People v. Major CA2/1

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Filed 9/11/24 P. v. Major CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B329008

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA003146)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING
BRIAN KEITH MAJOR, OPINION AND DENYING
REHEARING
Defendant and Appellant.
[NO CHANGE IN
JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion in the above-entitled matter
filed on September 6, 2024, be modified as follows:
1. In the final paragraph on page 7, the following
quoted instruction is deleted: “One who aids and abets is not
only guilty of the particular crime that to [his] knowledge [his]
confederates are contemplating committing, but [he] is also liable
for the natural and probable consequences of any criminal act
that [he] knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted. You
must determine whether the defendant is guilty of the crime
originally contemplated, and, if so, whether the crime charge [in
Count 1] was a natural and probable consequence of such
originally contemplated crime.”
2. The following image is inserted on page 7 in the place
of the deleted text:

3. On page 8, the following text in the last sentence of
the first full paragraph is deleted: “For purposes of this appeal
only, we credit this argument and rely only on the written
instruction which we have quoted above.”
4. The following sentence is inserted in its place:
“Although we find no discrepancy between the oral and written
instruction, for purposes of this appeal only, we assume, as Major

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argues, that the instruction on natural and probable
consequences applied to both the murder and attempted murder
counts.” [Footnote 5 remains at the end of the paragraph.]
Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied. There is no
change in judgment.

____________________________________________________________
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J. WEINGART, J.

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Filed 9/6/24 P. v. Major CA2/1 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B329008

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA003146)
v.

BRIAN KEITH MAJOR,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Kathyrn A. Solorzano, Judge. Affirmed.
James S. Donnelly-Saalfield, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
In 1991, a jury convicted petitioner Brian Keith Major of
murder and attempted murder and found that he committed both
crimes willfully and with premeditation and deliberation. The
jury also found the murder was committed while lying in wait,
found true that Major personally used a firearm in connection
with the murder and attempted murder, and found true he
inflicted great bodily injury on the attempted murder victim. The
trial court sentenced Major, inter alia, to life without the
possibility of parole for the murder and to life with the possibility
of parole for the attempted murder.
In 2022, Major petitioned for resentencing pursuant to
Penal Code section 1172.6.1 After appointing counsel for Major,
the resentencing court denied his petition at the prima facie
stage.
On appeal, Major argues the trial court erred in relying on
the factual recitation in our opinion on Major’s direct appeal and
the jury could have convicted him based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. He also contends his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance when counsel conceded
Major was ineligible for resentencing on the attempted murder
count.
We review the order denying resentencing de novo and
conclude, as a matter of law, that the jury found all elements of
murder and attempted murder as currently defined. The jury
instructions and jury verdict foreclose Major’s contention that the
jury could have convicted him based on the now invalid natural
and probable consequences doctrine. Because we have considered
the record de novo, we do not address whether defense counsel

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

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provided ineffective assistance in conceding Major was ineligible
for resentencing relief on his attempted murder conviction.
In sum, we affirm the resentencing court’s order denying
Major’s petition.

BACKGROUND
We summarize below only those facts relevant to the issues
on appeal. This summary is limited to providing context because
we rely only on the jury verdict and jury instructions to conclude
Major is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.

1. A jury convicted Major of murder and attempted
murder
In an information filed August 30, 1990, the People alleged
Major murdered Diondra Ann Picou. The People further alleged
Major “intentionally killed the victim while lying in wait . . . .”
and that he personally used a firearm. The People also alleged
Major attempted to murder N. Arellano and that the attempted
murder was willful, with premeditation and deliberation, and
Major personally used a firearm and personally inflicted great
bodily injury on Arellano.
Major was the sole defendant at trial. Arellano testified
she did not see the person shooting the gun. At trial, the parties
stipulated that as a result of the shooting, Arellano suffered great
bodily injury. Neither party disputed that Picou died of a
gunshot wound. R.J., a juvenile who pleaded guilty to being an
accessory after the fact, testified he saw Major shoot Picou and
Arellano. R.J. further testified Major and he drove to R.J.’s
house, where there was a gun. Major told R.J. that his boss was
planning to fire him because Major was sleeping at work. Major
said he was going to kill his supervisor. R.J. testified Major had

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the gun when they drove back to the hospital where Major
worked; R.J. identified the gun at trial. R.J., however, had the
gun in his pants when they entered the hospital. R.J. later gave
Major the gun and Major put it in a wall in the hospital. Later
that night, Major shot the gun and then handed the gun and his
car keys to R.J. R.J. left the hospital and put the gun in a plastic
bag and then in a sewer. During cross-examination, R.J. denied
being the shooter. R.J. admitted he previously lied to police,
telling the police that he never saw Major with the gun. On
cross-examination, he admitted he would lie to protect himself.2
In January 1991, the jury convicted defendant of murder
with findings of lying in wait and personal use of a firearm and
attempted murder with findings of personal use of a firearm and
personal infliction of great bodily injury. (People v. Major
(Jan. 29, 1993, B059105) [nonpub. opn.] at p. 2.) The trial court
sentenced Major to life without the possibility of parole for the
murder and to life with the possibility of parole for the attempted
murder.3 We affirmed the judgment of conviction. (Major, at
p. 19.)

2 During closing argument, defense counsel attacked R.J.’s
credibility and argued the only way to believe “Major was the
shooter in this particular case” was to credit R.J.’s testimony.
The prosecutor argued if R.J. were the shooter, the jury could not
find Major personally used the firearm or personally inflicted
great bodily injury.
3 For the murder, the court sentenced Major to life without
the possibility of parole and a four-year term on the firearm
enhancement. For the attempted murder, the court sentenced
Major to life with the possibility of parole plus four years for the
firearm enhancement and three years for the great bodily injury

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2. The court’s jury instructions
Because the jury instructions are central to the issues on
appeal, we quote them extensively.

a. Instructions on the elements of murder and attempted
murder
The court instructed the jury on murder as follows: “Every
person who unlawfully kills a human being with malice
aforethought is guilty of the crime of murder in violation of
Section 187 of the Penal Code. [¶] In order to prove such crime,
each of the following elements must be proved: [¶] 1. A human
being was killed. [¶] 2. The killing was unlawful, and [¶]
3. The killing was done with malice aforethought.” The court
also defined malice aforethought.
The trial court instructed the jury on only one theory of
first degree murder, that is, a deliberate and premeditated
killing: “All murder which is perpetrated by any kind of willful,
deliberate and premeditated killing with express malice
aforethought is murder of the first degree. [¶] The word ‘willful,’
as used in this instruction, means intentional. [¶] The word
‘deliberate’ means formed or arrived at or determined upon as a
result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and
against the proposed course of action. The word ‘premeditated’
means considered beforehand. [¶] If you find that the killing
was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on
the part of the defendant to kill, which was the result of
deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed

enhancement. The court stayed the firearm enhancement on the
murder. The court ordered the sentences to run consecutively.

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upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of
passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation, it is
murder of the first degree. [¶] . . . [¶] To constitute a deliberate
and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the
question of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice
and, having in mind the consequences, [he] decides to and does
kill.”
The court also instructed the jury on the following elements
of attempted murder: “1. A direct but ineffectual act was done
by one person towards killing another human being; and [¶]
2. The person committing such act harbored express malice
aforethought, namely, a specific intent to kill unlawfully another
human being.” The court further instructed the jury, “If you find
that the attempt to commit murder was preceded and
accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent to kill, which was the
result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have
been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden
heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of
deliberation, it is attempt to commit willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder.” “To constitute willful, deliberate, and
premeditated attempt to commit murder, the would-be slayer
must weigh and consider the question of killing and the reasons
for and against such a choice and, having in mind the
consequences, decides to kill and makes a direct but ineffectual
act to kill another human being.”
Finally, the court instructed the jury that to convict Major
of murder, “you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was either the actual killer or that he aided and
abetted the actual killer as defined in these instructions. It is not

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required that all twelve of you agree upon one theory or the
other.”

b. Natural and probable consequence instruction
The trial court instructed the jury on accomplice liability,
including an instruction on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Defense counsel objected to the
instructions on accomplice liability arguing that all of the
prosecution witnesses “link Mr. Major [to] being the shooter . . . .
I don’t see any evidence whereby the People can say, yes, we
presented evidence to you for you to believe that [R.J.] is the
shooter in this case.” The court responded, “Well, the only
evidence in this case is either the defendant was the shooter or
[R.J.] was the shooter; right?” Defense counsel responded that
the People “aren’t saying that [R.J.] was the shooter in this case.”
The court replied, “But you are.”
The centerpiece of Major’s argument is the following
instruction on the natural and probable consequences doctrine:
“One who aids and abets is not only guilty of the particular crime
that to [his] knowledge [his] confederates are contemplating
committing, but [he] is also liable for the natural and probable
consequences of any criminal act that [he] knowingly and
intentionally aided and abetted. You must determine whether
the defendant is guilty of the crime originally contemplated, and,
if so, whether the crime charge [in Count 1] was a natural and
probable consequence of such originally contemplated crime.”

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The court, however, did not instruct the jury on any such
“originally contemplated crime” or target offense.4
In his reply brief on appeal, Major argues there is a
discrepancy between the trial court’s oral and written instruction
in that the oral instruction applied the natural and probable
consequence only to the murder count whereas the written
instruction does not specify any count. Major argues this court
should consider the written instruction. For purposes of this
appeal only, we credit this argument and rely only on the written
instruction, which we have quoted above.5

c. Instructions on the firearm and great bodily injury
enhancements and the lying in wait special
circumstance
As to the firearm enhancement, the trial court instructed
the jury that to find personal use of a firearm, it had to find
Major intentionally fired the firearm. Specifically, the court

4 The trial predated People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th
248, which held that trial courts must instruct on the target
offense.
5 The trial court also instructed the jury on transferred
intent because the victim of the murder count was not Major’s
supervisor. The attempted murder victim, Arellano was his
supervisor, and the murder victim, Picou, was Arellano’s
assistant and in the same room at the time of the shooting. In
the prior appeal, we concluded that the transferred intent
instruction “was essentially irrelevant to the jury’s findings”
because “the murder was prosecuted strictly on a theory of
premeditation . . . [and therefore] required a finding that
appellant intended to kill.” (People v. Major, supra, B059105 at
p. 8.)

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instructed the jury in relevant part: “If you find the defendant
guilty of [one or both] of the crime[s] charged, you must
determine whether the defendant personally used a firearm in
the commission of such felony[ies].” “The term ‘used a firearm,’
as used in this instruction, means to intentionally to [sic] fire it.”
The court further instructed the jury: “The People have the
burden of proving the truth of this allegation. If you have a
reasonable doubt that it is true, you must find it to be not true.”
When discussing the instructions, the trial court indicated
it would ask the jury to make a special finding as to whether
Major was the shooter or an aider and abettor. The prosecutor
stated the personal use of a firearm allegation would reveal the
jury’s theory and the court agreed.
Regarding the infliction of great bodily injury
enhancement, the court told the jury: “It is alleged in Count 2
[attempted murder] that in the commission of the crime therein
described the defendant with the specific intent to inflict such
injury, personally inflicted great bodily injury on [N.] Arellano.
[¶] If you find the defendant guilty of Count 2, you must
determine whether or not the defendant, with the specific intent
to inflict such injury, did personally inflict great bodily injury, on
[N.] Arellano in the commission of attempted murder. [¶] ‘Great
bodily injury’ as used in this instruction means a significant or
substantial physical injury.”
Finally, the trial court instructed the jury on disregarding
instructions that would not apply to the facts the jury found:
“The purpose of the court’s instructions is to provide you with the
applicable law so that you may arrive at a just and lawful verdict.
Whether some instructions apply will depend upon what you find

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to be the facts. Disregard any instruction which applies to facts
determined by you not to exist.”

3. The resentencing court denies Major’s resentencing
petition
After Major petitioned for resentencing, the resentencing
court appointed counsel for him. In his brief, counsel argued
Major made a prima facie showing of eligibility as to the murder
conviction. According to Major, “Nothing in the record of
conviction” undermined Major’s allegations in his petition. Major
argued the court therefore must accept as true the petition and
issue an order to show cause.
At the hearing, defense counsel represented Major was
ineligible for resentencing for attempted murder because the jury
found true the great bodily injury enhancement regarding that
count. Counsel, however, asked the trial court to issue an order
to show cause as to the murder conviction.
The resentencing court found Major had not made a prima
facie case as to either count and thus was not eligible for
resentencing. The court recognized it had instructed the jury on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The court,
however, emphasized the jury found premeditation and
deliberation. The court indicated just one person fired a firearm
in this case and Major’s defense was that someone else fired the
gun. The court recognized that a true finding on use of a firearm
does not equate to intent to kill but reiterated the jury found both
crimes were committed with premeditation. The court
emphasized it was not “weighing . . . facts.” The court allowed
additional argument and defense counsel contended that by
referencing the appellate opinion, the court “weighed into the
Court of Appeal facts . . . .” Ultimately, the resentencing court

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found, “[T]he jury by necessity had to find that he premeditated,
the defendant premeditated” and for that reason the prima facie
case had not been made.

DISCUSSION
We review the resentencing court’s prima facie inquiry
de novo. (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251;
People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1174.)

A. Legal Principles Relevant to Major’s Resentencing
Petition
Prior to Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 4), under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, a defendant could be liable not only for the crime he
intended to commit with his confederate (the target crime), but
also for any other offense (nontarget crime) “committed by the
confederate as a ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the crime
originally aided and abetted.” (People v. Prettyman, supra,
14 Cal.4th at pp. 254, 262–263.) Under that now defunct
doctrine, the mens rea of the aider and abettor regarding the
nontarget crime was “ ‘irrelevant’ ” even if the nontarget crime
was murder. (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 164.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine for first and second degree murder.
(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 851.) Specifically, it
amended section 188 to provide: “Except as stated in
subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder,
a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice
shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)

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The Legislature enacted former section 1170.95, now
numbered section 1172.6,6 which provides a mechanism for
petitioners to seek retroactive resentencing if they could no
longer be convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter under the amended Penal Code. (See People v.
Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1173–1174.) The statute
provides in part: “(a) A person convicted of felony murder or
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
manslaughter may file a petition with the court that sentenced
the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder,
or manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply: [¶]
(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or
accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner
could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder. [¶]

6 As originally enacted in 2018, section 1170.95 applied
only to a “person convicted of felony murder or murder under a
natural and probable consequences theory . . . .” (Former
§ 1170.95, subd. (a).)

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(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
If a petitioner makes a prima facie showing of relief under
section 1172.6—that is, a showing that the petitioner was
convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter under a
theory no longer valid under the amended Penal Code—the
resentencing court must issue an order to show cause for an
evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); People v. Hurtado
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 891.) If “the record of conviction or
the court’s own documents indicate the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law, the resentencing court may deny
the petition without issuing an order to show cause.” (People v.
Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1174.) “In relying on the record
of conviction at the prima facie stage, however, the resentencing
court ‘should not engage in “factfinding involving the weighing of
evidence or the exercise of discretion.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(Ibid.)
People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433 recently clarified the
trial court’s role at the prima facie stage: “At the prima facie
stage, a court must accept as true a petitioner’s allegation that he
or she could not currently be convicted of a homicide offense
because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January
1, 2019, unless the allegation is refuted by the record. [Citation.]
And this allegation is not refuted by the record unless the record
conclusively establishes every element of the offense. If only one
element of the offense is established by the record, the petitioner
could still be correct that he or she could not currently be
convicted of the relevant offense based on the absence of other
elements.” (Curiel, at p. 463.)

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B. Applying Curiel, We Conclude That As a Matter of
Law, Major Is Ineligible for Resentencing on His
Murder and Attempted Murder Convictions
As instructed by Curiel, we consider whether as a matter of
law, the jury found every element of murder and attempted
murder as those crimes are currently defined. “Murder is the
unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought.”
(§ 187, subd. (a).) The instruction on murder required the jury to
find that a human being was killed and the killing was unlawful.
The jury found Major was the killer when it concluded he
intentionally fired the firearm in the commission of the murder.
Put differently, the firearm instruction allowed the jury to find
the firearm enhancement true only if it also found Major shot the
firearm. (See People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 747
[admission to personal use of a handgun in commission of the
murder showed that petitioner was the actual killer].)
The jury found that Major acted with malice aforethought
when it found that he acted willfully and with premeditation and
deliberation, the only theory of first degree murder before it.
Specifically, the first degree murder instruction provided: “If you
find that the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear,
deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to kill, which was
the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have
been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden
heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of
deliberation, it is murder of the first degree.”
As to the attempted murder conviction, “the prosecution
must establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the commission of a
direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended
killing.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591,

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602.) Here, the jury found Major harbored intent to kill when it
found the attempted murder was willful, deliberate and
premediated. The attempted murder instruction also required
that the jury find Major “harbored express malice aforethought,
namely, a specific intent to kill unlawfully another human being.”
The jury further found Major personally and intentionally fired a
firearm and personally inflicted great bodily injury on Arellano in
the commission of the attempted murder. Personally firing a
firearm is a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the
intended killing.
The jury could not have relied on the natural and probable
consequence theory for either the murder or attempted murder
because the trial court instructed the jury that the natural and
probable consequence theory applied only to an aider and abettor.
Here, the jury found that Major was the shooter, not an aider and
abettor in the shooting. Further, the court instructed the jury to
disregard instructions that do not apply. We presume the jury
followed the court’s instructions. (People v. Sanchez (2001)
26 Cal.4th 834, 852.)

C. Major’s Arguments Do Not Support Error
Major argues, “The order denying Mr. Major’s
section 1172.6 petition must be reversed because the jury was
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine
and nothing in the record rules out the possibility that it relied
upon this theory in convicting Mr. Major of first degree murder.”
(Some capitalization omitted.)
Major also argues he received ineffective assistance of
counsel when his defense counsel conceded Major was not
entitled to resentencing on the attempted murder.

15
These arguments do not evaluate the instructions taken as
a whole. None of his arguments demonstrates the jury could
have convicted Major on a natural and probable consequences
doctrine. As explained above, the natural and probable
consequence doctrine applied only to an aider and abettor and the
jury found Major was the shooter, not an aider and abettor.
Major argues the absence of an instruction on the target
offense does not rule out reliance on the natural and probable
consequence doctrine. That argument is irrelevant because the
finding that Major was the shooter, not an aider and abettor,
rules out reliance on the natural and probable consequence
doctrine.
Similarly, Major argues an instruction that the jury did not
have to agree whether defendant was the killer or aided and
abetted the killer “does not rule [out the] possibility that the jury
relied upon the natural and probable consequences doctrine.”
The jury, however, found that Major was the shooter, not an
aider and abettor. Thus, the instruction on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine did not apply, and again, the jury
was instructed to disregard instructions that were inconsistent
with its findings of fact.
Major contends the true finding of lying in wait does not
necessarily preclude resentencing. That proposition is off the
mark because we have not relied on that finding in concluding
Major is ineligible for resentencing.
Major cites People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588 for
the proposition that his personal use of a firearm does not
translate into ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law.
(Id. at p. 599.) In Offley, we explained the firearm use
enhancement does not establish “by itself” that the person who

16
used the firearm acted with malice aforethought. (Id. at pp. 592,
598.) In the same vein, In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593 held a
firearm enhancement was not dispositive of whether the
defendant harbored malice aforethought because it does not
encompass a finding on the defendant’s mental state. (Id. at
p. 604.) In Offley, however, we further explained, “In many
instances, additional information from the record will establish
that a defendant’s conviction was not based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, and that the jury must have
convicted the defendant on the basis of his own malice
aforethought.” (Id. at p. 599.)
Here, we have not relied on the firearm enhancement to
assess Major’s mental state. We have instead relied on the jury’s
findings on both counts that Major acted willfully and with
premeditation and deliberation. Based on those findings, we
conclude the jury necessarily found Major acted with malice
aforethought. In addition, as noted above, as to attempted
murder, the jury had to have found Major harbored malice
aforethought.
Major asserts the resentencing court improperly relied on
the factual summary in his appeal from his conviction. We have
reviewed Major’s eligibility de novo without relying on the factual
summary in the prior appellate opinion. We have concluded
based on the jury instructions and jury verdict that as a matter of
law, Major is ineligible for resentencing.
Because we have considered Major’s eligibility for
resentencing on his attempted murder conviction on the merits,
we do not address Major’s argument that his defense counsel
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in the trial court by

17
conceding Major was ineligible for resentencing on the attempted
murder conviction.

DISPOSITION
The order denying Brian Keith Major’s petition for
resentencing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.

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