People v. Dupes CA1/1

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Filed 8/29/24 P. v. Dupes CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A167931
v.
LUCCIANO SHAWN DUPES, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 022200922)
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
A jury convicted defendant Lucciano Shawn Dupes of seven
criminal offenses including driving or taking a vehicle without consent
(Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), count 1), fleeing a police officer while
driving recklessly, driving against traffic while fleeing a police officer,
felon in possession of a firearm, felon in possession of ammunition, hit
and run with property damage, and possession of burglary tools.
Defendant’s sole claim on appeal is that the trial court abused its
discretion in imposing an upper term sentence of four years on count 1.

1 This appeal is appropriately resolved by memorandum opinion

in accordance with California Standards of Judicial Administration,
section 8.1.
The amended information included a special allegation under
Penal Code section 666.52 as to count 1 that defendant was previously
convicted of vehicle theft and alleged eight qualifying prior convictions.
It further alleged seven aggravating factors, including: (1) his prior
convictions as an adult were numerous and increasing in seriousness
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)); 3 (2) defendant served a prior
prison term (rule 4.421(b)(3)); (3) he was on probation when the crime
was committed (rule 4.421(b)(4)); (4) his prior performance on probation
was unsatisfactory (rule 4.421(b)(5)); (5) the crime involved great
violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts
disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (rule
4.421(a)(1)); (6) he was armed with a weapon at the time of the
commission crime (rule 4.421(a)(2)); and (7) the crime involved an
attempted or actual taking or damage of great monetary value (rule
4.421(a)(9)).
Defendant waived a jury trial on his prior convictions as alleged
in count 1 and the aggravating sentencing factors. The court found
three prior felony convictions of Vehicle Code section 10851, two prior
felony convictions of Penal Code section 496d, and the seven alleged
factors in aggravation true beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court sentenced defendant to state prison for an aggregate
term of six years, comprised of an upper term of four years on count 1
plus consecutive terms of eight months each on counts 3, 4, and 5. On

2 Penal Code section 666.5 is an alternative sentencing scheme

that provides an elevated sentencing triad of two, three, or four years
for a prior vehicle theft conviction or related conduct. (People v. Lee
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 869–870.)
3 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
count 2, the court stayed a term of eight months, and imposed
concurrent county jail terms on counts 6 and 7.
Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) provides, “When a
judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies
three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order
imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as
otherwise provided in paragraph (2).” Paragraph (2), in turn, provides
in part, “The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term
only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that
justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle
term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.”
(Id., § 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
We review the trial court’s sentencing decision for abuse of
discretion, which will be found only when its decision is irrational or
arbitrary, or when it relied on circumstances that were irrelevant or
otherwise constituted an improper basis for the decision. (People v.
Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847; People v. Carmony (2004) 33
Cal.4th 367, 376–377.)
A court “generally cannot use a single fact both to aggravate the
base term and to impose an enhancement, nor may it use a fact
constituting an element of the offense either to aggravate or to enhance
a sentence.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350 (Scott).)
Defendant relies on this dual use prohibition to argue the court
improperly used “at least one” of his prior convictions for violation of
Vehicle Code section 10851 to elevate the sentence triad for count 1
pursuant to Penal Code section 666.5. He further contends the court
improperly “referred to the evidence of reckless driving, hitting two
other cars, and fleeing after one of those collisions” from the present
case to find factors in aggravation because those were separate offenses
for which punishment was imposed.
As an initial matter, defendant has forfeited his claim by failing
to raise an objection at sentencing. To encourage prompt correction of
error and reduce the number of unnecessary appellate claims, courts
require parties to raise certain issues at sentencing. (Scott, supra, 9
Cal.4th at p. 351.) The California Supreme Court concluded this
requirement applies to claims “involving the trial court’s failure to
properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices.” (Id.
at p. 353.) This includes “cases in which the stated reasons allegedly do
not apply to the particular case, and cases in which the court
purportedly erred because it doubled-counted a particular sentencing
factor, misweighed the various factors, or failed to state any reasons or
give a sufficient number of valid reasons.” (Ibid.) Moreover, “claims
deemed waived on appeal involve sentences which, though otherwise
permitted by law, were imposed in a procedurally or factually flawed
manner.” (Id. at p. 354.) Here, defendant was required to raise issues
related to his contention that some sentencing factors were dually used,
or double-counted, at the time of sentencing.
Even if defendant’s claim is not forfeited, we conclude any
purported error was harmless on this record. “In order to determine
whether error by the trial court in relying upon improper factors in
aggravation requires remanding for resentencing ‘the reviewing court
must determine if “it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the
absence of the error.” ’ ” (People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 233.)
At the hearing, the court gave a lengthy ruling supporting its
sentencing decision. The court was particularly concerned with
defendant’s poor performance on probation, emphasizing he “had
probation reinstated and revoked a number of times.” The court
summarized defendant’s criminal history, citing convictions in 2006,
2007, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2022,
including at least nine felonies, at least six unsuccessful periods of
probation, several prior prison terms, and that defendant was on
probation at the time of the present offense. Observing the “factors in
aggravation clearly show an increase in [defendant’s] criminal history,”
and the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, of which
there were none, the court denied probation and imposed an upper
term sentence on count 1.4
Even if the trial court improperly relied on one of the Vehicle
Code section 10851 convictions and the facts of the present offense,
defendant does not dispute the trial court properly relied on his poor
performance on probation, his numerous other prior convictions, his
prior prison terms, and that he was on probation at the time of the
current offense. (Rule 4.421(b)(2), (3), (4) & (5).) Defendant does not
challenge the factual basis of any of the aggravating factors relied upon
by the court, nor does he dispute there were no mitigating factors.

4 When imposing sentence on count 1, the court stated it “selects

the aggravating term based on the totality of the record in front of it
and the aggravating factors outweighing the mitigating factors and
having found the factors in aggravation true.”
Defendant further contends an upper term sentence is not
warranted because under amended Penal Code section 1170 there is a
middle term presumption and recent sentencing trends militate in
favor of more lenient sentencing. The statute, however, authorizes trial
courts to impose an upper term when justified by aggravating factors.
(Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(2).) Here, the trial court relied on
multiple valid aggravating factors and the absence of mitigating
circumstances to justify imposition of the upper term. For this reason,
even if we were to accept defendant’s arguments, it is not reasonably
probable the court would have imposed a different sentence on this
record.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BANKE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

SIGGINS, J.*

(People v. Dupes; A167931)

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First District

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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