CourtListener 10098131•People v. Shaver CA3
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Filed 8/28/24 P. v. Shaver CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Tehama)
----
THE PEOPLE, C097986
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 22CR-002616)
v.
CHASE ANDREW SHAVER,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Chase Andrew Shaver pled guilty to three felonies and admitted a prior
strike conviction. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of seven years four
months in state prison, including the upper term doubled on his conviction for being a
felon in possession of a firearm and a consecutive term for unlawful possession of
ammunition. On appeal, Shaver contends the trial court violated the dual use prohibition
by relying on the same two aggravating circumstances to impose consecutive terms as
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well as the upper term. Shaver also contends the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing the upper term based on the circumstances presented. We shall affirm the
judgment.
BACKGROUND
In January 2023, Shaver pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm
(Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count I),1 unlawful possession of ammunition
(§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count II), and possession of a short-barreled shotgun (§ 33215;
count III). Shaver also admitted to a prior strike conviction. In exchange for his plea, the
People agreed not to pursue “dissuading-type charges” against Shaver and his family
members. This was an open plea, and the parties agreed the maximum term available
was seven years four months.
In its presentencing report, the Probation Department (the Department) noted that
“[g]iven [Shaver’s] youthful age, he has an extensive juvenile and adult criminal record.”
Shaver’s criminal history includes a sustained wardship petition for obstructing a public
officer in 2012, and another one for possessing a firearm at a public school in 2013. As
an adult, Shaver was convicted of selling marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd.
(a)) in 2015 and sentenced to three years in state prison. Concurrent to that term, Shaver
was sentenced to two years for first degree residential burglary. (§ 459.) Shaver was
convicted of a separate first degree residential burglary (§ 459) in 2015 and sentenced to
six years in state prison.
In 2021, Shaver was sentenced to another two years in state prison for recklessly
evading a peace officer. (Veh. Code, § 2800.2.) That conviction resulted in a parole
violation for which Shaver served a concurrent 180-day term in prison. Shaver was later
released on postrelease community supervision (PRCS) but violated that as well and was
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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committed to 90 days in jail. Despite his criminal history, however, the Department
recommended Shaver be placed on probation with orders to complete the Tehama County
Adult Felon Drug Court program as a condition of his probation.
At the sentencing hearing, the court admitted, without objection, exhibits offered
by the prosecution, including a certified “RAP sheet” for Shaver, and certified records of
Shaver’s prior convictions. At the hearing, the trial court denied Shaver’s motion to
dismiss the prior strike conviction, finding Shaver’s “multiple felony convictions have
shown that he has not stopped his criminal conduct; and although the first step may be his
desire and he may be completely sincere with that, the Court has to see something before
I can do anything about that. And at this point, I have not.” Shaver thus argued for the
low term, relying on his long-term substance abuse, which began when he was 14 years
old, and the trauma of losing a sibling at a young age.
The trial court was not persuaded by Shaver’s argument: “The Court has reviewed
the probation report, heard from counsel and reviewed the records also submitted by the
People, and the Court notes that pursuant to [section] 1203[, subdivision] (e)(4) [Shaver]
is ineligible, except in an unusual case, to be placed on probation.
“Probation is not appropriate in this case. He has numerous prior felonies as well
as violations of parole and PRCS. [Shaver’s] record is such that the aggravating factors
do outweigh those in mitigation, and [the court] will find that the aggravating factors do
outweigh those . . . .” Accordingly, the trial court sentenced Shaver to the upper term of
three years (doubled for the prior strike) on count I. On count II, the court imposed one-
third the middle term (eight months), doubled for the prior strike offense, and ordered the
term to be served consecutive to the term on count I. The court imposed a concurrent
term of three years (doubled for the prior strike) on count III, but ordered that term stayed
pursuant to section 654.
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No objections were made, Shaver waived the breakdown of fines and fees, and the
trial court awarded Shaver 120 days of custody credit. Shaver appealed without a
certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Shaver argues the trial court abused its discretion by selecting the
upper term in counts I and III, and by relying on the same aggravating factors in
imposing both a consecutive sentence, and to impose the upper term. We disagree.
A. Dual Use Prohibition
As an initial matter, Shaver claims the court improperly relied on the same two
aggravating factors to impose both a consecutive term and to impose the upper term:
Shaver’s numerous prior felonies (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)), and his poor
performance on parole and PRCS (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(5)). Shaver
contends the court could only rely on one of these aggravating factors to impose a
consecutive term and the other to impose the upper term. This claim is forfeited by
Shaver’s failure to raise it below. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353.)
B. Abuse of Discretion
Shaver relies on language in section 1170, subdivision (b) and case law, in arguing
that the trial court abused its discretion when sentencing him to the upper term. Notably,
Section 1170, subdivision (b) was amended in 2022 (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3) and
provides: “When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies
three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a
sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).”
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).) Subdivision (b)(2) provides: “The court may impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime
that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the
facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have
been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
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trial. . . .” Shaver’s challenge to the trial court’s sentence in this case is not with the latter
part of subdivision (b)(2), but with whether the circumstances in this case justified the
imposition of a sentence exceeding the middle term.
We review the trial court’s sentencing decision for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) “ ‘In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are
guided by two fundamental precepts. First, “ ‘[t]he burden is on the party attacking the
sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.
[Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to
achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a
particular sentence will not be set aside on review.’ ” [Citations.] Second, a “ ‘decision
will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. “An appellate
tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment
of the trial judge.” ’ ” [Citation.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial
court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it.’ ” (People v. Strother (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 563,
571, quoting People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377.)
At oral argument, Shaver relied on People v Falcon (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 911,
review granted September 13, 2023, S281242, disapproved in part in People v Lynch
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, in arguing that a trial court may not merely select an upper term
simply because it seems warranted and supported by aggravating circumstances, but
rather because section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) now “creates an express presumption
against the imposition of an upper term sentence” (Falcon, at p. 921), the aggravating
factors must overcome this presumption in order to permit the trial court to select the
upper term. As Falcon stated: “The presumption bears weight in this determination.”
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(Ibid.) A holding, Shaver contends, that was recently reiterated in our Supreme Court’s
decision in People v. Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th 730.2
Here the trial court imposed the upper term based on Shaver’s poor performance
on parole and PRCS, as well as his numerous prior felonies. The trial court noted it
considered counsel’s arguments, including defense arguments regarding his childhood
and drug addiction as mitigating factors. The court weighed these circumstances and, on
balance, determined those in aggravation were weightier; the court selected the upper
term accordingly. We may not substitute our judgment on how the circumstances should
be weighed for that of the trial court. (See People v. Strother, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at
p. 571.) As a result, Shaver has not met his burden of showing the trial court acted in an
arbitrary or irrational manner. We thus conclude the trial court acted within its discretion
in imposing the upper term.
C. Clerical Error
Shaver further contends the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the
judgment of the court. Specifically, Shaver notes the abstract does not correctly reflect
that the sentence on count III was imposed concurrently and stayed under section 654.
The People agree. Having reviewed the record on appeal, we also agree and shall order
the abstract of judgment corrected. (See People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89.)
2 Lynch largely dealt with the appropriate test for assessing prejudice in these types
of sentencing errors. (People v. Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 755.) Because we do not
find error, we find Lynch largely inapplicable to the issue before us.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The clerk of the trial court is directed to prepare a
corrected abstract of judgment stating the sentence on count III is concurrent to the
sentence imposed on counts I and II and stayed pursuant to section 654 and forward a
certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
/s/
EARL, P. J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, J.
/s/
WISEMAN, J.*
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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