In re T.D. CA2/4

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Filed 9/19/24 In re T.D. CA2/4
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re T.D., a Person Coming B332467
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP05827A)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff,

v.

H.P. et al.,

Defendants and
Appellants.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of the County of
Los Angeles, Stephen C. Marpet, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Terence M. Chucas, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant H.P.
Linda Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Jocelyn D.
Marsha F. Levine, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Respondent T.D.

____________________________

Two men came forward and claimed to be the father of a
dependent child, respondent T.D. (born 2018). At the outset of
the dependency case, the juvenile court granted presumed father
status to appellant H.P. at an uncontested hearing.
Subsequently, Josue C. (Josue), T.D.’s biological father, appeared
and successfully moved for presumed father status.
Later, T.D.’s appointed counsel filed a Welfare and
Institutions Code, section 3881 petition requesting the court
vacate its order giving H.P. presumed father status. H.P. filed
his own section 388 petition requesting custody of T.D., or in the
alternative, an order granting him unmonitored visits. T.D.’s
petition was granted; H.P.’s petition was denied. The court
terminated jurisdiction, and its final exit order and judgment
granted H.P. monitored visits and no share of legal or physical
custody. H.P. appeals from the orders granting T.D.’s section 388
petition and denying his, as well as the exit order. We affirm.

1 Unless otherwise specified, statutory references in this opinion
are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2
BACKGROUND
A. Referral, Detention, Adjudication, and Disposition
T.D. came to the attention of the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in late
2021, when it was reported her mother, Jocelyn, had been violent
with family members in T.D.’s presence and smashed the
windshield of an aunt’s car. Family members reported Jocelyn
drank alcohol daily and excessively. Jocelyn did not appear for
drug testing arranged by DCFS and eventually refused to test.
In December 2021, DCFS filed a petition under section 300
alleging T.D. was at risk of serious physical harm from Jocelyn’s
violent behavior, her failure to protect, supervise, and care for
T.D., and her history of substance abuse and current alcohol
abuse. The petition alleged H.P. knew or should have known of
Jocelyn’s substance abuse but failed to protect T.D. Four days
after the petition was filed, H.P. filed a Statement Regarding
Parentage indicating he was T.D.’s father and describing his
history with the child and Jocelyn. Jocelyn filed a Parentage
Questionnaire that identified H.P. as T.D.’s father and supplied
additional facts about H.P.’s role in T.D.’s life, for example, that
he signed T.D.’s birth certificate. At that time, no other man
claimed to be T.D.’s father.
On December 28, 2021, the juvenile court ordered T.D.
detained. Jocelyn was allowed two-hour, monitored visits twice
weekly. H.P. was granted presumed father status, and in
January 2022, T.D. went to live with him.
Before a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing in
March 2022, DCFS reported that H.P. allowed Jocelyn to spend
unmonitored time with T.D. The court sustained the section 300
petition and declared T.D. a dependent. It also ordered

3
monitoring for Jocelyn’s visits. Though T.D. was allowed to
remain in H.P.’s custody, the court specifically forbade H.P. from
leaving T.D. alone with Jocelyn.

B. T.D.’s Removal from H.P.
In March 2022, Jocelyn entered a drug and alcohol
treatment program and tested positive for methamphetamine
and alcohol on arrival. By early May, the program discharged
her for bringing alcohol into the facility, and it reported her
treatment was “unsuccessful.” By early June, DCFS received
reports from Jocelyn’s mother, her therapist, and Jocelyn herself
that H.P. again had left T.D. at Jocelyn’s home, unmonitored, on
multiple occasions during the previous month. In mid-June 2022,
DCFS filed a supplemental petition under section 3872 and an
application to authorize T.D.’s removal from H.P.

C. Josue Is Granted Presumed Father Status
At a June 2022 detention hearing on the supplemental
petition, the juvenile court found a prima facie case was alleged,
and T.D. was ordered removed from H.P. Josue attended the
hearing. Earlier the same day, he filed his own Statement
Regarding Parentage alleging he was T.D.’s biological father
based on a 2019 paternity test and other facts concerning his
relationship with Jocelyn and T.D. The court ordered DNA
testing.

2 “Supplemental petitions are authorized under section 387.” (In
re Paul E. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 996, 1000, fn. 2.) “Briefly, the statute
provides that any ‘order changing or modifying a previous order by
removing a minor from the physical custody of a parent . . . shall be
made only after noticed hearing upon a supplemental petition.’” (Ibid.)

4
The test results indicated T.D. was indeed Josue’s
biological daughter, and in September 2022, Josue filed a motion
for presumed father status. Josue explained his absence from
T.D.’s early life was because Jocelyn told him that H.P. was the
child’s father. In 2019, however, Jocelyn told Josue he might be
T.D.’s father after all. A paternity test indicated T.D. was Josue’s
biological daughter, and he began building a relationship with
the child, providing clothes, food, and other necessities, and
having Jocelyn and T.D. stay in his home one to two weeks a
month. In the fall of 2021, however, Jocelyn prevented him from
contacting the child, and he did not hear from her again until the
spring of 2022, when she disclosed the open DCFS case. H.P.
filed no opposition to Josue’s motion. Neither man argued T.D.
should have only one presumed father.
On October 11, 2022, the juvenile court granted Josue’s
motion. The court also sustained DCFS’s supplemental petition
and ordered T.D. removed from H.P. The following month, T.D.
was placed with Josue, where she has remained for nearly two
years.

D. H.P.’s First Appeal
In November 2022, H.P. filed a notice of appeal from the
orders of October 11, 2022, among others. His appellate counsel
later filed a brief pursuant to In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th
835 (Phoenix H.)3 in which he advised us he (1) found no arguable

3 An “appointed counsel for a parent in an appeal from an order of
the juvenile court affecting parental rights who finds no arguable
issues . . . should (1) inform the court he or she has found no arguable
issues to be pursued on appeal, (2) file a brief setting out the applicable

5
issues to be pursued on appeal; and (2) had notified H.P. that,
unless H.P. filed a personal brief establishing good cause to
believe an arguable issue existed, the appeal would be dismissed.
(B325344, July 24, 2023.) H.P. did not file a brief, and we
dismissed the appeal as abandoned. (B325344, Sept. 26, 2023.)

E. The Section 388 Petitions
In May 2023, T.D. filed a petition pursuant to section 388.
T.D. asked the court to vacate the order granting H.P. presumed
father status, alleging circumstances had changed in that Josue
was caring for her and had formed a bond with her. Removing
H.P.’s presumed father status was better for T.D., she contended,
because Jocelyn and H.P. were no longer together and “having
three parents in three separate households [was] not ideal” for
T.D. Furthermore, the parents did not get along with one
another, and their conflicts played out in front of T.D., causing
her distress. DCFS supported T.D.’s petition.
H.P. filed a written opposition, as well as his own section
388 petition requesting the court vacate the order placing T.D.
with Josue and either return T.D. to H.P. or allow him
unmonitored visits.
At the August 2022 hearing, the juvenile court explained
its reasons for granting T.D.’s petition. H.P. and Jocelyn falsely
represented to the court that H.P. was T.D.’s father. After T.D.
went to live with H.P., he violated the visitation orders by
allowing Jocelyn unsupervised access to T.D., necessitating
DCFS’s filing of a section 387 supplemental petition. T.D. was
placed with Josue, and as a result, had spent time in the care of

facts and the law, and (3) provide a copy of the brief to the parent.”
(Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 843.)

6
both presumed fathers. The court concluded, “Being a presumed
father by way of [section] 7611 is a rebuttable presumption, and I
think the actions that occurred since [Josue] has had this child in
his care and custody are sufficient to show that it is in this
minor’s best interest to grant the 388, make [H.P.] an alleged
father, and to have his visits to be monitored by a monitor
approved of by [Josue] and/or a paid monitor paid for by [H.P].”4

F. Termination of Jurisdiction and Exit Orders
In September 2023, the juvenile court terminated
jurisdiction and issued an exit order granting sole legal and
physical custody to Josue. H.P., described as “Former Presumed
Father,” was awarded two-hour, once-a-month visits.
Subsequently, the court issued an amended judgment that
granted joint legal custody to Jocelyn and Josue. H.P.’s visitation
was unchanged.
H.P. appeals from the August and September 2023 orders.5
He contends the juvenile court erred in granting T.D.’s section
388 petition and removing his presumed father status, and in
granting him only monitored visits and no share of T.D.’s
custody.

4 The juvenile court denied H.P.’s petition without a hearing, and
H.P. does not contend this was erroneous. H.P. also does not contend
there was a lack of evidence to rebut his presumed parent status under
Family Code, section 7611, subdivision (a). We note the juvenile court
found clear and convincing evidence that H.P. violated visitation
orders by allowing Jocelyn unsupervised access to T.D. when it granted
the section 387 supplemental petition.
5 Jocelyn also filed a notice of appeal. DCFS appeared as a
respondent and moved to dismiss her appeal as moot. (BC325344,
Mar. 29, 2024.) The motion was granted. (BC325344, May 6, 2024.)

7
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law
1. Section 388 Petitions
A juvenile court dependency order may be changed,
modified, or set aside at any time. (§ 385.) A parent or a
dependent child, through a properly appointed guardian, may
petition the court to set aside an order on the grounds of change
of circumstance or new evidence. (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) 6 “‘The
petitioner has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the
evidence (1) that there is new evidence or a change of
circumstances and (2) that the proposed modification would be in
the best interests of the child.’ [Citation.]” (In re J.M. (2020) 50
Cal.App.5th 833, 845, italics omitted.)7
A section 388 petition “is addressed to the sound discretion
of the juvenile court and its decision will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.” (In re
Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415–416.) A court abuses its

6 T.D.’s counsel was appointed to represent her and “serve as the
[C]hild [A]buse [P]revention and [T]reatment [A]ct G[uardian] A[d]
L[item] or Guardian Ad Litem.” (See 42 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq.; § 326.5
[CAPTA guardian ad litem “may be an attorney”]; Rules of Court, rule
5.662(c) [CAPTA guardian ad litem must be appointed for every child
who is the subject of a dependency petition].) T.D.’s section 388
petition was filed by her attorney, who was also her guardian ad litem.
7 H.P. does not contend a section 388 petition was an improper
vehicle for challenging his father status. Courts have resolved
presumed parenthood questions in section 388 proceedings. (See, e.g.,
In re Eric E. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 252, 258 [“A request for presumed
father status after the expiration of the reunification period is made by
filing a section 388 petition”]; In re Vincent M. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th
943, 955.)

8
discretion if its determination is arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd. (In re A.F. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 778, 786.)

2. Presumed Fatherhood in Dependency Proceedings
H.P. contends the juvenile court erred in changing his
status from presumed father to alleged father. “‘In dependency
proceedings, “fathers” are divided into four categories—natural
[or biological], presumed, alleged, and de facto.’ [Citation.]” (In
re J.O. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 139, 146 (J.O.), abrogated on other
grounds, In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622.) “A biological father is
one whose paternity is established, but who does not qualify as a
presumed father.” (Ibid.) An alleged father may be the father
but has not “established himself as either a biological father or a
presumed father.” (Id. at pp. 146–147.) “The distinction is
important because only a presumed father is entitled to custody
or a reunification plan.” (Id. at p. 147.)
As a person not married to T.D.’s mother, H.P. could attain
presumed father status by signing a voluntary declaration of
parentage under Family Code sections 7570, et seq. (See Fam.
Code, § 7573, subd. (d) [a voluntary declaration of parentage “is
equivalent to a judgment of parentage of the child and confers on
the declarant all rights and duties of a parent”].) Alternatively,
H.P. could attain presumed parent status through section 7611,
subdivision (d), which requires, “‘The presumed parent receives
the child into his or her home and openly holds out the child as
his or her natural child.’” (In re Alexander P. (2016) 4
Cal.App.5th 475, 485.) “To qualify under subdivision (d), a
person must have a ‘fully developed parental relationship’ with
the child.” (Ibid). The presumed parent must demonstrate a full

9
commitment to his paternal responsibilities—emotional,
financial, and otherwise. (Ibid.)
H.P. spends a significant portion of his opening brief
arguing that the juvenile court was unclear about the basis for its
order finding him to be a presumed father. He asserts he is a
presumed father because he signed a voluntary declaration of
parentage, though he concedes it does not appear in the record.
He argues that, even if he did not sign the declaration of
parentage, he meets the standard for being a presumed father
under section 7611, subdivision (d). However, the basis upon
which H.P. was found to be a presumed father is not challenged
in this appeal. T.D. concedes that H.P. was properly made a
presumed father.
Josue was also made a presumed father after successfully
moving for that status. However, because H.P. did not
substantively oppose Josue’s motion in the juvenile court, he
forfeited any challenge to the October 2022 order granting the
motion. (In re Elijah V. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576, 582 (Elijah
V.) [“A parent’s failure to raise an issue in the juvenile court
prevents him or her from presenting the issue to the appellate
court”].) Moreover, the October 2022 order was dealt with in
H.P.’s prior appeal: it was identified in the notice of appeal, his
counsel represented the order presented no arguable issues,
(B325344, July 24, 2023), and we dismissed the appeal.8
(B325344, Sept. 26, 2023.). Our dismissal of the appeal became

8 Code of Civil Procedure section 913 states: “The dismissal of an
appeal shall be with prejudice to the right to file another appeal within
the time permitted, unless the dismissal is expressly made without
prejudice to another appeal.” Our dismissal of the prior appeal did not
expressly state it was without prejudice.

10
final. (Property Owners of Whispering Palms, Inc. v. Newport
Pacific, Inc. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 666, 677.)9 Accordingly, H.P.
has forfeited the ability to challenge the order granting Josue
presumed father status. We therefore proceed under the
assumption that both men initially met the statutory criteria for
presumed fathers10 and turn to T.D.’s petition under section 388.

B. T.D.’s Section 388 Petition
1. Contentions of Error and Forfeited Matters
H.P. argues for reversal of the order granting T.D.’s section
388 petition. He summarizes his argument as follows: “The
[j]uvenile [c]ourt abused its discretion because there was no
substantial evidence to support its finding and order and because

9 In the notice of appeal filed in this case, H.P. does not mention
the order granting Josue’s motion to be declared a presumed father.
10 Generally, there can be only one presumed father, even if two
men meet the definition. (J.O., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 147.)
When a juvenile court finds two men can each “claim a presumption of
fatherhood,” its undertaking is to consider policy and logic (§ 7612,
subd. (b)) and determine whether the “scales favor[ ]” one of the men.
(In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 607.) In “limited contexts,”
Family Code, section 7612, subdivision (c) permits courts to recognize
more than one presumed father, where “‘recognizing only two parents
would be detrimental to the child.’” (In re Donovan L. (2016) 244
Cal.App.4th 1075, 1087.) When Josue was granted presumed father
status, both H.P. and Josue had relationships with T.D. She had lived
with H.P. but was going to start living with Josue. No one requested
more-than-two-parents findings, and no express findings were made.
H.P. does not mention Family Code, section 7612, or argue there was a
need for more-than-two parents findings in his opening brief.
(Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah
Ins. Exchange (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 971, 982 [appellant forfeits an
issue by failing to raise it in his opening brief].)

11
it failed to protect [T.D.’s] lifelong relationship with [H.P].”
However, he does not articulate more specific contentions of error
with clarity.
“‘In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply
the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by
legal analysis and citation to the record.’” (United Grand Corp. v.
Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153.) We may
“exercise our discretion to consider arguments for which we can
discern a legal or factual basis in the briefs,” but “‘[w]e are not
obliged to make other arguments for [appellant] [citation], nor
are we obliged to speculate about which issues counsel intend to
raise.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Appellants, moreover, must “‘[s]tate each point under a
separate heading or subheading summarizing the point . . . .’”
(Petrovich Development Company, LLC v. City of Sacramento
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 963, 976, fn. 9, citing Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) “‘Failure to provide proper headings forfeits
issues that may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly
identified by a heading.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “The purpose of
requiring headings and coherent arguments in appellate briefs
is . . . [to require] ‘litigants to present their cause systematically’”
and clearly. Others should not be “‘compelled to extricate
[appellant’s contentions] from the mass.’ [Citation.]” (Opdyk v.
California Horse Racing Bd. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830,
fn. 4.)
H.P.’s brief, including its headings and subheadings, fails
to identify his specific arguments. We are left with a discussion
of how H.P. and Josue attained presumed father status, supposed
errors in those orders (which are not before us on appeal), and
the factual events that followed. For example, the subheadings

12
include “[T.D.] is placed with Josue,” “[H.P.] and Josue do not get
along,” and “Josue and Jocelyn do not get along.” In short, H.P.’s
brief lacks useful headings, cogent argument, and legal authority
to support each point.
That said, we can generally discern the facts and law on
which two arguments are based: (1) substantial evidence did not
support the juvenile court’s finding a change of circumstances;
and (2) the court failed to protect H.P.’s existing relationship with
T.D. We review these two points and conclude all other
assertions of error concerning the section 388 order are forfeited.

2. Substantial Evidence Supported a Finding of
Changed Circumstances
H.P. was granted presumed father status early in the case
at an uncontested hearing, when no other man claimed paternity.
Subsequently, the juvenile court sustained the section 300
petition’s allegation that H.P. knew of Jocelyn’s substance abuse
and failed to protect T.D. Allegations of Jocelyn’s violence and
alcohol abuse were also sustained, and the court allowed her only
short, monitored visits. Nevertheless, after T.D. went to live with
him, H.P. continued to fail to protect her, repeatedly leaving the
child in Jocelyn’s care unsupervised. He did so even when it was
apparent Jocelyn’s drug and alcohol use remained uncontrolled—
for example, after she was involuntarily discharged from a
treatment program for bringing alcohol into the facility. He
disregarded instructions from the court and social worker to stop
allowing Jocelyn to have unsupervised access to T.D.
DCFS filed a supplemental petition so T.D. could be
removed from H.P., alleging he had “endanger[ed] [T.D.’s]
physical health and safety and places the child at risk of serious

13
physical harm, damage and danger.” The court agreed, finding
“by clear and convincing evidence there is a substantial danger to
the minor’s physical and mental well-being.” After T.D. went to
live with Josue, H.P.’s visits were contentious, and Josue
reported H.P. tried to fight him and threatened to kill him.
Meanwhile, T.D.’s bond with Josue grew. Substantial evidence
established a significant change of circumstances that warranted
reevaluation of the earlier order, thereby satisfying the first
prong of section 388.
H.P. contends substantial evidence did not support the
juvenile court’s finding he “came into court, sat as the father,
swore under oath that he is the father, knowing full well he
wasn’t the father.” On this point, we agree. H.P. did not testify
at the December 28, 2021 hearing at which his presumed father
status was determined. This erroneous finding, however, was
harmless “in view of the strength of other evidence in the record”
that supported granting the section 388 petition. (In re Michael
G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 591.) The incorrect finding H.P.
made a misrepresentation to attain presumed father status was
less significant than the undisputed evidence he had endangered
T.D. while she was in his care.
H.P.’s other contentions invite us to reweigh the evidence,
make credibility determinations, and reach a different result.
H.P. questions Josue’s and Jocelyn’s credibility, and he argues
the juvenile court “ignored” evidence of Josue’s absences from
T.D.’s life, Josue’s criminal history, T.D.’s safety, H.P.’s
commitment to T.D., his participation in reunification services,
his acceptance of responsibility for violating court orders, and his
lack of criminal history. He also argues the court should not have
given weight to evidence of conflict between H.P. and Josue

14
during H.P.’s visits because the problems between them “had
long been fixed” before the section 388 hearing. Issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the juvenile court, and as a
reviewing court, we do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court. (In re
Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 602.) Accordingly, none of
H.P.’s other contentions establish reversible error.

3. Protection of the Relationship with T.D.
H.P. contends the juvenile court failed to focus on
protecting his existing relationship with T.D. He asserts his
social relationship with her was more important than a biological
relationship. However, the cases he cites in support of his
argument are inapplicable. Rodney F. v. Karen M. (1998) 61
Cal.App.4th 233, 239 (Rodney F.) and In re Marriage of Freeman
(1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1445 (Freeman) involved children
conceived during marriage, and to the extent the cases suggest a
duty to protect existing relationships, the cases were referring to
the relationship between a child and a mother’s husband, whose
fatherhood was conclusively presumed under Family Code,
section 7540. 11 (See Rodney F., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 239
[conclusive presumption favoring husband over biological father
“reflects the sanctity traditionally accorded to the relationships
that develop within the unitary family”]; Freeman, supra, 45
Cal.App.4th at pp. 144–1446 [where husband sought to avoid

11 Family Code, section 7540, subdivision (a) provides: “Except as
provided in Section 7541, the child of spouses who cohabited at the
time of conception and birth is conclusively presumed to be a child of
the marriage.”

15
child support obligation of then-four-year-old child, social
relationship was more important to paternity determination than
biological relationship].) As H.P. was not married to Jocelyn, the
presumption that section 7540 confers expressly upon “spouses”
does not apply to him. Evidence that T.D. had a strong social
relationship with him does not erase the substantial evidence
supporting the court’s finding that a significant change of
circumstances had occurred.
H.P. does not expressly argue that modification of the
presumed father order was not in T.D.’s best interest because she
had a strong relationship with him.12 However, even if this
argument is considered, substantial evidence supports a finding
that T.D.’s best interest was served by modification of the order
granting H.P. presumed father status. H.P. demonstrated during
the dependency he was unwilling or unable to protect T.D.
Moreover, the “toxic relationship” that had arisen between H.P.
and Josue and their conflicts during visits caused a social worker
to opine it was not in T.D.’s best interest for H.P. to be in contact
with her. DCFS reported that Josue was fulfilling T.D.’s needs,
and she was comfortable living with him.
In summary, substantial evidence supported the juvenile
court’s determination that changed circumstances warranted
changing H.P.’s presumed father status and the change was in
T.D.’s best interest. The court’s order granting T.D.’s petition
was not arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd.

12 As we have discussed, section 388 requires evidence that
(1) there is new evidence or a change of circumstances and (2) the
proposed modification would be in the best interests of the child. H.P.
only identifies the issue of changed circumstances, forfeiting any
challenge to the best interest finding.

16
C. Exit Order
H.P. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by
granting him monitored visits and by failing to allow him to
share custody of T.D. Section 362.4 authorizes the court to make
“exit orders” regarding custody and visitation upon terminating
dependency jurisdiction over a child. (In re J.M. (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 95, 112 (J.M.).) In making exit orders, the juvenile
court “‘which has been intimately involved in the protection of the
child, is best situated to make custody determinations based on
the best interests of the child without any preferences or
presumptions.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The court has broad
discretion in making such orders, which we review for an abuse of
discretion. (Id. at pp. 112–113.)
Only a presumed father is entitled to custody of a child.
(J.O., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 146; Fam. Code, § 3010,
subd. (a).) Because the juvenile court did not err in vacating
H.P.’s presumed father status, it did not abuse its discretion in
denying him a share of custody.
H.P. contends the custody order should be reversed because
the juvenile court intended to punish him, rather than serve
T.D.’s best interests. We disagree. In the opinion he cites, In re
N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1090, the juvenile court abused its
discretion by awarding custody to mother because she
participated in the case plan and father did not. (Id. at p. 1095.)
In this case, the custody order naturally flowed from the change
in H.P.’s presumed father status, which the court determined to
be in T.D.’s best interests. H.P. points to nothing in the record to
suggest punitive motives, and we decline to impute such motives
to the juvenile court.

17
As for visitation, H.P. does not show us that he made an
objection to the visitation order in the juvenile court.
Accordingly, he has forfeited his challenge. (Elijah V., supra, 127
Cal.App.4th at p. 582.) Moreover, H.P. concedes an alleged
father is not entitled to visitation.13 He also does not show that
requiring a monitor was an abuse of discretion, given H.P.’s past
conduct and the discord between him and Josue.

DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

MORI, J.
We concur:

CURREY, P. J.

ZUKIN, J.

13 In his opening brief, H.P. states, “In re A.H. (2022) 84 Cal
App.5th 340 provides an excellent summary of the differences between
presumed, biological and alleged fathers,” and he provides this quote
from the opinion: “‘Alleged fathers have “fewer rights” and, unlike
presumed fathers, “are not entitled to . . . visitation[.]”’ [(Id. at
p. 349.)]”

18

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