CourtListener 10115521•People v. Melton CA4/3
Texto completo
Filed 9/12/24 P. v. Melton CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063552
v. (Super. Ct. No. C-49015)
JAMES ANDREW MELTON, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Julian W. Bailey, Judge. Affirmed.
Laura Arnold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
In 2020, James Andrew Melton pleaded guilty to committing a
1981 murder. Under the terms of a plea agreement, the trial court suspended
the sentence (25 years to life) and imposed probation with various terms and
conditions. In 2023, the court revoked Melton’s probation, finding true three
alleged probation violations (two positive drug tests and the failure to enroll
in a drug treatment program). Melton appeals.
Appointed counsel filed an opening brief summarizing the
violation of probation (VOP) proceedings, but raising no arguable issues. (See
People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende); Anders v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 738 (Anders).) Melton filed two supplemental briefs.
In the interest of justice, this court has independently reviewed
the record. (See People v. Freeman (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 126, 133–134
[Wende review is generally not available following a probation revocation
hearing]; but see People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 230 [“if the
appellate court wishes, it may . . . exercise its discretion to conduct its own
independent review of the record in the interests of justice”].)
We find no arguable issues. We will briefly address the issues
Melton raises in his supplemental briefs and affirm the trial court’s order.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1981, police found 77-year-old Anthony DeSousa dead in his
Newport Beach condominium. DeSousa had been severely beaten about the
face and head; one of DeSousa’s teeth had been broken. A forensic pathologist
opined that the cause of death was ligature strangulation.
In 1982, Johnny Boyd testified against Melton at a preliminary
2
hearing. Boyd later testified at a trial. The jury convicted Melton of murder,
burglary, robbery, and found true two special circumstances. The jury
imposed the death penalty. The California Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment on direct appeal. In 1992, Boyd died.
In 2007, a federal district court granted habeas corpus relief. The
court held Melton was tried while mentally incompetent.
In 2011, Melton was retried on the same charges and special
circumstances; however, the People were no longer seeking the death penalty.
In a pretrial proceeding, the trial court denied the People’s motion to admit
Boyd’s preliminary hearing testimony. The court declared a mistrial after the
jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict.
In 2014, Melton was again retried, but this time the court
admitted Boyd’s preliminary hearing testimony. A jury convicted him on the
same charges and special circumstances. The court imposed a life sentence
without the possibility of parole. This court reversed, finding “Boyd’s
preliminary hearing testimony was improperly and prejudicially admitted.”
(People v Melton (Oct. 7, 2019, G056217) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2020, Melton pleaded guilty to DeSousa’s murder; the
prosecution dismissed the other charges and enhancements. The trial court
suspended imposition of sentence (25 years to life), and granted formal
probation. The terms included no use of controlled substances, and to:
“Cooperate with your probation . . . officer in any plan for psychological,
psychiatric, alcohol, and/or drug treatment.”
On February 7, 2022, the People filed a VOP petition alleging five
violations. The People alleged Melton “provided positive saliva drug tests for
amphetamine and methamphetamine on July 22, 2021, August 11, 2021,
3
November 19, 2021, December 27, 2021, and January 28, 2022.” The
recommendation was that Melton’s probation be revoked and reinstated with
additional custody time.
On April 4, 2022, Melton admitted the VOP. By agreement of the
parties, probation was revoked and reinstated with an additional term of 120
days in the Orange County Jail.
On May 12, 2023, the People filed a second VOP petition. The
People alleged that on November 2, 2022, Melton tested positive for
amphetamine, and on March 28, 2023, he tested positive for amphetamine
and methamphetamine. The People further alleged: “According to the records
of the Orange County Day Reporting Center (DRC), the probationer failed to
enroll in their program on May 9, 2023.” The recommendation was that
Melton “be found in violation of probation and probation be revoked, and
sentence imposed.”
VOP Hearing
Starting on October 23, 2023, the trial court presided over a
multiday contested VOP hearing. The People called three witnesses. Melton
called two witnesses; Melton also testified on his own behalf.
Probation Officer Ramiro Gonzalez testified that he had been
assigned to Melton’s case for about two years, generally meeting with him
every other week. On November 2, 2022, Melton’s random drug test returned
positive for methamphetamine. Gonzalez advised Melton of the results.
Gonzalez held the violation in abeyance, meaning Melton “would not be
arrested for that at that point and it can be used for future violations.”
Gonzalez “decided to work with Mr. Melton and provide a counseling program
4
for him to address his substance abuse issues.” Gonzalez referred Melton to
an agency used by probation for substance abuse counseling and other
services (the DRC). Melton did not report to the DRC, but had rescheduled
due to conflicting medical appointments.
Gonzalez testified that on March 28, 2023, Melton tested positive
for amphetamine and methamphetamine. Gonzalez advised Melton of the
results and again told him he needed to enroll in the DRC. In April and May,
Melton had several appointments with the DRC, but he failed to enroll.
Melton told Gonzalez that he believed the program would not benefit him,
but he said that he would give it a try. Gonzalez said Melton was not
employed at this time because he never provided a work schedule. Gonzalez
said he saw a letter of intent for employment, but Melton had no start date.
Diego Morales testified that he worked as an assistant case
manager in the DRC. Morales did intakes for new participants. Morales
spoke to Melton following an orientation in April or May of 2023. A date was
picked for Melton to return and sign up. When Melton returned he did not
enroll because he said he already had a job. Morales explained that the
services being offered were for substance abuse rather than employment, but
Melton “just said that he didn’t have enough time to come to a program.”
Morales explained to Melton that the DRC could work with his schedule, but
he “got up from the table and said, ‘I don’t want to do this.’” Morales notified
Melton’s probation officer. Melton later returned to the DRC. Morales did not
do the intake, but he overheard Melton tell someone else, “I don’t have time, I
don’t have time to do this.”
Syerra Avalos testified that she worked as a case manager in the
DRC. Avalos spoke to Melton in May 2023, after he had been there before.
5
Avalos began to explain the rules for the program and other intake issues for
two or three minutes. Melton said it was not something that he was going to
be able to do because of his work. Melton did not sign up for the program.
Avalos then had Melton talk to her supervisor, Mr. Ovalle.
Gary Sowards testified he was Melton’s attorney in the
postconviction federal habeas corpus proceedings. Sowards had maintained
contact with Melton. Sowards felt that Melton had promising possibilities of
leading a productive and healthy life.
Scarlett Nerad testified that she was a mitigation specialist with
a nonprofit in San Francisco that works on capital cases. As part of her work,
she had frequent communications with Melton, whom she had offered a job as
a trainer. She testified that she attempted to contact Melton’s probation
officer, but he did not return her messages. Nerad had written a job offer for
Melton, which she understood was to be shared with the probation officer.
Melton testified that after he spoke to Miss Avalos at the DRC,
he then spoke to Mr. Ovalle. Melton said that he asked if he could come in
two days a week, but he was told no, and that he had to commit to the whole
program. Melton told Ovalle, “I’m not refusing, but I can’t.” Melton explained
he had medical issues. Orville said he was going to contact the probation
officer. Melton said two days later he went to see the probation officer and he
was arrested.
The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the
allegations in the petition had been proven. The court said, “It appears to me
from the evidence, including your testimony, that you just weren’t willing to
go along with the entirety of the program. [¶] [Your attorney] emphasized
that you were willing at this point to have a substance abuse program, but by
6
your own testimony what you said is you were willing to go in and test two
times a week and you didn’t think the rest of it was applicable to you. But
those aren’t the choices of somebody who is on probation. Those are the
choices of the court through the actions of the probation officer.”
The court said, “I just don’t think you’re an appropriate candidate
to remain on probation from all the evidence I heard. [¶] I would like it to be
included in the transcript of this hearing that it’s my hope that you are
considered for parole in a very expeditious manner. And my hope and
expectation is that you’ll be able to make it on parole.”
After the VOP hearing, Melton filed a notice of appeal. This court
appointed counsel, who later filed an opening brief consistent with the
procedures outlined in Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436. Melton filed a
supplemental brief and an amended supplemental brief on his own behalf.
II.
DISCUSSION
When a defendant’s appointed appellate counsel identifies no
arguable issues on appeal from a postjudgment proceeding, an appellate
court may independently review the record for arguable issues. (Delgadillo,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 230; Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441–442.)
Generally, “an arguable issue on appeal consists of two elements.
First, the issue must be one which, in counsel’s professional opinion, is
meritorious. That is not to say that the contention must necessarily achieve
success. Rather, it must have a reasonable potential for success. Second, if
successful, the issue must be such that, if resolved favorably to the appellant,
the result will either be a reversal or a modification of the judgment.” (People
7
v. Johnson (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 106, 109.)
If a defendant files a supplemental brief, the “opinion must
reflect the contentions and the reasons that they fail.” (People v. Kelly (2006)
40 Cal.4th 106, 120.) However, a “decision does not require an extended
discussion of legal principles. [Citations.] Moreover, a recitation of each of the
defendant’s assertions will not be necessary in all cases; the purposes of the
. . . requirement may in some circumstances be satisfied by a summary
description of the contentions made and the reasons they fail.” (Id. at p. 121.)
Here, we have independently reviewed the record on appeal. We
agree with counsel that there are no arguable issues. Thus, we affirm the
trial court’s order, which revoked Melton’s probation and imposed the
suspended sentence (25 years to life).
We shall now attempt to briefly summarize and address the
major contentions Melton raises in his supplemental briefs.
Melton contends that since the trial court found he was no longer
suitable for probation at the 2023 VOP hearing, he should be allowed to
withdraw his 2020 guilty plea to the crime of murder.
Generally, a defendant can appeal from an order revoking
probation, but other matters “cannot thereby be reviewed.” (People v. Glaser
(1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 819, 821, disapproved on other grounds by People v.
Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210, 1218–1219, fn. 1.) Further, the revocation of
a defendant’s probation is not a permissible ground for withdrawal of a guilty
plea. (See Pen. Code, § 1018; see also People v. Superior Court (Rodas) (2017)
10 Cal.App.5th 1316 [the six-month time limit for withdrawing a guilty plea
after an order granting probation with entry of judgment suspended is
mandatory rather than directory].)
8
Melton contends that the trial court’s imposition of the suspended
sentence was in violation of the California Racial Justice Act (CRJA).
Under Penal Code section 745, the Legislature’s intention was to
eliminate racial bias through a variety of challenges that can be raised in
criminal proceedings. However, “the Legislature did not include any language
indicating a section 745 claim could be presented on direct appeal for the first
time.” (People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 812.) In this case, Melton
did not raise a challenge under the CRJA in the trial court; therefore, this
issue has been forfeited for purposes of appeal.
Melton contends that his counsel at the contested VOP hearing
was incompetent for failing to introduce his medical records into evidence and
for failing to call Mr. Ovalle from the DRC as a witness.
A defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 685–686.) However, a review
on appeal is generally confined to the record before us. (See People v. Green
(1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 991, 1001.) Here, the record does not disclose the
reasons for counsel’s decisions as to what evidence to present at the VOP
hearing. Therefore, this appeal is not the proper proceeding for Melton to
attempt to establish an ineffective assistance claim. (See People v. Mendoza
Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 267 [“claims of ineffective assistance are often
more appropriately litigated in a habeas corpus proceeding”].)
Melton contends that given his medical issues, and other factors,
there was insufficient evidence at the VOP hearing to support the trial court’s
finding that he willfully violated the terms of his probation. Melton also
suggests that his probation officer may have committed perjury.
In a sufficiency of the evidence review, it is not the role of an
9
appellate court to reweigh the evidence, nor is it our role on appeal to
consider the believability of witnesses. That is, “unless the testimony is
physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness
is sufficient to support” the decision of the trial court. (People v. Young (2005)
34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) Here, there was arguably some conflicting evidence
regarding Melton’s failure to enroll in the DRC program. However, there was
no conflicting evidence regarding the positive saliva drug tests. But in any
event, our role is not to reweigh the evidence, or to judge the credibility of the
witnesses at the VOP hearing. In sum, we find that the ruling of the trial
court is supported by substantial evidence.
Melton contends that his sentence is disproportionate to the
minor nature of the probation violations and therefore the court abused its
discretion in imposing the 25 years to life sentence.
Probation is not a right, but an act of clemency that may be
withdrawn if the privilege is abused. (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398,
402–403.) Like the granting of probation, revocation rests entirely in the
sound discretion of the trial court. Probation may be revoked if there are
reasons to believe that a defendant has violated the terms or conditions of
probation. While a court has broad discretion to revoke probation, it may not
“act arbitrarily or capriciously; its determination must be based on the facts.”
(People v. Walker (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 609, 612.) Here, it is evident from
the record that the court carefully weighed its decision, relied on the facts,
and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in arriving at its ruling. Thus, we
find that the court did not abuse its discretion.
10
III.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order revoking probation and imposing the
suspended 25 years to life sentence is affirmed.
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOETHALS, J.
SANCHEZ, J.
11
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.