People v. Hamilton CA2/6

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Filed 9/4/24 P. v. Hamilton CA2/6
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B319268
(Super. Ct. No. BA381749)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v. OPINION ON TRANSFER
FROM THE SUPREME
RICKY HAMILTON, COURT

Defendant and Appellant.

Ricky Hamilton was sentenced to 15 years to life for
attempted murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) and 25
years to life for use of a firearm in the commission of the offense.
The trial court stayed imposition of sentence on a gang
enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) pursuant to section 654.
In our original decision in this matter, we concluded the
Governor’s commutation of Hamilton’s sentence to 15 years to life
made a remand to the trial court to exercise its discretion under

1 All references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise

indicated.
section 12022.53, subdivision (h) moot. We also concluded that
amendments to section 186.22 do not require a remand because,
under the evidence produced at trial, any reasonable juror would
find the gang enhancement true under the amended version of
section 186.22.
Our Supreme Court transferred the matter back to the
Court of Appeal with directions to vacate our decision with
respect to section 186.22 amendments and to reconsider it in
light of People v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743 (Clark), and People
v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735 (Cooper). We reverse the gang
enhancement. In all other respects, we affirm.
FACTS
Because this matter has previously come before this court,
a brief statement of facts will be sufficient.
The Black P Stones gang is a “Bloods” gang. The Rollin
30’s gang (also known as the Harlem 30’s) is a “Crips” gang. The
gangs are rivals.
Hamilton is a member of the Black P Stones gang. Wassan
Flores (the victim) is an associate of the Rollin 30’s gang. In
2011, Hamilton was dating Rondalyn Johnson. Flores was a
friend of Johnson.
Flores lived in an apartment in Black P Stones gang
territory with his mother and sister. In February 2011, Hamilton
and another man came to the apartment door, and Hamilton
asked Flores if he was “from Harlem.” When a security guard
appeared, Hamilton and the other man left. Flores felt
disrespected.
A couple of days later, Flores saw Hamilton on the street
and challenged him to a fight. Hamilton ran away. Flores
relayed this information to Johnson.

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One night about two weeks later, Johnson and Flores spent
the evening together at Flores’s apartment. Flores’s mother was
at work and his sister was asleep. Johnson unlocked the sliding
door when Flores was not looking.
When Johnson left, Hamilton and two masked men entered
through the sliding door. Hamilton had a handgun. Flores saw
his face and identified him at trial.
The men kicked and beat Flores. Flores curled up in a fetal
position. Hamilton hit Flores in the head with the gun,
fracturing his skull. Flores ran toward his bedroom. Hamilton
fired five shots at him, hitting Flores’s hip. Hamilton took
Flores’s laptop and cellphone.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 12022.53
Hamilton contends the trial court erred in failing to
exercise its discretion on whether to strike the firearm
enhancement under section 12022.53.
At the time Hamilton was originally sentenced, a 25-years-
to-life sentence for use of a firearm was mandatory, pursuant to
section 12022.53, subdivision (d). While the judgment in
Hamilton’s case was not yet final, the Legislature amended
section 12022.53 to give the trial court discretion to strike or
dismiss the enhancement in the interest of justice pursuant to
section 1385. (§ 12022.53, subd. (h); Assem. Bill No. 1171, Stats.
2021, ch. 626, § 65, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) We remanded the matter to
the trial court to exercise its discretion.
On the date set for resentencing, Hamilton presented the
trial court with a commutation of sentence signed by the
Governor, reducing Hamilton’s sentence from 40 years to life to

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15 years to life. The trial court continued the sentencing to
confirm the authenticity of the commutation of sentence.
At the rescheduled hearing the trial court confirmed the
commutation of sentence and found our direction to exercise its
discretion under section 12022.53, subdivision (h) was moot. The
court ordered the case off calendar without exercising discretion.
Hamilton did not object. Instead, he asked the court to reduce
his sentence to a 15-year determinate term. The court refused on
the ground that it would be an unauthorized sentence.
Had the trial court exercised its discretion to strike or
dismiss the section 12022.53 enhancement, Hamilton would have
been left with a sentence of 15 years to life for attempted murder.
The Governor’s commutation left Hamilton with a sentence of
15 years to life. Hamilton has not explained how he is harmed.
Ordinarily we do not render opinions on moot questions or
abstract propositions. (People v. Gregerson (2011) 202
Cal.App.4th 306, 321.) A case is moot when the court’s opinion
can have no practical effect. (Ibid.)
Moreover, the Governor had already granted Hamilton
clemency. Hamilton refers to nothing that would justify a further
grant of clemency by striking the firearm enhancement. In fact,
in rejecting Hamilton’s plea for a 15-year determinate term, the
trial court stated, “I note that 12022.53 is still law. The court
believes that firearms present a huge danger to the community.”
When the trial court stated that the Governor’s
commutation of sentence rendered the remand to exercise its
discretion moot, the court was essentially saying it saw no basis
for granting further relief. The parties apparently understood
that. Hamilton points to no objection having been raised at the
sentencing hearing that the court refused to exercise its

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discretion on the section 12022.53 enhancement. In fact,
Hamilton’s only request at the sentencing hearing was that the
court change his sentence to a 15-year determinate term. The
court refused, pointing out that such a sentence is unauthorized.
Our remand to the trial court with instructions to exercise
its discretion under section 12022.53, subdivision (h) became
moot when the Governor issued a commutation of sentence. Even
if the matter were not moot, Hamilton waived the issue by failing
to object.
II. Amendments to Section 186.22
Hamilton contends the amendments to section 186.22
(Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 4, 5) enacted in Assembly Bill 333,
effective January 1, 2022, require remand to the trial court.
Section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) provides a sentence
enhancement for “a person who is convicted of a felony committed
for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a
criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further,
or assist in criminal conduct by gang members, shall, upon
conviction of that felony, in addition and consecutive to the
punishment prescribed for the felony or attempted felony of
which the person has been convicted . . . .” In this case the trial
court struck the gang enhancement as to counts 1 and 3 and
stayed the gang enhancement as to count 2.
Both the previous and amended versions of section 186.22
require that the crime be “committed for the benefit of, at the
direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang.”
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) The section was amended to provide that
the common benefit must be more than reputational. (Id. at
subds. (e)(1) & (g).)

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Previously, in order to prove the existence of a “criminal
street gang,” the prosecution was required to show that members
of the gang “individually or collectively” engage or engaged in a
“pattern of criminal gang activity.” (Former § 186.22, subd. (f).)
The amendment removed “individually or.” (§ 186.22, subd. (f).)
The prosecution now can only rely on collective engagement in
criminal activity.
The term “pattern of criminal gang activity” means the
commission or attempted commission of two or more designated
offenses. The prior version of section 186.22 required that the
offenses be committed “on separate occasions, or by two or more
persons.” (Former § 186.22, subd. (e).) There was no
requirement that the offenses be committed by members of the
gang, or that the offenses commonly benefited the gang. The
amended version requires that “the offenses were committed on
separate occasions or by two or more members” and that “the
offenses commonly benefited a criminal street gang, and the
common benefit from the offenses is more than reputational.”
(§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).)
(a) People v. Clark
In Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th 743, our Supreme Court
considered the relationship between the amended section 186.22,
subdivision (b) requiring a showing that the gang members
“collectively engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity,” and
subdivision (e)(1) defining “pattern” as requiring proof of two
predicate offenses committed for a common benefit “on separate
occasions or by two or more members.”
Our Supreme Court decided that the use of the disjunctive
in section 186.22, subdivision (e)(1) means that a predicate
offense can be committed by a lone actor. (Clark, supra, 15

6
Cal.5th at p. 756.) That raises the question of the meaning of
“collectively engage” in subdivision (f). In answering, our
Supreme Court stated: “The core inquiry is whether there exists
an organizational nexus between the crime and the gang . . . .
[T]his is conceptually distinct from the requirement to prove that
each predicate offense “commonly benefitted” the gang (§ 186.22
(e)(1)), even though the facts necessary to prove the two
requirements will often overlap with one another. Though the
crimes . . . may have been committed by individual gang
members, and provided a benefit to the gang, the undertakings
reflect the collective engagement of the gang inasmuch as there
exists an organizational nexus between the crimes and the
particular characteristics of the ‘ “criminal street gang” ’
established under section 186 (f).” (Id. at p. 763.)
The People concede that because the judgment is not final,
Hamilton is entitled to the benefits of section 186.22 as amended.
(In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740.) The case was tried prior to
the amendments to section 186.22. The jury was not instructed
on the required nexus between the predicate crimes and the
particular characteristics of the criminal street gang.
The People argue that the omission of the new elements
from the jury instructions was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt as to the second offense, but concede it was not harmless as
to the first offense. Thus, the People concede there is only one
valid predicate offense. We must reverse the gang enhancement.
(b) People v. Cooper
In Cooper, supra, 14 Cal.5th 735, the new elements
required by the amendments to section 186.22 did not exist at the
time the case was tried. Thus the new elements were not
included in the jury instructions. There, as here, the defendant

7
was entitled to the benefits of the amendments. Our Supreme
Court determined that Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18
provides the correct standard for assessing whether the omission
of the elements was harmless. (Cooper, at p. 742.) Under that
standard, the People must show the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Ibid.)
At trial, the People presented evidence of two predicate
offenses as follows:
The first offense was committed by Julian Blackshire, an
admitted Black P Stones gang member. He was convicted of a
murder that occurred on August 28, 2008. Blackshire robbed a
security guard, took the guard’s gun, and shot him with it. A
gang expert testified that weapons possession is one of the
primary activities of the Black P Stones gang. Taking the gun
was a common benefit to the gang. The connection between guns
and gangs is too close and too obvious to admit any other
reasonable conclusion.
The second offense is an attempted murder by two Black P
Stones gang members, Marquise Turley and Keishon Terrell.
Turley and Terrell drove into a rival gang member’s territory and
shot at a rival gang member several times. Targeting a rival
gang member is of common benefit that is more than
reputational. (§ 186.22, subd. (g).)
III. Amendment to Section 1109
Hamilton contends remand is necessary under an
amendment to section 1109 (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 5), allowing a
bifurcation trial on the gang enhancement.
But even assuming the procedural change to section 1109
applies retroactively, Hamilton fails to show prejudice. The
standard in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, applies to

8
the failure to bifurcate the gang enhancement. (People v. Tran
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1209-1210.)
The evidence that Hamilton committed the substantive
offenses is overwhelming. Even if the gang enhancement had
been bifurcated, gang evidence would have been admitted to
show identity and motive. The jury was instructed it could not
consider gang evidence to show Hamilton is a person of bad
character or had the disposition to commit the crimes.
(CALCRIM No. 1403.) We presume the jury followed the
instruction. (People v. Franklin (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 938, 953.)
Hamilton has failed to show it is reasonably probable he would
have obtained a more favorable result had the gang enhancement
been bifurcated. (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
DISPOSITION
The gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), is reversed.
In all other respects, we affirm.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

BALTODANO, J.

9
Renee F. Korn, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis, Idan Ivri and David A.
Wildman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

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