CourtListener 10103325•People v. Scott CA2/8
Texto completo
Filed 9/3/24 P. v. Scott CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B329373
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA448436
v.
MARQUS SCOTT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Lisa B. Lench, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Michael C. Keller, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
At a resentencing hearing, Marqus Scott requested the
court conduct a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016)
63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) to preserve evidence for his future
youth offender parole hearing. The court denied the request on
the ground that Scott was statutorily ineligible for youth offender
parole, and Scott appeals. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Scott was born in September 1996. At age 17, Scott
committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code,1 §211); the juvenile
court later declared Scott a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code section 602.
As described in the opinion in Scott’s prior appeal,2 on
March 14, 2016, Scott, age 19, participated in a drive-by shooting
that killed Bradford Smith. (People v. Scott (Mar. 2, 2022,
B301478) [nonpub. opn.]) In February 2016 and July 2016 police
discovered Scott was in possession of a firearm. (Ibid.) Scott was
convicted of special circumstances murder (§§ 187, subd. (a);
190.2, subd. (a)(21), (22)) and two counts of unlawful firearm
activity (§ 29820, subd. (b)). (Scott, supra, B301478.) The trial
court found Scott was subject to the enhanced sentencing
provisions of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(j),
1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) because his juvenile adjudication
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise indicated.
2 Scott requested we take judicial notice of certain pages of
our March 2, 2022 opinion from Scott’s earlier appeal, case No.
B301478. We take judicial notice of the entire opinion. (Evid.
Code, §§ 452, 459, subd. (a).)
2
constituted a prior serious or violent felony conviction for
purposes of sentence enhancement.
In Scott’s first appeal, we vacated the gang-related special
circumstance and enhancement findings due to changes in the
applicable law, and we remanded the matter to permit the People
to elect whether to retry the vacated allegations. (People v. Scott,
supra, B301478.) On remand, the People elected not to retry
those allegations.
At resentencing, the court sentenced Scott to life in prison
without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for Smith’s murder, plus
a consecutive determinate sentence of five years four months for
the two counts of unlawful firearm activity. Scott asked the court
to set a Franklin hearing to preserve evidence pertinent to a
future youth offender parole hearing. The trial court refused on
the ground that because Scott had been sentenced to LWOP, he
was statutorily ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing.
Scott appeals.
DISCUSSION
Section 3051 requires the Board of Parole Hearings (Board)
to conduct a youth3 offender parole hearing during the 15th, 20th,
or 25th year of a defendant’s incarceration if the defendant was
25 years or younger at the time of the “controlling offense,” that
is, “the offense or enhancement for which any sentencing court
imposed the longest term of imprisonment.” (§ 3051,
subds. (a)(2)(B), (b)(1)–(3).) “A person who was convicted of a
controlling offense that was committed when the person was
3 We refer to those over 18 years of age but younger than 26
years at the time of their offense as youth offenders, and to those
under 18 years of age at the time of their offense as juveniles.
3
25 years of age or younger and for which the sentence is a life
term of 25 years to life shall be eligible for release on parole at a
youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 25th year of
incarceration.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).) Several categories of offenders,
however, are excluded from eligibility pursuant to section 3051,
subdivision (h), including offenders such as Scott who were
“sentenced to [LWOP] for a controlling offense that was
committed after the person had attained 18 years of age.”
Offenders who are eligible for youth offender parole
hearings are entitled to what is termed a “Franklin hearing” “to
provide an opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record
of the juvenile [or youth] offender’s characteristics and
circumstances at the time of the offense so that the Board, years
later, may properly discharge its obligation to ‘give great weight
to’ youth-related factors” at the eventual hearing. (Franklin,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.)
On appeal, Scott argues the trial court erroneously denied
his Franklin hearing request because section 3051 violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection and prohibition
against cruel or unusual punishment.
I. Equal Protection
Scott’s first equal protection argument is that section 3051
denies him equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment because there is no rational basis to deny a youth
offender with an LWOP sentence a parole hearing when youth
offenders not sentenced to LWOP receive one. As Scott
acknowledges in his reply brief, the California Supreme Court’s
recent decision in People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834
(Hardin) forecloses this contention. In Hardin, the Supreme
Court held that “section 3051’s exclusion of young adult offenders
4
sentenced to [LWOP] is [not] constitutionally invalid under a
rational basis standard, either on its face or as applied
to . . . individuals who are serving [LWOP] sentences for special
circumstance murder.” (Id. at p. 839.)
Scott’s second equal protection argument is that there is no
rational basis for distinguishing between juveniles sentenced to
LWOP, who are eligible for a parole hearing (§ 3051, subd. (b)(4)),
and youth offenders sentenced to LWOP, who are not eligible for
such a hearing (id., subd. (h)). The courts that have considered
this argument have rejected it, and we agree with their analysis.
(E.g., People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 202–205
[Legislature may rationally extend the possibility of parole to
those whose crimes are less grave than special circumstance
murder, a crime it “ ‘deems so morally depraved and so injurious
as to warrant a sentence that carries no hope of release for the
criminal and no threat of recidivism for society’ ”]; In re Murray
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 456, 463–465 [“dr[awing] the line at
adulthood” has a rational basis] (Murray); People v. Morales
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 345–349 (Morales) [“for purposes of
LWOP offenders, the line drawn at 18 is a rational one”]; cf. In re
Jones (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 477, 482 (Jones) [“By drawing the
line at a defendant’s 18th birthday, the Legislature has chosen to
target the youngest, and presumably most deserving, of the group
of youthful offenders whose brains were still developing and
whose judgment had not yet matured. While young adults share
many of the attributes of youth, they are by definition further
along in the process of maturation, and the law need not be blind
to the difference”].) Additionally, although it was not considering
the same exclusion from parole eligibility under section 3051,
subdivision (h), the California Supreme Court has recently stated
5
that young adults and juveniles are “constitutionally different”
for purposes of sentencing, and it rejected the argument that the
Legislature, having extended parole eligibility from juveniles to
youth offenders, must “treat young adults the same as it treats
juveniles” in the section 3051 context. (People v. Williams (Aug.
29, 2024, S262229) __Cal.5th __ [applying Hardin and finding a
rational basis for section 3051, subdivision (h)’s exclusion of
defendants sentenced under the One Strike Law (§ 667.61) from
parole eligibility].)
We follow the Hardin Court and many others in finding no
equal protection violation in this context but highlighting the
need for additional legislative attention to this issue. (Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 864; see, e.g., Murray, supra,
68 Cal.App.5th at p. 464; Morales, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at
p. 349; People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 201–202
(conc. opn. of Dato, J.); People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th
769, 781 (Acosta); People v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th
1016, 1035–1036 (conc. opn. of Segal, J.) (Montelongo); Jones,
supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 486–487 (conc. opn. of Pollak, J.).)
As the Hardin Court explained, “Special circumstance murder is
an unquestionably grave offense, one that exacts an
unimaginable toll on the lives of victims and those the victims
leave behind. But we also know that young people—even young
people who have committed grave offenses—are capable of
significant, sometimes transformative, change over the course of
their lifetimes. To extinguish any hope of release, particularly for
an individual just past the cusp of adulthood, is a form of
retribution that exacts its own price—one borne not just by the
individuals involved, but by their families, by their communities,
and by society as a whole.” (Hardin, at pp. 864–865.)
6
II. Cruel or Unusual Punishment
In an argument essentially reframing his first equal
protection claim, Scott contends section 3051’s extension of youth
offender parole hearings to most but not all youth offenders
causes LWOP sentences for youth offenders to be grossly
disproportionate to the offenses for which they were imposed,
rendering them cruel or unusual under the California
Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) Scott concedes his LWOP
sentence “may not meet the three-part test set forth in In re
Lynch” (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424–427 for determining whether a
punishment is cruel or unusual pursuant to the California
Constitution, but maintains it is nonetheless grossly
disproportionate because it fails to take into account the reduced
culpability of youth offenders.
In Hardin, the California Supreme Court held the
Legislature had a rational basis for excluding youth offenders
serving LWOP sentences from the extension of youth offender
parole hearings. “[T]he Legislature consciously drew lines that
altered the parole component of offenders’ sentences based not
only on the age of the offender (and thus the offender’s
amenability to rehabilitation) but also on the offense and
sentence imposed. The lines the Legislature drew necessarily
reflect a set of legislative judgments about the nature of
punishment that is appropriate for the crime.” (Hardin, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 855.)
The California Supreme Court explained, “Life without
parole is the most severe sentence of imprisonment in California
law, applicable only in cases of special circumstance murder and
a small number of other offenses the law regards as particularly
serious. By excluding persons sentenced to life without parole
7
from youth offender parole proceedings, the Legislature exercised
its prerogative to define degrees of culpability and punishment by
leaving in place longstanding judgments about the seriousness of
these crimes and, relatedly, the punishment for them.” (Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 853, fn. omitted.) The court stated, “The
statutory framework indicates that the Legislature aimed to
increase opportunities for meaningful release for young adult
offenders, while taking into account the appropriate punishment
for the underlying crimes, depending on their severity. These are
essentially the same considerations involved whenever the
Legislature exercises its responsibility ‘for determining which
class of crimes deserves certain punishments and which crimes
should be distinguished from others.’ [Citation.] They are also
not dissimilar from the considerations that prompted the high
court to distinguish, for Eighth Amendment purposes, between
sentencing juveniles for homicide offenses and sentencing
juveniles for nonhomicide offenses. (Miller [v. Alabama (2012)
567 U.S. 460, 473 (Miller)] [based on considerations of ‘both
moral culpability and consequential harm,’ juvenile homicide
offenders, unlike juvenile nonhomicide offenders, may be
sentenced to life without possibility of parole, but only after
individualized sentencing that gives appropriate consideration to
the mitigating attributes of youth].) Much as the high court
invoked culpability-related concerns to distinguish among crimes
in that context, it is reasonable to infer that the Legislature
considered such concerns in this one.” (Hardin, at pp. 855–856.)
Given that the Hardin Court found a rational basis for
section 3051’s distinction between youth offenders sentenced to
LWOP and youth offenders not sentenced to LWOP, it is difficult
to envision how the same distinction could render an LWOP
8
sentence “so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted
that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of
human dignity.” (In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 424.) Scott
does not address this tension in his reply brief, filed after Hardin
was decided; he simply asserts that because there was no cruel or
unusual punishment claim in Hardin, that decision does not
affect the analysis here.
California courts have uniformly rejected the argument
that LWOP sentences imposed on young adults between the ages
of 18 and 25 constitute cruel and unusual punishment. (E.g.,
Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 781–782 [LWOP for a 21-
year-old offender on autism spectrum did not violate Eighth
Amendment]; People v. Windfield (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 496,
525–526 [despite scientific literature showing the features of
juveniles extend to 18 year olds, “we are bound by precedent and
there is no precedent for us to declare that Miller applies to 18
year old[]s”]; Montelongo, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1030–1032
[LWOP for an 18-year-old offender did not violate the Eighth
Amendment]; People v. Abundio (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1211,
1220–1221 [LWOP for an 18-year-old defendant was “not cruel
and/or unusual”].)
Although Scott points out that Acosta, Windfield, and
Montelongo concern cruel and unusual punishment claims under
the Eighth Amendment rather than claims under the California
Constitution, he does not provide any cogent argument why this
distinction makes a difference here. (See People v. Baker (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 711, 733 [noting the “considerable overlap in the
state and federal approaches” to cruel and/or unusual
punishment, both of which prohibit grossly disproportionate
punishment].) As the California Supreme Court has held that it
9
does not violate either federal or state constitutional prohibitions
on cruel and/or unusual punishment to sentence youth offenders
who commit special circumstance murder to the death penalty
(People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1234–1235), the lesser
sentence of LWOP for special circumstances murder is
necessarily constitutional.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
GRIMES, J.
VIRAMONTES, J
10
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.