CourtListener 10114360•People v. Perez CA2/8
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Filed 9/11/24 P. v. Perez CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B330009
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA465253-02
v.
JIMMY A. PEREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark S. Arnold, Judge. Affirmed.
Patricia S. Lai, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance. E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
——————————
We review an order denying appellant Jimmy A. Perez’s
petition for recall of sentence brought under Penal Code section
1172.6.1 We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2020, a jury found appellant Jimmy A. Perez guilty of
willful, deliberate and premeditated attempted murder and
possession of a firearm by a felon. (§§ 664/187, subd. (a); 29800,
subd. (a)(1).) The jury also found the attempted murder was
committed for the benefit of a gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and a
principal personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily
injury. (§12022.53, subds. (d) and (e)(1).) The trial court
sentenced Perez to 39 years to life plus four years in state prison.
On December 22, 2022, Perez filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The People filed a
response, attaching as exhibits our opinion affirming Perez’s
convictions, the jury instructions, and the verdict forms. Perez
filed a responsive pleading. On April 20, 2023, the trial court
held a prima facie hearing and denied the petition. The trial
court found Perez was not “convicted on a theory that is no longer
valid. Natural and probable consequences was not an instruction
given to the jury. There was no felony murder instruction given
to the jury.” This appeal followed.
For context only, we recite the facts of the offenses from our
prior opinion. (People v. Palacios et al. (July 6, 2022, B310844)
[nonpub. opn.].) Appellant and his co-defendant Anthony
Palacios entered a tent in a homeless encampment in the City of
Los Angeles. Inside the tent were two men. Palacios entered
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
with gun drawn and Perez followed, openly armed with a gun
pointed at the ground. Palacios asked the two men where they
were from and, upon getting a response, Palacios immediately
shot his weapon twice, killing one of the men and injuring the
other, who played dead until Palacios and Perez left the tent.
2
DISCUSSION
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) and Senate
Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) eliminated the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as a basis of liability for murder,
attempted murder, and manslaughter by amending sections 188
and 189. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
The intent of Senate Bill No. 1437 was “to ensure that murder
liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer,
did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant
in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); Lewis, at
p. 967.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also created section 1172.6,
establishing a procedure for defendants already convicted of
murder (and later, attempted murder and manslaughter) under
the old law to seek resentencing in the trial court if they believe
they could not be convicted of that crime given the amendments
to sections 188 and 189. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2, 3; Senate
Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) at § 2.) Section 1172.6
provides relief to those convicted of attempted murder only if the
2 Perez filed a request for judicial notice, asking us to take
notice of the trial record prepared on appeal in People v. Palacios
et al., supra, B310844. We grant the request.
3
conviction was based on the doctrine of natural and probable
consequences. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548
(Coley).)
Thus, petitions under section 1172.6 address convictions
where a defendant was not the shooter but was held vicariously
liable on one of several theories of liability identified in the
statute.
Petitioners are entitled to appointment of counsel upon the
filing of a compliant petition. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 963.)
If the record establishes ineligibility for resentencing as a matter
of law, the petition is properly denied. (Id. at pp. 970–972.)
However, the petition and record must establish “conclusively
that the defendant is ineligible for relief” as a matter of law.
(People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14 (Lopez).) When a
trial court denies a section 1172.6 petition based on the failure to
make a prima facie case for relief, our review is de novo. (Ibid.;
People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
The trial court inquiry into whether a prima facie case for
relief has been made is limited. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 971.) The trial court is entitled to review the record of
conviction, which includes the jury summations, jury
instructions, verdict forms, and prior appellate opinions. (Id. at
pp. 971–972.) However, Lewis cautions that although appellate
opinions are generally considered to be part of the record of
conviction, the prima facie bar was intentionally set very low.
The probative value of an appellate opinion is case-specific; a
trial court should not engage in “ ‘factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Id. at
p. 972.)
4
Ineligibility as a matter of law can be established in a
number of ways. If the record of conviction shows petitioner was
convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter under
any theory of liability that remains valid under Senate Bill
No. 1437 or in compliance with the requirements of the amended
law of felony murder, ineligibility for relief has been established.
(People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 945–949 (Estrada)
[petitioner convicted of direct aiding and abetting malice murder
is ineligible for relief]; People v. Medrano (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th
177, 182–183 [petitioner convicted based on intent to kill is
ineligible for relief]; Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 14
[petitioner convicted of attempted murder not based on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine is ineligible for
relief].)
If a petitioner makes a prima facie showing of eligibility for
relief, the trial court must issue an order to show cause and hold
an evidentiary hearing where the trial court sits as a factfinder.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d).) The People bear the burden of proving
petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under the law as
amended. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960.)
Perez was convicted of willful, deliberate and premeditated
attempted murder. He was not the actual killer in that he did
not shoot his weapon. Co-defendant Palacios fired the shot that
injured the victim. He concedes the jury was not instructed on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Rather, the jury
was instructed on direct aiding and abetting liability in that it
had to find that Perez himself knew Palacios intended to commit
the crime, Perez himself intended to aid and abet Palacios in
committing the crime, and Perez himself actually aided and
abetted the commission of the crime. (CALCRIM Nos. 400, 401,
5
600.) The trial court correctly found that Perez was ineligible for
relief as a matter of law. (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 14;
Estrada, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 945–949.)
Nevertheless, Perez argues we should construe section
1172.6 to afford relief to petitioners convicted of attempted
murder under theories of imputed malice other than the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. To do so would require us to
disregard the express language of section 1172.6, subdivision (a),
which reads: “A person convicted of felony murder or murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on
that person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter
may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to
have petitioner’s murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
counts . . . .” (§1172.6, subd. (a), italics added.) We decline to
rewrite the statute. (Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 547–
548.)
Perez also argues CALCRIM No. 601 and the prosecutor’s
closing argument allowed the jury to convict Perez of attempted
murder based solely on Palacios’s state of mind. This instruction
is irrelevant to the section 1172.6 petition as the instruction and
the closing argument pertained, in any event, only to the
additional allegation that the attempted murder was deliberate,
premeditated and willful. The instruction came into play only
after the jury had decided the issue of guilt on the attempted
murder count, for which the jury was properly instructed.
6
Perez also points to the prosecutor’s argument on
premeditation: “The attempted murder was done willfully and
with deliberation and premeditation if either Defendant Perez or
Defendant Palacios or both of them acted with that state of
mind.” This argument, again, applied only to the additional
allegation of premeditation, willfulness, and deliberation.3 We
find, as did the trial court, that the record is devoid of any jury
instructions or argument that allowed the jury to impute malice
to Perez.
3 Perez relies on People v. Whitson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
22, 33, and People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 440–441 to
argue that the instruction on premeditation “bled” over into the
instructions on attempted murder. We disagree. Both of those
cases involved trials where the jury was instructed on natural
and probable consequences, a dispositive consideration not
present here. We also reject Perez’s Fourteenth Amendment due
process argument. (People v. Fisher (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1022,
1030, fn. 7 [where petitioner is ineligible for resentencing relief as
a matter of law, his due process argument necessarily fails].)
7
DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition for recall of sentence is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
GRIMES, J.
WILEY, J.
8
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