People v. John CA3

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Filed 8/30/24 P. v. John CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(El Dorado)
----

THE PEOPLE, C098524

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. P20CRF0069)

v.

LUCAS ANTHONY JOHN,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Lucas Anthony John appeals the trial court’s revocation of his
probation and lifting of the suspension of execution on his previously imposed aggregate
13-year prison sentence. John challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
some, but not all, of his probation violations. He also argues the suspended sentence had
not actually been imposed by the Orange County Superior Court and that the El Dorado
County Superior Court judge sentencing him misunderstood her sentencing discretion.
We will affirm.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2019, a jury convicted John in Orange County case No. 17NF3607 of first
degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a))1 in which nonaccomplices
were present (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)) (the burglary case). He later admitted he had
suffered a prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd.
(a)(1)), and a prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(1)) in this
same case.
On September 27, 2019, the trial court sentenced John to an aggregate prison term
of 13 years in the burglary case, comprised of the midterm of four years, doubled to eight
years because of the prior strike, plus five years for the prior serious felony conviction.
The court struck the prison prior and suspended execution of John’s sentence, placing
him on five years’ felony probation under specified terms and conditions, including
following the directives of his probation officer and obeying the law.
In January 2020, the burglary case was transferred to El Dorado County.
On June 11, 2021, the El Dorado County District Attorney filed a probation
revocation petition (the June 11 petition) alleging John violated the probation condition
that he obey all laws by committing violations of Business and Professions Code sections
7028, subdivision (a) and 7027.1 subdivision (a) on February 12, 2020.
Later, the El Dorado County Probation Department filed a probation revocation
petition alleging new violations, which was amended on November 17, 2022, (the
November 17 petition) to allege five violations of probation. Specifically: (1) John
violated his probation by failing to obey all laws by committing assault with a deadly
weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); violation I); (2) John failed to report to the probation officer
as directed (violation II); (3) John absconded and his whereabouts were unknown

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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(violation III); (4) John committed battery on a spouse (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)) and was
placed on diversion after conditionally pleading no contest to violating that section, as
well as section 415, subdivision (a) (violation IV); and (5) John left the state of California
without permission (violation V).
A contested probation violation hearing took place on March 10, 2023, to resolve
the allegations of the June 11 petition and the November 17 petition. At the outset, the
court took judicial notice that John’s terms of probation included “that he was ordered to
obey all laws” and that “[i]n addition, he was required to report to Probation as ordered as
well as notify them of his current residence and whereabouts.”
As relevant to the June 11 petition, the People presented the testimony of Bryce
Allwardt, a special investigator on the statewide fraud team for the Department of
Consumer Affairs Contractors State License Board. Allwardt participated in a sting
operation on February 12, 2020, looking for people bidding or doing work without a
license. Specifically, Allwardt “obtained some information alleging that Mr. John was
advertising to perform some seal coating type of work” and got his phone number from
the Nextdoor application. Allwardt called John, confirmed he did seal coating work, and
made an appointment with John to bid the project. Allwardt then met John at the sting
address where John provided a business card that failed to identify whether he was a
licensed contractor as required by law. Allwardt told John he wanted the entire driveway
seal coated, and John offered to complete the work for $800. John’s identity was later
confirmed with his driver’s license, and Allwardt confirmed that John was the person he
had met with.2 According to Allwardt, seal coating work must be done by a licensed

2 On cross-examination, Allwardt said he was between 90 and 95 percent certain
John was the person he had met with. However, after refreshing his recollection on
redirect by looking at John’s CalPhoto from his report, Allwardt unequivocally identified
John.

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contractor if the work performed costs more than $500. A search of the Contractors State
License Board database reflected that John had never been granted a license within the
State of California.
As to the November 17 petition, the People withdrew alleged violations I and V.
The People then presented the testimony of Stephanie Clark, John’s probation officer in
El Dorado County, who had been supervising him in the high risk unit since March 2020.
On April 26, 2022, John was arrested in Los Angeles County; he was released the same
day and called Clark to explain what had happened. Clark directed John to report to
probation on April 29 at 2:00 p.m., but John failed to appear or call Clark to explain his
absence. John also stopped using the “SCRAM touch point” application to check in daily
with his GPS location, and his whereabouts were unknown until he was arrested. Prior to
April 2022, he had been compliant with probation, aside from concerns surrounding his
frequent moves in and out of the county.
Finally, the People presented exhibit No. 1, a minute order from the Los Angeles
County Superior Court that the People represented as showing that on “October 31st of
2022, Mr. John entered a plea to a violation of Penal Code section 415, which was
amended from the original charge of a 243(e)(1).” John’s attorney had no objection to
the admission of this exhibit, and the trial court admitted it after noting “it looks like a
three-page minute order from L.A. County. It’s in Case 2GD00756.” People’s exhibit
No. 1 is not part of the record in this appeal.
John’s counsel argued he was on probation with a suspended sentence, but should
be allowed to continue on probation with some local time due to the de minimis nature of
his violations. The People opposed this request, arguing the Business and Professions
Code violations were of the same character of conduct that had led to his conviction in
the burglary case and that the trial court should revoke probation and lift the suspension
on John’s 13-year sentence. Clark then relayed without objection that John reported
conflicting marital and relationship status information to the probation officer preparing

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the presentencing report as compared with information provided to his supervising
probation officer.
Following a recess to consider the evidence, the trial court found John violated his
probation as alleged in the June 11 petition and that the People had also established the
remaining three allegations from the November 17 petition. As to the violation supported
by exhibit No. 1, the trial court found John “failed to obey all laws pursuant to the plea
that was entered in Los Angeles County Case Number 2GD00756. It appears that the
plea was entered on October 31st, 2022, and it was entered as to two separate Counts.
One, a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code Section 243(e)(1) and then also Penal Code
Section 415(1).” John did not object.
Moving on to sentencing, the trial court noted the suspended 13-year prison
sentence imposed by the Orange County Superior Court, as well as the timing of John’s
various violations of probation, ultimately concluding that because Orange County
Superior Court had suspended the execution of the prison sentence it imposed, the court
could not modify that sentence upon revocation. Accordingly, the court lifted the
suspension, allowing John’s prison sentence to go into effect.
John timely appealed.
DISCUSSION

A. The Revocation of John’s Probation
John challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s
determination that he violated his probation by violating two sections of the Business and
Professions Code, as well as two sections of the Penal Code. John’s briefing fails to
acknowledge that he was also found to have violated his probation for not reporting to
probation as directed and by absconding on April 29, 2022. Putting aside the issue of
prejudice in light of this failure, we conclude John has failed to demonstrate error.

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“Section 1203.2, subdivision (a), authorizes a court to revoke probation if the
interests of justice so require and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe that the
person has violated any of the conditions of his or her probation. (See People v.
Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 447 (Rodriguez).) ‘ “When the evidence shows that a
defendant has not complied with the terms of probation, the order of probation may be
revoked at any time during the probationary period. [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
The standard of proof in a probation revocation proceeding is proof by a preponderance
of the evidence. (Rodriguez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 447; [citation].) ‘Probation
revocation proceedings are not a part of a criminal prosecution, and the trial court has
broad discretion in determining whether the probationer has violated probation.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Urke (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 766, 772, fn. omitted (Urke).)
We review the trial court’s revocation of probation for an abuse of discretion,
while factual findings made by the trial court when revoking probation are reviewed for
substantial evidence. (Urke, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 773.) “[G]reat deference is
accorded the trial court’s decision, bearing in mind that ‘[p]robation is not a matter of
right but an act of clemency, the granting and revocation of which are entirely within the
sound discretion of the trial court.’ ” (Ibid.)
“ ‘The discretion of the court to revoke probation is analogous to its power to
grant the probation, and the court’s discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of a
showing of abusive or arbitrary action. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] . . . [Citation.] ‘ “[O]nly
in a very extreme case should an appellate court interfere with the discretion of the trial
court in the matter of denying or revoking probation . . . .” ’ ([People v. ]Rodriguez,
supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 443.)” (Urke, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 773.) The defendant
maintains the burden of showing the trial court abused its discretion. (Ibid.)
Here, John challenges whether the testimony of Allwardt established the Business
and Professions Code violations. We begin by highlighting that John’s failure to raise
any evidentiary objections to Allwardt’s testimony has forfeited any such issues on

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appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 170.)
Accordingly, it was incumbent upon John to show Allwardt’s testimony as a whole did
not establish violations of Business and Professions Code sections 7028 and 7027.1.
(Urke, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 773.) He has not done so.
Business and Professions Code section 7027.1 proscribes advertising “for
construction or work of improvement . . . unless that person holds a valid license.” (Bus.
& Prof. Code, § 7027.1, subd. (a).) Included within the definition of advertising is the
issuance of a business card. (Id., subd. (b).) Further, Business and Professions Code
section 7028 prohibits an individual from engaging in business as a contractor without a
license. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7028.) Contractors include individuals who submit a bid
on a project to improve “any . . . road, parking facility . . . or other structure” (Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 7026), as well as individuals who submit bids for any “home improvement
project.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7026.1.) Notwithstanding these provisions, an individual
may advertise for improvement work under this chapter provided the aggregate cost of
the project is less than $500. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7027.2.)
Thus, Allwardt’s testimony that John bid $800 to perform the seal coating
improvement project for the sting house driveway, that seal coating work in excess of
$500 required a license, and that John did not have any license and provided a business
card is substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s determination that John violated
his probation condition that he obey all laws by violating Business and Professions Code
sections 7027.1 and 7028.3

3 John’s challenge to Allwardt’s identification of John at trial ignores that Allwardt
was 90 to 95 percent certain John was the individual who had made the bid at the sting
house and that Allwardt later removed any qualification on his identification of John. A
probation violation need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence. (People
v. Rodriguez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 447.)

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John also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he violated sections 415
and 243, subdivision (e)(1). The trial court’s findings that John violated his probation
condition that he obey the law by violating these provisions of the Penal Code were
supported by a minute order that is not part of the record on appeal, but which was
admitted into evidence without objection. While the People’s description of this minute
order only reflects a no contest plea to the section 415 violation, the trial court described
this document as reflecting pleas to violations “of Penal Code Section 243(e)(1) and then
also Penal Code Section 415(1).” Having not produced the document on appeal to show
it reflects otherwise, we find these descriptions of the minute order constitute substantial
evidence that John did plead no contest to violating both provisions of the Penal Code in
contravention of the requirement that he obey the law.

B. The Lifting of the Suspension on John’s Sentence
Finally, John challenges his sentence, arguing the Orange County Superior Court
never actually imposed the 13-year prison sentence and that the El Dorado County
Superior Court judge sentencing him misunderstood her sentencing discretion. We
disagree.
The record of the Orange County Superior Court’s sentence is important in this
regard. The trial court indicates the following: “I’ll select the midterm on Count 1 and
with the 667(d) prior, the strike prior, that would be — the midterm would be eight years,
which is the midterm of four years doubled. So it will be eight years, which is the
midterm on Count 1, plus the five-year prior 667(a), for a total of 13 years. [¶] I’ll strike
the 667(b) prior and execution of that sentence is suspended and I’ll place you on five
years of supervised probation with the following terms: [¶] . . . [¶] And you understand,
sir, that is the sentence, the 13 years in State Prison. You were on parole when this
occurred. You have a serious felony prior. You have numerous priors. So I’m giving you
a shot to stay out of prison by placing you on probation, by suspending the execution of

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that sentence. But should you violate the terms of that probation, you are already
sentenced to 13 years in prison. So if you come back here with a violation, I’m just going
to go ahead and impose that execution I suspended.”
Given the state of the record, that the Orange County Superior Court did not use
the word “impose” in meting out its sentence is of no consequence. The Orange County
Superior Court unequivocally imposed the 13-year aggregate prison sentence prior to
suspending execution of that sentence and placing John on five years’ formal probation.
The El Dorado County Superior Court judge recognized this, stating, “And the language
was specific, it was that the court actually sentenced Mr. John to 13 years in state prison
and it was only the execution of that sentence that was suspended. . . . [I]t wasn’t
imposition of sentence was stayed pending successful completion of probation. It was
the sentence was imposed and only the execution is suspended.” That John was subject
to the suspended prison sentence was also acknowledged by his counsel at the probation
revocation hearing, wherein he requested local prison time with continued supervision
rather than finding his violations worthy of a prison sentence.
Moreover, John has failed to show the El Dorado County Superior Court judge
misunderstood the scope of her sentencing discretion at the probation revocation hearing.
Rather, the judge correctly stated she could not modify the suspended sentence once she
rendered a decision to revoke John’s probation. (See People v. Martinez (2015)
240 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1017 [“when, as here, a lawful sentence is imposed but execution
thereof is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation, the exact sentence must be
ordered executed if probation is subsequently revoked”].) Thus, because the court found
John had not complied with probation and elected to revoke the probation grant, the trial
court acted in accordance with the law when it lifted the suspension of execution on
John’s 13-year prison sentence. (Ibid.; see also id. at p. 1012 [“The trial court is without
jurisdiction to modify or change a final judgment and is required to order into execution
that judgment after revocation of probation”].)

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At oral argument, John relied on People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081 to
argue that the trial court had discretion to reinstate probation, thereby providing an
avenue for imposition of a custodial sentence lower than the previously suspended
sentence of 13 years in prison. We agree that the trial court retained the discretion to
reinstate probation and modify the conditions thereof accordingly, including imposing a
condition of confinement other than a prison term.
“A probation violation does not automatically call for revocation of probation and
imprisonment. (People v. Hawthorne (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 789, 795.) A court may
modify, revoke, or terminate the defendant’s probation upon finding the defendant has
violated probation. (§ 1203.2, subds. (a), (b)(1).) The power to modify probation
necessarily includes the power to reinstate probation. (People v. Medina (2001)
89 Cal.App.4th 318, 321; Hawthorne, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 795.)” (People v.
Bolian (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1420.)
However, this is not the end of our inquiry. If, as happened here, the trial court
decides to terminate probation and declines to reinstate it, the sentence on termination is
determined by examining the manner in which the court originally sentenced the
defendant. “If the court originally suspended imposition of sentence, the court may, upon
revocation and termination of probation, ‘pronounce judgment for any time within the
longest period for which the person might have been sentenced.’ (§ 1203.2, subd. (c).)
But if the court originally imposed a sentence and suspended execution of it, upon
revocation and termination of probation, the court must order that imposed sentence into
effect. (People v. Howard[, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp.] 1088, 1095.) The court ordinarily
has no authority to impose a lesser sentence in such a case. (Howard, supra, at p. 1095.)”
(People v. Bolian, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1420-1421, fn. omitted.)
John further argued that the record in this case reflects the trial court’s
misunderstanding of this distinction, and therefore a misunderstanding of its discretion.
John fails to persuade. At the sentencing hearing on the violation of probation, trial

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counsel asked the court to exercise its discretion to “not view this as a prison violation,”
and reminded the trial court that “The court does have the discretion to not sentence Mr.
John to prison, to sentence Mr. John to local time.” The prosecutor, in urging the trial
court to execute the suspended sentence, focused on John’s prior criminal history and his
poor performance on probation. The prosecution also reminded the trial court of its
discretion to reinstate probation, thereby fashioning a new sentence that did not include
the 13-year prison term; “So I think that his conduct in and of itself shows that he is not
amenable to another chance on probation and I believe the Court has enough evidence to
find him in violation of the multiple allegations.” Although the prosecutor continued by
telling the court that “at that point in time, the only legal option is to impose or execute
that suspended 13-year prison sentence,” the previous statement regarding John’s
amenability to continued probation assumed the court could choose that as an option but
that if it instead chose not to reinstate probation, there was only one sentencing option.
The trial court then proceeded to find John in violation of probation, revoke probation,
and execute the original, stayed sentence. In doing so the trial court stated: “[G]etting
back to the original sentence that was imposed by the Orange County court. And the
language was specific, it was that the court actually sentenced Mr. John to 13 years in
state prison and it was only the execution of that sentence that was suspended.” “Again,
that is important language because this Court, pursuant to the finding in case law, one
that I was able to find on such short notice was People v. Colorado [sic]. It’s a 1995 case
at 32 Cal.App.4th 260. In that case, along with multiple others, is that once an individual
is found in violation of their probation and probation is revoked, the Court has no other
option, but to lift the execution — or excuse me — to immediately execute that sentence
that has been suspended. This Court is without the ability to modify, which means this
Court also cannot impose a greater sentence on Mr. John. Instead, this Court is bound by
the sentence that has been imposed and only its execution has been stayed pending
successful completion of his probation.”

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“Generally, when the record shows that the trial court proceeded with sentencing
on the erroneous assumption it lacked discretion, remand is necessary so that the trial
court may have the opportunity to exercise its sentencing discretion at a new sentencing
hearing. (See People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 530, fn. 13;
People v. Myers (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 699, 704.) Defendants are entitled to ‘sentencing
decisions made in the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court,’ and
a court that is unaware of its discretionary authority cannot exercise its informed
discretion. (People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8.) [¶] Remand for
resentencing is not required, however, if the record demonstrates the trial court was
aware of its sentencing discretion. (People v. Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 348,
fn. 8; People v. White Eagle (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1523.) Further, remand is
unnecessary if the record is silent concerning whether the trial court misunderstood its
sentencing discretion. Error may not be presumed from a silent record. (People v. White
Eagle, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1523.)” (People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th
1213, 1228-1229.)
Here, the record discloses that the litigants actively discussed the trial court’s
discretion to reinstate probation, but argued against it with the exception of the defense
attorney, who asked for “local time” — an option only available with continued
probation. Thus, the trial court was reminded that it had the option of reinstating
probation and fashioning a new sentence, including “local time.” But if it chose not to do
so, and declined to reinstate probation, the court was required to impose the very sentence
that had been previously suspended. We presume the trial court was aware of and
followed the applicable law. “ ‘[A] trial court is presumed to have been aware of and
followed the applicable law’ ” (People v. Martinez (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517),
and John has failed to convince us that the trial court’s comments in isolation signal
otherwise.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
EARL, P. J.

We concur:

/s/
DUARTE, J.

/s/
KRAUSE, J.

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