People v. Vui CA2/6

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Filed 9/19/24 P. v. Vui CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B331873
(Super. Ct. No. 2023002342)
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Ventura County)

v.

SETA VUI,

Defendant and Respondent.

The Ventura County District Attorney appeals from the
trial court’s order granting Seta Vui’s renewed motion to
suppress evidence (Pen. Code,1 § 1538.5, subd. (i)) and dismissing
counts for unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code,
§ 10851, subd. (a)) and receiving stolen property (§ 496d, subd.
(a)) pursuant to section 995, subdivision (a)(2)).2 The district

1 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The district attorney dismissed four additional charges
against Vui. Those charges are not at issue in this appeal.
attorney contends the suppressed evidence would have been
inevitably discovered. We agree, and reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The alleged underlying crimes
In January 2023, a Ventura woman reported her white
Honda Civic stolen. The prior night, the woman had encountered
an intruder in her home. The keys to her Honda were taken, and
the car was gone the next morning.
A few days later, a Somis farmworker saw an intruder on
the farm’s video surveillance system. She called police while a
supervisor went to investigate. The supervisor contacted the
intruder—later determined to be Vui—who said that he was
waiting for a friend to bring him some gasoline. There was a
white car parked nearby.
Ventura County Sheriff’s Deputy Juan Guerrero was
dispatched to the farm. When he arrived, he saw Vui and a white
Honda. Guerrero parked his patrol vehicle, walked toward Vui,
and told Vui to stop. Vui did not. Guerrero caught up to him and
told him he was being detained.
Vui was uncooperative and attempted to pull away from
Guerrero. He tensed his arms and would not allow them to be
placed behind his back. Two other deputies arrived on scene and
helped Guerrero handcuff Vui. Guerrero then conducted a
patdown search and found a key fob in Vui’s pocket. He later
pressed a button on the fob, which unlocked the nearby Honda.
A few minutes later, another deputy ran a records check on
the Honda and learned that it had been reported stolen.
Guerrero arrested Vui for vehicular theft. He undertook an
inventory search of the Honda and found Vui’s identification
inside.

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The motion to suppress
Prosecutors charged Vui with unlawfully driving or taking
a vehicle, receiving stolen property, and trespassing (§ 602, subd.
(m)). They later added resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)) and
charges stemming from an unrelated matter.
Prior to the preliminary hearing, Vui moved to suppress
the evidence found during the patdown search of his person and
the subsequent search of the Honda. At the combined
preliminary hearing/hearing on the motion to suppress, Guerrero
conceded that he had not formally arrested Vui at the time of the
search. He believed, however, that Vui had resisted arrest by
that time. He would have arrested Vui for that offense and then
searched him if their interaction had ended there. Guerrero also
would have run a records check and conducted an inventory
search of the Honda had he arrested Vui for resisting arrest.
At the conclusion of the hearing the magistrate denied
Vui’s motion to suppress:

“My hang up honestly is the inevitable discovery. I
think that the officer—I saw . . . the video. He could
have arrested him for a 148 at that point. I do
believe he would have patted him down or searched
him incident to arrest because he would have placed
him in a patrol car.

“He would have also been searching him incident to
arrest to see if there’s any indicia of other crimes[,]
including some kind of theft at the property.

“I also think it’s inevitable discover[y] because they
would have found the identification [in] the vehicle.
He would have been arrested for a 10851. They

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would have found [the] key incident to that
search . . . .

“And the trespass alone, we know he was—that there
was probable cause to arrest him for the trespass at
that time, and he would have been arrested at that
time for the trespass. Again, he would have been
searched then incident to arrest.

“So I think the real issue, the hurdle here is getting
over the inevitable discovery issues.

“So the motion is denied. The motion to suppress is
denied.”

The magistrate then held Vui to answer for unlawfully driving or
taking a vehicle, receiving stolen property, and resisting arrest.
The renewed motion to suppress
Vui renewed his motion to suppress in a section 995
challenge to the magistrate’s holding order. Vui argued
Guerrero’s patdown search was unlawful because there was no
evidence he was armed or dangerous, it was not immediately
apparent that the Honda key fob was contraband, and he was not
lawfully searched incident to arrest. Vui also argued the
inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply because there was no
evidence that Guerrero would have arrested him.
The trial court agreed with Vui and granted the renewed
motion to suppress:

“[W]hat makes this case very interesting is the officer
could have charged him with a 148 and put him
under . . . arrest for the 148 . . . and he would just be
searched incident to arrest. But the officer didn’t say

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that. And that’s—he didn’t give that as a reason why
he did the frisk. He could have, but he didn’t.

“Based upon my reading of In re Jeremiah [S. (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 299] and its progeny and the order of
events, it is hard for the [c]ourt to believe that three
officers are in fear of their safety or have a fear of
safety when you have an individual already in
handcuffs. That is the distinguishing thing that
puzzles me here.

“Based upon that, the [c]ourt grants the [1538.5]
motion.”

The court then granted Vui’s section 995 motion and dismissed
the charges against him.
DISCUSSION
Standard of review
The Fourth Amendment protects “against unreasonable
searches and seizures” by law enforcement. (U.S. Const., 4th
Amend.) Evidence obtained in violation of this guarantee may be
suppressed in a subsequent prosecution. (Mapp v. Ohio (1961)
367 U.S. 643, 655.)
Ordinarily, when a defendant renews a motion to suppress
evidence, the trial court “independently reviews the magistrate’s
legal conclusion and evaluates any new evidence presented, and
we review the court’s” ruling. (People v. Turner (2017) 13
Cal.App.5th 397, 404.) But where the renewed motion was
submitted on the transcript of the combined preliminary
hearing/motion to suppress hearing—i.e., no new evidence was
presented—“we disregard the findings of the trial court and
review the determination of the magistrate who ruled on the
initial motion.” (Blakes v. Superior Court (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th

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904, 910; see also Turner, at p. 404 [appellate court reviews
magistrate’s findings where no new evidence introduced with
renewed motion].) “ ‘We review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the magistrate’s ruling and will uphold [their]
express or implied findings if supported by substantial
evidence.’ ” (Blakes, at p. 910.) “ ‘The question of whether a
search was unreasonable, however, is a question of law.’ ” (Ibid.)
“ ‘On that issue, we exercise “independent judgment.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Inevitable discovery
The district attorney contends the trial court should have
upheld the magistrate’s denial of the motion to suppress because
the Honda key fob and Vui’s identification would have inevitably
been discovered. We agree.
“Evidence need not be suppressed if the prosecution can
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information
would inevitably have been discovered by lawful means.
[Citations.] As this is essentially a question of fact, we must
uphold the [magistrate’s] determination if supported by
substantial evidence. [Citations.] Deferential review is
particularly necessary when, as here, the factual determination
depends in part on judging a witness’s credibility.” (People v.
Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1040 (Carpenter).)
Substantial evidence supports the magistrate’s
determination that law enforcement would have inevitably
discovered the Honda key fob found on Vui’s person and his
identification found inside the Honda. At the combined
preliminary hearing/hearing on the motion to suppress, Guerrero
said that he would have arrested Vui for resisting arrest had
their interaction ended before the search of Vui’s person. There
was probable cause for that arrest: Vui was uncooperative and

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tried to pull away from Guerrero, and then tensed his arms when
Guerrero tried to handcuff him. (See, e.g., In re Muhammed C.
(2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329 [acts of physical resistance can
violate section 148].) Had Guerrero made that arrest he would
have been justified in searching Vui. (United States v. Robinson
(1973) 414 U.S. 218, 235.) That would have led to the discovery
of the Honda key fob. Guerrero would have then run a records
check and conducted an inventory search on the Honda. That
would have led to the discovery of Vui’s identification.
Vui counters that “[i]t is difficult to reconcile . . . Guerrero’s
assertion that he intended to arrest . . . Vui for a violation of
[section] 148 with his repeated insistence that . . . Vui was not
under arrest at the time the search was conducted.” We perceive
no such difficulty: Simply because Vui was not under arrest at
one point in time does not mean that he would not have been
placed under arrest at a later point. (People v. Salitter (1976) 55
Cal.App.3d 1046, 1049 [probable cause to arrest not vitiated by
officer’s additional investigation].) Moreover, the magistrate
found Guerrero’s testimony about what he would have done
credible. We must defer to that finding. (Carpenter, supra, 21
Cal.4th at p. 1040.) Our Supreme Court has upheld searches
under the inevitable discovery doctrine when similar findings
were made. (See, e.g., People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 721.)
We do too.3
DISPOSITION
The order granting Vui’s renewed motion to suppress
evidence, entered July 13, 2023, is reversed, and the matter is
remanded to the trial court with directions to deny the renewed

3 Given our conclusion, we do not resolve the district
attorney’s remaining contentions.

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suppression motion and to vacate the order setting aside counts 1
and 2 of the information.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

CODY, J.

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Paul W. Baelly, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Erik Nasarenko, District Attorney, and Thomas Frye,
Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Claudia Y. Bautista, Public Defender, and Thomas M.
Hartnett, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and
Respondent.

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