People v. White CA2/1

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Filed 8/28/24 P. v. White CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B327885

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA133697)
v.

KEVIN WHITE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura Walton, Judge. Affirmed with directions.
James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________________
Kevin White, who is serving a long prison term, appeals the
denial of his petition to challenge those convictions pursuant to
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Penal Code section 1172.6. We affirm. White’s jury was not
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine
when it convicted him of attempted murder, and he is thus
ineligible for relief under the plain language of section 1172.6.
Additionally, the record of conviction establishes the jury did not
convict White under any theory of imputed malice. We also reject
White’s contention that the matter must be remanded for further
proceedings under section 1172.1 but agree that the abstract of
judgment must be corrected.
BACKGROUND
A. Trial
We take the facts underlying White’s conviction from our
prior opinion affirming the judgment (People v. White (Jan. 23,
2017, B263887, B266107) [nonpub. opn.]), using them for
purposes of context only. (See People v. Vance (2023) 94
Cal.App.5th 706, 713 [a factual summary in a prior appellate
opinion is inadmissible to establish whether a defendant is
eligible for resentencing relief].)
In 2014, White, a gang member, drove fellow gang member
Alvin Johnson to the neighborhood of a rival gang. After passing
a home where three people were gathered on a porch, White
stopped the car and reversed it to a position from which Johnson
fired 18 rounds from a firearm at the people on the porch. One
was seriously wounded.
At trial, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 104
(“Nothing that the attorneys say is evidence”); 400 (stating a

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Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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person may be guilty of a crime either by having “directly
committed the crime” or by aiding and abetting a perpetrator who
directly committed the crime); 401 (defining the elements of
aiding and abetting liability); and 600 (stating attempted murder
liability requires that the defendant intended to kill a person).
The jury was not instructed on the theory of natural and
probable consequences, aiding and abetting, nor on any other
theory of imputed malice.
The jury convicted White of shooting at an inhabited
dwelling and three counts of premeditated, deliberate, and willful
attempted murder, and found gang and firearm allegations to be
true.
The court sentenced him to 96 years to life in prison,
including three consecutive sentences of 25 years to life for the
attempted murders and gang and firearm findings.
B. Resentencing Pursuant to Section 1172.6
In 2022, White petitioned the superior court for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. On December 13, 2022,
the trial court found he had established a prima facie case for
relief and conducted an evidentiary hearing.
At the hearing, the court indicated that it had asked the
prosecution to offer White a reduced sentence, and the
prosecution did in fact offer to agree to a reduction of White’s
sentence to two consecutive 15-to-life terms. White countered
with an offer to accept reduction to a determinate sentence of 33
years, which the People rejected. The trial court informed White
that several post-conviction factors weighed in his favor such that

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he would be well advised to accept the People’s offer and
anticipate early parole, but he refused.
The trial court denied White’s petition on the ground he
was ineligible for relief because the evidence presented at trial
established he was a direct aider and abettor who acted willfully
and deliberately.
The court stated, “The problem that Mr. White has in this
case . . . is that he was the driver. It is absolutely impossible to
commit a drive-by shooting without a driver. . . . It is possible
that the driver may not have known the intent of the shooter,
even in a drive-by shooting. However, under these facts, it is
difficult for me to come to that conclusion. . . . As the evidence in
reading the transcripts, Mr. White drives the car. He backs up
the car to a position where the shooter has an opportunity to
shoot directly upon the car. The shooter rolls down his window
and speaks—and knowing that both defendants are gang
members. The shooter rolls down the window and speaks before
he shoots at the victim. And he says, ‘What’s up Blood,’ while
rolling down the window, which is an indication to Mr. White, if
he didn’t know what was about to occur, that is a direct
indication that he knew a shooting was going to occur. He backs
up the car. He positions it. . . . And then Mr. White, as the
driver, sits there and allows his co-defendant to shoot off 18
rounds . . . . And it is interesting that it comes out that this all
went down on the defendant’s hood day, a celebration of their
gang, that these events went down. That makes him a major
participant. That makes his—based on this, I can’t second-guess
the jury—that he shared the intent of the shooter when you drive
up, back up, put the shooter in a position, the shooter rolls down
the window, has an opportunity to say ‘what’s up Blood’ to the

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victims, and then you sat there and allowed him to shoot 18
times. . . . That is shared intent to kill. That is the classic
textbook, law school case of aiding and abetting . . . . And based
on those facts, you acted willfully and deliberately in the
attempted murders. . . . [B]ased on the facts that were presented,
I can’t second guess that. . . . So based on all of that, the court
finds that you are not entitled to re-sentencing, Mr. White.”
White appeals from this denial of his section 1172.6
petition.
C. Resentencing Pursuant to Section 1172.1
Three weeks later, on January 3, 2023, the court on the
People’s motion conducted resentencing proceedings pursuant to
section 1172.1, which allowed resentencing “at any time upon the
recommendation of the . . . district attorney . . . .” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(1).)
The district attorney recommended that the court strike all
firearm findings and resentence White to 30 years to life,
comprising two consecutive 15-years-to-life sentences for two
counts of attempted murder with gang findings, plus a concurrent
term of 15 years to life for the third attempted murder count and
gang finding, plus a stayed life sentence for the conviction for
shooting at an inhabited dwelling.
White offered to accept a sentence of 21 or 22 years to life,
or of two concurrent 15-to-life terms, both of which the People
rejected.
The court resentenced White in accordance with the
People’s recommendation.
As part of the resentencing agreement, White waived his
“appeal rights and habeas petition rights pursuant to Assembly
Bill 333 regarding the [criminal street gang] allegation pursuant

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to [former] Penal Code section 1186.22 (b)(1)(C)(5).” He expressly
preserved his right to appeal the denial of his section 1172.6
petition.
DISCUSSION
A. White is Ineligible for Relief Under Section 1172.6
White contends he is eligible for resentencing relief under
section 1172.6. We disagree.
Section 1172.6 allows a defendant retroactively to seek
resentencing for certain homicide offenses in light of changes
enacted to the Penal Code. (People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th
1164, 1173.)
To qualify for relief, a petitioner must show, inter alia, “A
complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1), italics added.)
For a petitioner convicted of attempted murder, this
language affords relief only if the prosecution proceeded under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (People v. Coley
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 (Coley); accord, People v. Lovejoy
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860, 865.) Where the prosecution
proceeded under some other theory under which malice may be
imputed based solely on the petitioner’s participation in a crime,

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relief is available only if the petitioner was convicted of murder,
not attempted murder.
1. Section 1172.6 Does Not Apply to White’s
Convictions
Here, the parties confirmed to the resentencing court that
White’s jury was not instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine when it convicted him of attempted
murder. He is therefore ineligible for relief. (People v. Offley
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 599 [“if the jury did not receive an
instruction on the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
the jury could not have convicted the defendant on that basis,
and the petition should be summarily denied”].)
White argues that the legislative history of section 1172.6
supports giving it a broader construction that extends to
attempted murder convictions based on any theory which allowed
malice to be imputed to the defendant.
Whether section 1172.6 extends to White’s conviction is a
question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.
(People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694.) “ ‘[I]n construing a
statute, a court [must] ascertain the intent of the Legislature so
as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ [Citation.] In
determining that intent, we first examine the words of the
respective statutes: ‘If there is no ambiguity in the language of
the statute, “then the Legislature is presumed to have meant
what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.” ’ ”
(People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 151 (Coronado).) “If,
however, the terms of a statute provide no definitive answer,
then courts may resort to extrinsic sources, including the

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ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.”
(Ibid.)
Under its plain language, section 1172.6 affords relief only
to those convicted of murder, not attempted murder, if the
prosecution proceeded on a “theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1); Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
p. 548.) White was convicted only of attempted murder. He is
therefore ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.
Because the statutory language is clear, we may not
consult its legislative history to identify an alternative
construction. (Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 151.)
2. The Jury Did Not Convict on an Imputed
Malice Theory
Assuming arguendo, despite its plain language, section
1172.6 applies more broadly to attempted murder convictions
obtained under imputed malice theories other than the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, White still fails to
demonstrate any error. White contends that the prosecutor
argued to the jury that as the driver of the car, he necessarily had
to know the intended mission was to shoot the people on the
porch, which “constructively conflated” White’s intent to shoot at
an inhabited dwelling with Jackson’s murderous intent. White
contends this constitutes an imputed malice theory.
Assuming this argument presents a theory of imputed
malice, White fails to show the jury could have credited the
argument and imputed malice to him.
At trial, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 104,
which stated that “[n]othing that the attorneys say is evidence,”
No. 401, which stated that to be “guilty of a crime based on aiding

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and abetting that crime, the People must prove that . . . [¶] . . [¶]
. . . [t]he defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to commit
the crime . . . .” (italics added); and No. 600, which stated that
attempted murder liability requires that the defendant intended
to kill a person.
CALCRIM No. 401 further provided, “Someone aids and
abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful
purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact,
aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s
commission of that crime.” (Italics added.)
We presume a jury understands and follows the court’s
instructions, and “ ‘treat[s] the court’s instructions as a statement
of the law by a judge, and the prosecutor’s comments as words
spoken by an advocate . . . .’ ” (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th
101, 131.)
CALCRIM No. 401 leaves no room for a jury to impute an
aider and abettor’s malice as to one crime (murder) based on his
participation in a different crime (shooting at an inhabited
dwelling).
In the case of attempted murder, the perpetrator’s
“unlawful purpose” must be to kill someone. (See People v. Lee
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623 [attempted murder requires specific
intent to kill].) Under CALCRIM No. 401, combined with
CALCRIM No. 600, the jury could not have convicted White as an
aider and abettor without finding he knew his accomplice
intended to kill someone and intended to aid, facilitate, promote,
encourage, or instigate that killing—that is, that White also
intended to kill.
Nothing in the charges, the instructions, or the balance of
the trial permitted the jury to find White guilty on a theory other

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than direct aiding and abetting an attempted murder. And there
is no indication in the record to suggest, and White does not
contend, that the jury did not, in fact, follow the court’s
instructions. (See People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 734, 770
[where nothing in the record suggested that the jury did not
follow court’s instructions, presumption that the jury followed
instructions is not overcome].)
In short, White was not eligible for relief under section
1172.6 as a matter of law.
Given this holding, we need not reach White’s argument
that the trial court failed to act as an independent factfinder (by
stating it could “not second-guess the jury”) nor his implied
argument that the court’s ruling was unsupported by substantial
evidence.
We reject White’s argument that the court abrogated its
role as an independent factfinder when it stated it could not
“second-guess” the jury. The court stated, “based on this [i.e., the
trial evidence], I can’t second-guess the jury.” (Italics added.)
The court’s qualifier referencing the evidence indicated it was
acting as an independent factfinder.
B. The Section 1172.1 Proceedings Require No Remand
White contends that changes made to section 1172.1
effective January 2, 2024, “afford[] the court greater discretion in
fashioning a reduced sentence,” which requires remand for
further resentencing proceedings under that section. We
disagree.
1. Changes to Section 1172.1 After White’s
Resentencing Hearing
Prior to the January 3, 2023 section 1172.1 hearing, former
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) authorized the district attorney to

10
recommend to the superior court that the court recall a
previously imposed sentence and resentence the defendant. This
recommendation furnished the court with jurisdiction it
otherwise would not have to recall and resentence, and was “ ‘ “an
invitation to the court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction.” ’ ”
(People v. Braggs (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 809, 817 (Braggs).) At
that time the court had no jurisdiction to initiate a recall and
resentencing proceeding.
Effective January 1 and June 30, 2022, former section
1170, subdivision (d) was moved to new section 1170.03, then
renumbered to former section 1172.1. (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, §§ 1-
7; Braggs, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 818.)
As pertinent here, former section 1172.1 provided:
“The resentencing court may, in the interest of justice . . .
[¶] . . . Reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment by modifying
the sentence [or] [¶] . . . . Vacate the defendant’s conviction and
impose judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense or
lesser related offense . . . and then resentence the defendant to a
reduced term of imprisonment, with the concurrence of both the
defendant and the district attorney . . . .” (Former § 1172.1, subd.
(a)(3), italics added.)
Approximately one-year after White’s resentencing hearing,
Assembly Bill No. 600 (Stats. 2023, ch. 446, § 2) amended section
1172.1 to:
(1) Allow a trial court, on its own motion, to recall a
sentence and resentence a defendant when “applicable sentencing
laws at the time of the original sentencing are subsequently

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changed by new statutory authority or case law” (§ 1172.1, subd.
(a)(1));
(2) Allow a trial court to “[v]acate the defendant’s conviction
and impose judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense
or lesser related offense . . . with the concurrence of the defendant,
and then resentence the defendant to a reduced term of
imprisonment” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(3)(B)); and
(3) Require (rather than permit) a trial court to consider
specified postconviction factors in recalling a sentence and
resentencing the defendant (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(5)).
2. White has Either Fully or Partially Waived
Appeal on this Ground
a. White Waived any Appeal from the Court’s
Section 1172.1 Order
Preliminarily, we note that White never appealed from the
court’s ruling on the People’s section 1172.1 petition. On that
ground alone, his appeal is waived.
b. White Waived any Challenge to the Gang
Enhancement Portion of the 1172.1 Order
Even if White had appealed the court’s 1172.1 ruling, in the
court’s section 1172.1 proceedings, in which his sentence was
reduced from 96 to 30 years to life, largely due to modification of
the gang enhancements, he waived any right to appeal the gang
enhancement portion of the court’s order.
“In 2021, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 333
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333), known as the STEP
Forward Act of 2021. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 1.) Assembly Bill
333 amended Penal Code section 186.22 by imposing new
substantive requirements relating to gang enhancements and the

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criminal offense of gang participation. [Fn.] (Stats. 2021, ch.
699, § 4.).” (People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 7.)
In the section 1172.1 proceedings, White waived his “appeal
rights and habeas petition rights pursuant to Assembly Bill 333
regarding the [criminal street gang] allegation pursuant to
[former] Penal Code section 1186.22 (b)(1)(C)(5).”
Therefore, to the extent White appeals the trial court’s
ruling in the section 1172.1 proceedings, he waived any such
appeal as to the effect any changes in gang enhancements would
have on his sentence.
In sum, White either fully waived his right to appeal the
court’s section 1172.1 order (by appealing only from the section
1172.6 order) or waived his appeal insofar as the 1172.1 order
adjusted the gang enhancement portion of his sentence.
3. Remand is Not Appropriate
White’s appeal from the court’s section 1172.1 order fails on
its merits, as well.
White argues that remand is necessary to afford the trial
court an opportunity to exercise the enhanced resentencing
discretion provided in the 2024 amendments to section 1172.1.
We disagree.
First, proceedings under section 1172.1 are appropriate
only where “applicable sentencing laws at the time of the original
sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority
or case law.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) White identifies no change
in the sentencing laws that would permit a trial court on its own
motion to recall and further reduce his sentence.
Second, even if he did identify such a change, White does
not contend the court erred in any respect. He contends only that
the latest amendment to section 1172.1 conferred expanded

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discretion for the court to resentence him without “the
prosecution’s ratification of the sentencing,” and the court should
be given an opportunity to exercise this newfound discretion.
White misreads section 1172.1, which has always permitted
the trial court to reduce a sentence without the district attorney’s
concurrence.
Former section 1172.1 provided that the trial court could
either “[r]educe a defendant’s term of imprisonment by modifying
the sentence” or “[v]acate the defendant’s conviction and impose
judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser
related offense . . . and then resentence the defendant to a
reduced term of imprisonment, with the concurrence of both the
defendant and the district attorney.” (Former § 1172.1, subd.
(a)(3).)
Although the court’s discretion to vacate a conviction was
subject to the district attorney’s concurrence, its discretion to
reduce a sentence was not.
The 2024 amendment to section 1172.1 allowed a trial
court to “[v]acate the defendant’s conviction and impose judgment
on any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related
offense . . . with the concurrence of the defendant, and then
resentence the defendant to a reduced term of imprisonment.”
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(3)(B).) But this amendment expanded the
court’s discretion only to vacate a defendant’s conviction; it left
intact its unfettered discretion to reduce a sentence.
Thus, at the section 1172.1 proceedings on January 3, 2023,
the court already enjoyed the discretion to reduce White’s

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sentence beyond that to which the district attorney had agreed.
It elected not to do so. Remand is therefore unnecessary.
For these reasons, the court’s section 1172.1 order is
affirmed.
C. The Abstract of Judgment Must be Corrected
The trial court recalculated White’s presentence credits to
award 329 days of actual credit plus 49 days of conduct credits as
part of his original sentence, and then noted he had earned an
additional 2,806 days of actual credit since the original sentence.
White argues that the abstract of judgment does not reflect
those additional credits. Respondent concedes the point, and we
agree. Therefore, we will direct the court to correct the abstract.
(People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 188.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The trial court is directed to conform
the abstract of judgment to its ruling from the bench and forward
a copy of the corrected abstract to the CDCR.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

*
KELLEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. WEINGART, J.

*
Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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