CourtListener 10124290•People v. Vasquez CA2/1
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Filed 9/23/24 P. v. Vasquez CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B334700
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA220682)
v.
DANNY VASQUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Sam Ohta, Judge. Affirmed.
Nancy Gaynor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Danny Vasquez—whom a jury convicted of first degree
murder in 2002—asks us to reverse the trial court’s order
denying his petition filed pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6
(formerly section 1170.95).1 As relevant here, that section
permits a defendant convicted of “felony murder or murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime” to challenge the conviction and
petition for resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
Vasquez’s appointed appellate counsel filed a brief
identifying no issues on appeal and requesting that we follow
the procedures outlined in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216 (Delgadillo). Vasquez filed a supplemental brief in which
he raises 10 arguments concerning purported errors at his trial.
We conclude, however, that none of Vasquez’s arguments is
cognizable on appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition.
We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
“Vasquez, a member of the ‘Clover’ gang, shot and killed
Frank Hernandez, a member of the ‘Eastlake’ gang. At the time
1 Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references
are to the Penal Code. Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature
renumbered section 1170.95 as section 1172.6 (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10), without changing the statute’s content. We
hereafter cite to section 1172.6 for ease of reference.
2 We summarize here only the facts and procedural history
relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Although we set forth
a brief account of the circumstances of the offense taken from
our opinion in Vasquez’s direct appeal (see People v. Vasquez
(Feb. 25, 2004, B162629) [nonpub. opn.] (Vasquez I)), we do so
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of the shooting (the afternoon of August 3, 2001), Hernandez was
at home with his mother (Carmen Zapata, who is deaf) and his
girlfriend (Shirley Sanchez). Hernandez and Zapata were in the
living room; Sanchez was in a bedroom.
“Zapata felt a ‘boom’ from a gunshot, then saw Hernandez
turn around and fall to the floor. She saw Vasquez standing in
the doorway, holding a gun. He fired a second shot. Zapata
grabbed Vasquez’s hand and tried to close the door, but Vasquez
put his foot in the doorway. Zapata was face-to-face with
Vasquez during the struggle (‘I saw [his] face right in front of
me’).
“When Sanchez heard the first shot, she entered the living
room, saw ‘a guy’ shooting, and saw Zapata trying to protect
Hernandez. Sanchez helped Zapata force the door closed, and
Vasquez was shut out of the apartment. A neighbor called the
police, who received the 911 call at 1:25 p.m., and responded to
find Hernandez dead of multiple gunshot wounds.” (Vasquez I,
supra, B162629.)
The district attorney filed an information charging Vasquez
with Hernandez’s murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and alleging that
Vasquez had committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal
street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The information alleged
further that “a principal personally and intentionally discharged
a firearm, a handgun, which proximately caused great bodily
injury and death to [Hernandez] within the meaning of . . .
section 12022.53[, subdivisions] (d) and (e)(1).”
only to provide context for our present opinion. Our resolution of
Vasquez’s appeal does not rely on this factual account.
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At trial, the court did not instruct the jury on the felony
murder rule, the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
or any other theory of imputed malice murder.
Instead, with respect to the murder charge, the court
instructed that “[e]very person who unlawfully kills a human
being with malice aforethought is guilty of the crime of murder
in violation of section 187,” and that “[Vasquez] is accused of
having committed the crime of murder.” The court instructed
further that “ ‘[m]alice’ may be either express or implied,” and
that “[m]alice is express when there is manifested an intention
unlawfully to kill a human being.” Finally, the court instructed
concerning the requirements for first degree murder as follows:
“All murder which is perpetrated by any kind of willful,
deliberate and premeditated killing with express malice
aforethought is murder of the first degree.
“The word ‘willful,’ as used in this instruction, means
intentional.
“The word ‘deliberate’ means formed or arrived at or
determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing
of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.
The word ‘premeditated’ means considered beforehand.
“If you find that the killing was preceded and accompanied
by a clear, deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to kill,
which was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that
it must have been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not
under a sudden heat of passion or other condition precluding the
idea of deliberation, it is murder of the first degree.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“To constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the
slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing and the
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reasons for and against such a choice and, having in mind the
consequences, he decides to and does kill.”
With respect to the section 12022.53 firearm enhancement,
the court instructed the jury:
“It is alleged that [Vasquez] intentionally and personally
discharged a firearm and caused death to a person during the
commission of the crime charged.
“If you find . . . Vasquez guilty of the crime thus charged,
you must determine whether . . . Vasquez intentionally and
personally discharged a firearm and caused death to a person
in the commission of that felony.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“The term ‘intentionally and personally discharged a
firearm,’ as used in this instruction, means that [Vasquez]
himself must have intentionally discharged it.”
The jury convicted Vasquez of first degree murder and
found true the firearm and gang enhancement allegations.
The trial court sentenced Vasquez to 60 years to life in prison.
We affirmed Vasquez’s conviction on appeal, but modified his
sentence to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life “with a ‘no
parole’ condition until he has served ‘a minimum of 15 calendar
years.’ ” (See Vasquez I, supra, B162629.)
Nearly 15 years later, “the Legislature passed Senate
Bill [No.] 1437 ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to
ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is
not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was
not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).)
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The bill “substantially modified the law relating to
vicarious liability for murder by eliminating the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant
guilty of murder [citation] and by narrowing the scope of felony
murder [citation].” (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 11.)
The bill also added section 1172.6, which provides a procedure
whereby “convicted murderers who could not be convicted
under the law as amended” may petition to have their conviction
vacated and be resentenced on any remaining counts. (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) Via Senate Bill No. 775, the
Legislature subsequently expanded the scope of section 1172.6’s
relief to defendants convicted of murder pursuant to any “other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely
on that person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1);
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957, 959.)
Defendants who fall within section 1172.6’s parameters
may seek the relief the statute contemplates by “fil[ing] a
resentencing petition . . . alleging they could not currently be
convicted of murder because of the changes in the law required by
Senate Bill No. 1437.” (People v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
887, 891.) “If [a] petitioner [makes] a prima facie showing for
relief, the trial court [is] required to issue an order to show cause
for an evidentiary hearing.” (Ibid., citing § 1172.6, subd. (c).)
In assessing eligibility at the prima facie stage the court
“ ‘ “takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes
a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner
would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were
proved.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The court
may deny the petition at the prima facie stage if the record of
conviction “conclusively establishes every element of the offense”
under a theory of murder that remains valid following the
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enactment of Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775. (People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 463.)
Vasquez filed a pro se petition pursuant to section 1172.6
challenging his first degree murder conviction. Checking boxes
on a preprinted form petition, Vasquez attested that he “could
not presently be convicted of murder . . . because of [Senate Bill
No. 1437’s] changes” to the law. Vasquez also requested the trial
court appoint counsel to represent him in connection with the
petition, and the court did so.
The prosecution filed a written opposition to Vasquez’s
petition, arguing he is categorically ineligible for section 1172.6
relief because he “was prosecuted as the actual perpetrator
who acted with actual malice,” and “the jury was not instructed
on aiding and abetting,” “felony murder, natural and probable
consequences[,] or any other theory of culpability that imputed
malice to [him] based solely on [his] participation in a crime.”
In his written response, Vasquez did not dispute that
the jury convicted him as the actual shooter in an express
malice murder. Instead, he made only the conclusory assertion
that, given the “ ‘very low’ ” prima facie bar established by
section 1172.6, “[e]ven in circumstances such as these [he]
should get an evidentiary hearing.”
At the hearing on Vasquez’s petition, the trial court
concluded he had failed to demonstrate a prima facie case for
relief, explaining:
“In the instant case, the record of conviction establishes
that the prosecution tried the petitioner as the actual killer.
Furthermore, the only viable theory of first[ ]degree murder the
prosecution sought required proof of express malice[,] defined
under the law as an intent to kill, an element necessary to convict
petitioner of first[ ]degree murder.
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“While the prima facie bar is low, the record of conviction
refutes the allegation made by the petitioner that he could not
have been convicted based on the changes to [the law effected
by Senate Bill No. 1437].
“The record shows as a matter of law the petitioner was
tried as the actual killer, who harbored express malice. As such,
the court declines to make an order to show cause.”
Vasquez appealed the court’s denial of his petition, and
we appointed appellate counsel to represent him. Vasquez’s
appointed counsel filed a brief raising no issues and requesting
that we follow the procedures set forth in Delgadillo, including
that we permit Vasquez to file a supplemental brief raising
any issues he wishes us to consider. Vasquez timely filed a
supplemental brief.
DISCUSSION
Under Delgadillo, when appointed counsel files a brief
in an appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition and
identifies no arguable issues, the appellate court is not required
to conduct an independent review of the record to identify such
issues, even when the defendant files a supplemental brief.
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) The reviewing court,
however, has discretion to conduct such a review. (Ibid.)
Cognizant of our discretion, we decline to conduct an independent
review in this case.
If the appellant files a supplemental brief in a case
governed by Delgadillo, we are “required to evaluate the specific
arguments presented in [the appellant’s supplemental] brief.”
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
In his 17-page supplemental brief, Vasquez raises
10 issues that he contends “would have changed the outcome of
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the [section] 1172.6 proceedings”: (1) the two eyewitnesses who
identified him as the shooter did not provide credible testimony,
(2) one of the eyewitnesses was not competent to testify, (3) the
sign language interpreters utilized at trial were not sufficiently
qualified, (4) the prosecution introduced insufficient evidence
placing Vasquez at or near the crime scene, (5) the ”trial court
displayed bias due to race,” (6) Vasquez is not guilty of first
degree murder because he possessed “a youth state of mind”
when he committed the offense, (7) insufficient evidence supports
the section 186.22 gang enhancement allegation, (8) the jury
instructions provided in the case were “prejudicial and erroneous”
(although Vasquez does not contend they misstate the law
post-Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775, and he fails to identify
any specific errors in the instructions), (9) the trial court erred
in admitting prejudicial evidence, and (10) insufficient evidence
supports Vasquez’s conviction because “[t]o prove the killing
was deliberate and premeditated, it is not necessary to prove
the defendant . . . maturely[ ] and meaningfully reflected upon
the gravity of defendant’s act.” (Capitalization & underscoring
omitted.)
But none of these issues—all of which involve purported
errors at Vasquez’s trial—is cognizable on appeal from the
denial of a section 1172.6 petition. (See People v. Farfan (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947 [“The mere filing of a section [1172.6]
petition does not afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise
claims of trial error or to attack the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jury’s findings. To the contrary, ‘[n]othing in the
language of section [1172.6] suggests it was intended to provide
redress for allegedly erroneous prior factfinding . . . . The
purpose of section [1172.6] is to give defendants the benefit of
[Senate Bill No. 1437’s] amend[ments to the law] with respect
9
to issues not previously determined, not to provide a do-over
on factual disputes that have already been resolved’ ”]; accord,
People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 865 [“[s]ection 1172.6
does not create a right to a second appeal, and [the defendant]
cannot use it to resurrect a claim that should have been raised
in his . . . direct appeal”].) And Vasquez does not dispute that the
record of conviction here establishes that the jury found beyond
a reasonable doubt all elements necessary to convict him of first
degree murder under a theory that remains valid following the
enactment of Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying
Vasquez’s section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage.
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DISPOSITION
The order denying Vasquez’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J.
KLINE, J.*
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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