People v. Weyls CA4/3

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Filed 9/25/24 P. v. Weyls CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G064341

v. (Super. Ct. No. SWF2007393)

STEPHANIE CONKLIN WEYLS, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside
County, Stephen J. Gallon, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Britton B. Lacy, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
After pleading guilty to willful discharge of a firearm in a grossly
negligent manner, Stephanie Conklin Weyls was placed on three years
probation. Over the next three years, she violated her probation on multiple
occasions, but the trial court continued to reinstate probation. After she was
charged in a different case with animal cruelty, the court revoked probation
and imposed a mid-term sentence on her original firearm conviction. Weyls
appeals, arguing a statutory change to the maximum term of probation had
ended her probation before the last violation occurred. We affirm.
The trial court erred in concluding the statutory change did not
apply to Weyls. The error was harmless, however, because Weyls was not
entitled to the benefit of the statutory change as her underlying conviction
was a crime involving a victim of domestic violence.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2020, Weyls was charged in a felony complaint with
assault with a firearm on Brad B.1 (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2) [count 1])
and willful discharge of a firearm in a grossly negligent manner (Pen. Code,
§ 246.3, subd. (a) [count 2]). As to count 1, the complaint alleged Weyls
personally used a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5,
subdivision (a). As to count 2, it alleged she personally used a firearm within
the meaning of Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8).
In July 2020, Weyls pled guilty to count 2 and admitted personal
use of a firearm. (Pen. Code, §§ 246.3, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).) As part

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Brad B. is Weyls’s son.

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of the plea deal, count 1 and its attendant sentencing enhancement (Pen.
Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(2), 12022.5, subd. (a)) were dismissed. On July 16,
2020, the trial court placed Weyls on formal probation for three years with
conditions, including that she obey all laws and serve 180 days in jail. She
was awarded 37 days of presentence credits and ordered to serve the
remaining 143 days in a work release program.
In May 2021, the trial court terminated the work release order
and placed Weyls on electronic monitoring for 142 days. In October 2021,
June 2022, and December 2022, Weyls admitted violating her probation.
Each time, the court reinstated her probation.
On September 22, 2023, a felony complaint was filed charging
Weyls with animal cruelty. (Pen. Code, § 597, subd. (b).)2 Three days later,
Weyls was taken into custody on the instant probation violation; she denied
violating her probation. In November 2023, as a condition of Weyls’s
supervised release, she was ordered not to “maintain or possess any animals
including goldfish.” In December 2023, however, sheriff’s deputies responding
to a call from Weyls’s daughter about a verbal disagreement found Weyls in
possession of several dogs.
The evidentiary hearing on the alleged probation violation was
held in February 2024.
Weyls, through her defense counsel, argued the new two-year
limitation on the length of probation found in Penal Code section 1203.1
applied to her, meaning she was not legally on probation when the alleged
September 2023 probation violation occurred. The trial court found the

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Although the parties’ briefs go into great detail on the facts
underlying the animal cruelty charge, they are not relevant to our
determination on the probation issue and we do not address them.

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two-year limit on probation did not apply to Weyls because willful discharge
of a firearm, the charge to which she pled guilty, was a violent offense within
the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c). (Pen. Code,
§ 1203.1, subd. (l)(1).)
After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found Weyls had
been criminally negligent and had violated the terms of her probation by
failing to adequately care for an injured dog in her care although “there were
reasonable alternatives available that would have eliminated the suffering of
the animal, including surrender” and by having “dogs in her care and
custody” despite the court’s order.
On March 1, 2024, the trial court revoked Weyls’s probation and
imposed the mid-term sentence of two years. The court awarded Weyls
presentence credits of 184 days. Weyls filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s finding that a defendant violated the terms of
probation is reviewed for substantial evidence. (People v. Rauen (2011) 201
Cal.App.4th 421, 427.) A question of statutory interpretation is reviewed
de novo. (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.)
II.
AS AMENDED, PENAL CODE SECTION 1203.1 LIMITS PROBATION TO TWO YEARS,
BUT THE LIMITATION IS SUBJECT TO EXCEPTIONS.

Effective January 1, 2021, Penal Code section 1203.1 limits the
maximum term of probation to two years. (Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (a);
Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2.) Previously, a trial court could impose felony
probation for a term not exceeding the maximum possible sentence. (People v.

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Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 965–966.) The California Supreme Court
held the amendment to Penal Code section 1203.1 applies retroactively.
(People v. Prudholme, supra, at pp. 966–968.) The court also held the
amendment was applicable to plea agreements. (Id. at pp. 975–976.)
However, the statute contains exceptions to the two-year
limitation. Two of those exceptions are at issue here. “The two-year probation
limit in subdivision (a) shall not apply to: [¶] . . . An offense listed in
subdivision (c) of [Penal Code] Section 667.5 and an offense that includes
specific probation lengths within its provisions.” (Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd.
(l)(1), italics added.)
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING A VIOLENT FELONY NOT LISTED IN
PENAL CODE SECTION 667.5, SUBDIVISION (C) INVOKES THE EXCEPTION TO THE
TWO-YEAR PROBATION LIMITATION.

Weyls was originally placed on three years formal probation. The
amendments to Penal Code section 1203.1 took effect during her probation
term. Therefore, unless one of the exceptions to the statute applies, Weyls’s
probation term would be reduced to two years by operation of law, meaning
her probation would have ended before the September 2023 probation
violation occurred.
The trial court, however, found an exception to the two-year
probation limit applied. “The court does believe . . . this to be a violent offense
because of the [Penal Code section] 667.5(c) that she had pled to a felony
charge and admitted to use of a firearm which does make it a violent offense
as well as a strike. And the court—based on that, the court believes she
would not have been entitled to relief, whether sought or not. And so for those

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reasons the probationary period would have existed at the time of the alleged
offense or violations.”
Willful discharge of a firearm in a grossly negligent manner
(Pen. Code, § 246.3, subd. (a)) is not listed in Penal Code section 667.5,
subdivision (c). And although Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c)
includes “any felony in which the defendant uses a firearm which use has
been charged and proved as provided in subdivision (a) of [Penal Code]
Section 12022.3, or Section 12022.5 or 12022.55,” or “[a]ny violation of [Penal
Code] Section 12022.53,” Weyls admitted personally using a firearm under
Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8), which is not mentioned in Penal
Code section 667.5, subdivision (c).3
Many violent crimes are not listed in Penal Code section 667.5,
subdivision (c). “By its terms, section 667.5(c) is not an all-purpose list of
violent felonies for use in every aspect of California law. Instead, section
667.5(c) expressly states it is identifying violent felonies only ‘[f]or the
purpose of this section,’ and the purpose of section 667.5 is only to impose a
sentence enhancement for the specified offenses. There are many decidedly
violent felonies, such as rape of a drugged person [citation], sex trafficking
[citation], and hostage taking [citation], that are not among the violent
felonies listed in section 667.5(c).” (In re Febbo (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1088,
1101.) But Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (l)(1) does not exclude all
violent crimes from the two-year limit on probation, just those violent crimes
listed in Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c). (See People v. Jones (2023)

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As to count 1, a sentencing enhancement alleged Weyls used a
firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a). As
noted, however, count 1 and its attendant sentencing enhancement were
dismissed as part of Weyls’s plea agreement.

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88 Cal.App.5th 818, 822 [where statute creates exception to general rule
regarding accrual of credits if a defendant has been convicted of a violent
felony listed in § 667.5, subd. (c), the exception does not apply if the
defendant is convicted of a violent felony not listed there].) We therefore
conclude the trial court erred by ruling Penal Code section 1203.1,
subdivision (l)(1) applied to Weyls because she committed a violent felony.
IV.
THE OFFENSE WITH WHICH WEYLS ORIGINALLY WAS CHARGED CARRIED A
MANDATORY THREE-YEAR PROBATION PERIOD, MEANING THE TWO-YEAR
PROBATION LIMITATION IN PENAL CODE SECTION 1203.1, SUBDIVISION (A),
DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE.

Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (l)(1) also excludes from
the two-year limitation offenses that have “specific probation lengths.” If the
victim of a crime is a person described in section 6211 of the Family Code,
and probation is granted, the minimum term of probation is three years.
(Pen. Code, § 1203.097, subd. (a)(1).) “[A] defendant who is placed on
probation for committing a crime against a victim of domestic violence, as
defined by [Penal Code] section 1203.097, has committed ‘an offense that
includes specific probation lengths within its provisions.’ [Citation.] In such
circumstances, and in the absence of a contrary legislative indication, the
two-year felony probation limitation codified in [Penal Code] section 1203.1,
subdivision (a) does not apply.” (People v. Forester (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 447,
457–458.)
Family Code section 6211 provides: “‘Domestic violence’ is abuse
perpetrated against any of the following persons: [¶] (a) A spouse or former
spouse. [¶] (b) A cohabitant or former cohabitant, as defined in Section 6209.
[¶] (c) A person with whom the respondent is having or has had a dating or

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engagement relationship. [¶] (d) A person with whom the respondent has had
a child . . . . [¶] (e) A child of a party . . . . [¶] (f) Any other person related by
consanguinity or affinity within the second degree.” In People v. Forester, the
court held Penal Code section 1203.097 applied because the victim of the
crime was identified as a victim of domestic violence by Family Code section
6211. (People v. Forester, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 458, fn. 6; see People v.
Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 895 [under Pen. Code, § 1203.097,
two-year limit of Pen. Code, § 1203.1 did not apply because victim was
defendant’s adopted mother].)
Penal Code section 1203.097 focuses on the identity of the victim,
not the crime. “But appellant asserts that section 1203.097 is ambiguous as
to whether it applies to defendants convicted of crimes that lack a specific
reference to any particular victim, such as ‘the generic count of assault with
force likely to cause serious bodily injury’ under section 245, subdivision
(a)(1). Appellant urges this court to interpret section 1203.097 to apply only
to those crimes that expressly target domestic violence victims. [¶] We hold
the language of section 1203.097 is not ambiguous and affirm the trial court's
determination that it applies to a violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1),
so long as the facts underlying the assault involve a victim defined in Family
Code section 6211.” (People v. Cates (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 545, 550.)
If Penal Code section 1203.097 applies, Weyls’s probation would
not be subject to the two-year limitation in the amendment to Penal Code
section 1203.1. The Attorney General argues the trial court’s ruling that the
two-year limit on probation did not apply should be upheld because the
offense to which Weyls pled guilty constituted domestic violence. We agree.
The victim was Brad B., Weyls’s son. The child of a party is a person
identified in Family Code section 6211, subdivision (e). Therefore, under

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Penal Code section 1203.097, the trial court did not err by finding Weyls was
still on probation when she was charged with animal cruelty.
Weyls notes no protective order was issued in connection with the
imposition of probation when she pled guilty, although such a protective
order is a requirement under Penal Code section 1203.097, subdivision (a)(2).
First, Weyls cannot complain of any such error because the error was in her
favor. (See People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 57.) Second, any error by the
original sentencing court in failing to impose other mandatory terms does not
affect our statutory interpretation.
Weyls correctly notes that the trial court did not rely on Penal
Code section 1203.097 in denying her relief. On appeal, however, we consider
the trial court’s ruling, not the reasons given for it, and must affirm if the
ruling is correct on any grounds. (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.

DELANEY, J.

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