People v. Castillo CA5

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Filed 8/30/24 P. v. Castillo CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F086505
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 02CM0836HTA)
v.

HENRY JOSEPH CASTILLO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. Michael J.
Reinhart, Judge.
Robert Navarro, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and Angelo S. Edralin,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
In 2023, decades after defendant Henry Jospeh Castillo’s judgment became final,
the trial court recalled his sentence and resentenced him in accordance with Penal Code
section 1172.75,1 following notice by the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) that defendant may be serving a term that includes an
enhancement under section 667.5, former subdivision (b). Defendant appealed and raises
three challenges related to resentencing. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude the
trial court erred when it stayed the sentence for firearm possession under section 654,
when it concluded the concurrent sentences originally imposed were unauthorized and
imposed consecutive sentences, and when it denied defendant’s Romero2 motion based
on his criminal history without considering other relevant factors. Therefore, we vacate
the sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with the principles discussed herein.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2002, defendant, then 36 years old, was convicted of being a felon in possession
of a firearm (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)),3 and attempted criminal threats (§§ 664/422)
with an enhancement for personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated
proceeding, the jury found that defendant served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, former
subd. (b)), and had two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of the “Three
Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)). Defendant was sentenced
to two concurrent terms of 25 years to life, with additional terms of one year for the prior
prison term enhancement and 10 years for the firearm enhancement.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).
3 Effective January 1, 2012, section 12021, subdivision (a)(1), was repealed and recodified
as section 29800, subdivision (a)(1). (Stats. 2010, ch. 711, §§ 4, 6.)

2.
In August 2022, following the enactment of Senate Bill No. 4834 and receipt of a
notice from CDCR, the trial court issued an order informing the parties that, pursuant to
section 1172.75 (former § 1171.1; ante, fn. 4), defendant may be serving a sentence that
includes an enhancement imposed under section 667.5. The trial court appointed counsel
and set a hearing.
In January 2023, appellant’s counsel filed a motion seeking recall of sentence and
resentencing under sections 1172.1 and 1170.126 (Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012)
(Reform Act), in addition to relief under section 1172.75. In the motion, counsel
requested the court strike the firearm enhancement under Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 620) or reduce the 10-year upper term to the three-year
lower term under People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688 (Tirado).5 Although counsel
did not cite Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 81), counsel quoted
section 1385 as amended by Senate Bill 81 for the trial court’s “edification.” The
prosecutor filed an opposition, conceding the prior prison term must be stricken, but
opposing the motion to strike the firearm enhancement and for relief under the Reform
Act.

4 Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 added former sections 1171 and 1171.1,
which provided, subject to exceptions not relevant here, that any enhancements imposed prior to
January 1, 2018, pursuant to section 11370.2 of the Health and Safety Code and imposed prior to
January 1, 2020, pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b), were legally invalid. (Senate Bill
No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 483).) The bill also provided a timeline for
identification of individuals serving a term that included a now invalid enhancement, review and
resentencing. (Ibid.) Effective June 30, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
renumbered section 1171 to section 1172.7 and section 1171.1 to section 1172.75.
5 In Tirado, the California Supreme Court held that under section 1385, trial courts have
discretion to strike a greater enhancement under section 12022.53 and impose a lesser included,
uncharged enhancement under the statute, if supported by facts alleged and found true. (Tirado,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 700 & fn. 12.) Recently, the court held that this discretion is not limited
to imposition of a lesser included, uncharged enhancement under section 12022.53, and trial
courts may impose an enhancement under another statute, if supported by facts that were alleged
and found true. (People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1030.)

3.
At the June 2023 resentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that defendant’s
entitlement to relief from the prior prison term enhancement and resentencing under
section 1172.75 afforded him the opportunity to seek relief under all subsequent changes
in the law. Counsel specifically sought to have the two prior strike convictions, which
defendant incurred as a 17-year-old juvenile, stricken under Romero and to proceed under
section 1170.126 of the Reform Act. The trial court concluded defendant’s request for
relief under the Reform Act was untimely, struck the prior prison term enhancement,
denied the Romero motion, and declined to strike the firearm enhancement under
section 1385, but reduced the 10-year upper term to the four-year middle term. The court
also stayed the sentence on count I under section 654, reasoning that imposition of
concurrent terms in 2002 was unauthorized and it was precluded from imposing a greater
sentence at resentencing, but section 654 applied because the two offenses occurred
during a single course of conduct.
On appeal, defendant challenges three of the court’s sentencing decisions.
Defendant claims the trial court erred in staying the sentence on count I under
section 654, erred in imposing consecutive terms on counts I and II, and erred in denying
his Romero motion. The People dispute any entitlement to relief.
For the reasons discussed next, we vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for
resentencing.
DISCUSSION
I. Statutory Authority for Recall and Resentencing
A. Section 1172.75
Defendant’s prior prison term enhancement became legally invalid following the
passage of Senate Bill 483 and CDCR provided notice to the trial court, which then
recalled his sentence and resentenced him under that section. (§ 1172.75, subds. (a)–(c).)
“‘By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial
court strike the newly “invalid” enhancements.’” (People v. Garcia (2024) 101

4.
Cal.App.5th 848, 855, italics added, quoting People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th
393, 402.) The statute provides,

“(d) [¶] (1) Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a
lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the
elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public
safety. Resentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer
sentence than the one originally imposed.

“(2) The court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial
Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or
provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and
to promote uniformity of sentencing.

“(3) The court may consider postconviction factors, including, but
not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the
defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time
served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the
defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that
circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(1)–(3).)
B. Section 1172.1
In briefing, however, defendant also relies on recall and resentencing under
section 1172.1 as amended by Assembly Bill 600. (Assem. Bill No. 600 (2023–2024
Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 600).) Assembly Bill 600 amended section 1172.1, effective
January 1, 2024, to permit the trial court, “within 120 days of the date of commitment or
at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are
subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law … [to] recall the sentence
and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as
if they had not previously been sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody,
and provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.…” (Id.,
subd. (a)(1), italics added.)

5.
Assembly Bill 600 provides, “(a) It is the intent of the Legislature that, in
resentencing proceedings pursuant to Section 1172.1 of the Penal Code, all ameliorative
laws and court decisions allowing discretionary relief should be applied regardless of the
date of the offense or conviction.
“(b) It is the further intent of the Legislature that courts have full discretion in
resentencing proceedings pursuant to Section 1172.1 of the Penal Code to reconsider past
decisions to impose prior strikes. The list of factors considered in … Romero[, supra,] 13
Cal.4th 497, is not exhaustive. Courts should consider Section 1385 of the Penal Code,
postconviction factors, or any other evidence that continued incarceration is no longer in
the interests of justice.
“(c) Consistent with the California Racial Justice Act, it is the intent of the
Legislature to provide remedies that ameliorate discriminative practices in the criminal
justice system, including discrimination in seeking or obtaining convictions or imposing
sentences.
“(d) It is the intent of the Legislature that, in cases where the judge concludes that
recall and resentencing pursuant to Section 1172.1 of the Penal Code is appropriate, the
resentencing result in a meaningful modification. ‘Meaningful modification’ means it
will cause some actual change in the person’s circumstances, including, but not limited
to, immediate release, earlier release, and newly acquired entitlement to review by the
Board of Parole Hearings or the advancement of eligibility for a parole hearing.” (Legis.
Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 600, Stats. 2023 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.), Summary Dig.,
ch. 446, § 1, italics added.)
Defendant relies on this legislative intent to bolster his argument that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his Romero motion and remand for resentencing is
required. However, defendant does not have a right to recall and resentencing under this
section (§ 1172.1, subd. (c)), and CDCR did not recommend recall and resentencing
under section 1172.1 (id., subd. (a)(1)). As discussed below, we conclude the trial court

6.
erred in denying defendant’s Romero motion and we remand for resentencing. On
remand, to the extent he concludes it inures to his benefit, defendant is not precluded
from requesting that recall and resentencing be extended to include section 1172.1, but he
does not have a right to relief under that section.
II. Application of Section 654 to Count I
A. Background
Defendant was originally sentenced to two concurrent terms of 25 years to life,
and the trial court did not address section 654. (See People v. Mejia (2017) 9
Cal.App.5th 1036, 1045 [where there is no “explicit ruling by the trial court at
sentencing, we infer that the court made the finding appropriate to the sentence it
imposed, i.e., either applying section 654 or not applying it”].) At resentencing, the trial
court was of the view that imposition of concurrent terms was unauthorized and it noted
the prohibition against imposing greater punishment.6 However, the court concluded that
section 654 applied, stating, “The two offenses appear to be a single course of conduct, so
one of them would have to be stayed pursuant to Penal Code Section 654.”
The parties disagree on the nature of the error. Defendant claims, very generally,
that the court erred when it concluded consecutive sentences were unauthorized and when

6 “‘Under the general rule of state constitutional law that the California Supreme Court has
referred to as the Henderson rule, “[w]hen a defendant successfully appeals a criminal
conviction, California’s constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy precludes the
imposition of more severe punishment on resentencing.”’” (People v. Flores (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 420, 450, fn. 15 [discussing People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 496, 497].)
“The rule, which is grounded in double jeopardy and due process principles, serves to shield
criminal defendants from having to choose between letting an erroneous conviction stand and
risking more severe consequences on remand.” (People v. Flores, supra, at p. 450, fn. 15.)
“There are exceptions to the rule, [however,] including … ‘if the initial sentence was unlawful or
unauthorized’ [citations].” (Ibid.) Additionally, section 1172.75 expressly provides that
resentencing “shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.” (Id.,
subd. (d)(1).) We need not address this concern in further detail, because, as addressed in
part III. of the Discussion, imposition of concurrent sentences at the original sentencing hearing
was not unauthorized.

7.
it applied section 654. The People do not address the court’s imposition of consecutive
sentences, but argue that the court did not abuse its discretion when it stayed the sentence
on count I under section 654.
The California Supreme Court has recognized that “section 654 is irrelevant to the
question of whether multiple current convictions are sentenced concurrently or
consecutively under the three strikes law, because section 654 does not allow any
multiple punishment, whether concurrent or consecutive, and the analyses performed
under the two statutes are entirely separate.” (People v. Lawrence (2000) 24 Cal.4th 219,
226, citing People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 594 (Deloza); accord, People v.
Torres (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 185, 204.) “‘It has long been established that the
imposition of concurrent sentences is precluded by section 654 [citations] because [under
such a sentence] the defendant is deemed to be subjected to the term of both sentences
although they are served simultaneously.’” (People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787, 796.)
“[W]hen a court determines that a conviction falls within the meaning of section 654, it is
necessary to impose sentence but to stay the execution of the duplicative sentence, a
resolution we anticipated would prevent the addition of incremental punishment.” (Ibid.)
Therefore, we first consider whether the trial court erred when it stayed the sentence on
count I under section 654.
B. Legal Principles
As amended by Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill
518), effective January 1, 2022, section 654, subdivision (a), provides, “An act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be
punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be
punished under more than one provision.…” The statute “expressly prohibits separate
punishment for two crimes based on the same act, but has been interpreted to also
preclude multiple punishment for two or more crimes occurring within the same course
of conduct pursuant to a single intent.” (People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 642;

8.
accord, People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.) Determining “[w]hether a
defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under section 654 requires a two-step
inquiry .…” (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.) “We first consider if the
different crimes were completed by a ‘single physical act.’ [Citation.] If so, the
defendant may not be punished more than once for that act. Only if we conclude that the
case involves more than a single act—i.e., a course of conduct—do we then consider
whether that course of conduct reflects a single ‘“intent and objective”’ or multiple
intents and objectives.” (Ibid.)
“[T]he court acts in ‘excess of its jurisdiction’ and imposes an ‘unauthorized’
sentence when it erroneously stays or fails to stay execution of a sentence under
section 654.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354, fn. 17.) We review the trial
court’s express or implied factual findings for substantial evidence, and its conclusions of
law de novo. (People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618; People v. Perez (1979) 23
Cal.3d 545, 552 & fn. 5; People v. Moseley (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1598, 1603.) We
“affirm the trial court’s ruling, if it is supported by substantial evidence, on any valid
ground.” (People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 886, fn. 14, overruled in part on
another ground in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 103–104; accord, Brents, supra,
at p. 618.)
C. Analysis
This case involves a course of conduct rather than a single physical act.
Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and attempted
criminal threats, and, at resentencing, the trial court did not make any express factual
findings beyond noting there was a single course of conduct, a point the People reiterate
on review. However, it has long been recognized that with respect to the crime of being a
felon in possession of a firearm, whether the conduct is divisible and, therefore, subject to
additional punishment, depends on whether the defendant possessed the firearm before
committing other crimes. (People v. Venegas (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 32, 38; accord,

9.
People v. Rosas (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 107, 111.) Notably, the judge who oversaw the
jury trial and original sentencing did not apply section 654 and neither the original
probation report nor the supplemental probation report recommended application of
section 654.
“It is clear that multiple punishment is improper where the evidence ‘demonstrates
at most that fortuitous circumstances put the firearm in the defendant’s hand only at the
instant of committing another offense .…’” (People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th
1139, 1144 (Jones), quoting People v. Ratcliff (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1401, 1412.) “On
the other hand, it is clear that multiple punishment is proper where the evidence shows
that the defendant possessed the firearm before the crime, with an independent intent.”
(Jones, supra, at p. 1144.) In this case, the record reflects that defendant was at a bar,
where he struck up a conversation with a woman and told her he was going to kill the
manager.7 They went outside with several other people, where defendant made
additional threats. As defendant turned to leave, he displayed a handgun at his waist. We
discern no evidentiary support for a finding that defendant obtained the firearm
fortuitously at the time of the threats. (Jones, supra, at p. 1144.) Rather, the only
reasonable inference based on the facts underlying the crimes is that defendant had the
firearm at his waist when he entered the bar.
Accordingly, consistent with caselaw examining when section 654 does and does
not apply to bar multiple punishment for possession of a firearm during the commission
of another offense, we conclude section 654 does not bar multiple punishment in this
case. (E.g., People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 13, 22–23 [§ 654 applied to
possession of firearm and assault on officer where the defendant wrested firearm from
officer and shot at him]; People v. Ortiz (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1378–1379

7 We take judicial notice of our nonpublished opinion in People v. Castillo (Mar. 23, 2004,
F041496). (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)

10.
[reasonably inferable the defendant possessed the firearm prior to committing kidnapping
during carjacking and no evidence showed fortuitous circumstances placed firearm in his
hand at instant of kidnapping during carjacking]; People v. Vang (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th
912, 917 [§ 654 did not apply where possession of firearm inside home not fortuitous and
inseparable from possession of drugs]; People v. Flores (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 174,
186–187 [§ 654 did not apply where the defendant took firearm from coconspirator, put it
in his waistband, and removed it and fired only after others raised level of force]; Jones,
supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1147 [inferable the defendant had the firearm before
shooting at inhabited dwelling and any other interpretation absurd]; People v. Ratcliff,
supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1413 [§ 654 did not apply where the defendant committed
two armed robberies 90 minutes apart and was arrested 30 minutes later still in
possession of gun]; People v. Venegas (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 814, 819–821 [§ 654 applied
where no evidence the defendant possessed the gun before the shooting and defense
presented evidence of two people struggling over a gun before the defendant shot the
victim].) The trial court’s contrary conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence
and, therefore, it was error to stay the sentence on count I under section 654.
III. Imposition of Consecutive Sentences
Next, we turn to whether the trial court erred when it concluded concurrent terms
were unauthorized and imposed consecutive terms on counts I and II. As previously
discussed, “the question of whether sentences should be concurrent or consecutive is
separate from the question of whether section 654 prohibits multiple punishment”
(Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 594), and whether the Three Strikes law “requires
consecutive sentencing is not coextensive with the analysis for determining if section 654
permits multiple punishment” (Deloza, supra,. at p. 595). In Hendrix, the California
Supreme Court interpreted section 667, subdivisions (c)(6) and (7), of the Three Strikes
law and concluded, “Subdivision (c)(6) mandates consecutive sentencing for any current
felony not committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same set of

11.
operative facts. Consecutive sentencing is not mandated under subdivision (c)(6) if the
current felonies are committed on the same occasion or arise from the same set of
operative facts. However, under subdivision (c)(7), if any two current felonies are
serious or violent, and were not committed on the same occasion, and do not arise from
the same set of operative facts, the trial court must impose the sentences for these
offenses consecutive to each other and ‘consecutive to the sentence for any other
conviction for which the defendant may be consecutively sentenced in the manner
prescribed by law.’” (People v. Hendrix (1997) 16 Cal.4th 508, 513–514; accord, Deloza,
supra, at pp. 590–591 [interpreting §§ 1170.12, subd. (a)(6)–(7) & 654].)8 More recently,
in Henderson, the court revisited the issue and held, “[A]fter the Reform Act, a trial court
retains the Hendrix concurrent sentencing discretion when sentencing on qualifying
offenses committed on the same occasion or arising from the same set of operative facts.”
(People v. Henderson (2022) 14 Cal.5th 34, 56 (Henderson).)
In this case, at the original sentencing hearing, the trial judge stated it was a close
question, but it elected to impose concurrent terms because “of the close relationship
in proximity, time, and circumstances of the two offenses.” At resentencing, the trial
court concluded that concurrent sentences were unauthorized, but courts have discretion
to impose concurrent terms so long as the “qualifying offenses [were] committed on the
same occasion or arising from the same set of operative facts.” (Henderson, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 56.) Here, defendant was armed with a firearm at a bar, where he threatened
the manager, and he was arrested as he walked away. Under these circumstances, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it elected to impose concurrent terms at the
original sentencing hearing, and, at resentencing, the court erred in concluding otherwise.

8 Defendant’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a strike offense,
while his conviction for attempted criminal threats with a section 12022.5 firearm enhancement
is both a serious and a violent felony under the Three Strikes law. (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(8), 1192.7,
subd. (c)(38)–(39).)

12.
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1) [“Resentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in a
longer sentence than the one originally imposed.”]; People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal.2d 277,
281–282 [imposition of consecutive terms where concurrent terms were originally
imposed constitutes increased punishment].)
IV. Romero Motion
A. Procedural Background
Finally, defendant challenges the denial of his Romero motion. At the
resentencing hearing, the trial court stated, “Now, lastly, the Court recognizes that I do
have discretion if I choose to exercise it regarding what’s commonly referred to as a
Romero motion regarding the strikes. I’m electing not to exercise that discretion and I’m
not inclined to strike the strike priors, and that is based upon my review of the
defendant’s—again, his criminal history, which is set forth in the probation officer’s
report, which is essentially just a series of unending criminal behavior. And if memory
serves, when he went to prison for the 1994 conviction he went through numerous parole
violations and being returned to custody. He was released—just finally discharged on
April 20th of 2001, and then committed an offense for which he’s being sentenced just
shy of seven months later. Roughly nine months after being released from prison.
Excuse me, roughly 11 months after being released from prison.” (Italics added.)
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by focusing on his
criminal history to the exclusion of other relevant factors. He seeks remand and
resentencing so the court may consider the remoteness of his prior strike convictions, the
fact his prior strike convictions were incurred when he was a juvenile, and lack of
physical violence and danger to the public. The People dispute any entitlement to relief.9

9 The People also address entitlement to relief under section 1170.126 of the Reform Act
and Senate Bill 81. However, defendant does not claim error with respect to the trial court’s
denial of his request for relief under the Reform Act or challenge the trial court’s decision not to
strike the firearm enhancement under section 1385, subdivision (c), as amended by Senate Bill
81.

13.
B. Legal Principles
The trial court’s discretion to strike prior felony convictions in furtherance of
justice under section 1385 must be viewed through the lens of the Three Strikes alternate
sentencing scheme. (Wheeler v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2024) 15 Cal.5th
1193, 1206–1207.) “‘[T]he Three Strikes initiative, as well as the legislative act
embodying its terms, was intended to restrict courts’ discretion in sentencing repeat
offenders.’ (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 528.) To achieve this end, ‘the Three Strikes
law does not offer a discretionary sentencing choice, as do other sentencing laws, but
establishes a sentencing requirement to be applied in every case where the defendant has
at least one qualifying strike, unless the sentencing court “conclud[es] that an exception
to the scheme should be made because, for articulable reasons which can withstand
scrutiny for abuse, this defendant should be treated as though he actually fell outside the
Three Strikes scheme.”’ ([People v.] Strong [(2001)] 87 Cal.App.4th [328,] 337–338, fn.
omitted.)
“Consistent with the language of and the legislative intent behind the three strikes
law, we have established stringent standards that sentencing courts must follow in order
to find such an exception. ‘[I]n ruling whether to strike or vacate a prior serious and/or
violent felony conviction allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law, on its own
motion, “in furtherance of justice” pursuant to Penal Code section 1385[,
subdivision ](a), or in reviewing such a ruling, the court in question must consider
whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious
and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and
prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part,
and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or
more serious and/or violent felonies.’ ([People v.] Williams, supra, [(1998)] 17 Cal.4th
[148,] 161.)

14.
“Thus, the three strikes law not only establishes a sentencing norm, it carefully
circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart from this norm and requires the court to
explicitly justify its decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption
that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.
“In light of this presumption, a trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to
strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited circumstances. For example, an
abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court was not ‘aware of its discretion’ to
dismiss (People v. Langevin (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 520), or where the court considered
impermissible factors in declining to dismiss ([People v.] Gillispie [(1997)] 60
Cal.App.4th [429,] 434). Moreover, ‘the sentencing norms [established by the Three
Strikes law may, as a matter of law,] produce[] an “arbitrary, capricious or patently
absurd” result’ under the specific facts of a particular case.” (People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 377–378 (Carmony).)
C. Analysis
The record expressly reflects that the trial court relied on defendant’s criminal
history to deny his Romero motion, but there is no indication the trial court considered
the other relevant factors. Moreover, the prosecutor argued, incorrectly, that the trial
court must assess whether dismissal was in the furtherance of justice within the meaning
of section 1385 at the time his commitment offenses occurred.
Defendant’s two prior serious felony convictions were juvenile adjudications for
witness intimidation in violation of section 136.1, incurred in 1983, when defendant was
17 years old. Defendant is now 58 years old and his prior strike convictions were
incurred 41 years ago. Defense counsel represented that while incarcerated, defendant
took classes, participated in groups, and has not engaged in violent conduct. The
probation report reflects that defendant had two rule violations for cell fights, in 2008 and
2014, and he expressed remorse for possessing a firearm; and given defendant’s young
age at the time and the passage of 30 to 40 years, the probation officer concluded

15.
defendant might not pose a physical danger to others if released. These are all relevant
considerations.
Also relevant is the sentence imposed. The California Supreme Court has stated,
“‘[I]t is the overarching consideration because the underlying purpose of striking prior
conviction allegations is the avoidance of unjust sentences.’” (People v. Johnson (2015)
61 Cal.4th 674, 689, quoting People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 500.) Defendant
received two terms of 25 years to life based on an incident in which he entered a bar with
a firearm in his waistband and threatened the manager, and this sentence was in turn
based on two incidents, close in time, in which defendant threatened witnesses. Neither
society nor the Legislature condones this conduct, and under the Three Strikes law,
making criminal threats while armed is a violent felony and witness intimidation is a
serious felony. Nevertheless, criminal behavior occurs on a continuum, with crimes such
as murder, rape, and child molestation among the most abhorrent of crimes, resulting in
either fatal or grave harm to the victims and lifelong devastation to survivors and loved
ones. The trial court “must consider both the defendant’s constitutional rights and
society’s interest in the prosecution of crimes” and “‘whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions,
and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be
deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as
though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent
felonies.’” (People v. Johnson, supra, at pp. 688, 689, quoting People v. Williams (1998)
17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
The record in this case is not silent, but neither does it reflect “‘the trial court
balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit
of the law .…’” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) Further, defendant was entitled
to a full resentencing, including consideration of all the factors relevant to determining
whether to strike prior convictions under section 1385. Therefore, we vacate the ruling

16.
and remand for resentencing. While we express no view on how the trial court should
ultimately exercise its sentencing discretion on remand under section 1385, the court
shall consider all of the relevant factors, including the length of defendant’s sentence.
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s sentence is vacated and this matter is remanded for full resentencing
consistent with the principles discussed herein.

MEEHAN, J.
WE CONCUR:

HILL, P. J.

SNAUFFER, J.

17.

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