, “The Legislature had a rational basis to distinguish
between offenders with the same sentence (life without parole)
based on their age. For juvenile offenders, such a sentence may
violate the Eighth Amendment. [Citations.] But the same
sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment when imposed
on an adult, even an adult under the age of 26.” The Sands court
reasoned “the Legislature could rationally decide to remedy
unconstitutional sentences but go no further.” (Sands, at p. 204;
accord, In re Murray (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 456, 463-464
[rejecting equal protection challenge to section 3051 based on the

10
different treatment of juvenile and young adult offenders
sentenced to LWOP because “the United States and California
Supreme Courts have found the line drawn between juveniles
and nonjuveniles to be a rational one”]; People v. Morales (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 326, 347 [“for purposes of LWOP offenders, the
line drawn at 18 is a rational one”]; People v. Acosta (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 769, 779 [“[T]here is a rational basis for
distinguishing between juvenile LWOP offenders and young
adult LWOP offenders: their age.”].)

B. Section 3051 Does Not Violate the State Constitutional
Prohibition Against Cruel or Unusual Punishment
Blanche contends his LWOP sentence constituted cruel or
unusual punishment under article 1, section 17 of the California
Constitution.6 He acknowledges that his sentence did not
constitute cruel or unusual punishment when it was imposed in
1994. Instead, he argues that sections 3051 and 48017 rendered
his LWOP sentence constitutionally excessive because the
Legislature, in enacting the sections, acknowledged that youthful

6 Blanche does not contend his sentence constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
7 Section 4801, subdivision (c), provides that “[w]hen a
prisoner committed his or her controlling offense . . . when he or
she was 25 years of age or younger, the board [of parole
hearings], in reviewing a prisoner's suitability for parole
pursuant to Section 3041.5, shall give great weight to the
diminished culpability of youth as compared to adults, the
hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and
increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant
case law.”

11
offenders who commit serious or violent offenses before they turn
26 years old are less culpable than older offenders, but it denied
youth offender parole hearings for young adult offenders
sentenced to LWOP. Blanche has failed to meet his burden to
show his LWOP sentence constituted constitutionally excessive
punishment.
In In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959, 971-972, the
Supreme Court held with respect to excessive punishment claims
under the California Constitution that “the court’s inquiry
properly focuses on whether the punishment is ‘grossly
disproportionate’ to the offense and the offender or, stated
another way, whether the punishment is so excessive that it
‘“shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of
human dignity.”’” (Accord, In re Butler (2018) 4 Cal.5th 728, 746
[“A sentence violates the prohibition against unconstitutionally
disproportionate sentences only if it is so disproportionate that it
‘shocks the conscience.’”].) Palmer articulated “three analytical
techniques to aid our deferential review of excessiveness claims:
(1) an examination of the nature of the offense and the offender,
with particular attention to the degree of danger both pose to
society; (2) a comparison of the punishment with the punishment
California imposes for more serious offenses; and (3) a
comparison of the punishment with that prescribed in other
jurisdictions for the same offense.” (Palmer, at p. 973.) The
Supreme Court added, “A claim of excessive punishment must
overcome a ‘considerable burden’ [citation], and courts should
give ‘“the broadest discretion possible”’ [citation] to the legislative
judgment respecting appropriate punishment.” (Id. at p. 972.)
With respect to juvenile offenders, in Miller v. Alabama
(2012) 567 U.S. 460, 479, the United States Supreme Court held

12
that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that
mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile
offenders” (who committed their crime before they turned
18 years old). The court’s decision in Miller followed its decision
in Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 574 (Roper), which held
the Eighth Amendment prohibited the imposition of the death
penalty for juvenile offenders. In People v. Caballero (2012)
55 Cal.4th 262, 268, the California Supreme Court held, in the
context of a 110-years-to-life sentence imposed on a juvenile for
nonhomicide offenses, that parole-eligible sentences for juvenile
offenders violate the Eighth Amendment if the parole eligibility
date falls beyond the offender’s natural life expectancy.
The California Supreme Court in People v. Flores (2020)
9 Cal.5th 371, 429, considered whether the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on the death penalty for juvenile offenders under
Roper should apply to youthful offenders who commit crimes
between the ages of 18 and 21. The court rejected the defendant’s
argument that the Legislature’s enactment of section 3051,
subdivision (a)(1), providing youth offender parole hearings to
most youthful offenders who were 25 or younger at the time of
their commitment offense, supported a “categorical bar on the
death penalty for individuals between the ages of 18 and 21 at
the time of their offenses.” (Ibid.; accord, People v. Tran (2022)
13 Cal.5th 1169, 1234-1235 [rejecting argument “that imposing
the death penalty on persons for crimes committed while they
were 18 to 20 years old violates the state and federal
Constitutions because it is cruel and unusual punishment”];
People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 191 [death penalty did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the

13
federal and state Constitutions where defendant was 18 years old
at the time of the killing].)
The Courts of Appeal have applied a similar analysis to
Eighth Amendment challenges to young adult LWOP sentences.
As the court explained in In re Williams, 57 Cal.App.5th 427,
439, “If the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a sentence of
death for 21 year olds, then most assuredly, it does not prohibit
the lesser LWOP sentence.” (Accord, People v. Acosta, supra,
60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 769, 782 [LWOP sentences did not violate
Eighth Amendment where defendant was 21 years old at the
time of the murders]; People v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th
1016, 1020, 1030-1032 [rejecting an 18-year-old defendant’s
contention his LWOP sentence was cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment].)
Blanche argues that the cases that found young adult
LWOP sentences did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment relied on the Eighth Amendment, and not article I,
section 17 of the California Constitution, which prohibits cruel or
unusual punishment. But Blanche does not provide any
authority or rationale justifying a different result under the
California Constitution. And, as the California Supreme Court
observed in Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at page 847, footnote 2,
with respect to Hardin’s equal protection challenge under the
California Constitution, there is “‘“no reason to suppose” that
federal equal protection analysis would yield a result different
from what would emerge from analysis of the state Constitution.’”
(See People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 733 [“There is
considerable overlap in the state and federal approaches.
‘Although articulated slightly differently, both standards prohibit
punishment that is “grossly disproportionate” to the crime or the

14
individual culpability of the defendant.’ [Citation.] ‘The
touchstone in each is gross disproportionality.’”].)
Applying the analytical framework established by In re
Palmer, supra, 10 Cal.5th at page 973, we conclude Blanche’s
LWOP sentence does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment
under the California Constitution. Blanche was convicted of two
special circumstance murders and attempted murder when he
was 24 years old, and we must defer to the Legislature’s
determination that his special circumstance murder convictions
warranted the severe punishment of LWOP. (Id. at p. 972 [the
Legislature is given “considerable latitude in matching
punishments to offenses” because “‘[t]he choice of fitting and
proper penalties is not an exact science, but a legislative skill
involving an appraisal of the evils to be corrected, the weighing of
practical alternatives, consideration of relevant policy factors,
and responsiveness to the public will’”].) Blanche’s LWOP
sentences for the two special circumstance murders (committed
just six months apart) is not “‘grossly disproportionate’ to the
offense and the offender,” nor is it “so excessive that it ‘“shocks
the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human
dignity.”’” (Palmer, at p. 972; see In re Butler, supra, 4 Cal.5th at
p. 746.)

15
DISPOSITION

The order denying the Franklin proceeding is affirmed.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

STONE, J.

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