Wang v. Go CA1/3

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Filed 8/29/24 Wang v. Go CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

YINGQIAN WANG,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A167231

v. (San Francisco City & County
ANTHONY GO, RAYMOND GO, Super. Ct. No. CGC-21-591494)
QUAN YUNG GO REVOCABLE
TRUST, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

Plaintiff Yingqian1 Wang sued Anthony Go, Raymond Go, and the
Quan Yung Go Revocable Trust (collectively, defendants)2 for a variety of
claims related to her time living in a San Francisco residence with Raymond
Go. She left that residence pursuant to the settlement of an unlawful
detainer action brought by Anthony Go that included a release of all claims.
The trial court granted summary judgment of the instant action on the basis

1 Wang’s first name also appears throughout the record as “Ying,” but we
use “Yingqian” as that is how her name is set forth in her briefs.
2 Wang listed “Does 1-10” as additional defendants in her complaint but
did not name them during the trial court proceedings and does not discuss
them in her briefs. Therefore, she has forfeited any argument related to the
Does and we do not consider them for purposes of this appeal. (See Allen v.
City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.)

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that Raymond Go was an intended third-party beneficiary of that release.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2016, Wang immigrated to the United States from China and
enrolled in a graduate program at the Academy of Art University in San
Francisco. She passed her English course at the university in 2017 and
thereafter took all of the courses for her program entirely in English. Wang
graduated in May 2019, receiving a master’s degree in industrial design.
In October 2018, Wang began talking to Raymond Go on WeChat (a
mobile messaging application). Raymond Go invited Wang to stay at his
house, located on Vallejo Street in San Francisco, for as long as she wanted.
Wang agreed and moved her belongings into the living room. She then
moved into an empty bedroom in the house and stayed there for over a year;
no rent was ever paid. Raymond Go and Wang got into disputes over various
topics, and Wang alleges that Raymond Go physically and verbally assaulted
her.
The room that Wang resided in was owned by Raymond’s brother,
Anthony Go, as trustee of the Quan Yung Go Revocable Trust (Trust).
Anthony Go did not learn that Wang had moved in until October 2019, when
he returned from an extended international business trip. Through counsel
Jerod Hendrickson, Anthony Go sent Wang a notice to terminate her tenancy
but Wang failed to vacate the premises.
Unlawful Detainer Action
In November 2019, Anthony Go, as trustee of the Trust, filed an
unlawful detainer action against Wang. The unlawful detainer complaint
referenced Raymond Go by stating that Wang received a key from and took
possession of the premises with the permission of “Plaintiff’s agent.”

2
Through counsel Cynthia Barclay, Wang filed an answer raising
numerous defenses, including that “Plaintiff seeks to evict defendant based
on an act against defendant . . . that constitutes domestic violence.
Defendant was issued a protective order against the Plaintiff’s family
member residing at the property”—referring to Raymond Go.
Settlement Negotiations and Stipulation
The parties entered settlement negotiations (through counsel
Hendrickson and Barclay) to resolve the unlawful detainer action. The terms
of the negotiated Stipulation provided Wang would vacate the premises in
exchange for Anthony Go paying her $3,000 and dismissing the action.
Central to this appeal, the parties negotiated a mutual release as part
of the Stipulation and, as part of those negotiations, discussed carving
Raymond Go out of the release. Counsel for Anthony Go, Hendrickson,
proposed the following release:
“Except as set out herein, there is a mutual release of all claims
and causes of action that either party may have had as against
the other side as of the date this document is executed by the
respective parties, including those claims and causes of action
which are known and normally retained under Civil Code Section
1542. . . .[3] The parties warrant that each has been advised of an
understands the significance of an intends to waive any and all
rights prescribed in [section] 1542 . . . . The parties hereby
expressly waive the provisions of [section] 1542 . . . . The parties
hereto fully understand that they cannot hereafter make further
claims or seek any further recovery of any nature whatsoever
based upon, arising out of, or in connection with Defendant’s
occupancy of the Premises.”

3 Civil Code section 1542 provides: “A general release does not extend to
claims that the creditor or releasing party does not know or suspect to exist
in his or her favor at the time of executing the release and that, if known by
him or her, would have materially affected his or her settlement with the
debtor or released party.” (Civ. Code, § 1542.) All further undesignated
statutory references are to the Civil Code.

3
...
“This release also binds individuals, heirs, co-owners, spouses,
assignees, agents, attorneys, shareholders, subsidiaries, related
entities, predecessors, successors, officers, directors, managers,
employees, agents, tenants, assigns and affiliates, past and
present and future, and each of them of the parties.”

The Stipulation listed the parties as Anthony Go (as trustee) and Wang.
In January 2020, Wang met with her attorney, Barclay, to discuss the
proposed Stipulation in detail, including the release language and its effect
as to both Wang and Anthony Go. Barclay communicated with Wang in
English; Wang never indicated to Barclay that she could not understand the
language of the Stipulation and did not ask for any portion to be translated
into her native language (Mandarin). Wang told Barclay that she wanted to
add a “carve out” to the waiver for claims against Raymond Go.
Barclay then emailed Hendrickson stating: “We request that a carve
out to the waiver of claims be made for Ms. Wang to pursue, if she desires,
any claim she may have against Raymond Go.” Barclay suggested the
following language: “ ‘Defendant, however, shall retain any and all claims or
causes of action that Defendant may have against Raymond Go.’ ”
Hendrickson countered that carving out Raymond Go from the release would
only be acceptable if the Stipulation also contained a carve out for Anthony
Go to pursue claims against Wang for property damage. Barclay
communicated this offer to Wang, and Wang refused.
Ultimately, no carve out (for either Wang or Raymond Go) was added to
the Stipulation. However, at Wang’s request, Barclay crossed out the word
“tenants” from the list of those bound by the release, and Barclay and Wang
initialed above that modification. Wang and Anthony Go signed the
Stipulation. Wang thereafter moved out of the house and was paid $3,000.

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Wang’s Complaint
In May 2021, Wang filed the complaint underlying this appeal. Wang
raised six causes of action: negligence related to the maintenance of the
property against all defendants; negligence related to management of the
property against the Trust; a violation of the California Fair Employment
and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) against the Trust and Raymond
Go; and claims of battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress against both Anthony Go and Raymond Go.
Defendants filed an answer to the complaint raising various defenses,
including that the settlement of the unlawful detainer action precluded
Wang’s claims.
Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition
In August 2022, defendants moved for summary judgment4 on the basis
that Wang had signed the Stipulation that “fully (and mutually) released
‘[a]ll claims and causes of action that either party may have had as against
the other side.’ ”
In support of the motion, defendants included a declaration by
Hendrickson attesting to the settlement negotiations with Barclay, as
described above. Hendrickson asserted the Stipulation applied not only to
the parties in the unlawful detainer action but also to Raymond Go: Wang
alleged in her answer to the unlawful detainer action that Raymond Go had
abused her, and whether to carve out claims against Raymond Go was a
“major issue” that ultimately resulted in those claims not being carved out.
Hendrickson had not objected to the crossing out of “ ‘tenants’ ” from those

4 The motion was titled “Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the
Alternative Motion to Enforce the Prior Settlement Agreement Between the
Parties.” As the trial court and parties have done, we refer to it simply as a
motion for summary judgment.

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bound by the release as he “considered it meaningless.” Attached as exhibits
to Hendrickson’s declaration were the unlawful detainer complaint, Wang’s
answer, the signed Stipulation, and the email from Barclay to Hendrickson
requesting the carve out for claims against Raymond Go.
Defendants also provided a deposition of Barclay, in which she
discussed the negotiations in the unlawful detainer action as described
above.5 Barclay averred that Wang agreed to sign the Stipulation even
though it did not contain a carve out for Raymond Go. Wang never indicated
to Barclay that she did not understand the discussion of the carve outs or the
terms of the Stipulation. As to the crossing out of the word “tenants” from
the Stipulation, Barclay stated: “I explained to [Wang] that we took out the
term ‘tenants,’ because the person she was concerned about was Raymond Go
and that he was a tenant, but that would not -- that did not represent that
she would be able to sue in the future.”
Wang opposed the motion for summary judgment. She argued a triable
issue of fact existed as to whether the release in the Stipulation was binding
as to Raymond Go. Wang asserted that, as Raymond Go was not a party to
the Stipulation, and the release specifically referred to “ ‘party’ ” or
“ ‘parties,’ ” she only released the right to bring claims against Anthony Go as
trustee of the Trust. Wang further contended an issue of triable fact existed
as to whether she lacked the mental capacity to understand the Stipulation.
In a supporting declaration, Wang stated that she had expressed to
Barclay that she wished to sue Raymond Go in the future, leading Barclay to
send the email seeking the carve out for claims against him. Wang declared
she and Barclay crossed out the word “ ‘tenants’ ” in the Stipulation because

5 The was a determination of waiver of attorney-client communications
for purposes of the deposition.

6
Wang wanted to “make sure” that she was able to sue Raymond Go in the
future.
As to her ability to understand the Stipulation, Wang stated that
Barclay explained its terms without a translator, and the document was
never translated to Mandarin. Wang averred that she had required a
Mandarin interpreter throughout the instant litigation; had only “barely
passed” her English course in graduate school after initially failing; and
communicated with her employer via email with the assistance of an online
translation program. She asserted that, in addition to the language barrier,
her mental capacity prevented her from understanding the extent of the
Stipulation, as she had a concussion in August 2018 and was being treated
for PTSD, depression, anxiety, and suicidal ideations at the time of the
settlement negotiations (in January 2020).
Wang submitted medical notes from February and July 2019 indicating
she had symptoms of depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, post-concussion
syndrome, and mild traumatic brain injury.
Trial Court’s Ruling
In a December 2022 tentative ruling granting the motion for summary
judgment, the court found defendants shifted their burden of proof as to
whether the Stipulation in the prior unlawful detainer action barred the
instant action, and that Wang failed to create a triable issue of fact with
“competent admissible evidence.”
After oral argument on December 14, 2022, the court adopted the
tentative ruling virtually verbatim and granted the motion for summary
judgment on December 19, 2022. It subsequently entered judgment in favor
of defendants. Wang appealed.

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DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no triable issues of
material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on all causes of action.” (Choi v. Sagemark Consulting (2017) 18
Cal.App.5th 308, 318 (Choi).)
“We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, applying the
same three-step analysis as the trial court. [Citations.] First, we identify the
causes of action framed by the pleadings. Second, we determine whether the
moving party has satisfied its burden of showing the causes of action have no
merit because one or more elements cannot be established, or that there is a
complete defense to that cause of action. Third, if the moving party has made
a prima facie showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the
burden of production shifts and we review whether the party opposing
summary judgment has provided evidence of a triable issue of material fact
as to the cause of action or a defense. [Citations.] A party opposing summary
judgment may not ‘rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings’ but
must set forth ‘specific facts’ beyond the pleadings to show the existence of a
triable issue of material fact. [Citation.] The evidence must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (Choi, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th
at p. 318.) We independently determine whether the record supports the
trial court’s conclusion that the asserted claims fail as a matter of law.
(Miller v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1161, 1166.)
II. The Release Bars the Complaint as a Matter of Law
A valid release of claims, such as the release in the Stipulation, may
operate as a complete defense to a civil action. (See Rodriguez v. Oto (2013)
212 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1026.) As the parties agree, the release here did not

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expressly mention Raymond Go. Hence, we must determine whether
Raymond Go may enforce the release as a third-party beneficiary. (See
Neverkovec v. Fredericks (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 337, 347–349 (Neverkovec);
§ 1559.)6
A. Applicable Law
Release agreements are governed by general principles of contract law.
(Neverkovec, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 348.) Our goal when interpreting a
contract is to determine and give effect to the mutual intention of the parties
as it existed at the time the contract was executed. (Cline v. Homuth (2015)
235 Cal.App.4th 699, 705 (Cline); see § 1636.) If possible, the intention of the
parties is to be determined from the language of the contract alone, but “ ‘[a]
contract may be explained by reference to the circumstances under which it
was made, and the matter to which it relates.’ ” (Cline, at p. 705; §§ 1639,
1647.)
“ ‘[I]t is often impossible for the parties to be precise in expressing their
intent in a written document,’ ” and, therefore, courts “ ‘should preliminarily
consider all credible evidence to ascertain the intent of the parties.’ ” (Cline,
supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 705.) The California Supreme Court has stated:
“ ‘The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a
written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and

6 Wang does not dispute that the release extends to the Trust, but argues
for the first time in her reply brief that it does not extend to Anthony Go in
his individual capacity. However, “we do not consider points raised for the
first time in the reply brief absent a showing of good cause for the failure to
present them earlier.” (Shaw v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 740, 754.) As Wang provides no reason for failing to raise this
argument in her opening brief, we do not consider it. (See ibid.) In any
event, there is no indication in the record that Wang reasonably believed she
was retaining the right to sue Anthony Go in his individual capacity or that
he was not part of “the other side” of the unlawful detainer action.

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unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to
prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably
susceptible.’ ” (Garcia v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1984) 36 Cal.3d 426, 435
(Garcia).)
A third party’s rights under a contract are predicated on the
contracting parties’ intent to benefit him. (Garcia, supra, 36 Cal.3d at
p. 436.) Therefore, “to obtain summary judgment on the ground that a
general release has discharged him from liability, a third party to the release
agreement must affirmatively show that the parties intended to release him.”
(Neverkovec, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 349.) The burden of proof is on the
third party to make this showing. (Ibid.)
As discussed below, we conclude defendants carried their initial burden
of showing Raymond Go was an intended third-party beneficiary to the
release, and Wang failed to raise triable issues of fact to defeat the motion for
summary judgment.
B. Defendants Made a Prima Facie Showing that the
Stipulation Barred Wang’s Complaint
A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of
making a sufficient showing that the action is meritless based on a complete
defense. (Neverkovec, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 344.) Here, defendants met
their initial burden of presenting evidence that the release in the Stipulation
extended to Raymond Go and operated as a complete defense to Wang’s
lawsuit.
As defendants argued in the motion for summary judgment, the
Stipulation contained broad language that released “all claims and causes of
action that either party may have had as against the other side.” The release
also contained a waiver of the provisions of section 1542—which prohibits

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releases of unknown claims—and indicated the parties had been advised of,
and understood the significance of, waiving those rights. (See § 1542.)
Therefore, the release broadly covered any possible civil claims Wang could
bring against “the other side” that she “may have had” at the time of the
signing of the release, which includes the claims in her complaint. (See
Jefferson v. California Dept. of Youth Authority (2002) 28 Cal.4th 299, 307
[language waiving rights under section 1542 in release “establishes
unambiguously the parties’ intent that the release cover possible civil
claims”].)7
Moreover, defendants met their initial burden of showing the release
extended to Raymond Go as a third-party beneficiary based on Hendrickson’s
declaration, Barclay’s deposition, and the email from Barclay requesting a
carve out for claims against Raymond Go. And, contrary to Wang’s
contention, the trial court properly considered this extrinsic evidence in
construing the release as it was relevant to prove a meaning to which the
language of the release was reasonably susceptible, i.e., that it extended to
Raymond Go. (See Garcia, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 435.) The unlawful
detainer action stated Wang took possession of the premises from “Plaintiff’s
agent,” referencing Raymond Go, and Wang alleged in her answer to that
action that Raymond Go had assaulted her. Hence, both parties implicated
Raymond Go’s conduct in the action, making it reasonable that he fell within
“the other side.”

7 As we conclude the release covered the claims in Wang’s complaint
based on the language described above, we do not reach defendants’ assertion
that the claims are barred because they “arose out of or were related to
[Wang’s] tenancy of the property.”

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Even more telling as to the parties’ understanding of the scope of the
release was the evidence surrounding the proposed carve out. As Barclay and
Hendrickson both explained, and the email between them showed, Wang
specifically and unsuccessfully sought to include “a carve out to the waiver of
claims . . . for Ms. Wang to pursue . . . any claim she may have against
Raymond Go.” The most logical inference from Wang’s seeking to add a
clause stating that she “ ‘shall retain any and all claims or causes of action
that [she] may have against Raymond Go’ ” is that she understood the
release, as drafted, did not allow her to bring such claims against him. When
Hendrickson countered Wang’s proposal with a carve out for claims by
Anthony Go against Wang, she refused the counteroffer—evidence that Wang
gave up on her effort to seek a carve out for Raymond Go to avoid any
liability on her part for property damage. Ultimately, Wang agreed to sign
the Stipulation even though it did not contain a carve out for Raymond Go.
Based on this evidence, we conclude defendants met their burden to
“affirmatively show that the parties intended to release” Raymond Go. (See
Neverkovec, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 349.)
C. Wang Failed to Raise an Issue of Triable Fact that the
Parties Did Not Intend to Release Raymond Go
When a defendant seeking summary judgment has made a sufficient
showing that an action is meritless due to a complete defense, “the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to present specific facts showing a triable issue of
material fact.” (Neverkovec, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 344.) “There is a
triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a
reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party
opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, fn. omitted.)

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Wang contends she raised an issue of triable fact as to whether she
intended to release Raymond Go from future claims as a third-party
beneficiary to the Stipulation. In support, she points to the fact that she and
Barclay crossed out the word “tenants” from the list of those bound by the
release prior to the parties’ signing the Stipulation. We are not convinced.
As an initial matter, it does not follow that merely because Wang
crossed out “tenants” from those bound by the release, the parties thereby
removed any tenants (like Raymond Go) from falling within the ambit of the
release itself. As discussed above, the release language itself extended to
“the other side,” which—as Wang apparently understood given her effort to
seek the carve out—extended to Raymond Go.
Moreover, the record shows that, regardless of Wang’s wishes, she was
made aware by counsel that crossing out “tenants” from that list would not
allow her to sue Raymond Go. Barclay expressly explained to Wang that,
although they “took out the term ‘tenants,’ because the person she was
concerned about was Raymond Go and that he was a tenant, . . . that did not
represent that [Wang] would be able to sue in the future.”
Wang’s reliance on In re Marriage of Lund (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 40 is
unavailing. There, the appellate court concluded the parties had executed an
agreement while married that “unambiguously” transmuted the separate
property of the husband into community property. (Id. at p. 51.) In so
finding, the court noted that two provisions of the agreement made clear that
all property previously held as the husband’s separate property was to be
considered community property as of the execution of the agreement. (Id. at
pp. 51–52.) The court also pointed to the parties’ elimination of a distinct
section of the agreement, which identified the husband’s real property as his
separate property, as confirmation of their intent to transmute all his

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separate property. (Id. at p. 52.) By removing that section, the court
concluded, “the parties manifested their intent to eliminate any potential
argument that the real properties identified in [that section] were not subject
to the transmutation provided for” in the agreement. (Ibid.)
By contrast, the terms of the Stipulation here do not “unambiguously”
show the parties intended to preclude Raymond Go as a third-party
beneficiary to the release. (Cf. In re Marriage of Lund, supra, 174
Cal.App.4th at p. 51.) Hence, the removal of the word “tenants” from the list
of those bound by the release—which, as noted above, had no bearing on who
was encompassed by the release—did not manifest an intent by the parties to
eliminate any argument that Raymond Go was a third-party beneficiary. (Cf.
id. at p. 52.)
Accordingly, Wang’s declaration as to her intention in crossing out
“tenants” was not sufficient to set forth specific facts to allow a reasonable
trier of fact to find the release did not extend to Raymond Go as a third-party
beneficiary. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at
p. 850.)
D. Wang Failed to Raise an Issue of Triable Fact as to Her
Understanding of the Stipulation
Wang contends she raised an issue of triable fact as to her
understanding of the Stipulation based on her English literacy, combined
with her mental health issues. We disagree.
Wang relies on Little v. Sanchez (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 501 in support
of this assertion. In that case, the tenants, who did not speak English, were
presented with documents in English by their landlord entitling him to
immediate possession of their homes, and it was uncontested that the tenants

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signed without understanding the nature and effect of the documents. (Id. at
p. 504.)
The record here contains no evidence that Wang did not understand the
Stipulation. (See Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co., Inc. (2015) 239
Cal.App.4th 750, 765.) When Wang met with Barclay to discuss the
Stipulation in January 2020, she had already completed a master’s degree in
industrial design, having taken years of courses in English. She had also
passed an English course as part of that program in 2017. Moreover, her own
attorney stated that Wang never indicated during their discussions that she
could not understand the language of the Stipulation, nor did she ask for any
portion to be translated to Mandarin. And while Wang’s medical documents
showed she had some mental health symptoms in February and July 2019,
she did not present any evidence that those symptoms prevented her from
understanding the terms of the Stipulation. Wang did not present an issue of
triable fact on this basis.
In sum, defendants met their initial burden of proffering prima facie
evidence that the release in the Stipulation barred this lawsuit and Wang
failed to meet her burden of proffering evidence raising triable issues of fact
that would preclude summary judgment in favor of defendants. Accordingly,
we shall affirm.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants and respondents are awarded
costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

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_________________________
Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Fujisaki, Acting P. J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

A167231/Wang v. Go et al.

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