People v. Vigeant CA2/2

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Filed 9/26/24 P. v. Vigeant CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B331638

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA075960)
v.

ANTHONY RED VIGEANT,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Michael Clough and Michael W. Clough;
Law Offices of Richard L. Sternfeld and Richard L. Sternfeld for
Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
Anthony Red Vigeant (defendant) appeals the trial court’s
denial of his petition for relief under Penal Code1 section 1172.62
after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, defense counsel devotes
most of their attention to accusing the trial court of being
“confused,” “clearly unprepared,” slapdash, and dishonest, and to
accusing the prosecutor of being “arrogant” and “cavalier.” These
accusations are unsupported by the record, and hence manifestly
inappropriate and unbecoming of officers of the court. Because
our independent review of the record indicates that the trial
court’s underlying ruling is correct, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts3
A. The underlying crime
In 2007, defendant and his cousin Trevor Glenn Landers
(Landers) were United States Marines stationed at Camp
Pendleton Marine Base. In August of that year, they befriended
Ramon Hernandez (Hernandez), a fellow Marine who told them
about the injuries he had received on his second tour of duty in
Iraq. His injuries were significant: He had shrapnel inside his
brain. He lost his left eye, his sense of smell, his left frontal lobe

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

2 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
We therefore refer to the law formerly codified at section 1170.95
as section 1172.6.

3 These facts are drawn directly from the trial transcript,
which defendant in his reply brief concedes we may consider.

2
and part of his right frontal lobe. He suffered nerve damage in
his right arm and hand. And his brain injuries affected his
thinking, causing him to process information more slowly and
diminishing his ability to feel empathy toward others.
Soon after meeting Hernandez, defendant and Landers told
him that they had a problem with a man named David Pettigrew
(Pettigrew). They explained that Landers had agreed to buy
cocaine from Pettigrew, who had taken defendant’s laptop as
security for the upcoming deal, and Pettigrew had yet to produce
the cocaine or return the laptop. Pettigrew was a total stranger
to Hernandez.
On the night of September 7, 2007, and early the next
morning, defendant and Landers called Pettigrew several times
in Hernandez’s presence. Landers left one message warning
Pettigrew that he “better fuckin’ call [Landers] back.” Defendant
left three messages further warning Pettigrew that he “and [his]
cousin” (that is, Landers) were “ready to rumble,” that Pettigrew
was “fucked if [he] tr[ied] to run” because they “kn[e]w where to
find [him],” and were “gonna come to [his] house,” where it would
“get really ugly.”
On September 9, 2007, Landers asked defendant to pick
him up. Defendant agreed and Hernandez went with him to pick
up Landers, who was again complaining about Pettigrew. At one
point, Landers stated that, if he had a gun, “he would bust a cap
in [Pettigrew’s] ass.” Hernandez offered up that he had a
handgun in his barracks. Upon hearing this, Landers became
“excited, very enthusiastic,” and asked Hernandez where the gun
was located. Defendant and Landers indicated that they wanted
Hernandez to get the handgun and shoot Pettigrew.

3
Because Hernandez’s barracks was a 45-minute drive to
the south, Landers drove the three of them in defendant’s car to
retrieve the gun and then turned around and drove two hours
north to get to Pettigrew’s apartment in Long Beach. During
that drive, Hernandez said he did not like that Pettigrew was
messing with fellow Marines. He asked defendant and Landers
what they wanted him to do. Their response? Shoot Pettigrew.
When Hernandez pointed out the difference between being shot
and being dead, and asked, “Which one do you want?” Defendant
and Landers clarified that they wanted Pettigrew “dead.”
Defendant indicated at least three times that he wanted
Pettigrew killed. Defendant took the gun from Hernandez,
“aim[ed] it out the window,” “flipp[ed] it around,” and “h[ung] it
out the passenger side window, aiming at the windshield.” In
preparation for the confrontation to come, Hernandez loaded the
gun and fired it out the car’s window.
When they arrived at Pettigrew’s apartment, Hernandez
again asked defendant to confirm his instructions, “Are you sure
this is what you want? . . . If you want this guy dead and he
doesn’t give you what you want, then I am going to shoot him
because you said you want him dead, right?” Defendant
responded that he wanted Pettigrew “dead.”
Landers climbed a fence to check if they could access
Pettigrew’s apartment through a window. He came back and told
the others they would have to go through the front door.
Hernandez did not want to enter the apartment “blind,” so
Landers drew a “floor plan” for him out of twigs and small rocks.
When the three men entered the apartment, Pettigrew
appeared to be asleep or passed out. When he awoke, defendant
and Landers yelled, “Where is [the] coke?” and “Where is [the]

4
computer? Where is my shit?” Pettigrew offered to call his dealer
to get the cocaine, but when Pettigrew placed a call with his cell
phone, he called Landers’s phone.
At that point, Hernandez pulled out the gun and stated he
would give Pettigrew 10 seconds to produce the cocaine.
Defendant did not stop Hernandez or tell him to put the gun
away. Instead, defendant and Landers told Pettigrew to call his
dealer “and get the coke here right now” because Hernandez “is
going to shoot you” “when he makes it to ten.” Hernandez
counted very slowly, pausing approximately 10 or 15 seconds
between each number. When he got to 10, he pulled the trigger
and shot Pettigrew from a distance of about four feet.
Rather than checking whether Pettigrew was still alive, all
three men fled the apartment, ran to the car, and drove away. In
total, the three men were inside of Pettigrew’s apartment for “no
more than 20 minutes.”
Landers drove them back to Camp Pendleton. Once there,
they went to Landers’s room and “h[u]ng out” for about three
more hours drinking. They agreed not to say anything about
what happened and to pretend they did not know each other.
Defendant and Hernandez returned to their own barracks.
B. Charging, conviction, and appeal
1. Charges
In the operative, first amended information, the People
charged defendant and Landers with the first degree murder of
Pettigrew (§ 187, subd. (a)), attempted home invasion robbery (§§
664, 211), and first degree residential burglary (§ 459). As to the
murder, the People alleged the special circumstance that
defendants “were engaged in the attempted commission of the
crime of robbery” and “in the commission of the crime of

5
residential burglary.” (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) As to all three
crimes, the People further alleged that “a principal was armed”
during those crimes. (§ 12022, subd. (a).)
2. Trial and conviction
Hernandez ended up pleading to all counts without a plea
agreement, but agreed to testify for the prosecution.
The matter proceeded to a joint jury trial against defendant
and Landers. The jury convicted defendant of first degree
murder, attempted home invasion robbery, and first degree
residential burglary. The jury found true the special
circumstance allegation and made true findings on the firearm
enhancement.
3. Sentence
Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of life
without the possibility of parole, plus a determinate term of 66
months in state prison.4
4. Appeal
Defendant appealed his conviction, and we affirmed his
conviction in an unpublished opinion.
II. Procedural Background
On December 7, 2021, defendant filed a petition seeking
resentencing under section 1172.6. After a full round of briefing
during which defendant and the People cited to the record of
conviction used on direct appeal, the court held an evidentiary
hearing on May 22, 2023.
At that hearing, the People elected to rely on the record of
conviction and did not offer any additional evidence. Defendant
also did not introduce any additional evidence and did not

4 Landers was convicted of the same crimes and received an
identical sentence.

6
request a continuance of the hearing to allow witnesses to testify.
Instead, defense counsel accused the trial court of conducting a
“clearly improper” proceeding, of making “specious” arguments,
and of having “predetermined” and “presaged” the outcome.
Accepting defense counsel’s representation that “the real issue”
and “main argument” in defendant’s petition was “the
inconsistency and weakness of . . . Hernandez’s testimony,” the
court reviewed the “whole” of Hernandez’s testimony during the
lunch break but otherwise relied on counsel’s written summaries
of the less critical portions of the trial transcript as being
accurate. The court then denied defendant’s petition, finding
sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to uphold
defendant’s murder conviction on two still-valid theories of
murder liability—namely, that (1) defendant was a major
participant in the burglary and attempted robbery of Pettigrew’s
residence who acted with reckless indifference to the value of
human life, as defined in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788
(Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), and (2)
defendant “direct[ly] aid[ed] and abett[ed]” Hernandez’s shooting
of Pettigrew by participating in “sort of a conditional conspiracy”
to kill Pettigrew if Pettigrew did not produce cocaine, and hence
defendant personally acted with the intent to kill.
Defendant filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant attacks the trial court’s ruling with three
categories of arguments: (1) those attacking the ruling, (2) those
attacking the trial court, and (3) those attacking the prosecutor.
Although defendant devotes very little time to the first category,
we will start with that category.

7
I. The Substantive Section 1172.6 Ruling
In 2018, our Legislature amended the definition of
“murder” in our state to preclude a jury from “imput[ing]” the
“malice” element of that crime “based solely on [a defendant's]
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Our Legislature's
purpose was to ensure that “[a] person's culpability for murder
[is] premised upon that person's own actions and subjective mens
rea.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(g).) As amended, liability for
murder is limited to persons (1) who are the actual killer; (2) who
aided and abetted the actual killer in the murder (that is, who
acted with the intent to kill); or (3) who were a major participant
in the underlying felony that resulted in the killing, but only if
they also acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§§ 188,
subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); e.g., People v. Johns (2020) 50
Cal.App.5th 46, 58-59.)
Section 1172.6 is the procedural vehicle by which persons
convicted in now-final judgments can seek to vacate convictions
that do not satisfy the now-current definition of “murder.”
Where, as here, a defendant files a facially sufficient petition and
the record does not otherwise foreclose relief as a matter of law,
the trial court must issue an order to show cause and convene an
evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) At the hearing, the
People have the burden of proving to the trial court, acting as an
independent factfinder, that a defendant is guilty of murder on a
still-valid theory. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
Among other things,5 the trial court found beyond a

5 Although the trial court offered a second, independent basis
for finding defendant guilty of murder—namely, that he was a
direct aider and abettor who acted with the intent to kill—we
need only discuss one basis to affirm.

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reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty under the still-valid
theory that he was a major participant in the burglary and
robbery that resulted in Pettigrew’s death and that he acted with
reckless indifference to human life. Our task is to assess whether
“substantial evidence”—“that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value”—supports the trial court's
independent finding that defendant acted with reckless
indifference. (People v. Nieber (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458, 476.)
In so doing, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the court's finding, drawing all reasonable inferences in support
of that finding. (Ibid.)
Thus, we turn to examining whether substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s subsidiary findings that defendant was
a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as those elements were
narrowed under Banks and Clark.
A. Major participant
Under Banks and Clark, a “major participant” in a burglary
or attempted robbery is someone whose “personal involvement” is
“substantial”; such a participant “need not be the ringleader,” but
his involvement must be “greater than the actions of an ordinary
aider and abettor.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 802; People v.
Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1281.) Courts are to examine
the totality of the circumstances when evaluating the extent of
participation, including several factors our Supreme Court
identified in Banks as relevant but not dispositive on the issue:
(1) the defendant/aider and abettor’s role in planning the
burglary and attempted robbery; (2) his role in supplying or using
lethal weapons; (3) his awareness of the “particular dangers
posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past

9
experience or conduct of the other participants”; (4) his presence
at the scene of the killing and thus whether he was “in a position
to facilitate or prevent the actual murder”; and (5) his actions
after the use of lethal force. (Banks, at p. 803; Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 611.)
Substantial evidence supports the finding that defendant
was a major participant, even when applying the heightened
standard set forth in Banks and Clark.
First, defendant played a significant role in planning the
attempted robbery/burglary. Defendant had previously left
messages to Pettigrew warning that they were “gonna come to
[his] house”; defendant’s car was used and he drove for part of the
time on the day they traveled to Pettigrew’s apartment; and he
told Hernandez at least three times that he wanted Pettigrew
dead.
Second, defendant played a major role in obtaining the
weapon used. He recruited Hernandez to get his handgun; he
enthusiastically embraced Hernandez’s offer to use Hernandez’s
gun; he saw the gun and heard Hernandez test it while driving to
Pettigrew’s apartment; and, knowing Hernandez’s willingness to
follow defendant’s instruction to use the gun on Pettigrew, he did
nothing to dissuade Hernandez from bringing it into Pettigrew’s
apartment.
Third, defendant was aware of the particular dangers posed
by the nature of the crime and the participants. Hernandez told
defendant about his combat history and physical and
psychological injuries; the plan involved robbing and burglarizing
a drug dealer; defendant knew Hernandez was armed; and
defendant repeatedly affirmed that he wanted Pettigrew dead if
he and Landers did not get the cocaine. Given that defendant

10
repeatedly stated his plans in front of Hernandez and saw how
Hernandez eagerly supported him in those plans and how
Hernandez then asked for specific instructions on whether to kill
or just maim Pettigrew if Pettigrew did not produce the drugs or
laptop, the evidence also supports the inference that defendant
was aware that Hernandez was very suggestible.
Fourth, defendant was at the scene of the killing and did
not intervene in any way to stop Hernandez from shooting
Pettigrew even though he was so close that blood from
Pettigrew’s head wound almost splattered him.
Fifth and finally, defendant did not render any aid to the
victim. Instead, he fled the scene; he stopped to get some food on
the drive back to Camp Pendleton; and he “hung out” with his
cohorts for a few hours after they got back to base.
B. Reckless indifference to human life
Under Banks and Clark, a defendant acts with reckless
indifference to human life when he ““‘knowingly engag[es] in
criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.””’
(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 801, quoting People v.
Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 577, quoting Tison v. Arizona
(1987) 481 U.S. 137, 157-158.) This standard “has a subjective
and an objective” component. (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th
667, 677 (Scoggins).) To satisfy the subjective component, “‘[t]he
defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent
manner in which the [underlying felony] is committed,’ and . . .
must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death his or
her actions create.’” (Scoggins, at p. 677, quoting Banks, at p.
801.) The key is whether the defendant evinces “a willingness to
kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even
if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the

11
outcome of his actions.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.) To
satisfy the objective component, the risk of death “‘“must be of
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and
purpose of the [defendant’s] conduct and the circumstances
known to him . . . , its disregard involves a gross deviation from
the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe
in the [defendant’s] situation.”’” (Scoggins, at p. 677,
quoting Clark, at p. 617.)
Our Supreme Court has identified a number of
considerations bearing on whether a defendant has acted with
reckless indifference to human life. “No one of these
considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803); what matters is
the totality of the considerations (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p.
677). The considerations are: (1) “Did the defendant use or know
that a gun would be used during the [underlying] felony,” and,
relatedly, “[h]ow many weapons were ultimately used?”; (2) “Was
the defendant physically present at the crime,” such that he had
“the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim?”; (3)
“What was the duration of the interaction between the
perpetrators of the [underlying] felony and the victims?”; (4)
“What was the defendant’s knowledge of his . . . confederate’s
propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force?”; and
(5) “What efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of
violence during the felony?” (Id., citing Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at pp. 618-623.)
Substantial evidence supports the finding that defendant
acted with reckless indifference to human life, even when
applying the heightened standard set forth in Banks and Clark.
First, although defendant did not personally use the gun, he

12
knew Hernandez was armed with a gun and knew he had
confirmed with Hernandez multiple times earlier in the night
that he wanted Pettigrew dead. Second, defendant was present
during the shooting and close to Pettigrew and the shooter.
Additionally, defendant was present and heard Hernandez
during the prolonged count to ten and did not try to stop or
dissuade him from shooting Pettigrew. Third, the entire incident
took approximately 20 minutes, most of which was spent
demanding cocaine from Pettigrew before Hernandez shot him.
Fourth, defendant was aware of Hernandez’s combat record
consisting of two tours in Iraq and the injuries he suffered, and
confirmed multiple times during the night that he wanted
Pettigrew killed. Fifth and finally, defendant made no effort to
minimize the risk of violence; he did not tell Hernandez to leave
the gun in the car; he did not tell him to put the gun away; and
he did not interrupt Hernandez when Hernandez began counting
to ten, which defendant knew was the precursor to shooting
Pettigrew.
C. Defendant’s arguments
Defendant makes a variety of arguments attacking the trial
court’s ruling.
First, defendant argues that the trial court’s order is
invalid—and that he is automatically entitled to relief under
section 1172.6—because the trial court did not at the beginning of
the hearing formally receive into evidence or take judicial notice
of the evidence adduced in the underlying trial proceedings.
Defendant misunderstands the nature of a section 1172.6
hearing. The plain text of section 1172.6 states that “[t]he
admission of evidence in the [evidentiary] hearing shall be
governed by the Evidence Code, except that the court may

13
consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or
trial that is admissible under current law . . . .” (§ 1172.6, subd.
(d)(3), italics added.)6 This italicized language provides that the
evidence “previously admitted at . . . trial”—which in this case
indisputably includes the transcripts and trial exhibits—may be
considered at the evidentiary hearing; nothing in the statute
requires formal re-admission or judicial notice of that evidence
during the evidentiary hearing. We decline to create an
additional procedural step obligating the trial court to utter the
magic words “I re-admit this” in order to recognize evidence that
is already part of the record of conviction. That would elevate
form over substance and turn section 1172.6 proceedings into a
game of procedural “gotcha.”
Second, defendant argues that the trial court’s denial of
section 1172.6 relief relied upon the theory that he was part of a
conspiracy, which is improper because defendant was never
charged with a conspiracy. This argument rests on a misreading
of the record. To begin, the trial court’s reference to a conspiracy
was to explain its finding that defendant acted with the intent to
kill and hence was still guilty of murder as a direct aider and
abettor, which remains a viable theory of criminal liability for
murder. Further, the trial court’s denial also independently
rested on the finding that defendant was a major participant in

6 We accordingly reject defendant’s collateral argument that
the trial court erred in considering the transcript from recorded
voicemails rather than the tapes themselves. The transcripts
were admitted as an exhibit. Even if they were not, and even if
the tapes themselves (rather than the transcripts) were admitted,
this would be prejudicial only if there is some evidence that the
transcripts did not accurately reflect the tapes’ content, and no
such evidence exists.

14
the underlying attempted robbery and burglary and acted with
reckless indifference to human life.
Third, defendant registers his disagreement with the trial
court’s analysis, accusing the trial court of “cherry pick[ing] a
handful of citations” and attacking Hernandez’s testimony as
wholly unbelievable due to its internal inconsistencies. The trial
court’s analysis cited Banks and Clark—the two central cases to
its primary ruling; as such, they are precisely the types of cases
one should cherry pick. And it is not our role in substantial
evidence review to reweigh witness credibility, so defendant’s
disagreement with the trial court’s evaluation of Hernandez’s
testimony is of no moment. (People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th
86, 106.) For the first time in his reply brief, defendant also
asserts that he was “substantially less culpable than” Landers or
Hernandez, but, as noted above, neither the “major participant”
nor “reckless indifference” requirements are defined by reference
to whom in a particular case is most “culpable.”
Fourth and finally, defendant at oral argument posited that
defendant was too drunk to have been recklessly indifferent to
the value of human life. The record does not support this
argument. Although Hernandez testified that he and defendant
were “drinking[ and] watching football” when Landers called
them, there is no evidence that defendant was drunk (or
otherwise incapable of being recklessly indifferent to the value of
human life). Defendant’s conduct during the hours immediately
before confronting Pettigrew and during that confrontation
support a finding that defendant was not drunk. Although
Landers drove defendant’s car to Pettigrew’s residence, there is
no evidence to suggest that it was because defendant was drunk;
indeed, defendant drove just a few minutes before to pick up

15
Landers.
II. Attacks on the Trial Court
Defendant also levels several attacks at the trial court
itself, including that (1) the court openly admitted that it had not
re-read the entire transcript and instead re-read only the portion
of the trial transcript important to defendant’s section 1172.6
petition; (2) the court misspoke when referring to the exhibits
attached to the People’s opposition, and thus implied that its
ruling relied on a portion of the trial transcript including
counsel’s closing arguments; (3) the court could not have possibly
reviewed Hernandez’s 200 pages of testimony during the lunch
break, and because no one admitted that transcript into the
record from the hearing, there is no way to prove that the trial
court was not lying when it said it reviewed that transcript; and
(4) the trial court’s factual findings in denying his petition “read
like what they were: a quickly slapped together justification of an
order . . . that was not based on a thorough and reasoned
consideration of the facts as they specifically related to
[defendant].”7

7 Although defendant does not provide any reasoned
argument on appeal on these issues, defendant also chastises the
trial court for (1) not allowing him to call a psychologist relevant
to show that he lacked the capacity to act with reckless
indifference to human life; (2) not allowing him to call Hernandez
as a witness during the hearing; and (3) not allowing him to call
the prosecutor as a witness at the hearing. The trial court
rejected each of these arguments, finding that (1) defendant had
not requested the appointment of a psychologist until the date of
the hearing, which was untimely, and did not request a
continuance of the hearing to arrange for the psychologist to be
present; (2) defendant had not taken the appropriate procedural
steps to ensure that Hernandez (who was in custody) was

16
We reject these arguments.
To begin, defendant cites no support for the notion that any
of these alleged missteps somehow affects our evaluation of
whether substantial evidence in the record of conviction that we
have also read supports the trial court’s factual findings.
Further, the trial court did not misstep, and defendant’s
criticisms of the trial court’s conduct all lack merit. First,
defendant cites no law obligating a trial court to re-read every
portion of every prior proceeding in a criminal case before making
a ruling on a pending section 1172.6 case. The court re-read that
portion of the trial transcript that both parties indicated was the
critical portion, and relied on counsel to accurately represent the
other portions of the transcript not implicated in defendant’s
petition. To demand that a court spend days and days re-reading
portions of the proceedings that both parties agree are not
germane to a pending motion is to demand that courts waste
finite and valuable time, and ignore the parties’ own
representations to the court in this case. Second, defendant’s
highlighting of the court’s misstatement proves nothing more
than that the court misspoke; the court’s recitation of facts in
support of its ruling all come from the evidence itself, even if that
evidence was repeated in the parties’ closing arguments at trial.
Third, we decline defendant’s invitation to presume that trial
courts do not discharge their judicial duties and then lie to cover
up their nonfeasance. The law is to the contrary. (Evid. Code, §

brought to court, and instead merely chatted with the court clerk,
and then made the “tactical” decision not to request a
continuance of the hearing to secure Hernandez’s presence; and
(3) defendant’s proffer as to what testimony the prosecutor would
provide indicated only a “fishing expedition.” We perceive no
error with these rulings.

17
664.) What is more, we know that the trial court actually read
the transcript because it cited numerous portions of Hernandez’s
testimony and referenced exhibits that do not appear in the
parties’ summaries of that testimony. Fourth, defendant’s
unprofessional and petty characterization of the trial court’s
findings as “quickly slapped together” overlooks that those
findings track the Banks and Clark factors, which are the salient
points necessary for a “thorough and reasoned consideration” of
the issues defendant’s petition presents.
III. Attacks on the Prosecutor
Defendant also levels several attacks on the prosecutor,
including that he (1) incorrectly urged the trial court to rely on
the factual summary from the Landers appellate decision, (2)
improperly pressured the trial court to move forward on the
hearing just because the victim’s family was in court, (3)
improperly resisted the subpoenas for Hernandez and himself,
and (4) acted in an “arrogant” and “cavalier” manner.
We reject these arguments.
Again, and as a threshold matter, defendant cites no
authority for the proposition that misconduct by the prosecutor
invalidates a ruling that is supported by substantial evidence.
Further, defendant’s arguments all lack merit on their own.
First, because the trial court’s order is supported by the evidence
in the trial transcript, any error by the prosecutor in urging the
trial court to look to the factual summary in the appellate opinion
was not prejudicial. Second, the hearing went forward because
defendant also declined to ask for a continuance. Third,
Hernandez was never subject to a subpoena, and the trial court
denied defendant’s request to call the prosecutor because
defendant failed to make a proffer that amounted to more than a

18
“fishing expedition”; that the prosecutor moved to quash the
subpoena against him orally (rather than in writing) is
accordingly of no moment. Lastly, we have reviewed the hearing
transcript and do not see evidence of the prosecutor being either
“arrogant” or “cavalier”; but even if there were, at no point did
the prosecutor—unlike defense counsel—cross the line into
unprofessionalism.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST

_________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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