Bartlett v. Ahmad CA4/1

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Filed 9/13/24 Bartlett v. Ahmad CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID BARTLETT, D083788

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. (Super. Ct. No. PSC1800647 )

SOHAIL AHMAD et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Carol A. Greene, Judge. Reversed.
Williams Iagmin and Jon R. Williams; Walker Law, Justin O. Walker
and Jared A. Veliz for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Kramer, deBoer & Keane and Jeffrey G. Keane for Defendants and
Respondents.
I. INTRODUCTION
A jury awarded David Bartlett damages in a medical malpractice
lawsuit against Sohail Ahmad, M.D., and Desert Spine Sport & Joint Center
(collectively Respondents). Finding insufficient evidence of causation, the
trial court granted Respondents’ motion for a new trial. Bartlett appeals
from that order, claiming it violates Code of Civil Procedure section 6571 by
failing to address both grounds for negligence he submitted to the jury. We
agree and reverse the order.
II. BACKGROUND
On October 31, 2016, Dr. Ahmad performed surgery on Bartlett’s right
knee at Desert Spine Sport & Joint Center. That surgery included a partial
knee replacement, in which Dr. Ahmad implanted a three-piece prosthetic
consisting of a femoral component, a tibial component, and a polyethylene
liner in between.
Bartlett went to the emergency room twice in the following week
because his surgical incision bled. Those trips occurred on October 31, 2016,
several hours after the surgery, and November 4, 2016. Both times the
attending physicians did not observe any signs of infection at the incision
site. Bartlett also went to Desert Orthopedic Center on November 8, 2016,
where a physician’s assistant examined his bandages and found them to be
clean and dry.
Dr. Ahmad examined Bartlett in his office on November 15, 2016.
Discovering signs of infection, Dr. Ahmad manually cleaned the incision site
and scheduled a follow up visit two days later. Dr. Ahmad observed
continued drainage from the wound on November 17, and scheduled
debridement surgery for November 21. The debridement or “washout”
procedure involves reopening the surgical wound and cleaning potentially
infected areas with a scalpel and sterile water and may include replacing the
polyethylene liner. Dr. Ahmad debrided Bartlett’s knee on November 21;
however, he did not remove the polyethylene liner.

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2
Dr. Ahmad referred Bartlett to an infectious disease specialist,
Dr. Bachir Younes, who gave Bartlett intravenous antibiotics for 120 days
following the wound cleaning procedure. Dr. Younes then prescribed Bartlett
oral antibiotics for one year. Bartlett stopped taking the oral antibiotics after
approximately six or seven months.
In September 2017, Dr. Steven Bradley Daines observed symptoms of
infection in Bartlett’s knee. Dr. Daines performed additional surgeries on
Bartlett in 2017 and 2019, including a two-stage, total knee replacement.
In 2018, Bartlett filed a medical malpractice complaint against

Respondents.2 Bartlett alleged that during the November 21, 2016 washout
procedure, Dr. Ahmad found a foreign object inside Bartlett’s patella, “a
result of carelessness, unsterile materials, and unsanitary conditions during
the surgery.” Bartlett also alleged that Respondents failed to properly
diagnosis and treat the foreign object and his infection, allowing the infection
to spread and resulting in multiple surgeries, treatments, and extended care.

During the 2022 trial on Bartlett’s complaint,3 Bartlett presented
expert testimony from infectious disease specialist Dr. Gonzalo Ballon-Landa.
Dr. Ballon-Landa stated that if you treat an infected prosthetic joint within
the first 10 days, there is an 80 percent chance the treatment will be
successful. His opinion was based on his experience and numerous lectures
he attended, but not any specific medical literature. Respondents’ counsel
asked Dr. Ballon-Landa, “Have you ever tried to scale that period of time to if

2 Bartlett’s complaint contained additional causes of action for elder
abuse and fraud, which were dismissed by summary adjudication. It also
named other defendants against whom he did not prevail.

3 This was the second trial. The first, which occurred in 2021, resulted in
a mistrial after one of the jurors contracted COVID-19.
3
it’s 12 days, [successful treatment of infection] drops a certain percentage; if
it’s 15 days, it goes down; by 30 days, you’re actually below 50 percent chance
of getting a better result?” Dr. Ballon-Landa responded, “I think that is an
impossible question to answer.”
Believing Bartlett developed the infection in his knee between
October 31, 2016 and November 4, 2016, Dr. Ballon-Landa opined that if the
debridement surgery occurred by November 10, 2016, there was an
80 percent chance Bartlett would have avoided subsequent surgeries.
Dr. Ballon-Landa further testified that if Bartlett continued the oral
antibiotic regimen prescribed by Dr. Younes, “he probably would not have
had the problems he had.” However, Dr. Ballon-Landa also stated that
bacteria can attach to a prosthesis creating a “gooey/gluey type of material,”
which is difficult for the immune system and antibiotics to penetrate and
cure.
Orthopedic surgeon Dr. William W. Winternitz, Jr., also testified on
Bartlett’s behalf. He opined that Dr. Ahmad breached an orthopedic
surgeon’s standard of care in several ways, including failing to evaluate
Bartlett and debride the knee within five to seven days following the initial
surgery, and not replacing the polyethylene liner during the washout
procedure on November 21 because bacteria can live underneath it.
Bartlett also submitted Dr. Daines’s previously recorded deposition
testimony. Dr. Daines suspected Bartlett’s infection in 2017 was a
continuation of his initial infection that was never eradicated. He further
explained that implants are non-biologic material without any blood supply,

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so antibiotics are not generally an effective way to treat an infected implant,

and replacement of the implant is commonly required.4
Ultimately, the jury returned a special verdict finding Respondents
“negligent in the diagnosis or treatment of [Bartlett].” The jury awarded
Bartlett $200,000 in non-economic damages.
After the trial court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict,
Respondents moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new
trial. Both motions alleged insufficient evidence of causation to support the

jury’s findings.5 After hearing argument on August 18, 2022, the trial court
took the matter under submission. The trial court then issued its ruling on
August 22, 2022, stating:
In this case, there was evidence that [sic] provided by
Dr. Winternitz that the post-operative care provided by
Dr. Ahmad did not meet the standard of care. Plaintiff’s
Opposition, Exhibit 3, pg. 4 lines 2-28, pg. 5 lines 1-27.
Dr. Winternitz did not testify as to causation. Dr. Ballon-
Landa provided expert testimony regarding causation of
this infection. Plaintiff’s Opposition, Exhibit 2 pg. 3, lines
8-12. He testified that Mr. Bartlett developed an infection
sometime between the 31st of October and the 4th of
November, despite the emergency records and testimony of
Dr. Tang that there were no signs of infection observed on
November 4th. Plaintiff’s Supplemental, Exhibit 12, pg. 27,
lines 5-12. Dr. Ballon-Landa later testified that if

4 Other witnesses testified at the 2022 trial, though neither Bartlett nor
Respondents designated the complete trial transcript on appeal. We
summarize only the relevant evidence within the limited, available
transcript.

5 The motions also alleged excessive damages, but the trial court did not
address that issue in its final ruling. We are therefore prohibited from
affirming the new trial order on that ground. (§ 657 [a new trial order “shall
not be affirmed upon the ground of . . . excessive or inadequate damages,
unless such ground is stated in the order granting the motion”].)
5
Mr. Bartlett had stayed on the oral antibiotics ordered by
the infectious disease doctor, he would not have had the
recurrence of the infection in 2017. Plaintiff’s Opposition,
Exhibit 2, page 46, lines 1-6. Dr. Ballon-Lando’s [sic]
testimony also did not seem to be with sufficient medical
probability when cross-examined as he gave an opinion on
a washout’s success at 10 days, but said it was impossible
to do with regard to 12 or 15 days. Plaintiff’s Opposition,
Exhibit 2, pg. 45, lines 7-22. Based upon this evidence, the
Court cannot say that there is no evidence to support the
verdict and thus cannot grant [judgment notwithstanding
the verdict].

However, the above cited evidence on a Motion for
New Trial, where the Court can and should consider the
credibility independently of the jury’s conclusions. In the
Court’s independent evaluation of the evidence, the expert
testimony provided on behalf of Mr. Bartlett was
insufficient to support a finding of causation. Dr. Ballon-
Lando’s [sic] opinions appeared to be more his experience
rather that [sic] an industry standard. In addition, he was
recommending completing a washout surgery within 10
days or by November 14, 2016. However, there was no
evidence of an infection as of November 4th when
Mr. Bartlett presented to the emergency room. The first
evidence of infection was on November 15, 2016 and
pursuant to the agreed upon facts, Mr. Bartlett received a
washout surgery within 10 days of that date on November
21, 2016. Therefore, the Court finds that there was
inadequate evidence for the jury to find causation of
Mr. Bartlett’s claimed injuries. The Motion for New Trial
is granted.

Bartlett timely appealed from the ruling.
III. DISCUSSION
Bartlett argues he pursued two independent negligence theories
against Respondents: (1) failing to timely diagnose and treat his infection
after the October 31, 2016 surgery; and (2) failing to remove the polyethylene
liner during the debridement on November 21, 2016. Bartlett claims the trial
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court’s order addresses the first theory, but not the second. He contends this
failure means the trial court violated section 657 and the order for a new trial
must be reversed.
Respondents agree Bartlett alleged two negligence theories, but
they identify them differently. They concur the first was based on delayed
diagnosis and treatment of the infection but contend the second was based
on the foreign object found in Bartlett’s knee, not a failure to remove
the polyethylene liner. Respondents claim at trial Bartlett abandoned
what they identify as the second theory, and he only proceeded under the
first. Respondents also argue the trial court adequately specified its
reasons for finding insufficient causation evidence because it discredited
Dr. Ballon-Landa’s opinion regarding the timing of treatment, it noted
that Dr. Ballon-Landa believed the 2017 infection was caused by Bartlett
discontinuing his antibiotics, and Bartlett did not offer any expert testimony
on causation regarding the failure to remove the polyethylene liner. They
assert the new trial order clearly stated an evidentiary insufficiency as to any
causation argument.
A. Procedural Requirements for a New Trial Order
A trial court may order a new trial based on “[i]nsufficiency of the
evidence to justify the verdict.” (§ 657, subd. (6).) To do so, the court must
weigh the evidence and be “convinced from the entire record, including
reasonable inferences therefrom, that the . . . jury clearly should have
reached a different verdict.” (§ 657.)
An order granting a new trial “shall specify the ground or grounds upon
which it is granted and the court’s reason or reasons for granting the new
trial upon each ground stated.” (§ 657.) “This level of specificity is required
‘in order to serve the twofold purpose of the specification requirement:

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encouraging careful deliberation by the trial court before ruling on a motion
for new trial, and making a record sufficiently precise to permit meaningful
appellate review.’ ” (Estes v. Eaton Corporation (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th
636, 642–643 (Estes).)
“No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the content of such a
specification, and it will necessarily vary according to the facts and
circumstances of each case.” (Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104, 115.) But
“ ‘[t]he trial judge’s specification of reasons “must briefly identify the portion
of the record which convinces the judge ‘that the . . . jury clearly should have
reached a different verdict.’ ” ’ ” (Estes, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 642.)
“ ‘[S]trict compliance’ with section 657 is required,” and a new trial order
should be specific enough to “ ‘avoid any need for the appellate court to rely
on inference or speculation.’ ” (Estes, at p. 642.)
B. Standard of Review for Order Granting New Trial
In general, a trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a
new trial. (Romero v. Riggs (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 117, 121.) The trial court
has the power to “to disbelieve witnesses, reweigh the evidence, and draw
reasonable inferences therefrom contrary to those of the trier of fact,” and “on
appeal, all presumptions are in favor of the order as against the verdict.”
(Mercer v. Perez, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 112.)
However, “on appeal from an order granting a new trial upon the
ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict . . . , it shall
be conclusively presumed that said order as to such ground was made only for
the reasons specified in said order . . . , and such order shall be reversed as to
such ground only if there is no substantial basis in the record for any of such
reasons.” (§ 657.) Accordingly, if a new trial is ordered on the ground of
insufficient evidence, and the reasons stated for that ground are inadequate,

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the record does not support the order and it must be reversed. (Miller v. Los
Angeles County Flood Control Dist. (1973) 8 Cal.3d 689, 699.)
For example, a new trial order providing “adequate reason for finding
the verdict wrong on only one issue of several submitted to the jury, is
erroneous. To grant a new trial in such a situation, the trial court must
adequately specify reasons why the evidence is insufficient on all issues
presumably found by the jury to support the verdict.” (Previte v.
Lincolnwood, Inc. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 976, 987 [new trial order after verdict
for plaintiffs failed to comply with § 657 because there were multiple theories
of liability and the order only addressed one]; see also Estes, supra,
51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 647–648 [new trial order after defense verdict was
insufficient because it did not specify which of plaintiff’s several asbestos
exposure theories the trial court accepted].)
Further, “When . . . a statement of reasons is insufficient, an appellate
court cannot remand the case to permit the trial court to correct the error but
must reverse the new trial order with the result that the judgment is
automatically reinstated.” (Estes, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 649.)
C. Analysis
Respondents are correct that the operative complaint alleged
negligence based on a foreign object found in Bartlett’s knee, and Bartlett
apparently abandoned that issue at trial by not presenting any evidence to

support it.6 However, through Dr. Winternitz’s testimony, Bartlett presented
evidence that Respondents acted negligently not only in delaying their
response to the infection, but also by failing to replace the polyethylene liner
during the November 21, 2016 washout procedure. Additional evidence of

6 This determination is made without the benefit of a complete reporter’s
transcript. (See footnote 4, ante.)
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that issue was submitted through Drs. Ballon-Landa and Daines, who stated
that bacteria could attach to a prosthesis and treatment by replacement of
the device can be more effective than antibiotics.
Regardless of whether we consider the delay and the polyethylene liner
as two independent negligence theories or two examples of negligence under
a single theory, both of those issues were submitted to the jury. Further, by
stating Respondents were “negligent in the diagnosis or treatment” of
Bartlett, the jury’s special verdict could have rested on one or both of those
issues. As such, to comply with section 657, the court was required to
address both delay and the polyethylene liner in its new trial order.
Although the order references the portions of the record on which the
court found Dr. Ballon-Landa’s testimony insufficient to support causation, it
only discusses causation in the context of delay in treatment. The trial court
discredited Dr. Ballon-Landa’s opinion because (1) it was inconsistent with
other evidence of when the infection was first discovered, and (2) the 10-day,
80 percent success rate opinion regarding debridement surgery “did not seem
to be with sufficient medical probability” and “appeared to be more his
experience rather that an industry standard.” These criticisms relate to
timing of care, not the failure to remove the polyethylene liner.
The only portion of the court’s order that could potentially relate to the
polyethylene liner was the reference to Dr. Ballon-Landa’s opinion “that if
Mr. Bartlett had stayed on the oral antibiotics ordered by the infectious
disease doctor, he would not have had the recurrence of the infection in
2017.” That testimony could be relevant to causation linked to delay or to the
polyethylene liner. However, to connect the court’s ruling to the polyethylene
liner we would have to speculate about whether and how the court considered
it in that context.

10
The cessation of oral antibiotics was only mentioned in the discussion
regarding the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the trial
court did not clearly cross-reference it when addressing the motion for a new

trial.7 Even if we assume an adequate cross-reference, the mere mention of
Bartlett’s discontinuation of oral antibiotics does not necessarily resolve
causation regarding the polyethylene liner.
“ ‘A defendant’s negligent conduct may combine with another factor to
cause harm; if a defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing
the plaintiff’s harm, then the defendant is responsible for the harm; a
defendant cannot avoid responsibility just because some other person,
condition, or event was also a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s
harm; but conduct is not a substantial factor in causing harm if the same
harm would have occurred without that conduct.’ ” (Lawrence v. La Jolla
Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 11, 33.) With no
discussion of the polyethylene liner, we cannot ascertain if the trial court
undertook the necessary substantial factor analysis. For example, did it find
that Bartlett’s 2017 infection would have occurred even if the liner was
removed? Or did it determine that oral antibiotics would have cured an
infected liner despite Drs. Ballon-Landa and Daines’s testimony indicating
that antibiotics do not always effectively treat an infected prosthesis? And if
the court came to either determination, did it go on to consider whether

7 A trial court may satisfy section 657 by cross-referencing findings made
in a different part of an order “so long as it makes clear to a reviewing court
the basis for its decision.” (Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 405,
413.) In shifting its analysis to the new trial motion, the court vaguely
stated, “[h]owever, the above cited evidence on a Motion for New Trial, where
the Court can and should consider the credibility independently of the jury’s
conclusions.” It then proceeded to discuss evidence related to timing of care,
with no mention of Bartlett’s termination of oral antibiotics.
11
failure to remove the liner was nonetheless a substantial factor in causing
Bartlett harm? These questions are not answered in the new trial order.
In sum, the jury’s verdict could have been based on either delayed
treatment or the failure to remove the polyethylene liner, and by only
addressing delay, the trial court failed to provide an adequate statement of
reasons for a new trial based on insufficient evidence. The new trial order
also frustrates the dual purposes of section 657. By not addressing the
polyethylene liner, the order “is not ‘specific enough to facilitate appellate
review,’ ” and “we cannot be assured it was the product of careful deliberation
as the Legislature envisioned.” (Estes, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 649.)
Consequently, we must reverse the new trial order and reinstate the original

judgment.8

8 We acknowledge this result may seem harsh. But our Supreme Court
has required strict interpretation of section 657 despite such criticisms,
explaining, “ ‘ “The power of the legislature [in] specifying procedural steps
for new trials is exclusive and unlimited. [Citations.] The wisdom of or
necessity for certain requirements are matters for legislative and not judicial
consideration . . . .” ’ ” (Oakland Raiders v. National Football League (2007)
41 Cal.4th 624, 635.)
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IV. DISPOSITION
The new trial order is reversed and the judgment on the jury’s verdict
is reinstated. Bartlett is awarded costs on appeal.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.

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