In re M.H. CA2/8

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Filed 8/30/24 In re M.H. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re M.H., a Person Coming B333184
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP04036A)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Kristen Byrdsong, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and David M. Miller, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
J.S., the paternal grandmother of minor M.H., purports to
appeal from the orders denying her petition under Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 388, and terminating parental rights
over M.H. under section 366.26. J.S. contends the juvenile court
erred in issuing these orders because it failed to ensure that she
would have continued visitation with M.H. after the child was
adopted. We conclude J.S.’s claims fail because the record shows
that the court previously ordered unmonitored visitation between
J.S. and M.H., and that such order remained in effect following
the termination of parental rights. The court did not abuse its
discretion in denying J.S.’s section 388 petition for increased
visitation, or in failing to order postadoption visitation at the
section 366.26 hearing. We accordingly affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Section 300 petition
W.Z. (Father) and A.H. (Mother) are the parents of M.H.,
a boy born in October 2022. Father is deceased, and has no other
children. Mother has five older children, four of whom were prior
dependents of the juvenile court. This matter came to the
attention of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) when both Mother and M.H. tested
positive for amphetamine at the child’s birth. Following the
birth, DCFS detained M.H. from Mother, and placed the child
with the maternal grandparents, T.V. and R.V. The maternal
grandparents also have custody of Mother’s five older children
through legal guardianship or adoption.

1 Unless otherwise stated, all further undesignated statutory
references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2
On February 1, 2023, the juvenile court sustained a section
300 petition for M.H. based on Mother’s substance abuse, mental
and emotional problems, and history of domestic violence with a
male companion. The court removed M.H. from Mother’s
custody, and bypassed reunification services for her. DCFS
began assessing adoption by the maternal grandparents as
M.H.’s permanent plan.
II. J.S.’s visitation with M.H.
On February 1, 2023, the same date that it sustained the
section 300 petition, the juvenile court also ordered visitation
between M.H. and his paternal grandmother, J.S. The record
does not disclose the specific terms of the visitation order other
than that J.S.’s visits would be unmonitored, the exchange would
occur at a halfway point, and DCFS had the discretion to
liberalize the visits.
The following day, DCFS provided J.S. with a visitation
schedule. Under the initial schedule, J.S. would have
unmonitored visits with M.H. every other Sunday starting on
February 5, 2023. On February 14, 2023, DCFS decided to
gradually liberalize J.S.’s visitation, first to weekly Sunday visits,
then to overnight weekend visits, and finally to alternating week-
long visits. Under the amended schedule, M.H. would spend
alternating weeks with his maternal and paternal grandparents
starting on March 5, 2023. DCFS noted that the purpose of this
change was not to assess J.S. for placement since M.H. was
suitably placed with his maternal grandparents, but to allow the
paternal family an opportunity to bond with the child. Following
the change, DCFS visited J.S.’s home on two occasions, and
observed that J.S. was loving and appropriate with M.H.

3
As of May 2023, M.H. continued to do well in the maternal
grandparents’ care, and was closely bonded to them. M.H. was
receiving Regional Center services, and his caregivers were
attentive to all of his needs. While the maternal grandparents
were committed to adopting the child and providing him with a
permanent home, J.S. also desired to become M.H.’s prospective
adoptive parent and maintain a relationship with him. Both J.S.
and the maternal grandparents filed requests to be declared
M.H.’s de facto parents.
On May 31, 2023, while the two requests for de facto parent
status were pending, DCFS reduced J.S.’s visitation with M.H. to
overnight weekend visits twice per month. DCFS explained that
alternating weeks between J.S. and the maternal grandparents
was not a sustainable visitation plan given M.H.’s need for
stability and permanency. DCFS determined that reverting to
overnight weekend visits would allow J.S. to maintain a bond
with M.H. while providing more stability for the child in his
current placement. When DCFS advised J.S. of the amended
schedule, she expressed her belief that the maternal
grandmother, T.V., orchestrated the change. DCFS assured J.S.
that this was not the case, and that the plan was always to revert
to overnight weekend visits once she and M.H. were able to form
a familial relationship. The schedule change took effect on
June 9, 2023.
In its July 2023 status review report, DCFS recommended
a permanent plan of adoption by M.H.’s maternal grandparents.
According to the report, M.H. continued to thrive in the home of
his maternal grandparents, and they consistently showed
themselves to be loving caregivers who treated M.H. as their own
son. In addition, the child had a strong bond with his five half-

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siblings who resided in the same home. During their time
together, J.S. also demonstrated love, affection, and appropriate
care for M.H. DCFS did not, however, support any change in
placement given that M.H. had been in his maternal
grandparents’ care since his birth. DCFS instead referred the
parties to mediation to establish a postadoption contact
agreement.
On July 10, 2023, the juvenile court held a hearing on the
two requests for de facto parent status. After hearing testimony
from both T.V. and J.S., the court granted the maternal
grandparents’ request and denied J.S.’s request. The court found
that M.H. had substantial ties to the maternal grandparents and
his half-siblings, and that it would be detrimental to sever those
ties. The court noted that the maternal grandparents had been
caring for M.H. since his birth, were well-adapted to meeting his
special needs, and were in the process of qualifying as his
prospective adoptive parents. The court also expressed that it
was in M.H.’s best interest to have a relationship with both sets
of grandparents, and encouraged them to follow through with
mediation to achieve that result.
In a last minute information report filed in late July 2023,
DCFS stated it was concerned about recent comments that J.S.
made regarding adoption by the maternal grandparents.
According to the report, J.S. repeatedly asked the social worker
what it would take to stop the adoption and prevent the
termination of parental rights. J.S. also said she wanted to show
M.H. photos of Father so that he would know who his “real
father” was. DCFS further reported that T.V. shared a concern
about J.S.’s attendance at M.H.’s medical appointments. Because
doctors’ offices only allowed two adults to be present in the exam

5
room, the maternal grandfather, R.V., could not attend M.H.’s
appointments when J.S. was there. DCFS recommended that
both T.V. and R.V. be present at the appointments as M.H.’s
caregivers, and then relay any pertinent information to J.S.
At a review hearing held on August 7, 2023, the juvenile
court ordered that J.S. was no longer allowed to attend M.H.’s
medical appointments so that his current caretakers could be
present. Given J.S.’s comments about adoption, the court also
advised counsel to walk the matter on calendar if any issues with
J.S.’s visitation arose.
In September 2023, T.V. raised additional concerns about
J.S.’s contact with M.H. T.V. informed DCFS that J.S. continued
to show up for M.H.’s medical appointments even when she could
not enter the building. J.S. also sent excessive text messages
addressed to M.H., who was preverbal. The maternal
grandparents reported the current visitation schedule was
providing M.H. with more structure and stability, but they
wanted discretion over J.S.’s visits as they continued to build a
relationship with M.H.’s paternal family.
III. J.S.’s section 388 petition
On September 19, 2023, J.S. filed a section 388 petition to
modify the orders made on July 10 and August 7, 2023. In her
petition, J.S. stated that she believed she was misrepresented at
the July 10 hearing in her goal to adopt M.H., and that she was
told after the August 7 hearing that she could no longer attend
M.H.’s medical appointments. J.S. also stated that DCFS
decreased her visitation with M.H. from alternating weeks to two
overnight weekends per month despite the lack of any issue with
the prior schedule.

6
The relief sought included (1) a legal guardianship over
M.H. with the option to adopt, (2) a coguardianship with the
maternal grandparents, and (3) the resumption of a consistent
visitation schedule and participation in M.H.’s appointments.
In support of the petition, J.S. stated: “[M.H.] will be provided a
loving, nutritional caring safe home and environment. [M.H.]
will receive undivided individual full attention to enhance his
cognitive and emotional and mental growth. Additionally, he will
have a growing relationship with his paternal family members,
aunts, uncles, cousins and grandparents.” The record does not
show whether J.S. or her attorney served a copy of the petition on
all parties.
On September 21, 2023, the juvenile court summarily
denied J.S.’s section 388 petition. In its order, the court found
that J.S.’s request did not state new evidence or a change of
circumstances, and that it constituted an improper ex parte
communication.
IV. Section 366.26 hearing
On September 26, 2023, the juvenile court held the section
366.26 hearing for M.H. J.S. did not attend the hearing. Mother
submitted on DCFS’s request that the court terminate parental
rights over M.H. and free him for adoption by the maternal
grandparents. Counsel for M.H. also joined in DCFS’s request,
noting that the maternal grandparents had been caring for the
child since his birth, and were committed to providing him a
loving, secure, and stable home. The court terminated parental
rights over M.H., ordered adoption as the permanent plan, and
designated the maternal grandparents as the prospective
adoptive parents. In its minute order for the section 366.26

7
hearing, the court stated that “[a]ll prior orders not in conflict
shall remain in full force and effect.”
On November 8, 2023, J.S. filed an appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Scope of appellate review
We first address the proper scope of this appeal. In her
November 8, 2023 notice of appeal, J.S. stated that she was
appealing (1) the July 10, 2023 “denial [of] de facto parent/legal
guardian/misrepresentation,” (2) the August 7, 2023 order that
she was “no longer allowed to attend doctor appointments,” and
(3) the September 26, 2023 order for “decreased contact without
reasonable reason.”
The timely filing of a notice of appeal is a prerequisite to
appellate jurisdiction. (In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 246.)
To be timely, the notice of appeal ordinarily must be filed within
60 days of the appealable judgment or order. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.406(a)(1).) Additionally, “ ‘ “[a]ppellate briefs must
provide argument and legal authority for the positions taken.”
[Citation.] “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it
but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to
authority, we treat the point as waived.” ’ ” (In re J.F. (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79.) Here, J.S. failed to file a timely notice of
appeal from either the July 10, 2023 order denying her request
for de facto parent status, or the August 7, 2023 order prohibiting
her from attending M.H.’s medical appointments. She also failed
to raise any argument regarding these orders in her appellate
briefing. J.S. thus is precluded from challenging them in this
appeal.
J.S. did file a timely notice of appeal from the September
26, 2023 order terminating parental rights. In her appellate

8
briefing, she also seeks to challenge the September 21, 2023 order
denying her section 388 petition regarding visitation. J.S. claims
the juvenile court erred in issuing both orders because it failed to
ensure that she would have continued contact with M.H. once the
child was adopted by the maternal grandparents. As a general
rule, “ ‘notices of appeal are to be liberally construed so as to
protect the right of appeal if it is reasonably clear what [the]
appellant was trying to appeal from, and where the respondent
could not possibly have been misled or prejudiced.’ ” (In re
Joshua S. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 261, 272.) Although J.S.’s notice of
appeal does not specifically reference the September 21, 2023
order denying her section 388 petition, it does state that she is
appealing the order for “decreased contact” with M.H. Because
the section 388 petition sought relief from DCFS’s decision to
decrease J.S.’s visitation to overnight weekend visits, we liberally
construe the notice of appeal as challenging both the order
terminating parental rights and the portion of the order denying
J.S.’s section 388 petition regarding visitation.
II. The juvenile court did not err in denying J.S.’s
section 388 request for increased visitation
J.S. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when it
denied her section 388 petition without ordering a hearing on the
issue of visitation. In her petition, J.S. asked the court to order a
return to alternating weeklong visits with M.H. rather than the
current schedule of overnight weekend visits twice per month.
We see no abuse of discretion in the denial of the petition.
Section 388 permits the juvenile court, “upon grounds of
change of circumstance or new evidence, . . . to change, modify, or
set aside any order of court previously made . . . .” (§ 388,
subd. (a)(1).) The statute allows the modification of a prior order

9
only when a parent or other person with an interest in a
dependent child establishes that (1) changed circumstances or
new evidence exists; and (2) the proposed modification would
promote the best interest of the child. (In re Christopher L.
(2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, 1080.) “The change of circumstances or
new evidence ‘must be of such significant nature that it requires
. . . modification of the challenged prior order.’ ” (In re Mickel O.
(2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615 (Mickel O.).) “In assessing the
best interests of the child, ‘a primary consideration . . . is the goal
of assuring stability and continuity.’ ” (Id. at p. 616.) The
petitioner “must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to
relief in order to trigger the right to an evidentiary hearing on
the petition.” (In re R.F. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 718, 728.)
We review the summary denial of a section 388 petition for abuse
of discretion. (Ibid.)
In this case, the juvenile court acted within its discretion
when it summarily denied J.S.’s section 388 request for a change
in visitation. The court originally ordered unmonitored visits
between J.S. and M.H. on February 1, 2023. The record does not
include a copy of the visitation order or a complete description of
its terms. The record does reflect that DCFS had discretion to
liberalize the visits, and that it began doing so in mid-February
2023, increasing J.S.’s time with M.H. from weekly day visits to
overnight weekend visits to alternating week-long visits.
Starting in March 2023, M.H. spent the entirety of every other
week with J.S. and the paternal family. DCFS explained,
however, that the purpose of this increase in visitation was not to
evaluate J.S. for M.H.’s placement, but rather to permit the
paternal family an opportunity to form a bond with the young
child. The record further shows that, in June 2023, DCFS

10
changed the visitation schedule back to overnight weekends twice
per month. Because J.S. was able to form a bond with M.H.
during their additional time together, DCFS decided that
reverting to overnight weekend visits would allow J.S. to
maintain that bond while best serving the child’s need for
stability in his prospective adoptive home.
When J.S. filed her section 388 petition in September 2023,
she sought a return to the prior visitation schedule of alternating
weeks between the maternal and paternal families. J.S. asserted
that the requested change would provide M.H. with “a loving,
nutritional caring safe home and environment,” and would allow
him to receive “undivided individual full attention to enhance his
cognitive and emotional and mental growth.” The evidence
demonstrated, however, that the maternal grandparents had
been providing M.H. with a safe and loving home since his birth,
and that they were well-adapted at caring for the child’s special
needs. Furthermore, M.H. was thriving in his maternal
grandparents’ care, and he was closely bonded with both his
caregivers and his maternal half-siblings. Although it is
undisputed that J.S. also was loving and attentive toward M.H.,
DCFS reasonably determined that a 50/50 split in custodial time
between the maternal and paternal grandparents was not a
feasible long-term plan given the child’s need for stability and
permanency. After DCFS reduced J.S.’s visits to two overnight
weekends per month, the maternal grandparents reported that
the amended schedule was providing M.H. with more structure
and stability in his prospective adoptive home.
On this record, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude
that J.S. failed to make a prima facie showing that there were
changed circumstances, or that an order for increased visitation

11
was in M.H.’s best interest. The juvenile court accordingly did
not abuse its discretion in denying the section 388 petition.
III. The juvenile court did not err in failing to order
postadoption visitation at the section 366.26 hearing
J.S. also contends the juvenile court abused its discretion
when it terminated parental rights without issuing an order for
postadoption visitation between J.S. and M.H. J.S. claims that,
by failing to order postadoption visitation at the section 366.26
hearing, the juvenile court effectively terminated her visitation
with M.H. We conclude J.S.’s claim lacks merit.
“Grandparents’ rights to court-ordered visitation with their
grandchildren are purely statutory.” (In re Marriage of Harris
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 210, 219.) In dependency proceedings, section
361.2, subdivision (i), governs a grandparent’s right to visitation
with a child that is removed from parental custody. (In re J.T.
(2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 953, 962.) It provides that “[i]f the court
has ordered removal of the child from the physical custody of the
child’s parents . . ., the court shall consider whether the family
ties and best interest of the child will be served by granting
visitation rights to the child’s grandparents.” (§ 361.2, subd. (i).)
Additionally, section 362.4 authorizes the juvenile court to order
visitation between a child and a grandparent when terminating
dependency jurisdiction. (In re J.T., at p. 962.) Under that
statute, “[i]f the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a
minor who has been adjudged a dependent child . . . , the juvenile
court on its own motion, may issue . . . an order determining the
custody of, or visitation with, the child.” (§ 362.4, subd. (a).)
We generally review the juvenile court’s visitation order for abuse
of discretion. (In re J.P. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1119.)

12
Citing Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th 586, J.S. argues
the juvenile court abused its discretion at the section 366.26
hearing by effectively terminating her visitation with M.H. when
it terminated parental rights. In that case, the juvenile court
terminated parental rights over two children with adoption by
the paternal grandparents as the permanent plan. (Id. at
pp. 610–612.) At the same time, the court summarily terminated
the maternal grandparents’ supervised visitation, explaining that
the children would “ ‘probably end up being adopted by [paternal
grandparents],’ ” who would decide whether to allow visits. (Id.
at p. 612.) In reversing the order terminating the visitation, the
Court of Appeal reasoned there was “nothing in the record
indicating that supervised visitation should cease because of the
possible adoption in the future.” (Id. at p. 618.) The court also
noted the maternal grandparents were “blindsided by this last-
minute decision and the summary manner in which all contact
with [the children] was abruptly terminated.” (Ibid.)
J.S. contends that, as in Mickel O., she “was ‘blindsided’ by
the sudden termination of her visitation.” But contrary to this
claim, there is no indication in the record that the juvenile court
terminated J.S.’s visitation with M.H. when it terminated
parental rights. As discussed, the court granted J.S.
unmonitored visitation with M.H. in February 2023. DCFS
gradually liberalized J.S.’s visitation to alternating week-long
visits before reverting to overnight weekend visits starting in
June 2023. This visitation schedule was still in effect as of
September 2023, when the court held the section 366.26 hearing.
At that time, the court terminated parental rights over M.H. and
ordered adoption as the child’s permanent plan. The court did
not, however, terminate J.S.’s visits with M.H. or otherwise

13
modify its prior visitation order. In fact, neither the court nor the
parties addressed the issue of visitation at all. Instead, the court
stated in its minute order for the hearing that “[a]ll prior orders
not in conflict shall remain in full force and effect.” Therefore, at
the conclusion of the section 366.26 hearing, the prior order for
visitation remained in effect notwithstanding the termination of
parental rights.
J.S. asserts that, given the strained relationship between
the maternal and paternal grandparents, the juvenile court
abused its discretion by failing to make a postadoption visitation
order when it terminated parental rights. In support of this
argument, J.S. cites to cases holding that the juvenile court has
authority under section 362.4 to order visitation between a child
and a nonparent when terminating dependency jurisdiction. (In
re J.T., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 960; In re Hirenia C. (1993)
18 Cal.App.4th 504, 518; In re Robin N. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th
1140, 1146.) However, section 362.4 has no application at this
stage of the dependency proceedings because the juvenile court
did not terminate its jurisdiction over M.H. when it terminated
parental rights. Rather, consistent with section 366.26, the court
transferred care and custody of the child to DCFS for adoptive
planning and placement. Because the court continued to exercise
jurisdiction over M.H. at the conclusion of the section 366.26
hearing, its existing visitation order remained in effect.
J.S. claims a postadoption visitation order was necessary in
this case because the maternal grandparents have not allowed
her to have any visits with M.H. since the section 366.26 hearing.
However, the record before us in this appeal is limited to matters
that occurred prior to the challenged order terminating parental
rights. As of the September 2023 section 366.26 hearing, J.S.

14
was having overnight weekend visits twice per month, and there
is nothing in the record that suggests the maternal grandparents
refused to comply with that schedule. J.S. did not attend the
section 366.26 hearing, and none of the parties that did attend
asked the court to consider a postadoption visitation order at that
time. To the extent J.S. seeks to present new evidence regarding
events that have occurred since the section 366.26 hearing, she
must raise any such issue with the juvenile court in the first
instance. Subject to rare exceptions not applicable here, an
appellate court cannot receive or consider postjudgment evidence
that was never before the juvenile court. (In re Zeth S. (2003)
31 Cal.4th 396, 399.) On this record, J.S. has failed to show an
abuse of discretion in the order terminating parental rights.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders denying J.S.’s section 388
petition and terminating parental rights over M.H. are affirmed.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

GRIMES, J.

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