People v. Ivy CA3

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Filed 9/10/24 P. v. Ivy CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----

THE PEOPLE, C098419

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. STK-CR-FE-
2011-0007262)
v.

DEVAUGHN LEE IVY,

Defendant and Appellant.

In 2011, during a high-speed chase, defendant DeVaughn Lee Ivy fired a rifle
multiple times at a vehicle containing a rival gang member, the gang member’s girlfriend,
and their infant son, injuring the child. (People v. Ivy (Apr. 3, 2014, C071077) [nonpub.
opn.].)1 In 2014, a jury found Ivy guilty of three counts of premeditated attempted

1 Over Ivy’s objection, we grant the People’s request to take judicial notice of the
record in Ivy’s direct appeal (case No. C071077), including this court’s unpublished
opinion. However, we do not rely on any factual assertions therein. (Evid. Code, § 452,
subd. (d).) .

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murder, along with associated enhancements and other charges. In 2023, the trial court
summarily denied Ivy’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6,2
concluding that Ivy had not made a prima facie case for relief under the statute.
Ivy contends the trial court erred in summarily denying his petition and engaged in
prohibited factfinding in doing so. Ivy further argues that, assuming without conceding
that the jury’s verdicts have a preclusive effect on his petition, the California Supreme
Court’s decision in People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, limiting the use of the “kill
zone” jury instruction — given in this case — represents a significant change in the law
that warrants reexamination of the propriety of that instruction and the jury’s findings of
intent to kill. We conclude that any error in the kill zone instruction constitutes
instructional error that, in this case, was not impacted by the amendments to sections 188
and 189, and therefore falls outside the scope of section 1172.6. We thus conclude the
trial court’s denial of Ivy’s 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage was appropriate and
we affirm the trial court’s order denying the petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2011, Ivy pursued a car in which a rival gang member, Antoneyo Robinson, was
fleeing with Robinson’s girlfriend, B.M., and their infant son, J. Ivy fired multiple
rounds from a semiautomatic rifle into the back of the car. A bullet fragment struck J. in
the back of the head and lodged beneath his skin. The injury was not fatal because the
bullet was slowed by its initial impact with the car.
Ivy was charged with attempted murder on the theory that he was the actual
shooter acting with premeditation and deliberation. At trial, the prosecutor argued that
Ivy was guilty of the premeditated and deliberated attempted murder of B.M. and J. based
on what is commonly known as the kill zone theory. Pursuant to that theory, the trial

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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court instructed the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 600 and 601 on attempted murder and
attempted murder with deliberation and premeditation. As instructed, CALCRIM
No. 600 stated:
“The defendant is charged in Count 1, 2 & 3 with attempted murder.
“To prove that the defendant is guilty of attempted murder, the People must prove
that:
“1. The defendant took at least one direct but ineffective step toward killing
another person;
“AND
“2. The defendant intended to kill that person.
“A direct step requires more than merely planning or preparing to commit murder
or obtaining or arranging for something needed to commit murder. A direct step is one
that goes beyond planning or preparation and shows that a person is putting his or her
plan into action. A direct step indicates a definite and unambiguous intent to kill. It is a
direct movement toward the commission of the crime after preparations are made. It is
an immediate step that puts the plan in motion so that the plan would have been
completed if some circumstance outside the plan had not interrupted the attempt.
“A person may intend to kill a specific victim or victims and at the same time
intend to kill everyone in a particular zone of harm or ‘kill zone.’ In order to convict the
defendant of the attempted murder of [J.] or [B.M.] the People must prove that the
defendant not only intended to kill Antoneyo Robinson, but also either intended to kill
[J.] or [B.M.], or intended to kill everyone within the kill zone. If you have a reasonable
doubt whether the defendant intended to kill [B.M.] or [J.] or intended to kill Antoneyo
Robinson by killing everyone in the kill zone, then you must find the defendant not guilty
of the attempted murder of [B.M.] or [J.].”
In 2012, the jury found Ivy guilty of three counts of premeditated attempted
murder, one count of shooting at an occupied vehicle, three counts of assault with a

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firearm, and one count of causing corporal injury to a child. The jury found true various
firearm and great bodily injury enhancements, including, as to the three counts of
attempted murder, the allegations that Ivy personally and intentionally used and
discharged a firearm during the commission of the crimes pursuant to section 12022.53,
subdivisions (b) and (c). As to the attempted murder of J., the jury found true the
additional allegation that Ivy intentionally and personally discharged a firearm and
caused great bodily injury to J., within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
Ivy was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life, plus three consecutive life
terms and a consecutive determinate term of 13 years four months in state prison.
A different panel of this court subsequently affirmed the judgment. (People v. Ivy,
supra, C071077.)
In 2022, Ivy filed a petition for resentencing under former section 1170.953
alleging he was convicted on a now-invalid theory of attempted murder. The People filed
an informal response arguing, inter alia, that Ivy was ineligible as a matter of law because
the jury that found Ivy guilty was not instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.
In reply, Ivy argued that, under the jury instructions given, the jury could have
imputed malice to him as to B.M. and J. based solely on his participation in the attempted
murder of Robinson. Specifically, Ivy asserted that the kill zone instruction read to the
jury and argued by the prosecutor was defective under People v. Canizales, supra,
7 Cal.5th at pages 607 through 608, and allowed the jury to convict Ivy of the attempted
murders of B.M. and J., when Ivy only intended to kill Robinson.

3 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered former section 1170.95 to
section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive changes to the
statute. Although Ivy filed his petition under former section 1170.95, we cite the current
section number throughout this opinion.

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The trial court conducted a hearing to determine whether Ivy had made a prima
facie showing of eligibility for relief under section 1172.6. At the hearing, defense
counsel argued the kill zone instruction should have emphasized to the jury that it should
not convict Ivy of attempted murder of B.M. and J. unless the jury determined beyond a
reasonable doubt that Ivy specifically intended to kill B.M. and J. in order to ensure
Robinson’s death. Counsel argued that “Under Canizales, the instruction given to
petitioner’s jury was deficient in this critical respect. The instruction failed to make the
jury understand . . . the nuanced difference between intent to kill and conscious disregard
for life, as it pertained to [B.M.] and [J].”
The trial court ruled that, “Ivy had a determined, resolute intent to kill [ ]
Robinson, who was in a car with the driver and a child. And [Ivy], who was the sole
shooter, you know, hunted [ ] Robinson down and shot multiple times into the car.
Whether — the kill zone on appeal was upheld, albeit this was before Canizales, but even
after Canizales, this court finds that [Ivy] would not benefit from the new murder laws
and that the record is clear that [ ] Ivy had the intent to kill anybody that was in that car.
So I’m going to deny [ ] Ivy and find that he’s not made a prima facie case for relief
under 1172.6.”
DISCUSSION
I
Senate Bill No. 1437
The enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437)
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) altered the substantive law of murder in two areas. First, with
certain exceptions, it narrowed the application of the felony-murder rule. Second, it
imposed a new requirement that, except in cases of felony murder, “a principal in a crime
shall act with malice aforethought” to be convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
“Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
crime.” (Ibid.)

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With Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775), the
Legislature expanded the scope of Senate Bill 1437 to include those convicted of
attempted murder and manslaughter. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.) Thus, section 1172.6,
subdivision (a) currently provides that “[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice
is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter may file
a petition” for recall and resentencing if certain conditions are met. (Italics added.)
These conditions are: (1) the charging document allowed prosecutors to “proceed under
a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine[,] or [any] other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely
on [their] participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine” (§ 1172.6, subd (a)(1), italics added); (2) the petitioner was
convicted of murder, manslaughter, or attempted murder or accepted a plea in lieu of a
trial where the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder; and
(3) the petitioner could not now be convicted of murder or attempted murder under the
current versions of sections 188 and 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(2), (3).)
“We review de novo an order denying a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie
review stage.” (People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1170; see People v. Berry-
Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921, 930.) We may affirm if the trial court’s order is
correct on any legal theory, regardless of the court’s reasoning in reaching its decision.
(People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 145 [“On appeal we consider the
correctness of the trial court’s ruling itself, not the correctness of the trial court’s reasons
for reaching its decision”].)
Section 1172.6 requires a prima facie determination. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) Under
the statute, the trial court must appoint the petitioner counsel if requested, receive
briefing from the parties (§ 1172.6, subds. (b) & (c)), and determine whether “the

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petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) At the prima facie stage, the court may consider the petition and “the record
of conviction in determining whether that single prima facie showing is made.” (People
v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970.) The threshold for such a showing is very low, so in
reviewing the record of conviction and any appellate opinions, the trial court should take
the petition’s allegations as true and refrain from engaging in factfinding, weighing
evidence, or exercising discretion. (Id. at pp. 971-972.) The “authority to make
determinations without conducting an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section [1172.6],
subd[ivision] (d) is limited to readily ascertainable facts from the record (such as the
crime of conviction), rather than factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion (such as determining whether the petitioner showed reckless
indifference to human life in the commission of the crime).” (People v. Drayton (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 965, 980, disapproved on other grounds in Lewis, at p. 963.) But, if the
record of conviction contains facts refuting the allegations in the petition and shows the
petitioner was the actual killer, aided and abetted with intent to kill, or was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life, the trial court may deny
the petition as a matter of law without further proceedings. (§ 189, subd. (e); Lewis, at
p. 971.)
If, after accepting the facts in the petition as true, the petitioner is entitled to relief
because he or she has met the requirements of section 1172.6, subdivision (a), the trial
court should issue an order to show cause unless the parties waive the hearing or the
petitioner’s entitlement to relief is established as a matter of law by the record.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(2).)
II
Analysis
Preliminarily we note that the People contend that based on the plain language of
the statute, a person convicted of attempted murder is eligible for relief only if that

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conviction was based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or another
imputed malice theory of liability, and because Ivy’s jury did not receive any natural and
probable consequences instructions, they claim he is not entitled to relief. Indeed, neither
party disputes that Ivy was prosecuted and, in fact, convicted as the actual shooter. We
acknowledge there exists authority for the proposition that, because the language
pertaining to attempted murder in subdivision (a) and (a)(1) of section 1172.6 is
unambiguous, the Legislature meant what it said: The statute provides resentencing relief
to those convicted of attempted murder based only on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (See People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548; accord,
People v. Lovejoy (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860, 865 [“Following the passage of Senate
Bill 775 in 2022, it is now clear that defendants . . . convicted of attempted murder are
potentially eligible for relief under section 1172.6 if the conviction could have been based
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine”].) In Coley, as here, “[t]he
jurors . . . were not instructed on that doctrine.” (Coley, at p. 548.) As a result, the
defendant in that case was ineligible for section 1172.6 relief based on his conviction for
attempted murder. (Coley, at p. 548; see also People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th
588, 599 [“if the jury did not receive an instruction on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, the jury could not have convicted the defendant on that basis, and
the petition should be summarily denied”]; People v. Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 389,
395; People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52; People v. Cortes (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 198, 205; People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 677; People v.
Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1056.)
Despite the absence of a natural and probable consequences instruction, Ivy
contends that the kill zone instruction given in this case allowed the jury to convict him
on a now prohibited imputed malice theory. Thus, we proceed to analyze Ivy’s particular
claims.

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Ivy contends the trial court erred in denying his petition at the prima facie stage
because the trial proceedings and, in particular, the jury’s verdicts did not foreclose his
eligibility for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. He argues that the trial court
erroneously engaged in prohibited factfinding in concluding that an intent to kill
Robinson necessarily established an intent to kill everybody in the car. Since case law
encourages the trial court to consider the record of conviction to determine whether a
petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement of relief (see People v. Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 970) and Ivy has not pointed out what part of that review
constituted error, we move on to address whether or not the trial court’s conclusion,
based on its review of the record, that Ivy was ineligible for relief, was proper.
In sum, we agree with the People that the record refutes Ivy’s allegation that he
cannot be convicted of attempted murder under the current versions of sections 188 and
189. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a).) Ivy was prosecuted and convicted on the theory he was
the sole shooter; his jury did not receive instructions on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, nor on aiding and abetting another. Ivy does not dispute this.
Rather, his argument focuses on the deficiency of the jury instruction regarding the kill
zone theory of attempted murder. At the prima facie hearing, defense counsel made the
straightforward assertion that the kill zone instruction given in this case was deficient
because it allowed the jury to impute to Ivy the intent to kill B.M. and J. based on his
attempt to kill Robinson. On appeal, Ivy further argues that, in light of the significant
change in the law through People v. Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th 591, the kill zone
instruction was defective and we should not give preclusive effect to the jury’s verdicts.
We conclude that Ivy’s contentions based on the defects in jury instructions regarding the
kill zone theory of attempted murder are not cognizable under these postjudgment
proceedings.
Ivy first argues that the kill zone instruction given did not accurately convey to the
jury it had to find he had the concurrent specific intent to kill all three victims in the car

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at which he shot. This constitutes a claim of instructional error that was available to Ivy
prior to any changes to the law under Senate Bill 1437 or Senate Bill 775.
By the time of Ivy’s trial in 2012, California law was already clear that to be
convicted under a kill zone theory of liability, it had to be proven that Ivy had the specific
intent to kill not only the primary target, but everyone within that zone of harm.
Our Supreme Court first adopted a kill zone theory of liability for attempted
murder in People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313. The defendant in Bland, along with
another man, fired multiple shots into a car that contained a driver and two passengers.
The driver died from a gunshot wound to his chest. Both passengers were also shot but
survived. The evidence was not clear who fired the shots that hit the passengers. (Id. at
p. 318.) A jury convicted the defendant of the first degree murder of the driver and the
premeditated attempted murders of both passengers. The Court of Appeal reversed the
two attempted murder convictions, finding the trial court erroneously instructed the jury
on the doctrine of transferred intent. (Ibid.) That instruction told the jury: “ ‘When one
attempts to kill a certain person, but by mistake or inadvertence kills a different person,
the crime, if any, so committed is the same as though the person originally intended to be
killed, had been killed.’ (CALJIC No. 8.65)” (Id. at p. 319.) The Bland court concluded
that transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder. “To be guilty of attempted
murder, the defendant must intend to kill the alleged victim, not someone else. The
defendant’s mental state must be examined as to each alleged attempted murder victim.
Someone who intends to kill only one person and attempts unsuccessfully to do so, is
guilty of the attempted murder of the intended victim, but not of others.” (Id. at p. 328.)
The court went on to embrace the concurrent intent theory articulated in Ford v. State
(Md.Ct.App. 1993) 625 A.2d 984, distinguishing between transferred intent and
concurrent intent. “The Ford court explained that although the intent to kill a primary
target does not transfer to a survivor, the fact the person desires to kill a particular target
does not preclude finding that the person also, concurrently, intended to kill others within

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what it termed the ‘kill zone.’ The intent is concurrent . . . when the nature and scope of
the attack, while directed at a primary victim, are such that we can conclude the
perpetrator intended to ensure harm to the primary victim by harming everyone in that
victim’s vicinity.” (Bland, at p. 329.) The court then went on to conclude: “[T]his case
permits — virtually compels — a similar inference. Even if the jury found that defendant
primarily wanted to kill [the driver] rather than [the driver’s] passengers, it could
reasonably also have found a concurrent intent to kill those passengers when defendant
and his cohort fired a flurry of bullets at the fleeing car and thereby created a kill zone.
Such a finding fully supports attempted murder convictions as to the passengers.” (Id. at
pp. 330-331.) Finding that the jury was properly instructed on the defendant’s intent as
to the two passengers (noting that the challenged instruction applied to a killing, not to an
attempted killing), the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
That this law existed at the time of Ivy’s trial, gave him ample opportunity to
argue that the jury instruction as drafted in this case constituted error under Bland. His
remedy for any alleged instructional error that affected the verdict was his appeal from
the judgment of conviction. His failure to raise the argument on direct appeal forfeited
that claim (cf. In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759), and the subsequent petition
process created by the Legislature when it enacted Senate Bill 1437 did nothing to change
the applicable law so as to resurrect an argument he had already abandoned. (People v.
Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 867-868.)
Ivy urges us to find an equitable exception to issue preclusion and collateral
estoppel because, he argues, Canizales represented a significant change in the law. Yet he
fails to provide us with any analysis. While Canizales narrowed the availability of the
kill zone instruction to circumstances wherein the defendant’s attack on a primary target
is such that the only reasonable inference is that the defendant intended to create a zone
of harm in which he or she intended to kill everyone present within that zone in order to
insure the primary target’s death (People v. Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607), we

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disagree it represented a significant change in the law for purposes of applying an
equitable exception to issue preclusion. We find equitable exception does not apply here.
Even if, as Ivy argues, Canizales represented a significant change in the law and
the kill zone instruction in this case did not comport with the principles established in
Canizales, there is another reason why he would still not be eligible for relief, because
“ ‘the alleged error he identifies has nothing to do with the legislative changes that gave
rise to section 1172.6’s petition process.’ ” (People v. Berry-Vierwinden, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 933; see People v. Burns, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 865 [“Section
1172.6 does not create a right to a second appeal, and [the defendant] cannot use it to
resurrect a claim that should have been raised in his . . . direct appeal”].)
To be eligible for relief under section 1172.6, Ivy must show he can no longer be
convicted of attempted murder, “because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
[by Senate Bill 1437].” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Ivy cannot make that showing, because
neither Senate Bill 1437 nor Senate Bill 775 made changes to the kill zone theory or the
specific intent to kill required for attempted murder. (See People v. Berry-Vierwinden,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 933 [instructional error identified by the defendant had
“ ‘nothing to do with the legislative changes to California’s murder law effected by
Senate Bill [ ] 1437 . . . and Senate Bill [ ] 775’ ”].) We agree with the reasoning of
other Courts of Appeal that Senate Bill 1437 did not change the law to prohibit
conviction of attempted murder on a concurrent intent theory that was already settled
California law by the time of Ivy’s trial. In light of such, Ivy cannot “establish that he
‘could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to
Section 188 or 189’ ” made by Senate Bill 1437. (People v. Berry-Vierwinden, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 936, italics omitted, citing People v. Burns, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th
862 & People v. Flores, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th 1164.)
Thus, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying Ivy’s petition.

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DISPOSITION
The order denying Ivy’s petition under section 1172.6 is affirmed.

/s/
EARL, P. J.

We concur:

/s/
DUARTE, J.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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