People v. Harrison CA1/3

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Filed 8/29/24 P. v. Harrison CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168439
v.
KEON SAMARIE HARRISON, (Solano County Super. Ct. No.
FCR362582)
Defendant and Appellant.

A jury convicted Keon Samarie Harrison of robbery and assault with a
semiautomatic firearm. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 245, subd. (b); undesignated
statutory references are to this code.) On appeal, Harrison contends we must
vacate his convictions because he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
According to Harrison, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to
suppress an in-field identification or exclude subsequent tainted in-court
identifications of him as the robber. He also faults his counsel for failing to
request a pretrial lineup to test witness identifications in a nonsuggestive
atmosphere. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
One night in March 2022, a man ran through the front door of a
Vacaville Wingstop restaurant toward the cash register. He was wearing a
black hooded sweatshirt with a front pocket, as well as a black ski mask
covering his entire face and head aside from his eyes. He pulled a gun from
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his pocket and pointed it at an employee behind the counter. He asked for all
the money in the drawer and pointed the gun at the manager’s head. He
yelled “ ‘give it all to me.’ ” The manager put bills from the register into a
bag, and the man returned the gun to his pocket. He ran out the door in the
direction of a neighboring apartment complex.
The employees called the police, who arrived less than three minutes
later. The employees described the suspect as a Black male, wearing a black
top, black pants, and a black ski mask, approximately six feet and one to two
inches tall, and weighing 145 to 155 pounds. Officers also reviewed the
restaurant’s surveillance footage, which revealed additional details — the
robber was wearing a red undershirt and black and red Air Jordan sneakers.
Officers searched for the suspect at the apartment complex approximately
300 to 400 yards away. Roughly 15 minutes after receiving the initial
dispatch call, officers encountered a group of men in the apartment courtyard
who fit some characteristics of the suspect’s description. For example, one
person had a black hooded sweatshirt with a large logo on it. But the
surveillance footage did not reveal any logo on the robber’s sweatshirt.
Officers searched the group but did not find any weapons or anything in their
pockets that appeared to relate to the crime, such as a gun, ski mask, or cash.
Approximately one hour later, officers located Harrison seated on the
third-floor breezeway of one of the apartment buildings. He was wearing a
black sweatshirt, red undershirt, black pants, and red and black Air Jordan
sneakers. In his pockets, officers found approximately $200 in small bills,
such as fives, tens and twenties. A search of the surrounding area, including
the stairwell, revealed a black ski mask and a semiautomatic firearm.
Officers detained Harrison.

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An officer drove the Wingstop cashier to the apartment building to
confirm whether Harrison was the robber. The cashier was kept separate
from other witnesses to prevent influencing other identifications. The officer
read the cashier an admonition regarding in-field showups. It warned the
cashier to disregard any radio traffic over the police radio and to not allow
anything heard to influence his decision. The admonition expressly stated,
“ ‘The persons contacted by the police may or may not be the persons who
committed the crime. The fact that the person seen may or may not be in
police custody should not influence your judgment and you should not
conclude or guess that the persons seen are in fact the persons who
committed the crime.’ ” When the cashier arrived at the apartment complex,
officers removed Harrison from the back of the police car and made him stand
in front of the car’s floodlights. The cashier recognized the black hooded
sweatshirt and pants, and considered Harrison’s height and body frame.
Although officers declined the cashier’s request that Harrison put on a mask
or get closer to him, the cashier “knew it was him” — the robbery suspect —
when Harrison lifted his head up and made eye contact with him.
At a preliminary hearing, the cashier again identified Harrison as the
masked robber. He identified Harrison based on his eyes, which he described
as large and round. He stated he could not forget the eyes of the individual
who put a gun to his head. Harrison’s counsel objected, arguing the
identification was irrelevant and improper authentication. According to
counsel, the cashier testified the suspect was wearing a ski mask covered by
a hooded sweatshirt. Because Harrison was the only person at the
preliminary hearing who appeared to be a criminal defendant, defense
counsel argued the identification was improper and overly suggestive.

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The court overruled the objection but allowed counsel to cross-examine the
cashier on those issues.
The district attorney charged Harrison with second degree robbery
(§ 211), assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)), and the
lesser included offense of assault with a firearm (id., subd. (a)(2)). The
information further alleged Harrison personally used a firearm in connection
with the robbery. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) During the jury trial, the cashier
again identified Harrison in court as the masked robber. A second employee
also described the robber’s clothing and features that she could recollect.
According to the second employee, the robber was wearing a ski mask
showing his eyes, which were brown and oval. He was approximately six feet
tall and very skinny. When asked to identify a person in the courtroom who
pointed the gun at her, the employee — over counsel’s objection — identified
Harrison. The employee stated that she was “pretty confident” in her
identification, based on appellant’s eyes and his build. During closing
arguments, Harrison’s counsel highlighted weaknesses in the employees’
identification of Harrison.
DISCUSSION
Harrison contends the cashier’s in-field identification was the product
of an unreasonably suggestive one-person showup, and his trial counsel was
ineffective by failing to file a motion to suppress the identification and
subsequent in-court identifications. In addition, he contends his counsel was
ineffective for not requesting a nonsuggestive pretrial lineup for any
prosecution identification witnesses. Harrison fails to satisfy the heavy
burden for prevailing on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on appeal.
(People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198.)

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Criminal defendants have the right to effective assistance of counsel.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 684–686; People v. Ledesma
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215.) To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the
defendant must demonstrate counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under the prevailing professional norms, and that
deficiency was prejudicial — a reasonable probability that but for the
counsel’s failure, he would have obtained a more favorable outcome.
(Ledesma, at pp. 216–218; People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966.) There
is a presumption that counsel’s actions fall within a broad range of
reasonableness, affording “great deference to counsel’s tactical decisions.”
(People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 674.) We reverse a conviction based
on ineffective assistance of counsel only if the record affirmatively discloses
counsel had no tactical purpose for the omission, counsel was asked for a
reason but failed to provide one, or there is no satisfactory explanation for the
omission. (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.)
First, the failure of Harrison’s counsel to challenge the in-field showup
did not amount to ineffective assistance because, on this record, a motion to
suppress that evidence would likely have been denied. (People v. Taylor
(1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 720, 726 [counsel acts with reasonable competence if
they conclude a motion to suppress identification would not be successful
since counsel “is under no obligation to make idle or frivolous motions”].)
When challenging an identification procedure, a defendant must establish it
is unnecessarily suggestive, and it was not otherwise reliable under the
totality of the circumstances. (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926,
989.) Identification procedures are unduly suggestive if they suggest “ ‘in
advance of identification by the witness the identity of the person suspected
by the police.’ ” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 413.) It is only

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necessary to determine the reliability of the identification if the identification
procedure is unnecessarily suggestive. (Id. at p. 412.) Courts review both
identification analysis prongs de novo. (People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th
595, 608–609.)
The in-field identification procedures employed here were not unduly
suggestive — they were “ ‘not so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise
to a substantial likelihood of misidentification.’ ” (People v. Garcia (2016)
244 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1359 (Garcia).) While a single person “showup may
pose a danger of suggestiveness, such showups ‘are not necessarily or
inherently unfair,’ ” as Harrison contends. (People v. Medina (1995)
11 Cal.4th 694, 753.) Single person showups “for purposes of in-field
identifications are encouraged.” (In re Carlos M. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 372,
387 (Carlos M.).) The “element of suggestiveness inherent in the procedure is
offset by the reliability of an identification made while the events are fresh in
the witness’s mind.” (Ibid.) They serve the interests of both the suspect and
law enforcement by facilitating “ ‘an immediate determination as to whether
the correct person has been apprehended.’ ” (Garcia, at p. 1359.) Indeed,
such a showup is justified by “the need to exclude from consideration
innocent persons so that the police may continue the search for [suspects]
while it is reasonably likely [they are] still in the area.” (People v. Johnson
(1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 316, 323.)
Here, an armed robber who pointed a gun at the head of an employee of
a dining establishment and stole money from the cash register had just run
in the direction of a nearby apartment complex. Wingstop employees
described the robber as a Black male wearing all black clothing, including a
black hooded sweatshirt. Further information revealed the suspect was
wearing a red undershirt and red and black shoes. Officers located Harrison,

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who fit this description, approximately one hour after the robbery. He had
little time to drastically alter his appearance or change his clothing. The
showup occurred that same night. Conducting the showup at this time
facilitated an identification of the robbery suspect while the events were fresh
in the cashier’s mind. (Carlos M., supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 387.)
More importantly, nothing in the record reflects the officers, “at the
threshold, improperly suggest[ed] something to the witness” — that they
“wittingly or unwittingly, initiate[d] an unduly suggestive procedure.”
(People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 413.) The cashier was kept separate
from other witnesses during the showup to prevent communication that
could influence their respective identifications. (People v. Sequeira (1981)
126 Cal.App.3d 1, 16 [identification procedure eminently fair where, among
other things, witnesses were separated and were precluded from talking with
each other].) There is no evidence the officers made any express or implied
suggestions to the cashier encouraging him to identify Harrison as the
robbery suspect. (Carlos M., supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 386.) To the
contrary, the officer admonished the cashier that Harrison’s presence in
police custody should not influence his judgment or lead to the conclusion
he in fact committed the crime. This mitigated any suggestibility of the
identification procedure. (People v. Johnson, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 323
[pretrial identification not impermissibly suggestive where officers did not
indicate they had apprehended the suspect or would be showing the witness
the suspect]; see also Garcia, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1360–1361 [no
due process violation where police admonished the victims to not infer guilt
from the fact the individuals were detained].) That the officers presented
only Harrison during the in-field showup does not render it unduly
suggestive, contrary to Harrison’s assertions. By definition, an in-field

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showup “is generally an informal confrontation involving only the police, the
victim and the suspect.” (People v. Dampier (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 709, 713.)
And critically, being detained by police is “not so unduly suggestive as to
taint the identification.” (Carlos M., at p. 386 [handcuffing a detained
suspect not unduly suggestive].)
In sum, the in-field showup was not unduly suggestive. Thus, it is
unnecessary to address Harrison’s arguments attacking the reliability of the
cashier’s identification under the totality of the circumstances. (People v.
Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 412.) We also reject Harrison’s challenge to
the cashier’s in-court identification, which was premised on his contention
the in-field showup was improperly conducted. (Cf. People v. Ybarra (2008)
166 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1082.) The failure to challenge this evidence did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408 — a habeas corpus proceeding
concluding counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate or
challenge identification procedures employed by police — does not compel a
different result. (Id. at p. 430.) There, the court identified several aspects of
the identification process that tended to be highly and unnecessarily
suggestive of guilt. (Ibid.) Among other things, officers repeatedly referred
to the defendant as the murderer, and defendant was presented in a single
person showup a few feet from the witnesses while other suspects were
presented in four- to six-person lineups several yards in front of the
witnesses. (Id. at pp. 430–431.) Despite this, the defendant’s counsel made
no effort to exclude identification testimony either before or during trial.
(Id. at p. 431.) Counsel testified he did not believe there was anything wrong
with the identification procedures, and in any event, he believed the police
would likely testify there was nothing wrong with the procedures — or they

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would perjure themselves if there was. (Id. at p. 432.) The court deemed this
explanation unacceptable to justify counsel’s failure to preserve problems
regarding the identification for the jury. (Id. at p. 433.)
Here, Harrison raises his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on
direct appeal, not in a habeas corpus proceeding. (People v. Lopez, supra,
42 Cal.4th at p. 972 [“except in those rare instances where there is no
conceivable tactical purpose for counsel’s actions, claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel should be raised on habeas corpus, not on direct
appeal”].) Harrison’s counsel was not asked for a reason and did not provide
one for failing to suppress the in-field showup. (People v. Mai, supra, 57
Cal.4th at p. 1009.) And as set forth above, there is a satisfactory
explanation for this omission — on this record, there has been no showing the
motion would have succeeded. (People v. Taylor, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at
p. 726.) Unlike Hall, the in-field showup here did not have any of these
markers of undue suggestiveness. Moreover, Harrison’s counsel did try to
exclude the identifications during trial — he objected to all three in-court
identifications. Harrison’s counsel was not ineffective for not doing more.
Second, we reject Harrison’s argument that his counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to seek the suppression of the second
employee’s in-court identification of him. During the preliminary hearing,
counsel objected to the cashier’s in-court identification. He argued the
witness described the robber as wearing a ski mask covered by a hooded
sweatshirt, with no further description. But he noted there was only one
person who appeared to be a criminal defendant — Harrison, who was seated
at defense counsel’s table — thus the identification was improper and overly
suggestive. The trial court overruled the objection and noted Harrison’s
counsel could cross-examine the witness about those issues. Hence, it was

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reasonable for counsel to believe a pretrial motion to suppress further in-
court identifications would have been futile, even if properly filed and
litigated. (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122 [“Counsel is not
ineffective for failing to make frivolous or futile motions”].)
To the extent Harrison argues his counsel was required to demand
a pretrial lineup before the second employee could make an in-court
identification, we disagree. An in-court identification that is not preceded by
a pretrial identification lineup is not impermissibly suggestive as a matter of
law. (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1155.) Indeed, “there is no
absolute right to a pretrial lineup before an in-court identification.” (Id. at
p. 1155.) Instead, a defendant may “upon timely request . . . , be afforded
a pretrial lineup” if “eyewitness identification is shown to be a material issue
and there exists a reasonable likelihood of a mistaken identification which
a lineup would tend to resolve.” (Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d
617, 625, 627, italics added, fn. omitted [issuing a writ noting trial court has
discretion to order holding a lineup].) But the lack of a pretrial lineup does
not necessarily deprive the defendant of the opportunity to test a witness’s
“ability to make an identification in a nonsuggestive atmosphere.”
(Rodrigues, at p. 1155.) For “ ‘in-court identifications not preceded by
a lineup,’ ” the “ ‘weaknesses, if any, are directly apparent at the trial itself
and can be argued to the court and jury without the necessity of depending on
an attempt to picture a past lineup by words alone.’ ” (Ibid.)
Harrison’s counsel could have made a tactical decision that it would be
more harmful than helpful to the case to request a pretrial lineup. For
example, if a lineup did occur and the second employee positively identified
Harrison as the masked robber, the testimony would have been more

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persuasive at trial. By not requesting a pretrial lineup, counsel could have
been attempting to forestall a legitimate identification in court.
Moreover, as Harrison acknowledges, his counsel focused extensively
on trying to discredit the employee’s identification of Harrison as the robber
at trial. He cross-examined the second employee on the reliability of her in-
court identification, pointing out that she described the suspect as a Black
male, and Harrison was the only young, Black male in the courtroom. During
closing arguments, counsel argued the employee’s in-court identification was
unreliable because she had viewed Harrison before testifying — she
previously saw him sitting in the courtroom, and he was clearly the person
being prosecuted for robbery. He further drew the jury’s attention to the fact
Harrison is Black and the second employee is not, further undermining the
reliability of the in-court identification. (E.g., People v. McDonald (1984)
37 Cal.3d 351, 368 [“many jurors are likely to have some awareness of the
fact that an eyewitness is more accurate in identifying a person of his own
race than one of another race”], overruled on other grounds by People v.
Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896.) If counsel made a tactical decision to press
these attacks during trial instead of moving to suppress evidence or request
a pretrial lineup, we cannot say any such decision was unreasonable. On this
record, there is no basis to conclude counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Thus, Harrison fails to demonstrate
his counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
TUCHER, P. J.

_________________________
PETROU, J.

A168439; P. v. Harrison

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