People v. Cabrera CA3

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Filed 9/26/24 P. v. Cabrera CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C099447

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 23FE005693)

v.

GABRIEL CABRERA,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Gabriel Cabrera pled no contest to a corporal injury offense against his
girlfriend that occurred on January 10, 2023. He was later charged in this case with
discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner and being a felon in possession of a
firearm several days prior to the domestic violence incident charged in the first case. The
trial court denied defendant’s pretrial request to dismiss the firearm charges in the second
case under Penal Code1 section 654 and Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d 822
(Kellett), and a jury found defendant guilty of those offenses.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in not dismissing the firearm
charges under the Kellett rule because the domestic violence offense and the firearm
offenses occurred at substantially the same time and location, and the evidence was
required to prove that the domestic violence offense supplied proof of the firearm
offenses. He also contends insufficient evidence supports his negligent discharge
conviction. Finding no merit to his contentions, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A
The Events Of January 2023
On January 25, 2023,2 Sacramento County Sheriff’s deputies responded to a report
of a domestic violence threat at an apartment complex in Sacramento. M.D. told deputies
that defendant, her boyfriend, had threatened her in a text message. M.D. claimed that
defendant was in possession of multiple firearms and that three weeks prior he had
threatened her with a firearm and had punched and choked her. While speaking with the
deputies, defendant contacted M.D. via FaceTime and he appeared to have two real
firearms with him in his vehicle. She took blurry screen shots of defendant and gave
them to the deputies. She also provided the deputies with screenshots and recorded audio
from her messages with defendant on his cell phone.
The following day, January 26, Deputy Aaron Muradyan pulled defendant over
while driving and arrested him for the domestic violence incident involving M.D. the
previous night; defendant was the only person in the car. At the time, defendant was on
felony searchable probation with an electronic search condition. A cell phone actively
being used for GPS navigation, a scale, and various drugs were found in the car, but no
firearms were located. Defendant denied the phone was his and refused to provide the

2 All further date references are to 2023 unless otherwise noted.
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passcode to access the phone. Detective Steve Hernandez collected the phone as
evidence.
B
The Domestic Violence Case
On January 30, four days after his arrest, defendant was arraigned on a felony
complaint in Sacramento County case No. 23FE001364 (the domestic violence case),
alleging that on or about January 10 defendant had made criminal threats against M.D.
and had unlawfully inflicted a corporal injury on her, and that on or about January 26,3
defendant had made criminal threats against M.D. and had unlawfully possessed cocaine
and oxycodone for sale.
Ten days later, on February 9, defendant pled no contest to the inflicting a corporal
injury on January 10, and the remaining counts were dismissed. On March 1, the trial
court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on two years of formal
probation with various terms and conditions, including 364 days in county jail.
C
Investigation And Prosecution Of The Firearm Case
After confiscating defendant’s cell phone, Detective Hernandez submitted it to a
technician for a forensic analysis to extract data from the phone without the passcode. By
the end of February or early March, the extraction process revealed the phone’s passcode,
which allowed Detective Hernandez to fully access the phone to examine its contents. In
doing so, he found several date- and time-stamped videos on the phone.4
One video recorded around 6:39 p.m. on January 1 showed defendant holding a
pistol with an extended translucent magazine. Inside the see-through magazine, there
were “ammunition stampings on the back of the casing of the live ammunition.” Based

3 Defendant was arrested with drugs in his car on January 26, but M.D. reported the
domestic violence incident on January 25.
4 The jury reviewed these videos during trial.
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on his training and experience, Detective Hernandez explained that the caliber of the
bullets in the magazine was “40 Smith & Wesson” and that there were two different
brands of ammunition visible in the magazine.
Detective Hernandez also found four videos recorded on January 7. In one of the
videos taken around 6:12 a.m., defendant is seen “cycling live rounds” out of a “polymer
80 firearm.” In another video, recorded around 7:35 a.m., defendant is holding what
appears to be the same firearm from the previous videos demonstrating its “night sights”
and “combination laser light attachment.” A video recorded at 7:37 a.m. shows
defendant demonstrating the attachment and removing the pistol magazine from what
appears to be the same gun. A fourth video from January 7 shows defendant wearing
distinctive clothing.
Detective Hernandez located another video taken on January 8 at 1:56 a.m. In the
video, defendant is wearing the same distinctive clothing from the previous video and is
holding a firearm at the apartment complex. It is dark and lightly raining. It appears
defendant is recording the video on his cell phone while his phone light is on, and he then
discharges the firearm four times in an unknown direction.
Upon recognizing the apartment complex in the video, Detective Hernandez
investigated whether any 911 calls regarding the complex were received around 2:00 a.m.
on January 8, and discovered that a 911 call had been made on that date. In April, he
interviewed several residents of the apartment complex regarding the shooting that he
believed occurred there on January 8. He also collected shell casings that one witness
had picked up from the parking lot following the shooting.
On April 21 defendant was charged in case No. 23FE005693 (the firearm case)
with negligently discharging a firearm on or about January 8 and being a felon in
possession of a firearm on or about and between January 1 and January 8 based on the
videos Detective Hernandez had found following the forensic analysis of defendant’s
phone. The information also alleged two circumstances in aggravation—that defendant

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was on probation when he committed the offenses and that his participation on probation
had been less than satisfactory. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(4), (b)(5).)
D
Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss Under Kellett
Defendant moved to dismiss the firearm charges under section 654 and our
Supreme Court’s decision in Kellett, supra, 63 Cal.2d 822, arguing it constituted a
successive prosecution of offenses arising from the same act or course of conduct as his
earlier domestic violence case. Defendant argued that the prosecution was aware of the
evidence and facts showing he possessed and discharged the firearm on or about
January 8 when it charged and prosecuted him with domestic violence in the earlier case.
Because the domestic violence case resulted in a conviction and sentence, and the
prosecution failed to allege all offenses in a single criminal proceeding, defendant argued
that section 654 barred the subsequent prosecution for the firearm offenses.
The prosecution opposed the dismissal motion, asserting the two prosecutions did
not arise out of the same act or course of conduct, that the prosecution did not have actual
knowledge, nor should it have, of the multiple prosecutions, and that it would be grossly
unjust for defendant to escape prosecution for the firearm charges. According to the
prosecution, the alleged incidents involved different dates, times, and victims.
At the hearing on the Kellett motion, defense counsel argued that the firearm case
arose out of the same course of conduct as the domestic violence case because “they
share the common denominator of the phone.” Defendant’s cell phone, in counsel’s
view, “plays a crucial role in the domestic violence case with the complaining witness in
that case constantly referencing the phone and texts sent over the phone, videos over the
phone, and the whole reason why the police collected the phone as evidence stems from
[M.D.’s] comments about [defendant’s] phone.” Given the “similar time lines,” counsel
asserted that the facts in the firearm case “somewhat line up with the facts that are in the
domestic violence case.”

5
The prosecution argued that dismissal under section 654 and Kellett was not
required where, like here, evidence connected to one crime, such as defendant’s cell
phone, was tested months later and connected to a second criminal offense. Under such
circumstances, a defendant’s plea to the first crime did not bar a later prosecution for the
second crime after the subsequent discovery of the evidence linking the defendant to the
second crime.
The trial court denied the motion, finding that section 654 and Kellett did not
preclude prosecution for the firearm offenses, nor did trying both cases amount to the
harassment of defendant. The court noted that the domestic violence case did not include
any firearm enhancements and, because defendant’s cell phone had to undergo a further
extraction process before the sheriff’s department could fully access its contents, the
evidence relative to the possession and discharge of the firearm in the subsequent
prosecution was not readily available to the prosecution at the time of filing the domestic
violence complaint and defendant’s almost immediate no contest plea in that case. The
court further found that shooting a firearm in a parking lot sometime between January 1
and January 8 and the domestic violence incidents, which occurred on January 10 and
January 25, did not make the offenses so interrelated that the two prosecutions ran afoul
of Kellett or section 654.
E
Subsequent Trial Court Proceedings In The Firearm Case
At trial, Deputy Muradyan testified regarding locating the cell phone in the vehicle
defendant was driving when he was arrested. Detective Hernandez testified about
conducting a forensic analysis of the phone in order to access the above-described videos,
which showed defendant possessing and discharging a firearm between January 1 and
January 8. He also testified that the apartment complex where the shooting occurred had
over 200 units and was located next to another nearly identical apartment complex. The
apartment complex was located in a busy area of town and next to a business plaza or
shopping center.
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A resident of the apartment complex testified that she called 911 around 2:00 a.m.
on January 8 to report hearing several gunshots coming from the parking lot of the
complex. Although it was dark outside, she noticed what appeared to be a person in the
parking lot holding a flashlight, although she could not see any distinguishing features.
She did not see any cars driving away. Neither she nor her property were damaged from
the incident. An audio recording Detective Hernandez played for her during the April
2023 interview sounded like the three or four gunshots she reported hearing on January 8.
A second resident testified that very early on January 8 he heard at least three
gunshots. Although he was not injured during the shooting, the shots were “close enough
to wake [him] up” inside his apartment. When it was light outside, he went to the
parking lot to see if he could determine how close the shots were to his apartment
building and he found four shell casings near the laundry room, which he picked up in
case the police ever asked about them. He eventually gave the shell casings to the
apartment manager. Detective Hernandez interviewed the resident about the incident in
April 2023, and he showed the detective where he found the shell casings in the parking
lot.
A third resident testified that late on January 7 or early on January 8, he heard at
least four, possibly five, loud gunshots right next to his bedroom window. Based on the
sound, he believed the gunshots were aimed “directly towards” his window. Being
familiar with firearms, the gunshots frightened him, and he ducked and got on the
ground. When he went outside in the morning, he saw several shell casings in the
parking lot. He called 911 to report what he found and took pictures of the casings,
which he later shared with Detective Hernandez in April 2023. He was not injured in the
shooting and his property was not damaged.
Detective Hernandez testified that the four expended .40-caliber shell casings he
collected from the apartment complex had the same stamping as the rounds that were
seen in the videos taken from defendant’s phone. Based on his experience with firearms,
Detective Hernandez testified that if someone were to shoot bullets into the air, they
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would come down with a velocity that could harm someone. He also testified that if
someone shot at the ground of a paved parking lot, like the one at the apartment complex,
the bullet could ricochet and hit someone. And, if someone shot “straight out,” the bullet
could hit someone who was not a target and simply a bystander in the area. In his
experience, bullet wounds can cause serious injury or death.
The jury found defendant guilty as charged in the firearm case. In a bifurcated
proceeding, the trial court found the aggravating circumstances true.
The trial court sentenced defendant to the low term of one year four months for the
negligent discharge conviction and a consecutive eight months (one-third the midterm)
for the felon in possession of a firearm conviction for an aggregate term of two years in
prison, which was consecutive to a one-year term imposed for a drug offense in case
No. 21FE002911. Defendant’s total aggregate term was three years in prison. The court
imposed various fines and fees and awarded defendant credits.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
I
Kellett Motion To Dismiss
Section 654 prohibits not only multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible
course of conduct but also multiple prosecutions. The statute provides: “An act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be
punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be
punished under more than one provision. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under
any one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.” (§ 654,
subd. (a), italics added.) Under this section, double prosecution may be precluded even
when double punishment is permissible. (People v. Ochoa (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 15,
27.) We review the legal question of whether section 654 applies de novo. (People v.
Valli (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 786, 794.)

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In Kellett, our Supreme Court held that when “the prosecution is or should be
aware of more than one offense in which the same act or course of conduct plays a
significant part, all such offenses must be prosecuted in a single proceeding unless
joinder is prohibited or severance permitted for good cause. Failure to unite all such
offenses will result in a bar to subsequent prosecution of any offense omitted if the initial
proceedings culminate in either acquittal or conviction and sentence.” (Kellett, supra,
63 Cal.2d at p. 827.) “This procedural rule is designed to prevent harassment and to save
both the state and defendants time and resources.” (In re Dennis B. (1976) 18 Cal.3d
687, 692.)
Appellate courts have developed two tests to determine whether the Kellett rule
applies. Under one test, courts have found Kellett inapplicable where the offenses
occurred at different times and locations. (People v. Valli, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at
p. 797.) Under the other test, the Kellett rule will not apply unless the “ ‘evidence needed
to prove one offense necessarily supplies proof of the other.’ ” (Valli, at p. 799.) This
evidentiary test “ ‘ “requires more than a trivial overlap of the evidence. Simply using
facts from the first prosecution in the subsequent prosecution does not trigger application
of Kellett.” ’ ” (People v. Linville (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 919, 931.)
Under either test, we find no error. As the trial court noted, defendant’s domestic
violence offense and his firearm offenses occurred at different times and in different
locations. Defendant was charged with threatening and committing acts of domestic
violence against M.D. on January 10 and January 25. He was accused of unlawfully
possessing a firearm between January 1 and January 8 and negligently discharging a
firearm in the apartment complex’s parking lot on January 8. Defendant, moreover, was
charged and arraigned in the domestic violence case four days after his arrest on
January 26 and he pled to one corporal injury offense 10 days later—approximately one
month before the sheriff’s department was able to fully access his cell phone to discover
the videos defendant had taken of himself possessing and firing a gun on and between
January 1 and January 8, the basis of the charges in the firearm case.
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Alternatively, minimal overlapping evidence existed between the cases. Video
evidence that defendant possessed a firearm between January 1 and January 8 and
discharged a firearm in a parking lot on January 8 did not supply proof that defendant
inflicted a corporal injury on M.D. two days later on January 10 or several weeks later on
January 25. While M.D. did apparently show deputies some messages she had received
from defendant’s cell phone when she first made a domestic violence report, nothing in
the record establishes that what M.D. showed the deputies was introduced at defendant’s
trial on the firearm offenses. Thus, while defendant’s cell phone may have played a role
in each prosecution, the overlap of evidence was minimal. (People v. Linville, supra,
27 Cal.App.5th at p. 931 [simply using facts from first prosecution in second prosecution
does not trigger Kellett rule].)
Finally, as the trial court noted and the People point out, the sheriff’s department
had no reasonable knowledge or ability to prosecute all offenses in a single proceeding.
Defendant himself refused to provide the sheriff’s department with his passcode as
required by the terms of the electronic search condition of his probation, which delayed
the detective from discovering, collecting, and investigating the video evidence later
extracted from his phone following a forensic analysis. Had defendant timely provided
his passcode, the videos could have immediately been discovered and the firearm
offenses could have been charged together with the domestic violence offenses in a single
prosecution. Kellett, however, was not designed to shield a defendant from later
prosecution for criminal acts where his own conduct improperly delayed the discovery of
such criminal acts. Defendant is not entitled to such a windfall.
II
Substantial Evidence
Defendant argues that his conviction for negligently discharging a firearm must be
reversed because there was no evidence as to the direction the firearm was discharged or
whether the rounds discharged were live rounds. He contends that based on the evidence,
the jury could not determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the weapon was discharged
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in such a manner as to create an immediate danger of injury or death. We disagree,
finding substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict.
“When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1,
27), resolving all conflicts in the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences to
support the conviction (People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 408; People v.
Small (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 319, 325 [“The substantial evidence rule is generous to the
respondent on appeal”]). We do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate a witness’s
credibility (Lindberg, at p. 27), and “ ‘may conclude that there is no substantial evidence
in support of conviction only if it can be said that on the evidence presented no
reasonable fact finder could find the defendant guilty on the theory presented’ ”
(Campbell, at p. 408). “If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings,
reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” (Lindberg, at p. 27.)
The jury found defendant guilty of violating section 246.3, subdivision (a).
Section 246.3, subdivision (a), states: “Except as otherwise authorized by law, any
person who willfully discharges a firearm in a grossly negligent manner which could
result in injury or death to a person is guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by
imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment pursuant to
subdivision (h) of [s]ection 1170.”
To prove defendant guilty of the grossly negligent discharge offense, the trial
court instructed the jury that the prosecution had to prove, in relevant part: (1)
“defendant intentionally shot a firearm”; (2) “defendant did the shooting with gross
negligence”; and (3) “[t]he shooting could have resulted in the injury or death of a
person.” “Gross negligence,” in turn, meant that defendant “act[ed] in a reckless way
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that create[d] a high risk of death or great bodily injury” and that “[a] reasonable person
would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk. (See also People v.
Ramirez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 980, 990 [explaining that to prove a violation of § 246.3,
subd. (a), the prosecution is not required to show that an identifiable person was actually
in danger of injury or death from the defendant’s grossly negligent shooting; it is
sufficient to prove it was reasonably foreseeable that human injury or death might result
under the circumstances].)
Here, defendant fired a gun four times in a highly populated residential area,
presenting a high risk of serious injury or death rising to the level of gross negligence
under section 246.3. Detective Hernandez testified that defendant fired the gun in the
parking lot of the apartment complex, which was located in a “busy area” of town. The
apartment complex itself had over 200 residential units, and it was next to a similarly
large apartment complex and across the street from a shopping center or business plaza.
Shell casings were found in the parking lot near the laundry room of the complex, and at
least one resident said the shots were so loud that he believed the person was firing
directly outside his window, causing him to fear for his life and get on the ground.
The jury reasonably could have found that firing a gun under those circumstances,
no matter which direction the gun was pointed, was grossly negligent because defendant
created a high risk of death or serious bodily injury to members of the public. The jury
reasonably could have inferred that any number of residents could have been walking
through the complex or sitting in their cars at the time of the shooting. (People v.
Ramirez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 987 [§ 246.3’s “risk element requires the likely presence
of people in the area, not the actual presence of a specific person”].) Indeed, several
residents were in fact home in their apartments when the shooting occurred and were
frightened by the proximity of the gunshots.
Detective Hernandez further testified that bullet wounds can be deadly, and that
shots fired directly at an object, in the air, or that ricochet off pavement or other nearby
structures could travel with such velocity as to seriously injure or kill innocent
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bystanders. (See, e.g., People v. Alonzo (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 535, 537, 540 [shooting a
gun several times into the air in a commercial area not only presented the possibility of
hitting a member of the public, it also presented the very real possibility of generating
responsive gunfire; the fact that the gun was pointed up in the air was precisely the type
of behavior the statute was intended to deter].) He also testified that the four expended
.40-caliber shell casings found at the scene bore the same manufacturer’s stamping as the
rounds in the translucent magazine seen in videos taken from defendant’s phone. Based
on the totality of the evidence, the jury reasonably could find that defendant acted with
gross negligence by shooting live rounds from a firearm four times in the paved parking
lot of a crowded residential apartment complex located in a busy part of town.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
MAURO, J.

/s/
DUARTE, J.

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