CourtListener 10118923•In re N.G. CA2/6
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Filed 9/16/24 In re N.G. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re N.G., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B327166
Under the Juvenile Court (Super. Ct. No. PJ53919)
Law. (Los Angeles County)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
N.G.,
Defendant and Appellant.
N.G. challenges the juvenile court’s dispositional order
committing him to the Secure Youth Treatment Facility (SYTF)
for a baseline confinement term of seven years after finding true
the allegation that he committed second degree murder. (Pen.
Code, §§ 187, 189; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.)1
Appellant contends: (1) the juvenile court abused its
discretion and violated his right to confrontation when it
prohibited defense counsel from cross-examining a witness about
prior uncharged conduct, (2) the matter should be remanded for
the juvenile court to reconsider the baseline term in accordance
with new law, and (3) this court should conduct an independent
review of the confidential files reviewed by the juvenile court
following the grant of appellant’s Pitchess motion to determine
whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in deciding what
complaints were discoverable.
We remand the case so the juvenile court may exercise its
discretion whether to impose a lesser baseline term. In all other
respects, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural Background
In August 2021, at approximately 11:30 p.m., police officers
heard a gunshot near Sepulveda Boulevard and Superior Street.
They drove to the location and found a white Toyota Corolla in
the middle of the street. The vehicle had a bullet hole in the rear
driver’s side window. The driver, later identified as C.R.,
suffered a fatal gunshot wound to the back of his head. Inside
the vehicle, officers found cell phones and a plastic bag that
contained marijuana. Officers also found a shell casing from a 9-
millimeter bullet located approximately 36 feet away from the
vehicle.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
Surveillance video from the scene showed an individual in a
white hoodie approaching the victim’s vehicle. As the vehicle
began to drive away, there was a visible muzzle flash, the vehicle
lurched to a stop, and the individual in the hoodie ran away.
Additional video recovered from an apartment building
near the shooting showed a young man running with a gun,
hopping a fence, tucking a sweatshirt under a car, and then
returning to the car.
When officers searched the car, a Dodge Magnum, they
found a white hoodie with a handgun wrapped inside. The gun
was loaded with several rounds in the magazine and had an
empty cartridge in the chamber that had failed to eject properly.
Officers also found a plastic bag that contained marijuana, as
well as paperwork indicating the vehicle belonged to appellant’s
mother.
Appellant was arrested in another state pursuant to a
warrant for his arrest.
Contested Jurisdictional Hearing
At the contested jurisdictional hearing, the People
presented evidence including surveillance video, witness
testimony, and other items of evidence indicating appellant was
the shooter.
The victim’s friend, D.J., testified after he was granted
immunity. On the day of the shooting, D.J., C.R., and another
friend, Frankie, were hanging out at Frankie’s house. They were
all drinking alcohol. D.J. recalled he drank three or four beers
and had some marijuana. After several hours, they decided to
buy more marijuana.
3
C.R. drove, while D.J. sat in the front seat, and another
friend, J.P.,2 sat in the backseat. When they arrived at the
location of Superior Street near Sepulveda Boulevard, C.R.
stopped his vehicle, and an individual wearing a hoodie
approached the driver’s side window. D.J. testified that a drug
transaction occurred between C.R. and the individual in the
hoodie, but D.J. did not hear their conversation.
D.J. heard a gunshot and the vehicle went forward about a
foot then stopped. D.J. noticed C.R. was bleeding, not moving,
and had a bullet wound to his head. D.J. attempted to reach over
C.R. and drive the vehicle but it would not move. Both he and
J.P. exited the vehicle and fled the scene.
Angela Bittbauer, a criminalist for the Los Angeles Police
Department, analyzed DNA seized from the pistol and the
sweatshirt and compared it to a DNA sample from appellant.
The DNA from the pistol was deemed unusable but DNA from
the sweatshirt matched appellant’s DNA.
The parties stipulated, among other things, that the seized
semi-automatic pistol fired the casing recovered at the scene,
C.R. died from a gunshot wound to the head, and cellular
telephone records placed appellant in the area at the time of the
murder.
After listening to testimony and considering all of the
evidence presented, including testimony from the defense expert
on adolescent brain development, the juvenile court sustained the
petition.
After a contested disposition hearing, the juvenile court
ordered appellant committed to SYTF for a baseline confinement
term of seven years. The juvenile court further set appellant’s
2 J.P. was also granted immunity but he refused to testify.
4
maximum confinement time as life, but with the limitation that
the actual confinement time in SYTF not exceed appellant
turning 25 years of age.
Prior Uncharged Conduct
Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion
and violated his right to confrontation when it prohibited him
from cross-examining D.J. about his prior uncharged conduct.
The trial court has broad discretion in determining the
relevance of evidence. (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310,
337.) “A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is
reviewable for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Vieira (2005) 35
Cal.4th 264, 292.)
Here, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
ruling that cross-examination about D.J.’s arrest for carjacking
was not relevant, particularly given that D.J. was granted
immunity for his testimony. Thus, he had no reason to believe
that any unfavorable testimony to the prosecution would result in
adverse consequences for him.
Moreover, there was no confrontation clause violation.
“Although the right of confrontation includes the right to cross-
examine adverse witnesses on matters reflecting on their
credibility, ‘trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the
Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on
such cross-examination.’” (People v. Quartermain (1997) 16
Cal.4th 600, 623 (Quartermain), quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall
(1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679.)
“A trial court’s limitation on cross-examination pertaining
to the credibility of a witness does not violate the confrontation
clause unless a reasonable jury might have received a
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significantly different impression of the witness’s credibility had
the excluded cross-examination been permitted.” (Quartermain,
supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 623-624; People v. Williams (2016) 1
Cal.5th 1166, 1192.)
Here, there was other evidence by which D.J.’s credibility
could have been impeached, including his admission to using
drugs and his plan to purchase more drugs on the night C.R. was
murdered. A reasonable trier of fact would not have received a
significantly different impression of D.J.’s credibility had he been
cross-examined about his unrelated arrest for carjacking.
Appellant rejects this conclusion and contends that if D.J.
were confronted with questions about the carjacking, and
especially if he admitted the violent conduct, his credibility would
have been “seriously undermined in a way that his admission
about consuming drugs did not come close to accomplishing.”
Even if we were to conclude that the juvenile court’s ruling
regarding cross-examination of D.J.’s prior uncharged conduct
was error, the error is harmless under any standard in view of
the overwhelming evidence of appellant’s guilt in this case. (See
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18; People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.)
Baseline Term of Confinement
Appellant next contends the matter should be remanded to
permit the juvenile court to exercise its discretion to impose a
lesser baseline term in light of California Rules of Court, rule
5.806(d), which became effective after the dispositional hearing.
The People agree.
Effective July 1, 2023, the baseline confinement term for
second degree murder was modified from seven years to a range
of four to seven years. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.806(d)
6
[setting forth offense-based classification matrix].) However, at
the time of the dispositional hearing in June 2023, the Judicial
Council had not yet adopted a matrix of offense-based
classifications. Thus, in accordance with the applicable
guidelines in place at the time, the juvenile court ordered
appellant committed to a baseline confinement term of seven
years. (See § 875, subds. (b)(1), (h)(1); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, §
30807.)
Because appellant’s judgment was not yet final as of July
2023, and rule 5.806 grants trial courts discretion to possibly
ameliorate punishment, he is entitled to have the juvenile court
reconsider his baseline term. (Cal Rules of Court, rule 5.806(d);
People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299.)
Pitchess Motion3
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion for “Discovery
of Brady Information” in the personnel records of five Los
Angeles police officers involved in the investigation. The juvenile
court granted a portion of the motion. After conducting an in
camera review of the files, the juvenile court ordered discovery
but did not specify on the record what discovery was ordered.
Appellant asks us to independently review the confidential
files reviewed by the trial court following the grant of his Pitchess
motion to determine whether the juvenile court abused its
discretion in deciding what complaints were discoverable. The
People agree that we need only review the juvenile courts in
camera transcripts to determine whether the juvenile court
properly exercised its discretion.
The sealed record at issue here includes a full transcript of
the in camera hearing, but not the actual personnel files that
3 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).
7
formed the basis of the juvenile court’s ruling. Our Supreme
Court has determined that, in the context of a Pitchess motion,
meaningful appellate review can be accomplished by examining
the sealed transcript of the trial court’s in camera review
proceedings to determine if the trial court adequately fulfilled its
function. (People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1209; People v.
Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1228-1229.)
Based on our review of the sealed transcript, we conclude
the juvenile court followed proper Pitchess procedures and did not
erroneously withhold any information.
Disposition
The matter is remanded for the limited purpose of allowing
the juvenile court to reconsider appellant’s baseline confinement
term pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 5.806(d). In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
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Susan Ser, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Elana Goldstein, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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