CourtListener 10103559•People v. Vidrio CA2/3
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Filed 9/3/24 P. v. Vidrio CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B326796
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA138861)
v.
JOSE VIDRIO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
Ellen M. Matsumoto, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Gabriel
Bradley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Defendant and appellant Jose Vidrio was convicted of
second degree murder in 1997. Vidrio now appeals from an order
denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1170.95.1 The trial court concluded the jury did not
impute malice to convict Vidrio of second degree murder. Vidrio
contends the trial court erred because the jury could have found
him guilty under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. We affirm the order denying Vidrio’s petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Underlying Crime
We take our statement of the facts underlying Vidrio’s
crime from the Court of Appeal opinion affirming the judgment of
conviction. (People v. Vidrio (Nov. 24, 1999, B119665) [nonpub.
opn.] (Vidrio).)2
“At approximately 11 p.m. on September 26, 1996, Michael
Blumberg was outside the Panama Hotel, near the intersection of
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
We refer to the law as section 1172.6 for the remainder of this
opinion.
2 We refer to the Court of Appeal opinion affirming the
judgment of Vidrio’s conviction only “for background purposes
and to provide context for the parties’ arguments.” (People v.
Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 978, fn. 2.) We do not rely on
the facts in Vidrio to review the trial court’s determination of his
eligibility for resentencing at the prima facie stage. (Id. at
p. 988.)
2
Fifth and Wall Street in downtown Los Angeles. Using a pair of
homemade nunchaks, Blumberg was trying to fight off appellant
and Francisco Toledo.
“Jimmy Buie, the security guard for the hotel, saw the
altercation. He asked the three men to move away from the
hotel. Appellant and Toledo started to walk in one direction.
Blumberg started to walk in the opposite direction.
“Appellant and Toledo then turned around and ran towards
and attacked Blumberg. At one point, Blumberg lost his balance
and fell to the ground. Toledo grabbed Blumberg and punched
him. As Toledo held Blumberg, appellant used a knife to
repeatedly stab Blumberg. Blumberg fell to the ground.
Appellant continued to stab Blumberg. Toledo kicked the fallen
man.[3]
“Appellant and Toledo ran to a nearby hotel. Blumberg
staggered to a nearby police station. Blumberg told a police
sergeant that ‘Cholos stabbed me.’ Blumberg died early the next
morning. Blumberg’s wounds were consistent with the knife
found in appellant’s pocket.
“Defense.
“Appellant testified on his own behalf to the following. He
had consumed a few beers that night and was ‘somewhat’ but not
‘totally’ drunk. He saw Toledo and Blumberg arguing and
fighting. Blumberg hit Toledo with the nunchaks. Appellant
tried to stop the fight because ‘. . . it didn’t seem right . . . that it
should be such an uneven fight.’ Appellant told Blumberg to stop
3 The jury ultimately convicted Toledo of assault with a
deadly weapon. In closing argument, the prosecutor contended
circumstantial evidence indicated Toledo had also used a knife
during the altercation.
3
hitting Toledo. Blumberg said something like, ‘Would you like
some too?’ Blumberg struck appellant with the nunchaks. Buie
broke up the fight. Appellant and Toledo started to walk away.
Blumberg said something like, ‘When the guard goes inside,
you’ll see. You’ll get it.’ Appellant was scared and dizzy. He and
Toledo returned. Appellant felt he ‘had to do everything’ and had
to ‘go all the way because as soon as the guard went back
in[, Blumberg] was going to use the nunchaks’ against him and
Toledo. The three fought. Blumberg hit him with the nunchaks.
Appellant used the knife because he was desperate. ‘[H]e
couldn’t figure out a way to get [Blumberg] away from [him].’
‘Everything happened in a flash.’ ” Blumberg died from his
injuries.
Trial, Verdict, and Sentencing
The People charged Vidrio and Toledo each with one count
of murder. (§ 187, subd. (a).) The information alleged that Vidrio
personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (a knife) in the
commission of the crime. (§ 12022, subd. (b).)
In November 1997, Vidrio and Toledo were jointly tried.
Vidrio testified that he stabbed Blumberg in self-defense. In her
closing argument, the prosecutor argued both Vidrio and Toledo
were guilty of murder and that both acted with either express or
implied malice. Vidrio’s counsel, in closing, conceded that the
facts about Vidrio’s involvement were undisputed: “Mr. Vidrio
told you he stabbed Mr. Blumberg. It’s not in dispute. There are
no questions of identification. A stabbing occurred. Quite
unfortunately Mr. Blumberg is now deceased. It is not in
dispute.” Counsel instead argued the “undisputed facts” proved
Vidrio acted only with the intent to “defend himself from the
imminent threat as well as defend Mr. Toledo.”
4
After the jury retired for deliberations, the court asked
counsel whether it should instruct the jury with CALJIC
No. 3.02, which “talks about aiding and abetting where the
intended crime is one, but the natural and probable consequences
are another.” The court further explained, “I have never heard
any argument that the intended crime was the assault. So it may
not be appropriate, but if there is any interest in having me give
that instruction based on the way the arguments have gone . . . .”
Toledo’s counsel objected to the instruction. The court
acknowledged: “You [Toledo] are the one who would be affected.”
The court decided not to instruct the jury under CALJIC No. 3.02
unless “it turns out that’s where [the jurors] are going . . . .”
Subsequently, the jury submitted a question to the court: “If we
find one defendant guilty of one crime, can we find the other
defendant guilty of aiding and abetting a crime of a greater or
lesser degree?” In response to the jury’s question, the trial court
instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 3.02.4
4 CALJIC No. 3.02, as given, stated: “One who aids and abets
another in a commission of a crime is not only guilty of that
crime, but is also guilty of any other crime committed by a
principal which is a natural and probable consequence of the
crime originally aided and abetted. [¶] In order to find the
defendant guilty of the crime of murder as charged in Count I as
an aider and abettor, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that: [¶] 1. The crime of an assault with intent to commit
great bodily injury was committed; [¶] 2. That the defendant, this
aider and abettor defendant, aided and abetted that crime; [¶]
3. That a co-principal of that crime committed the crime of
murder or manslaughter; and [¶] 4. That the crime of murder or
manslaughter was a natural and probable consequence of the
commission of the crime of assault with intent to commit great
bodily injury.”
5
The jury convicted Vidrio of second degree murder. The
jury further found true that Vidrio personally used a knife in the
commission of the crime. The jury found Toledo not guilty of
murder and convicted him of the lesser included offense of
assault with a deadly weapon. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) The court
sentenced Vidrio to 16 years to life for the murder and the
section 12022 enhancement.
Resentencing Proceedings
In August 2022, Vidrio filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6. The trial court appointed counsel. The
People filed an opposition, and Vidrio filed a reply through
counsel.
In November 2022, the court held a hearing and denied
Vidrio’s petition. The court found Vidrio failed to make a prima
facie showing of eligibility because the record did not contain any
jury instructions permitting the jury to impute malice to Vidrio to
reach its verdict. Vidrio timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6
In 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 “to
amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f);
see also People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708 (Strong);
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis); People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile).) The bill
amended section 188 by adding the requirement that, except as
6
stated in section 189, subdivision (e), “in order to be convicted of
murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought.
Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) The amendments
to the Penal Code did not invalidate murder convictions based on
the theory that the defendant was the actual killer. (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
1158, 1166, review granted May 1, 2024, S284232; People v.
Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 967 [Senate Bill No. 1437
imposed heightened mens rea requirement only for persons who
were not actual killers].)
Senate Bill No. 1437 created a procedure, now codified at
section 1172.6, in which persons convicted of qualifying offenses
under the former law may seek resentencing if they could no
longer be convicted of those offenses under amended section 188.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 847.) A defendant must file a petition declaring that, among
other things, the defendant could not presently be convicted of
murder under the current law. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708.) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of
entitlement to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause.
“If the court declines to make an order to show cause, it shall
provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons for doing so.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
II. Prima Facie Stage and Standard of Review
At the prima facie stage, “ ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s
factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
or her factual allegations were proved.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.)
7
“While the trial court may look at the record of
conviction . . . to determine whether a petitioner has made a
prima facie case for section [1172.6] relief, the prima facie inquiry
under subdivision (c) is limited.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 971.) Courts may not engage in “ ‘factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ [Citation.]”
(Id. at p. 972.) Rather, “[t]he record should be consulted at the
prima facie stage only to determine ‘readily ascertainable facts,’
such as the crime of conviction and findings on enhancements.”
(People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 815; see, e.g.,
People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 54–56 (Harden)
[considering jury instructions and verdicts in prima facie stage
analysis]; People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 106 (Ervin)
[considering sentencing enhancements, jury instructions, closing
arguments, and verdicts at prima facie stage].) The court may
make credibility determinations adverse to a petitioner only if
the record of conviction “ ‘ “contain[s] facts refuting the
allegations made in the petition” . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Lewis, at
p. 971.)
As relevant here, a petitioner fails to make a prima facie
showing for relief “if the record of conviction conclusively
establishes . . . that . . . the petitioner was the actual killer, or . . .
the petitioner acted with malice aforethought that was not
imputed based solely on participation in a crime.” (People v.
Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.) The trial court’s denial of a
resentencing petition at the prima facie stage “ ‘is a purely legal
conclusion,’ ” which appellate courts review de novo. (Ervin,
supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 101.)
8
III. The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Jury
Found Vidrio Guilty of Second Degree Murder Under
a Currently Valid Theory
Vidrio contends that the trial court erred in denying his
petition because, under CALJIC No. 3.02, the jury could have
convicted him as an aider and abettor of second degree murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. We
disagree.
A. The jury instructions and verdicts show the
jury found Vidrio was the actual killer
The record of conviction conclusively established that the
jury, by finding true that Vidrio personally used a knife in the
commission of second degree murder, convicted Vidrio as the
actual killer. The People charged only Vidrio and Toledo in the
victim’s murder. It was undisputed at trial that Vidrio stabbed
the victim. The jury convicted Vidrio of the victim’s murder and
found that he personally used a knife in the commission of the
crime. Taken together, the jury’s verdict necessarily reflects the
factual finding that Vidrio was the assailant who stabbed the
victim and therefore “personally committed the homicidal act.”
(People v. Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64, 88; see, e.g., Harden,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 55 [“when viewing the verdicts as a
whole,” jury’s findings that defendant was guilty of murder and
personally inflicted great bodily injury meant jury found she was
the actual killer of victim who had been strangled].)
Once the jury found Vidrio personally used a knife in the
commission of the murder, the natural and probable
consequences theory became inapplicable. (People v. Morales
(2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1120, 1132–1133 [natural and probable
consequences theory inapplicable to attempted murder conviction
9
once jury found true that defendant personally discharged a
firearm and was the actual shooter].) On this basis alone, Vidrio
is ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law.
Vidrio contends that the jury’s true finding regarding the
knife does not preclude his entitlement to resentencing relief
because it “is a determination that appellant used a knife: it is
not a determination that he killed the victim with the knife.” To
the extent Vidrio is arguing this finding does not establish he was
the actual killer, this argument also fails. As explained above,
the verdicts necessarily reflect the factual finding that Vidrio was
convicted as the actual killer. Toledo’s possible role in stabbing
the victim does not alter this conclusion. Assuming the jury
believed Toledo also stabbed the victim, it only found Vidrio
guilty of murder. The jury’s finding that Vidrio was guilty of
murder, and that Toledo was guilty only of assault with a deadly
weapon, together foreclose the possibility that the jury concluded
Vidrio personally used a knife but was not the actual killer.
Moreover, that Vidrio did not act alone does not preclude the
jury’s finding that he was the actual killer; his personal
involvement in the killing, even as a concurrent cause of the
victim’s death, is sufficient. (See, e.g., People v. Pock (1993) 19
Cal.App.4th 1263, 1274–1276 [jury was properly instructed that
defendant could be actual killer where he fired shots at victim
but “there was some doubt as to whether appellant fired the
actual fatal shot”].)
B. The jury instructions show the jury found
Vidrio personally acted with malice
The record of conviction also irrefutably demonstrates that
the jury convicted Vidrio of murder based on a finding that he
personally harbored malice. Although the trial court instructed
10
the jury on the natural and probable consequences doctrine under
CALJIC No. 3.02, the jury’s verdicts exclude the possibility that
the jury relied on this theory to convict Vidrio of murder. For
aiding and abetting liability to attach to Vidrio under CALJIC
No. 3.02, the jury would have needed to find that Vidrio aided
and abetted an assault and “[t]hat a co-principal in [the assault]
committed the crime of murder or manslaughter . . . .” But the
jury convicted Toledo, the only other person alleged to be involved
in the underlying crime, of committing assault. CALJIC No. 3.02
therefore did not permit the jury to convict Vidrio of second
degree murder using the natural and probable consequences
theory.
Nor did any remaining instructions permit the jury to
impute malice to Vidrio to convict him of murder. The court
instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.11, which defined express
and implied malice; CALJIC No. 8.30, which defined second
degree express malice murder; and CALJIC No. 8.31, which
defined second degree implied malice murder. In response to a
juror’s question about the requisite intent for second degree
murder,5 the court further clarified that the jury could convict
either defendant of murder by finding “express malice, the intent
to kill, but no premeditation,” or by finding “implied malice which
does not require an intent to kill . . . .” The trial court did not
instruct on any other theory of imputed malice. Thus, the jury’s
verdict necessarily reflects its factual finding that Vidrio
personally harbored either express or implied malice in the
commission of second degree murder.
5 Specifically, a juror asked, “If we find that a defendant had
intent to commit serious bodily harm and no intent to kill can we
still find that defendant guilty of 2nd degree murder[?]”
11
DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
12
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