People v. Martinez CA2/1

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Filed 8/28/24 P. v. Martinez CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B331023

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA477963)
v.

ALEXANDER MARTINEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
A jury convicted defendant and appellant Alexander
Martinez of one count of mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203)1 for
attacking and permanently injuring a man in retaliation for an
earlier fight. Martinez contends the trial court abused its
discretion by imposing the upper term of eight years in prison,
and by imposing a five-year enhancement for a prior serious
felony conviction (see § 667, subd. (a)(1)) rather than exercising
its authority under section 1385 to strike or dismiss the
enhancement. We find no error and affirm.2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
During the morning of May 13, 2019, two women in East
Los Angeles reported to police that a homeless man, later
identified as James Hester, had been harassing and grabbing
them as they were walking on the street. A witness testified that
she saw Hester following the two women until Martinez arrived,
got out of his car, and began fighting with Hester, apparently
trying to defend the two women. Hester put Martinez in a
headlock and threw him to the ground. Martinez suffered a
bump on his head and was bleeding from his ears and nose. After
the fight, he drove away before the police arrived.

1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory
references are to the Penal Code.
2 Martinez also requests that we review the trial court’s
conduct of an in camera hearing under Pitchess v. Superior Court
(1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 to determine if the court improperly
withheld any documents relating to police misconduct. We have
done so and have not found any error in the trial court’s conduct
of the hearing.

2
About two hours later, Martinez attacked Hester at a
nearby bus stop. Surveillance cameras showed Hester standing
at the bus stop when a car approached and stopped nearby.
Martinez exited the car and met up with a second, unidentified
man. Martinez and the second man ran up to Hester from behind
and attacked him. Martinez punched Hester in the back of the
head, causing him to fall and hit his head on the concrete.
Martinez kicked or stomped on Hester’s chest, and the second
man also kicked Hester. Both Martinez and the second man then
fled.
Hester sustained serious injuries in the attack and had
difficulty breathing afterward. The temporal bone near his ear
was fractured, and part of the bone on the left side of his head
was removed to treat elevated intracranial pressure and allow
fluid to drain from his brain. Hester’s father testified that Hester
spent months in rehabilitation and had to relearn to feed himself,
walk, and talk. He then suffered a massive stroke or seizure,
undoing all his progress. At the time of the trial, more than three
years after the attack, Hester’s right arm and leg were paralyzed,
and he remained unable to speak.
The prosecution charged Martinez with one count of
attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and one count of
aggravated mayhem (§ 205), and alleged that he had suffered one
prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and one prior
strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)). The
prosecution also alleged several aggravating factors regarding
the offenses and Martinez’s prior criminal history. A jury
acquitted Martinez of attempted murder but convicted him of
mayhem (§ 203), a lesser-included offense of aggravated

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mayhem.3 Martinez admitted the prior convictions and chose to
submit the aggravating factors to trial by the court rather than
the jury.
Martinez moved that the court strike his prior serious
felony conviction for purposes of sentencing pursuant to People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, and that it not
impose a five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision
(a)(1). The trial court declined to strike the five-year
enhancement, but granted the Romero motion and thus did not
double the base term of Martinez’s sentence, as otherwise would
have been required. (See §§ 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subd.
(c)(1).) The court found that the prosecution had proved five
alleged aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and
imposed the upper term of eight years for mayhem, resulting in a
total sentence of 13 years.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by
Imposing the High Term Sentence
Martinez contends the trial court abused its discretion by
imposing the high term sentence of eight years for mayhem. In
Martinez’s view, the upper term sentence resulted from the
court’s failure “to properly balance factors in mitigation” against
the aggravating factors the court found true. We are not
persuaded. Martinez has not shown that the trial court’s

3 Both mayhem statutes proscribe the infliction of a
permanent disability or disfigurement. Aggravated mayhem
differs from ordinary mayhem in that it additionally requires
that the defendant intentionally cause such a disability or
disfigurement. (People v. Park (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 61, 64.)

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“ ‘ “sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary” ’ ” (People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376), as is required to overturn a
court’s discretionary sentencing decision on appeal.
A trial court may not impose an upper term determinate
sentence unless “there are circumstances in aggravation of the
crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment
exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have
been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or
by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) Furthermore,
“unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances [such] that imposition of
the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the
court shall order imposition of the lower term” when any of
several specified mitigating factors was present and “was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense.” (Id., subd.
(b)(6).)
In the amended information, the prosecution alleged seven
factors in aggravation: that “[t]he crime involved great violence,
great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts
disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness”
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)); that “[t]he victim was
particularly vulnerable” (id., rule 4.421(a)(3)); that “[t]he
defendant induced others to participate in the commission of the
crime or occupied a position of leadership or dominance of other
participants in its commission” (id., rule 4.421(a)(4)); that “[t]he
manner in which the crime was carried out indicates planning,
sophistication, or professionalism” (id., rule 4.421(a)(8)); that
“[t]he defendant has served a prior term in prison or county jail
under section 1170[, subdivision] (h)” (id., rule 4.421(b)(3)); that

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Martinez showed a lack of remorse; and that he was a member of
a criminal street gang.4
After the jury returned its verdict on the substantive
offenses, Martinez requested a court trial on the aggravating
circumstances. The prosecutor dismissed the allegation that
Martinez was a gang member, and the court found not true the
allegation that the circumstances of the crime suggested
“planning, sophistication, or professionalism.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(a)(8).) The court found that the People had
proved the five remaining allegations of aggravating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Martinez does not
dispute that substantial evidence supports the court’s findings as
to these aggravating circumstances.
Martinez’s attorney filed a brief arguing that the court
should impose the middle or low term sentence in light of several
mitigating factors, including childhood trauma Martinez suffered,

4 These last two alleged factors are not aggravating
circumstances specifically mentioned in California Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(a) and (b), but the prosecution alleged they
were relevant under rule 4.421(c), which states that courts may
consider as aggravating circumstances “other factors statutorily
declared to be circumstances in aggravation or that reasonably
relate to the defendant or the circumstances under which the
crime was committed,” as well as rule 4.408(a), which states that
“[t]he listing of factors in these rules for making discretionary
sentencing decisions is not exhaustive and does not prohibit a
trial judge from using additional criteria reasonably related to
the decision being made.”

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as well as a learning disability.5 The trial court stated it was
“looking at the mitigating factors that [the attorney] did present
in his packet” and did “consider that,” but nevertheless found
that “the aggravating factors warrant the court giving the
defendant the high term.”
Martinez argues that the trial court “failed to properly
balance factors in mitigation,” resulting in an “irrational and
arbitrary” decision to impose the high term sentence. We
disagree. The trial court carefully reviewed the evidence of the
aggravating factors, noting that Martinez “coldcocked [Hester] in
the head” while he was facing the opposite direction, instantly
knocking him out, then stomped on him while he was down. In
addition, the court found that Martinez showed a lack of remorse
in a video recording of an interview with police after the incident
even when told that Hester might die of his injuries. Reasonable
minds might differ over the importance of Martinez’s prior
conviction, which occurred many years earlier, or of the
significance of his difficult childhood. But nothing in the court’s
decision suggests it failed to consider the proper factors, nor that
“its decision [was] so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable
person could agree with it,” as is required for a showing of abuse
of discretion. (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)

5 Because Martinez argued against the imposition of an
upper term sentence, we reject the People’s argument that
Martinez forfeited the argument on appeal. Martinez’s attorney
called attention to the mitigating factors at sentencing and
requested that the court impose the low or middle term. We see
no justification for requiring him to make a further objection
after the trial court rejected his arguments.

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B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by
Declining to Strike the Five-year Enhancement
The trial court imposed a five-year enhancement under
section 667, subdivision (a)(1) on the ground that Martinez had
suffered a prior serious felony conviction for a robbery he
committed in 2010. Martinez argues that the trial court abused
its discretion because it failed to apply the correct legal standard
in deciding to impose the enhancement. We disagree.
Section 1385 gives trial courts discretion to strike or
dismiss sentence enhancements “if it is in the furtherance of
justice to do so” (id., subd. (c)(1)), and provides direction to courts
in applying that discretion. In particular, the statute instructs
courts to “consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by
the defendant to prove that any of [several] mitigating
circumstances . . . are present. Proof of the presence of one or
more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing
the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public
safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.”6 (Id., subd. (c)(2).)
The statute lists nine potential mitigating factors, three of
which Martinez argues apply in this case: “The current offense is

6 The statute was amended to add the requirement to
consider these mitigating factors as a part of Senate Bill No. 81
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1) which became
effective January 1, 2022. (See People v. Anderson (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 233, 238, review granted April 19, 2023, S278786.)
Martinez’s sentencing hearing took place in 2023, when the new
law was in effect.

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connected to mental illness” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(D)); “[t]he
current offense is connected to prior victimization or childhood
trauma” (id., subd. (c)(2)(E)); and “[t]he enhancement is based on
a prior conviction that is over five years old” (id., subd. (c)(2)(H)).
Martinez argues the trial court erred by failing to “afford great
weight” (id., subd. (c)(2)) to these mitigating circumstances, and
by not making a finding as to whether “dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety” (ibid.).
The People argue Martinez forfeited his claim by failing to
call the trial court’s attention to these mitigating factors. We
disagree. Although Martinez’s attorney focused at the sentencing
hearing on other grounds7 for striking the enhancement, he filed
a motion in advance of the hearing in which he made the same
arguments for dismissing the enhancement that he does now. As
exhibits to the motion, Martinez included a psychologist’s
assessment and records regarding Martinez’s childhood. Further,
during the sentencing hearing, the court referred to the
mitigating materials that Martinez’s attorney submitted. This
was sufficient to preserve the argument on appeal.
Nevertheless, we disagree with Martinez’s claim that the
trial court abused its discretion by declining to strike the
enhancement. The trial court discussed its decision to impose the
enhancement only briefly, after explaining in detail its findings
on the aggravating and mitigating factors: “Now, with regard to
the [enhancement under section] 667 . . . , the court is going to
impose the five years, for a total of 13 years. The court
recognizes it has the discretion to strike that [enhancement], in

7 Martinez does not renew these arguments on appeal, and
we do not address them.

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unique circumstances, and also [on] a case-by-case basis;
however, in this situation, I don’t believe that it is warranted at
all. And the court is recognizing its discretion and its ability and
declining to exercise that.”
Absent evidence to the contrary, “we presume that the trial
court followed established law and thus properly exercised its
discretion in sentencing a criminal defendant.” (People v.
Weddington (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 468, 492.) Nothing in the
court’s statement regarding the enhancement overcomes that
presumption. Martinez is correct that the court did not discuss
whether “dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public
safety” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)), but that does not mean the court did
not consider the issue. “Error may not be presumed from a silent
record.” (People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1229.)
Furthermore, if Martinez believed the court failed to adequately
consider the question of his dangerousness or other relevant
parts of the statute, he could have called the court’s attention to
the oversight during the sentencing hearing. Having failed to do
so, he may not now complain that the court did not make more
robust findings on the record.
As noted above (see Discussion, part A, ante), the court did
address the mitigating factors when explaining its decision to
impose the high-term sentence. We infer the court considered
those factors as well when deciding not to strike the
enhancement. Furthermore, the presence of mitigating
circumstances does not require the court to dismiss an
enhancement. (People v. Walker (Aug. 15, 2024, S278309) ___
Cal.5th ___, ___ [2024 WL 3819098 at p. *6].) Instead, even if the
court concludes dismissal would not endanger public safety, it
still “must determine whether dismissal is in furtherance of

10
justice” by balancing the mitigating circumstances against any
“substantial, relevant, and credible evidence of aggravating
factors.” (Ibid.) The court in People v. Ortiz (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 1087 described this approach, in a formulation our
Supreme Court later endorsed, as “a holistic balancing with
special emphasis on the enumerated mitigating factors.” (Id. at
p. 1096, cited in People v. Walker, supra, at p. ___ [2024 WL
3819098 at p. *6].)
In this case, the trial court could have reasonably
concluded, in light of Martinez’s extreme and violent retaliation
in which he returned to assault Hester after a relatively minor
fight, that dismissing the five-year enhancement from his
sentence would indeed endanger public safety. Alternatively, if
the court did not believe dismissing the enhancement would
endanger public safety, the court reasonably could have found,
even after “afford[ing] great weight” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)) to the
mitigating factors, that they were insufficient to overcome the
numerous and substantial aggravating circumstances in the case,
such that imposition of the enhancement was warranted.
Because Martinez has not shown that the trial court’s decision to
impose the enhancement “was irrational or arbitrary” (People v.
Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 376), nor that the court applied
an incorrect legal standard, we affirm.

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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

KELLEY, J.*

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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